Department I: Integration and Conflict
Director: Günther Schlee

Content:

1. Introduction

At the time of writing most of the component projects of this research programme are still in the data-collection phase, which means that no final results can be presented yet. This is therefore the wrong place to expect an elegantly constructed new theory of integration and conflict in its final shape.

Advances toward a new theory (or a refined version of old theories) of integration and conflict are, however, being made. The preliminary results of the individual projects allow for the identification of conceptual tools, which emerge in a plurality of settings. Recurrent patterns have been discovered which allow for tentative typologies of cases. Close analysis of regional cases and their comparison have led to first attempts at generalisation.

The order in which this report is presented follows the sequence of these cognitive steps. It starts with the individual projects and the regional clusters they form and then proceeds to the recurrent features of the preliminary findings, which offer themselves as dimensions of comparison and thus lead to more refined research questions.

The theoretical focus of this research programme is on processes of identification and differentiation, it is mainly on the outward signs of belonging and not belonging, on the surface through which we interact with others as social beings. This is not to deny the relevance of deeper and hidden aspects such as 'values' or latent 'functions'. It is simply to compensate for the lack of attention to the surface of things in the past. Social scientists and scholars in all the arts and humanities have always had a tendency to dig deep. We may not have been superficial enough where superficiality was required. We think that on the level of outward identification, i.e. people's claims to belong to one or the other group and their categorisations of others, insights can be made. In combination with other findings about 'values', 'beliefs', 'norms', and other motive forces such as material and immaterial costs and benefits (to individuals, to groups, and to individuals who identify with groups), we can throw a new light on the workings of integration and conflict.

What constitutes social identities, i.e. the question of who belongs to whom and why, is a basic question of social science and remains thus far without a satisfactory answer. Or it can be answered in too many alternative ways, which amounts to the same thing. To explain collective identifications through group interests, as is sometimes attempted, falls short of a solution since, as groups emerge, their changing composition may lead to changing perceptions of shared interests. Any attempt to manipulate identities according to perceptions of political or economic interests has to start from pre-existing identifications. The options of those who have an influence on the formation and change of social identities at any moment of time are limited by social givens. Identity politics is the interface of action and structure, it is where fluidity meets rigidity and either modifies it or breaks over it.

The substance of identity politics is the possible ways in which people can claim to be the same as other people or to be different from them. These are myriad. The scope of identification is one of them. Identifications can be wider or narrower. Conditions can be identified under which it is advantageous for individual or collective actors to define wider identities which they share with others, for example to strengthen their own group or to widen their alliances when they feel insecure, or to keep their own numbers small, when they do not wish to share their resources or when they feel strong enough to prevail against their neighbours alone in a conflict and do not want any allies who could claim a part of the loot. Successful identity politics requires means of inclusion and means of exclusion and the capacity to switch discourse from one to the other.

One way to move up and down in scope is to include wider or smaller units of the same kind, i.e. units defined by criteria belonging to the same category, such as linguistic criteria. Dialect differences, language, and language family all provide linguistic criteria of identification. Within this category the options range from stressing minimal dialectal differences to

underlining similarities between the languages of widely dispersed languages belonging to the same families as defined by linguists and postulating the relatedness of their speakers (Pan-Slavism, Turanianism, "Bantu Philosophy…").

Anthropologists discuss another form of belonging under the heading of descent. Descent reckoning can be of different kinds (different forms of linearity, non-unilinear systems, etc.) or of different degrees of inclusiveness within one particular type. Reference to real or putative remote ancestors normally implies the inclusion of more people within one's own group than operating with shallow genealogies. Assuming similar reproduction rates between the units compared, genealogical depth correlates with demographic strength.

Religion (or to use a less culture-bound term of possibly easier universal application: belief systems) is another such category. Religion, too, follows the segmentary principle. The primary identification can either be with a worldwide religious community or with a small sect or order. Similar considerations can be applied to all other subsystems of culture or complexes of symbols: they all provide materials which can be constructed as identity markers at various levels of inclusivity.

Biological givens come into play as well, most prominent among them pigmentation. Cultural definitions of skin colour categories vary widely. People who are perceived to be white in one context are black in another and vice versa. In the Sudan a rather elaborate system comprising intermediate categories such as yellow and red is at work. There are many ways to shift the line between "us" and "them".

Taking narrower or broader criteria of the same general category to alter the inclusiveness of the intended collective identification is one way to formulate identities of different scope. Another way to do this is by changing the category of criteria. If one wants to enlarge one's group definition, one's affiliation or system of alliances in a conceptual space in which religious commonality is perceived as more widespread than the shared linguistic features, one might change from a linguistic group definition to a religious one. People who want to stress a more particular identity might move the other way in such a setting; that is, one switches from one category of criteria to another such category.[1]

Yet another way to move up and down in scope is by connecting categorical distinctions by different operators: "and" or "or". To illustrate: there are more hot cakes and more sweet cakes than cakes that are both hot and sweet. In the same way "white", English speaking Protestants who only accept other weakly pigmented persons of the same language *and* creed as being of their own kind apply a more narrow type of identification than those in whom the presence of one *or* the other of these features already evokes a feeling of commonality.

[1] This is one of the ways in which Elwert (2002) uses the term switching.

Identities defined by different criteria typically do not replace each other but tend to co-exist, often in some sort of hierarchy, that is a changing or contested one. From a typology of forms of identification we can therefore move on to a typology of forms of co-existence of identities. If one visualises the categories of criteria by the dimensions of a graph, say by taking religious identifications as values along the y-axis and ethnic identifications as values along the x-axis, one will find some fields defined by given x and y values more populated than others. There are Christian Arabs and Muslim Arabs, but Buddhism rarely combines with an Arab identity, and so on.

Some ideologies postulate complete inclusion of identities defined by criteria belonging to one dimension into identities defined by criteria belonging to another dimension. Religious homogeneity can be postulated for ethnic or linguistic groups. Many Poles believe that to be a proper Pole one needs to be Catholic.[2] More typically, however, identities defined by criteria belonging to different dimensions cross-cut each other, as we can see with Christian and Muslim Arabs, Arab and non-Arab Christians etc. Even identities, which are depicted by their bearers as belonging to the same general category, can be found to crosscut each other.

Ethnic and clan identity both tend to be stated in a descent idiom. Nevertheless, the same clans have been found in different ethnic groups in a number of cases. Crosscutting identities have been primarily seen as binding forces: as crosscutting *ties*.[3] More recently they have been shown to be used in identity games of all sorts. In conflicts they have been found to have de-escalating effects in some cases and escalating ones in other cases, depending on factors, which require further exploration.

The many ways in which social identities can change historically or situationally should not mislead us into believing that identity is an easy game to play. There are factors which limit the possibility of changing identities at will for utilitarian or other reasons.

One such limitation is the requirement of plausibility. Identity claims need to make sense in terms of what people expect. Although "invention" has become extremely fashionable for titles of books on a wide variety of social science matters in recent decades, we insist that identities are not freely invented but social constructs. And like material constructions, i.e. buildings, the source of the metaphor, social constructs also tend to be made of local materials. Their historical justifications are in most cases not just faked but selective appropriations and positional interpretations of *real* events. They also require stability and consistency. Claims need to be consistent with earlier claims, ascriptions with earlier ascriptions. The

[2] Hann 1996, 1998
[3] Gluckman 1966

past crystallises into social structures with limited flexibility, which leaves an equally restricted room for agency.

There are also material forces at work: 'nation'-states impose their language ("a language is a dialect with an army") and their origin myths on those whom they claim as citizens. One's own potential to manipulate one's identity might be limited by ascriptions backed by powerful institutions.

All this should be kept in mind when we discuss below the myriad ways in which identities change. Structural constraints would otherwise be underemphasised.

2. Regional Aspects

The research projects implemented within the "Integration and Conflict" programme are distributed over a large area of the surface of the globe: specifically within the northwestern quarter of the Old World, comprising the northern part of sub-Saharan Africa and western Eurasia (Fig.1).

These projects are not scattered randomly across this wide area but are found in certain zones, thus forming regional clusters.

The first of these zones is the Sudanic belt, which stretches through the mostly semi-arid interior parts of Africa from the Niger to the Nile. The second zone is North-East Africa from Egypt to the Horn. Culturally, ecologically and linguistically, the Horn comprises the northern half of Kenya. The area along the Blue Nile, where some of the Institute's activities take place, forms a link between these two zones not only geographically, by belonging both to the Sudanic zone and to North-East Africa, but also in terms of the languages and populations under study there. The third regional cluster, if one can speak of a cluster comprising just two projects, is in Turkic speaking areas of Central Asia. The final regional cluster is in Europe where three projects deal with trans-national migrants. This brings the total number of clusters to four. The following list of researchers and their study areas is grouped by these clusters.

This list includes those of researchers affiliated with the Institute on a regular basis, e.g. as holders of doctoral and postdoctoral grants, holders of academic positions, or as long-term visitors. In many projects field research assistants from the groups under study, including academics with qualifications in disciplines other than anthropology and non-academics, are of great importance. Their names are numerous to be included in this brief overview. However, in other reports and publications their contributions are duly acknowledged; and indeed, in some, they figure as co-authors.

Fig. 1: Locations of the research projects of the Department "Integration and Conflict". The numbers correspond to those in the list.

Sudanic zone

1. Andrea Behrends: Wadai (Chad)
2. Andreas Dafinger: southern Burkina Faso
3. Youssouf Diallo: Mali, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast
4. Tilo Grätz: Atakora (Benin), Mali
5. Martine Guichard: Borgou (Benin), Adamaoua (Cameroon)
6. Michaela Pelican: Grasslands (Cameroon)
7. Stephen Reyna (visiting professor): Chad
8. Günther Schlee and Al-Amin Abu-Manga (visiting professor): Blue Nile area (Sudan)

North-East Africa

9. Christiane Falge (associated project sponsored by Cusanus-Werk) Gambella (Ethiopia)
10. Dereje Feyissa: Gambella (Ethiopia)
11. Georg Haneke: southern Ethiopia
12. Bettina Mann: Egypt
13. Andrea Nicolas: Oromia (Ethiopia)
14. Günther Schlee: northern Kenya, southern Oromia (Ethiopia)
15. Tadesse Wolde Gossa (from Prof. Hann's Department): south-western Ethiopia
16. John Wood (temporary): Marsabit (Kenya)

Central Asia

17. Peter Finke: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan
18. Meltem Sancak: Uzbekistan

Europe

19. Nina Glick Schiller: Foreigners in Germany and USA (associated project mainly externally financed)
20. Boris Nieswand: Ghanaians in Germany
21. Günther Schlee: Somali in Europe

What follows is a brief description of each of these projects by the individual researchers. The relationships between these projects and the dimensions of comparison they share as well as relationships of overlapping interests and cooperation beyond the confines of the Department will then be discussed further.

3. Themes of the Individual Projects

Sudanic zone

Refugees in Dar Masalit (Chad) – strategies of integration and dissociation

Andrea Behrends

Throughout its history, Dar Masalit (the "home of the Masalit") has been an African frontier area. In pre-colonial times it served as a buffer zone flanked by the empires of Dar Fur to the east and Ouaddaï to the west. It then became a point of contact between French and British colonial regimes in the late 19th century and, since 1912 the international border of Chad and Sudan runs through its western part. Today post-colonial national politics influences regional processes on each side of the border resulting, among other things, in continuous trans-national movements. This flow of people as labour-migrants, traders, and in particular as refugees to and from the national border is of central concern to this project.

Conflicts between Masalit farmers and formerly nomadic Arab herders have been frequent in this region since the late 1950s. In recent years there have been armed clashes on the Sudanese side of the border. As a result of these conflicts, over twenty thousand Masalit and Arab refugees have continuously crossed the border to Chad since 1997. Many of these refugees have been received by their respective relatives in Masalit and Arab villages. But some of them, in particular those who fled from more distant areas (up to fifty and more kilometres away from the border), have settled in separated sites close to existing villages, but not among the autochthonous population. In 1998 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began to assist in the region, initially with an "urgency programme" entitling refugees as well as the local population to receive food, soap and medical goods. By mid 2000 the UNCHR switched over to an "integration programme", which does not include the distribution of goods, but encourages instead the formation of farming cooperatives in order to make permanent settlement in the region an attractive option for the newcomers.

This project takes a threefold approach with the aim of defining integration/dissociation strategies and changes in identity patterns of different groups along the lines of ethnic and/or national identities: First, it investigates perceptions of self and other in the relations between the autochthonous Masalit and Arab settlers. Secondly, it observes different strategies of integration and dissociation applied by refugees, both Arabs and Masalit, from Sudan to Chad. Thirdly, it analyses generational differences that cross ethnic identity and belonging. Beginning from the assumption that ethnic and national identities are constructs based on certain historical, structural and collective givens, this project proposes to review exist-

ing theoretical literature on trans-national migration and frontiers, as well as identity formation in regard to refugee situations in order to develop a theoretical contribution based on its ethnographic findings.

The Savannah landscape in southern Burkina Faso. Access to resources is negotiated between herders and farmers and encoded in the spatial order. (Photo: A. Dafinger)

Social and Spatial Orders: farmer-herdsmen relations in south-east Burkina Faso
Andreas Dafinger

Change and reproduction of cultural identities in western Africa are strongly determined by a high degree of migration and mobility that occurs in this region. The integration of migrants or the stressing of ethnic differences are the two poles that shape (and constantly reshape) ethnic attributes, social norms, and strategies. This project will analyse the causes and consequences of identity formation processes among the farming Bisa and the pastoral FulBe populations in southern Burkina Faso. Although both groups are sedentary and have been living together in the region for as long as 200 years, questions of autochthony vs. allochthony and different patterns of mobility are a main topic of interethnic discourse, and are used to maintain group differences as well as to create fields of interaction. These include economic (exchange of cattle and food), as well as social and religious relations: a restrictive, although socially quite relevant system of intermarriage, personal friendship or the rendering of religious services.

The working hypothesis is that, while institutionalised relations tend to stress differences and ethnic separation, these interactions help at the same time to construct a common identity based on locality and the shared natural environment. This notion of a common local identity is mainly expressed in individual/personal relations across ethnic groups. Thus, a major aim of the project lies in describing and analysing the normative socio-political framework that provides the background for these individual relationships and how the two fields of public and semi-private social interaction are interrelated.

A key approach in the understanding of the processes of spatial and temporal separation and integration is the analysis of the social landscape: both principles - inclusion and exclusion - are encoded in the spatial order. Certain parts of the land, such as fields or pasture grounds, would be considered permanently or temporarily off-limits for the respective other group. Other places, such as markets or watering holes, are designed to generate encounters. Another major focus of the project is to determine the rules of how "physical" space is shared and divided sequentially, i.e. in time, and geographically, i.e. in space. Questions of cognitive representations of the environment, as well as differing concepts of land-rights and access to and control of resources are analysed in detail.

A second focus of research involves the comparison of a group's internal social and political organisation. Strategies of alliance making and networking differ greatly between the two groups and determine their mutual relations. Marriage preferences, for example, play an important role in reaffirming claims of autochthony among the farming Bisa on the one hand, while they keep up the ideal of a nomadic people among the FulBe on the other. Among the Bisa, clan-exogamy, together with the preference for marrying into neighbouring groups creates a stable regional network that ties its members to the land. The preference for lineage endogamy among the FulBe, ensures a lineage's autonomy and allows them to maintain major kinship-relations even in a situation of migration.

A third major topic of the project is concerned with the transition of these local inter-group relations within the modern nation state, its administrative institutions, and global connections. In the course of the ongoing land rights reform in Burkina Faso, e.g. local notions of landownership (including the rights to control and access resources) become formally legalised. This aggravates local struggles for political power and, at the same time, may represent a serious challenge to the democratisation processes as traditional chieftaincies regain importance in the national political landscape.

Pastoralism, Migration and Identity: the FulBe in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire

Youssouf Diallo

The tendency of people to continuously move for ritual, economic and political reasons is one of the most enduring characteristics of the history of the West African savannah. This project contributes to the study of the conditions and forms of the southward pastoral migration of FulBe to the sub-humid zones of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Two central topics, which this study investigates, are the nature of farmer-pastoralist interactions and the role of the state in these relations.

In the past, pastoral expansion led to the cultural assimilation of non-FulBe populations and their incorporation into FulBe state formations. But the migration of FulBe pastoralists and their specific adjustment to new contexts also resulted in a partial or total assimilation for some of them into village communities and earlier state organisations (Diallo 1997). Some FulBe shifted from cattle husbandry to agriculture and changed their ethnic identification after having adopted the culture, language and traditions of their hosts, while others mixed with local populations through intermarriage and gave rise to new "ethnic groups". As a mobile group, the FulBe have always had to adjust themselves to local conditions. Their southward migration, as a relatively recent phenomenon resulting in occupation of niches in "new" pastoral spaces, will be considered from this perspective.

In this new ecological context the FulBe pastoralists do not live in isolation from sedentary farmers with whom they have various institutional arrangements. Their gradual migration into the sub-humid regions and the subsequent spread of pastoral activities in these zones give them opportunities to develop cooperation with local farmers (Senufo, Komono, Lobi, etc.) who are more or less inclined to diversify their economy. Today, in the area of study, the practice of farmers entrusting their livestock to FulBe is common. The Bobo-Bwa or the Komono of Burkina and the Senufo of northern Côte d'Ivoire, who promoted the emergence of multi-ethnic settings, encourage FulBe herders, among other socio-professional groups (blacksmiths, weavers, traders, etc.), to settle among them. The Master of the Earth and host-stranger relations represent two key socio-cultural institutions by which most of the FulBe migrants are integrated in village communities.

In addition to peaceful coexistence and cooperation, the relations between FulBe pastoralists and farmers are sometimes characterised by tensions and violent interethnic conflicts. Crop damage and natural resource competition are the main reasons for conflict between the two groups of producers. Recent studies on farmer-herder relations provide ample evidence of such hostilities.

The southward migration of FulBe has a political dimension and generates a number of social problems. The FulBe presence in the north of Côte d'Ivoire, for example, is a matter of political interest and of controversy. During the decades from 1970 and 1990, the Ivorian state launched a number of livestock projects to increase national livestock production and to reduce the country's dependence on external markets. FulBe immigrants from the neighbouring countries (Burkina Faso, Mali) were offered pastoralist infrastructures, such as free veterinary care, and were encouraged to settle in special grazing areas in northern Côte d'Ivoire. Such outside intervention to promote pastoral production later heightened tensions between pastoralists and local farmers who considered the state intervention as favouritism towards FulBe strangers. The impact of national policy on both pastoral mobility and farmer-herder relations will be considered in light of these aspects.

Gold Mining, Migration, and Risk Management: problems of emergent multi-ethnic communities in West Africa
Tilo Grätz

This project addresses the social and cultural context of non-industrial gold mining in areas of immigration in contemporary West Africa. Two case studies, in Benin and Burkina Faso, have been formulated to make this analysis.

In recent years gold-digging activities have increased all over West Africa. The discovery of new (and often illegal) sites and the reopening of known, abandoned reserves of gold exploitation has led to new waves of labour migration, especially in the dry season. The migrants seek an additional income, and many of them are quite attracted by the sudden wealth of some gold-diggers. A variety of multi-ethnic communities have emerged, and in a short period of time small camps and villages have developed into bigger settlements. The gold rush attracts traders, bar owners, prostitutes as well as priests and healers to offer their services. Prices increase but newly offered goods expand the local market, creating new consumption opportunities.

The project deals with issues of interethnic relations and multiple hierarchical relations as well as conflicts related to the exploitation of gold reserves.

There are a variety of conflicts between immigrants and local settlers who are not always able to defend exclusive rights of exploitation. The domination of a certain group in a certain region is due to a specific local political arrangement, historicising constructions of autochthonity and the intervention of the state. Generally, the state of both countries, tries to end illegal gold mining and gold smuggling. After recognising, however, that deploying army or police forces was too costly and did not end

these activities, new policies were implemented, including partial legalisation and supervision of private activities. Gold mining and gold-trade today is part of an international system of economic exchange, dependent on changes on the world market and the activities of numerous intermediary gold traders. The project mainly addresses two aspects of this globalisation: the interethnic relations in these mining communities and the handling of risk by the migrants. 'Risk', in this context, refers to poverty and the probability of serious health damage and accidents. The management of these risks features very different strategies, including religious activities (prayers, charms, blessings) as well as particular modes of social organisation and solidarity.

Young gold miners working in mountain shaft, some 30m beneath the surface. The miners work in small teams under difficult conditions (near Kwatena, northern Benin).
(Photo: Tilo Grätz)

Finally, there are striking differences between different groups of miners that are due not only to different levels of experience and technical expertise but also to their degree of social cohesion. Thus, the emergence of a particular moral economy of (non-industrial) gold mining and its interethnic variations will be an important aspect of this research project.

Ethnicity and Integration: the FulBe of northern Benin and northern Cameroon and their neighbours
Martine Guichard

Ethnicity is often associated with conflicts. At the same time, it may become the basis for living together peacefully. The FulBe of northern Benin and their peasant neighbours, the Bariba, provide a good illustration of this point. Both groups communicate in many settings by accentuating cultural differences. This practice reveals the importance attributed to mutual exteriority and to ethnic boundaries in their interactions. Ethnic boundaries between these two groups are quite rigid and rarely crosscut. This relative impermeability is frequently corroborated by actors on purported grounds of very limited relations of exchange. But, in fact, this view is not confirmed by observation. Exchanges are numerous and organised in such a way that they contribute to the solidification of the precarious position of the FulBe by weakening the negative effects of their strong tendency towards the pursuit of "exit options".

One focus of the current project will be on the stabilising or integrative dimension of ethnicity. Material already collected in northern Benin will be compared with data found in the ethnographic literature dealing with various groups that place great emphasis on otherness when interacting.

A second focus will be on issues of identity dynamics among the FulBe, especially in northern Benin and northern Cameroon. In the latter region, two FulBe populations that have developed different local forms of collective identity can be found. These are the so-called "settled Fulani", or Huya; and members of a section of the FulBe which, in the literature, are reported to be a very mobile cattle-keeping group, and which is referred to as the Mbororo.

Kind of hut mostly built by the Mbororo for temporary habitation (Bindiba, northern Cameroon).
(Photo: M. Guichard)

In each of these groups "trans-FulBeisation" processes have been recorded, such as the assimilation of members of one FulBe sub-ethnic group into another FulBe subgroup. These processes occur simultaneously to processes of FulBeisation, the incorporation of non-FulBe into a FulBe subgroup, normally the Huya. Trans-FulBeisation processes affecting the Mbororo have increased in the course of last few years. Many of them are now engaged in adjusting their sub-ethnicity to the one displayed by the Huya, who occupied a hegemonic position in the past and who have a

reputation for the great porosity of their boundaries. Their sub-ethnicity has indeed a highly incorporative character, particularly with regard to non-FulBe. Significant numbers of these populations have been absorbed into the Huya category or are involved in a process of ethnic transition. Such changes in identity are said to be easy. Nevertheless, it takes two or three generations before total assimilation will be accomplished. Theoretically speaking, this is also valid for the Mbororo. Their "FulBeness" does not function as a prerequisite to a more rapid, complete and permanent transcending of the boundaries that separate them from the Huya. In practice, even those who began to adopt elements of the Huya sub-ethnicity about eight decades ago do not seem to be on the path ending up as Huya. Thus, there is no noticeable decline in the salience of the Mbororo category.

Several key factors appear to explain this situation. Some have been examined in previous research in which the present study is rooted. The range of criteria that play an important role in the persistence versus the attenuation of differentiations between Huya and Mbororo will be analysed further. They will be discussed in a wider perspective and with respect to their relevance to other locations. In this context, careful attention will be paid to variables such as politics, economy and religion (Islam).

A third focus of this project will be on complementary arrangements that exist between the FulBe of northern Benin and northern Cameroon and their neighbours. These arrangements are of great interest because they entail integrative aspects. This is also true for contrasting cognitive representations that involve a 'we/they' divide defined in ethnic terms (e.g. perceptions of space and magical and religious conceptions). These representations, too, have a pacifying potential. They tend to mitigate interethnic conflicts and inhibit the outbreak of violence. In this respect, they have similar functions in interethnic joking relationships and friendships. On many occasions the importance of friendship ties between FulBe and non-FulBe is minimised by the actors. Obviously, both groups privilege narratives according to which such ties are either non-existent or predatory and therefore undesirable. Interethnic friendships, however, are widespread and involve many exchanges. These exchanges, as well as the relationships in the name of which they occur, are often kept hidden from public view and knowledge. Their veiled dimension makes it difficult for outsiders, including anthropologists, to evaluate what occurs in interethnic friendships or to understand what kind of support they may give. This partly explains why most of the researchers studying the FulBe and their neighbours have failed for a long time to recognise the significance of these friendships. Another reason is that friendship has received little attention in anthropology. In this discipline non-Western societies are believed to be 'based' on kinship and to have limited space for friendship. This view will be critically assessed in the last part of this project.

Ethnic Conflict and Integration: the Mbororo and their neighbouring communities in north-western Cameroon
Michaela Pelican

The Mbororo in Northwest Cameroon belong to the pastoral FulBe. They moved into and started settling the area under research in the early 20th century. Today they form a part of the cultural heritage of the North West Province and are officially recognised by the Cameroonian government, as well as by the majority of the Grassfields population.

In view of the ethnic, historical, political and socio-economic variety and complexity of the area, two research sites, namely Misaje and Bali-Nyonga, were chosen. The villages belong to the chiefdoms of the Nchaney and Chamba respectively and the majority of the population are small-scale farmers. The Mbororo communities situated in the vicinity of these villages belong to two different subgroups, the Aku and the Jafun. They differ considerably in their migration backgrounds and agro-pastoral practices. In both research areas the Hausa, a heterogeneous group of people comprising all Muslim migrants from Nigeria (except for the Mbororo), as well as local converts to Islam, form part of the ethnic setting.

The cattle market is an important forum for economic interaction and interethnic relations. Various actors of different ethnic and professional background are involved in these transactions. (Photo: M. Pelican)

The interplay of integration and conflict – the main theme of our programme – actually characterises interethnic relations in the research area. Since their arrival in the Grassfields, the relationship between the Mbororo and the neighbouring communities has been both advantageous and problematic. The competition over limited natural resources, influenced by historical, political, economic and demographic factors, as well as social, cultural and religious differences, has led to a system of mutual complementarity and, at the same time, to serious land disputes and various forms of inequality. In spite of the mediating efforts by the colonial and post-colonial governments, numerous conflicts remain unresolved and appear to have worsened in the national context of economic depression and the democratisation processes that started in the 1990s.

Interethnic interaction and communication – one of the main foci of this project – have to be analysed on two levels. First, public interaction and communication between Mbororo and members of neighbouring communities, including government officials, tend to follow a fixed model based on cultural and ethnic stereotypes. Be it a meeting called by the government authorities concerning cattle theft, the working relationship between employees of an ethnically heterogeneous NGO or the participation in a naming ceremony, each participant acts according to common patterns that do not foster mutual understanding, but rather reinforce differences and misconceptions. As long as these incidences of public interaction and communication deal with peaceful aspects of the cohabitation of the various ethnic groups, actors feel comfortable with their roles. But whenever problematic aspects such as farmer-grazer conflicts are concerned, arguments become circular and end in mutual accusations and in the deterioration of the precarious relationship.

Secondly, on a less formal level, interaction and communication between individual members of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds are much more relaxed and often accompanied by friendship. Actors make use of their multiple identities and crosscutting ties, refer to shared experiences (e.g. in school), stress religious links and converse in languages common to all of them. Cultural stereotypes are joked about and ridiculed and patterns of behaviour are even borrowed from other ethnic groups. A Hausa woman may tease her Mbororo neighbour who is married to a Hausa man because she is producing *gari* (maniok polenta) for sale, and has thereby become a *'kaado'* (Non-Mbororo). Young Mbororo husbands can be seen going to the nightclub with their native or Hausa girlfriends while their wives and children stay behind in their compounds in the bush.

Interethnic relations, like social relations in general, are based on contacts between individuals whose actions are shaped by their personal experiences as well as their social, cultural, religious, political and economic backgrounds. This research project focuses on gender and age-specific aspects of interaction and communication structures and on the

respective strategies used by the Mbororo and their neighbours. Some of the working questions arising from the field are:

- How do perceptions and conceptions of violent and non-violent behaviour differ in relation to inter- and intra-ethnic relations and how do individuals deal with them?
- Under which circumstances do interethnic friendships develop?
- How do conceptions of ethnicity and marriage affect interethnic partnerships?
- Which factors contribute to frequent religious conversion?

The methods used include participant observation, interviews, network analysis, archival and library research, as well as interactive approaches (e.g. social drama).

Power and the Regions in Chad
Stephen R. Reyna

This project formulates and applies theory pertinent to organised violence. There are three parts to the project. The first part constructs micro-level theory of the operation of structures within the individual that determine action. Such theory is concerned with neurohermeneutics. The second part of the project constructs macro-level theory of structures external to the individual that are based upon the coordination of action into practices and institutions. Such theory is concerned with force and power. The third part of the project utilises this theory to explain organised violence between approximately A.D. 1400 and the present. Emphasis is upon the increasing global nature of this violence. Specifically, the theory is applied to analyse power in Chad. Here a Muslim north has warred with a non-Muslim south for thirty years. At first glance this Thirty Year War appears to be one caused by religious animosities between different ethnic groups. More complete investigation places the war within the context of global political and economic struggles between advanced capitalist states and their opponents during the Cold War.

Ethnicity and Migration along the Blue Nile (Sudan)
Günther Schlee and Al-Amin Abu-Manga (visiting professor)

The Sudanese stretch of the Blue Nile valley is an area of immigration. Its southern half is suitable for rain fed agriculture, which is often combined with irrigated gardens along the riverbank. To the north rainfall decreases and the importance of irrigation grows. The largest irrigated farm on earth, the Gezira Scheme, extends from here all the way to the White Nile. There are other large schemes of gravity irrigation and many small

pump schemes. The Sudan has undergone a recent economic decline due to:

- the war in the South
- cleptocratic misadministration by a self-styled "Islamic" regime (some observers attach hope to recent changes), and
- international isolation (now relaxed since oil has been found).

Before this recent decline the core area of the Sudan, comprising the Blue Nile, was believed to have the potential to become the breadbasket of the whole Arab World.

Until the 1970s when airplanes took over from lorries, donkeys, and the walking stick, the area was on the overland route from West Africa to Mecca. Numerous pilgrims stayed here when they ran out of money on the way to the holy sites or settled along the Blue Nile on their way back from the *hajj.* Others did not come on a *hajj* but on a *hijra*, a religiously motivated flight modelled on the escape of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. Large parts of the nobility of 19th century West African jihadist states such as that of Hajj 'Umar Tall between the Senegal and the Niger and the Hausa-Fulani states of what was to become Northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon ended up here, withdrawing from the advance of French and British colonialism.

Interviewing Mbororo-FulBe in the Blue Nile area. (Photo: H. Schlee)

In this area today, one finds largely ethnically segregated hamlets and neighbourhoods of Kanuri speakers from Borno and Kanem on Lake Chad and of Hausa or Fulfulde speakers. One also finds mixed Hausa and Fulfulde speaking settlements. Tendencies to cluster along "tribal" lines can also be observed among the Arabs, many of whom came as traders from the north. Other immigrants to the area came as pastoral nomads, some to settle, others to continue their nomadic ways. Until as late as the 1950s there was an influx of Mbororo: cattle keeping FulBe nomads who are quite different from the urban FulBe or Fulani, as they are called in Nigeria. Arabs also moved as nomads into the region: cattle-keeping Kenaana and camel-keeping Rufa'a.

The area provides an ideal setting for the study of ethnicity. According to Fredrik Barth, ethnic identities are articulated at the boundaries to other such identities. With nearly everyone in this area being an immigrant or a descendant of immigrants, one finds many local representations of wide-spread ethnic groups in new regional arrangements and combinations: new boundary situations which, according to the currently most accepted theory of ethnicity (Barth 1969) should lead to new formulations of ethnicity. To study these processes, field research is carried out by Schlee in depth in a Kenaana Arab, a "Bornu" (Kanuri) , and a Ja'ali Arab neighbourhood in Barankawa village near Abu Na'ama, using participant observation, microcensus, the genealogical method, and the collection of oral traditions. The scattered Oromo migrants in and around Abu N'ama and the seasonally present Mbororo are also studied. On a larger scale, in an area stretching from Sennar to close to Damazin in the south, in cooperation with Abu-Manga, oral traditions and settlement histories are collected.

North-East Africa

Religious Identity and Conversion among Nuer in Ethiopia and the USA

Christiane Falge

The research project deals with the process of modernisation through conversion. Nuer Christianity is characterised by indigenisation in terms of an emerging local church. This is reflected in a high level of self-ordination, revivalist movements and the nearly complete absence of white missionaries. By appropriating Christianity a new cultural space has been created which has become a catalyst for social change. In fact, contemporary Nuer seem to be impatiently trying to catch up with modernity at a heightened pace. The major catalyst for this is Christianity, which is acquired and promoted by young educated leaders of a society, which traditionally lacked formal institutions of power and leadership. This study will describe the path of the Nuer towards vernacular modernity by focusing on local conversion from 'traditional belief' to Christianity.

As a result of a UN resettlement programme, which gives refugees 'entry tickets' to the Western world, many Nuer have managed to enter the USA where they form one of the newest groups of immigrants with a time depth of barely ten years. Some of the American Nuer who left Ethiopia in the late 80s have, since 1997, started visiting their home-areas. Many come to marry, but some are also coming in order to establish churches, which have accelerated what Sharon Hutchinson (forthcoming) calls 'segmentary Christianity'. Nuer on the Ethiopian side are

now confronted with 12 different religious denominations that seem to enforce clan-cleavages. The Nuer experience of Christianity is characterised by localisation and indifference towards outsiders. Recently, Nuer in the Sudan, Ethiopia and Australia have established a cultural revivalist movement. This movement's theology associates the late Nuer prophet Ngundeng with prophets of the world religions and started forming a 'Church'. By referring to Ngundeng as the only real God for the Nuer, the movement is criticising an imposed Christianity as manifested in a white God and 'imported' denominations from America. There seems to be a general anxiety toward cultural assimilation into outside groups.

All Nuer converts are seriously involved in a discussion over the application of Christianity. While some denominations are ultra-modernist, others try to integrate tradition, the culmination of which is the Ngundeng church. By looking at inter-generational differences this study will seek to understand the elders' place as the beneficiaries of tradition in a religious space that values modernity.

Nuer have developed multiple major identities between which switching is common: Sudanese Nuer (1 Million), Ethiopian Nuer (ca. 42,000), refugees in Ethiopia (ca. 20,000) or US American Nuer (ca. 9000). At the same time they are divided into different subgroups, with their own distinctive political, cultural and religious traits. A multi-sited ethnography is employed to analyse the dynamic interplay between Nuer subgroups and their sub-divisional as well as trans-national ties. Key questions are which identity is mobilised where and whether religious identity is a unifier among these subgroups or whether it further divides society. Hence, by focussing on the emergence of new religious identities in the Sudan, Ethiopia and the United States, the project will contribute to understanding the process of Nuer modernisation.

Ethnic Conflict and Integration: the case of Gambella, western Ethiopia

Dereje Feyissa

According to official classification, more than 80 socio-linguistic groups of various sizes live in Ethiopia. The relationships among these groups include histories of conflict, accommodation and integration. By the 1980s ethnic tension had led to the proliferation of ethnic liberation movements opposed to the rigidly centralised and militarist state. With the seizure of power by the ruling EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front), itself an ethnic coalition, in 1991 the Ethiopian state has been radically reorganised, going from a unitary to an ethnic federal structure. Gambella National Regional state is one of the nine ethnic states in the new federal arrangement. The new political establishment has intensely

affected inter-group relations, redressing old imbalances while creating new ones.

Kong Dieu: From Makot to Addis Ababa. Kong is the leader of the Nuer community who came from southern Sudan and settled in Mokat, Itang district, Gambella region in 1983. In 1998 their settlement became subject of public debate when they asked for a political recognition. This fuelled a conflict between Anywaa and Nuer in Itang district. Subsequently attempts were made to deport the Nuer settlers. Kong then went to Addis Ababa (the national parliament) to appeal for citizenship rights where he stayed for a year. This is a picture of Kong in Addis Ababa, March 2001, showing despair and impatience. (Photo: D. Feyissa)

Gambella is located in western Ethiopia along the Sudanese border. There are five ethnic groups living in Gambella. These are the Nuer (the majority of whom live in the Sudan, for numbers see above: Christiane Falge), Anywaa, Majanger, Komo and Oppo. There is also a sizeable settler community from the neighbouring highlands who do not form an ethnic group in their own perception but are seen as separate "racial" and cultural group by the five Nilotic groups.

The research examines modes of interaction among those groups living in the study area who form distinct social entities (not only linguistically and culturally, but also in terms of livelihood strategies), analyse factors and processes which generate ethnic conflict, and explore possibilities for peaceful coexistence. This will be particularly examined in terms of the resource equation, opportunity structure, modes of political participation and the impact of the civil war in southern Sudan.

More specific questions include: How do the various ethnic groups interact in access to resources? How do they manage internal variations to compete as groups? Who defines the "rules of the game", and what do

the alignment of forces look like? How do individuals manage their multiple identities and cross - cutting alliances? What is the nature of the inter-group boundaries and how are they maintained? What is the role of history in shaping inter-group relations? How do the modes of imagining local identities function, and who are the opinion makers, particularly in the situation of the diaspora?

The study also looks at the inter-play between state and society and examines the role of the state in interethnic conflicts as the main mediator and dispenser of resources. This entails an in-depth analysis of the current experiment in ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The fact will be emphasised, that Gambella region is a sort of experimental ground for a "mini-ethnic-state" in the new federal structure. How does it work? In this regard, the study will examine the new political edifice and the gap between the ideal and the actual and how it is affecting the local opportunity structure in terms of winners and losers.

The current debate on identity will be studied along various axes such as gender, age and regional/local variables. How do people experience being members of a certain group? Finally, the study aims at shedding some light on the demanding question of promotion of social justice. Of particular interest will be the nature and mode of economic interaction among the various groups. The prospect of integration will also be sought in the political sphere, especially in terms of the relevance and consequence of ethnicity as a predominant mode of political mobilisation vis-à-vis the current experiment of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.

The main method of research will be progressive contextualisation. In order to paint a dynamic picture of the problem, interethnic relations will be located both at the micro/local and macro/national and international arenas. This includes analysis of historical encounters among the groups under question; the resource equation and the local opportunity structure, and the political economy of power at the national level as well as the civil war in the neighbouring southern Sudan.

Identities in Ethiopia and the Struggle for the Nation State

Georg Haneke

The Horn of Africa has been destabilised by the recent conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia and by the many internal conflicts in countries such as Somalia or Ethiopia. Beside the war against Eritrea, another reason for the difficult situation in Ethiopia is the fact that the country is ruled by the Tigrean minority with consequences for all parts of the society, including repression, monopolisation tendencies on all levels and obstruction of access to financial and political power resources for most people in Ethiopia.

The project area was the Kenyan-Ethiopian Highway in southern Ethiopia. Such a road not only divides a country and its ethnic groups but also connects the centre, the cities and the periphery. This particular road is used as a communication line bringing central state decisions and developments to far away parts of the country but also as a trade and smuggling route connecting the hinterland of Somalia to the south-eastern regions of Ethiopia. An advantage of using a road as a unit of observation is that it allows the exploration of different ways of life: the crowded capital Addis Ababa as the trade and power centre of the country, from agricultural areas and rural towns to the nomadic societies of cattle and camel herders in the south, from western consumer attitudes to traditional ways of life. Besides being the lifeline of the south, the road is used for military purposes, namely to control the area and, depending on the political circumstances, as a route for refugees.

Although Ethiopia has dozens of different 'tribes' and languages, the vast majority belong to just four main groups: the Tigre (ca. 5% of the whole population), the Amhara (ca. 15%), the Somali (ca. 15%) and the Oromo (ca. 40-50%). Other than the Somali, who are struggling for a degree of autonomy approaching independence in the Ogaden, all other ethnic groups claim Addis Ababa as their capital. The Amhara, as the former rulers and the elite of the country, claim the political power with pan-Ethiopian ideals. Many of them mistrust both the Tigre and the Oromo, and are convinced that the Amhara are the only people who are able to rule the country in the long run, as they did under the emperors. The Tigre have ruled the country since the fall of the communist regime of Mengistu (1991). They confiscated most of the weapons of the army and started controlling the rest of the country. Today, in many parts of Ethiopia they are seen as occupiers because a coalition government of different liberation fronts failed soon after the fall of the Mengistu regime. Since taking over the government in Addis Ababa, the Tigreans have started to monopolise power in every sense. Media and all levels of administration were made to toe the line, circles close to the government monopolised the economy, the absence of human rights, repression and a permanent control by the secret service became conspicuous. The largest population are the Oromo. Although the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the military and political arm of the Oromo opposition movement, claim their own nation state, the struggle is not as strong or as successful as some of the leaders, especially those in exile, expected. The reasons for this are different levels of identity among the Oromo.

The Oromo do not seem to be as homogenous as some of the other peoples of Ethiopia might be. Although, according to many of my informants, some main criteria, such as a common language, a common history, a common system of social structure, a common consciousness of belonging to a discriminated group or common demarcations to others can be pointed out, a strong common Oromo identity does not seem to

exist. Identity markers are far stronger on micro levels such as on the family or sub-clan based daily life practices. For most people it is more important to get support from their brothers and sisters of their own family or other small units than to have a political idea of a 'Free Oromia'. On a meso-level, clans and sub-ethnicities are the most important base for any identity. The feeling of belonging to such a unit is much stronger than an uncertain belonging to the Oromo people. On the meso-level, life together with other ethnicities is organised and implies processes of negotiation, to gain access to resources for example. One proof that sub-ethnicity based identities are more important than the idea of being Oromo is the number of clashes between the former.

It is obvious that identity is multidimensional. In the case of Ethiopia the struggle for the nation state will continue in different but complicated ways, especially against a background where identities can shift easily, not only from smaller to larger units but also between other demarcations such as profession, religion, education, social status etc. The research will discuss and compare some different theoretical concepts of identity, ethnicity, nation and nationalism that can be observed in the context of struggling for the nation state in Ethiopia.

Food, Consumption and Social Identity in Urban Egypt (Cairo)
Bettina Mann

Cross-cultural studies show that food consumption is not only highly structured by culture but is also an expression of cultural and social boundaries. The consumption of food not only shapes individual identity – in terms of physical and symbolic self-formation – but sharing and incorporating food also implies the incorporation of the individual subject into a culinary system and a social group. Food and dietary rules reflect and symbolise social relations and can be a powerful means of inclusion in or exclusion from social groups. Gender, class, religion and nation are dimensions shaping the culinary field.

The project deals mainly with the food culture of middle-class families, based on fieldwork in different quarters of Greater Cairo. In the last decades, Egypt has undergone drastic political and economic change. The economic restructuring initiated by the Open-Door policy (infitah) was characterised by a shift from a centrally planned, highly subsidised welfare economy to a free market economy. This transformation implied not only an increasing

Goods on display. A supermarket in Cairo.
(Photo: B. Mann)

presence of commodities of the world market, but also remarkable changes in the Egyptian social topography. New standards of consumption are an expression of an altered lifestyle and increased market power. It is important to stress that whereas for the majority of the Egyptian people access to food becomes increasingly difficult, the new consumption possibilities - offered by market institutions and transmitted through media- provide parts of the middle-class with new options for their lifestyles and identity formation. Empirical results indicate that middle-class lifestyles are marked by an ongoing attempt at demarcation towards the lower strata of society, in the sense of creating distance from the poor 'Other'. However, one can hardly speak of one homogeneous middle class lifestyle. Rather, food consumption is a social arena in which competing identities are expressed and negotiated.

A second focus of the project is upon processes of building a national cuisine. National and international migration, tourism, an increasing market for culinary literature as well as a differentiated gastronomy are factors contributing to a nationally oriented landscape of culinary differences. The study tries to investigate (re) presentations of the Egyptian national cuisine using cookbooks, journals, newspapers, and observations in different branches of gastronomy.

Mediation on Demand: the institution of elders in Ada'a (central Ethiopia)
Andrea Nicolas

Under the misleading assumption that the geographical centre of a state would always dominate local culture, central Ethiopia has long been exempt from intensive anthropological research. Yet in this location, interesting non-state cultural phenomena can be observed. This includes the institution of mediation and settlement by Oromo and Amhara elders.

Special procedures and rituals can produce a reconciliation of conflicting parties, most of them families, who clash over insults, brawls, disputes about property, bride-abductions, or killings.

Four elders are waiting outside a father's compound, who's daughter was abducted for marriage by a young man. The elders try to reconcile the girl's family.
(Photo: A. Nicolas)

The prescriptive procedures differ in each of these cases and are adjusted according to the gravity and possible consequences of the particular case. The particular interest of this project is to document such regulations or models of acting and to show how and why elders apply them. In their form and language, the rituals and courses of action already contain the potential to appease. They are not as arbitrary as they might appear at a first glance. In serious cases of quarrel and bloodshed for instance, particular time intervals have to be maintained in the course of the continuing mediation activities by elders, thus leaving time for the quarrelling parties to calm down. Also, the procedure stipulates that not the perpetrator's side, but a third party – the group of elders – contact the injured's family and enter into negotiations with its representatives. This reduces the likelihood of acts of revenge and of immediate face-to-face confrontation of persons directly involved in the conflict. Certain formal speeches, promises and confessions of guilt by the perpetrating side's elders may induce the other side to yield to the request for reconciliation. A whole spectrum of communicative strategies is used in order to restore peace, since, despite their respected role in society, success of the elders' endeavours cannot be taken for granted. The aim of mediation is not primarily to punish guilty persons but to reconcile the aggrieved families or groups. In serious cases that have led to ostracism, this would mean the reintegration of the perpetrator and his relatives into local society.

This research project about the institution of elders in Ada'a involves a one-year phase of fieldwork in Ethiopia. In addition to the analysis of the already quite extensive interview material, a collection of case studies and their photographic or video documentation during participant observation in the course of the year will serve as the ethnographic base for a comprehensive study of processes and procedures of mediation.

In spite of its regional focus, the project provides theoretical and comparative perspectives for social anthropology. Not only are elders a fundamental part of local social organisation, but there is also evidence in Ada'a that members of the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups have developed a common institution of elders that crosses ethnic borders. This is noteworthy, since in the discourse of ethnic identity politics these group borders are often conceived of as rigid and essential. Historical processes in Ada'a and the wider area of Shewa, however, have led to the emergence not only of shared institutions for both ethnic groups, but also to a composite system of laws applicable to their members. It seems worthwhile therefore, to explore how in the course of time, apparent "enemy groups" are capable of constructing institutions such as the elders' mediation that serve the explicit aim of integration and conflict settlement.

Islam and Ethnicity in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia
Günther Schlee

In the Horn of Africa politico-military units, i.e. those who fight together against other units of this kind, tend to speak the same language. This is a combination of features which is often referred to as 'ethnic': groups which act together and are linguistically distinct may be called 'ethnic' groups. In colonial times they were perceived as "tribes" by the colonials. These 'ethnic' or 'tribal' units show a degree of fluidity. One of the factors which shape present day ethnic identities, Oromoisation, i.e. the adoption of Oromo speech and the adjustment to Boran-Oromo political patterns, might not predate the sixteenth century as far as the area which now is northern Kenya is concerned. Another factor, Islamisation, has had high tides and ebbs over the centuries which continue presently. Both play a role in ethnogenesis and are used as distinctive features on the ethnic level: the most conspicuous difference between the Gabra and the Rendille is that the former speak Oromo and the latter do not, the most salient feature which distinguishes the speakers of other Somali and Somali-like dialects from the Rendille is that they are Muslims and the Rendille typically are not. Patrilineal clanship is a more conservative principle and ethnic groups, being of relatively recent origin, can in many cases be shown to be composed of the same old clans. Northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia are largely composed of the same ethnic groups. Interethnic relationships therefore have to be studied in this area as a whole. What Oromo and Somali do to each other in Ethiopia affects their relationship within Kenya, not to mention cross-border relationships.

Ethnicity has in recent years become increasingly politicised on the national level both in Ethiopia and in Kenya. In Ethiopia a constitution, which even concedes the right to secede to ethnic groups, and a regional order, based on component states that are ethnically based have been introduced since 1991. In Kenya, ethnic territoriality has evolved without any legal basis but apparently with backing from the very centre of power, through expulsions and massacres. This has exacerbated ethnic conflict because more than ever before is at stake in them. This leads, in combination with the spread of automatic weapons to faster escalations and higher levels of mortality than in past conflicts in this area.

The author has conducted research in this area since 1974. Much material about recent conflicts has been collected together with Abdullahi Shongolo. The Max Planck Institute offers the opportunity to put the patterns of conflict which emerge in this mosaic of peoples into the comparative perspective of a much wider mosaic of peoples.

Interethnic Relations, Property and the State in South-West Ethiopia
Tadesse, Wolde Gossa (from Prof. Hann's Department)

This project deals with an ethnically highly diverse area of southwest Ethiopia which is characterised by a high incidence of interethnic violence, especially between pastoralist groups. Interethnic relations are complicated rather than eased by the state as an intervening factor. Interethnic relations are also based upon institutions that promote integration. These include ritual cooperation, formalised friendships and trade routes which are protected by traditional norms. These aspects of conflict, integration, and collective identities, as well as its location, link this project to other work in this Department.

Another focus of the project is property relations and its primary affiliation is with the Department II . A fuller description can be found there.

Roads to Nowhere: imagining modernity in the form of heavy equipment (the Gabra, the State, and the Multinationals)
John C. Wood

This project grows out of a long-standing interest in how the Gabra, a camel-herding people in northern Kenya, manage multiple discordant identities, and the implications of these "combined" identities for persons and the groups with which they are associated.

So far, this research has focused largely on gender, specifically on an institution in which Gabra men are said to become women. The change of course is not complete: these men who are women are still men. The combination, in fact, is key; the two identities reshape each other, producing a whole that is somehow greater than its parts.

Out of this interest in gender have grown related interests in combined ethnic identities (Gabra who are also Rendille) and combinatory "stances" in the world: Gabra who are at once tied to tradition, or *ada*, and at the same time active participants in non-Gabra institutions, such as national or regional politics and market economies.

Indeed, the question of how people make a shift in worldview from one that sees the past as template for the present to one that sees an imagined future as the appropriate template has come to the foreground. How do people make these changes? How do they juggle them together? In this project, the process of answering these questions is initiated by studying Gabra understandings of a singular event in recent history.

In the late 1980s, multinational petroleum interests explored for oil in the northern deserts of Kenya. No one seems to know whether they found any. It is all a big secret of course. But the episode, both sudden and brief, must have been like a visitation from another planet for the

Gabra. The geologists and engineers landed with huge earth-moving equipment, air-conditioned trailers, barbecue pits for steaks and hamburgers, ice-cold drinks, mirrored sunglasses, helicopters and planes, radios and telephones, and lots and lots of money. Then, over the course of several months, they set about clearing absolutely straight roads to nowhere through the desert rubble. The roads were used in making accurate seismic measurements to construct images of the deep underground. They also drilled several exploratory wells. Then, as suddenly as they arrived, they left; and, just as suddenly, the flow of money they were paying labourers dried up.

Earlier fieldwork has shown that the event lingers, as you would expect, in people's memories and imaginations. Some, lucky enough to have gotten jobs, invested their income in livestock and became relatively wealthy. Others became drunks. Most seem to have ignored the whole enterprise as best they could. A number have not known quite what to do with themselves, having touched the metallic substance of modernity and the external world. Lately, Gabra have begun to explain certain misfortunes, particularly a number of deaths by cancer, to something that the explorers did to the land or left behind in it.

It is intended, in addition to finding out as much as possible about what the oil companies say they did, to collect an assortment of Gabra narratives and other discourses about the episode and what has happened since. It will be examined what these discourses reveal about how the episode shaped or reshaped Gabra understandings of themselves, what happened to them, and their relationship with the world beyond. Following the ideas of Bakhtin, Fabian, and Taussig on dialogic memory, meaning construction, modernity, and mimesis and alterity, it will be explored how Gabra have re-contextualised this bold and extraordinary visitation, which came suddenly with little or no warning, and then vanished, but apparently not completely.

Central Asia

Ethnic Identity and Differentiation Among Turkic-Speaking Groups in Central Asia

Peter Finke

Ethnic identity and interethnic relations in former Soviet Central Asia seem something of a puzzle. Instead of expected clashes between the former colonised Turkic- and Iranian-speaking Muslims and the former Russian colonisers, conflicts have mainly arisen between different indigenous ethnic groups. Furthermore, it was not the gaining of independence, as is still the common view in the west, which gave rise to these conflicts, since most of them occurred in the last years of Soviet rule and have

eased since its breakdown. In order to understand the origins of integration and conflict in post-Soviet Central Asia this research project investigates the patterns of identity building and mutual differentiation among a number of Turkic-speaking groups.

Three topics will be considered in this project. The first concerns ethnogenetic processes and trans-ethnic connections. The coming into being of what we today refer to as the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Uygurs is closely interwoven; although the actual processes underlying their similarities and differences are largely unclear. It is assumed that Turkic groups, once differentiated in a former period, intermingled again later. In addition, Iranian and Mongolian groups also took part in this formation processes. Early clan names of heterogeneous origin are still to be found among different Turkic groups indicating their interrelated ethnogenesis. Trans-ethnic identification and interaction among these clans have not been documented but may nevertheless exist. Other reasons for trans-ethnic identities may include affiliation to Sufi brotherhoods or former party membership.

A second topic will be contemporary patterns of interaction between the mentioned groups, all of which are Sunni Muslims. Seemingly, the main contradiction is between former pastoralists, i.e. the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz, with a strong Mongolian influence, and the sedentary Uzbeks and Uygurs, who are closer to the Iranian world. For ecological reasons, the interaction between these two types of societies seldom had the form of "patch-work" living - as is typical in many parts of the Middle East - but rather had nomads and sedentary people being regionally separated. For this reason, interaction takes place mainly in transitional areas or because of recent migration as, for example, in the case of the Uygurs in southeastern Kazakhstan.

The third point of investigation will be that of internal integrity versus differentiation. Internal integration in pastoralist society is maintained through clan segmentation. Its meaning and dangers for the process of nation building are currently heavily disputed in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Among both Uzbeks and Uygurs internal differentiation has traditionally been organised according to regional origin, i.e. Bukharaliq, Ferganaliq, Kashgarliq etc. No concept of common identity seems to have existed until the early 20th century at which time both groups were artificially created as nations from above. It would be one challenge to study to what degree this has been a successful policy, or whether regional identities still play a

A Kyrgyz yurt restaurant in front of the Soviet architectural heritage. Is it the renewed meaning of national emblems or just a decision of practicality? (Photo: P. Finke)

more important role. A second type of internal differentiation may be caused by the migration of parts of an ethnic group within Central Asia. A third type of differentiation may be encountered with subgroups not fully absorbed into the major ethnic group to this day, as seems to be the case with the Kypchak-Uzbeks, the Taranchi or the Muslim Kalmyks in Kyrgyzstan.

Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Central Asia

Meltem Sancak

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the independence of the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) raised expectations of political, economic and social conflict in this region. The focus of attention has been given to possible tensions among the different ethnic groups in these new independent republics. All Central Asian States are aware of their multi-ethnic structure, therefore to imagine that each republic consists of just one ethnic group is nothing but utopian. (i.e. in 1989 the non-titular people constituted 60.1 per cent of the population in Kazakhstan, 47.6 in Kyrgyzstan).

Post-Soviet Central Asian republics are trying, in addition to economic and political transformations, to legitimise the creation of a nation-state, while at the same time governing their multi-ethnic population. With independence, members of the titular groups started to acquire a dominant and privileged status in different spheres, such as Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan. They are said to enjoy easier access to resources and better opportunities for upward social mobility. However, in order to understand the nature of daily interactions and conflicts in the region it is necessary to consider socio-economic, political, and historical factors. This is because conflict-generating factors, i.e. inequalities and disparities, do not necessarily follow ethnic lines.

Multi-ethnic communities are often associated with conflict. In this research project possible relationships between ethnicity and conflict will be the focus of study. The major objective will be to discover ways to compare conflict generating factors within the same, and between different, ethnic groups. Intra-ethnic variations and internal differentiations should be taken into account and analysed carefully for a better understanding of the interethnic relations and their construction.

Identity is not exclusively determined by belonging to a certain ethnic group. Locality, as well as other aspects, can be significant identity generating factors. Therefore the conditions under which identity is constructed and ethnic interaction (cooperation and conflict) takes place have to be considered carefully in order to understand the decision-making process of the individual. The research will also focus on concepts

such as ethnicity as property and how it is inherited against a background of intra- and interethnic relations.

An Uzbek guest room (mexmonxona). Large houses which can accommodate numerous guests are a central issue in Uzbek culture. In general, men and women gather separately in the presence of guests.
(Photo: M. Sancak)

Europe

Ghanaians in Germany
Boris Nieswand

Ghana has become one of the major countries of emigration from West Africa since the late 1960s. In the 1990s it was estimated that 10-20% of all Ghanaian citizens were living abroad, which would correspond to between 2 and 4 million people based on the current size of the Ghanaian population. The long-term flow of migration has strong but ambiguous effects. On the one hand especially qualified people, such as teachers, engineers, nurses and doctors have left the country, negatively influencing economic and other developments. On the other hand the remittances from, and the trade-relations with, Ghanaians abroad have become more and more important for the economic growth of Ghana and the wellbeing of many families.

The migrants and their everyday practices have a strong impact on the recent social and political situation of Ghana. New possibilities of telecommunication and fast and cheap air transport provide trans-national migrants with a global infrastructure. On the basis of these technical opportunities new economic, social and political relations are emerging between Ghanaians abroad and those in the homeland, which seems to provide a good case to study forms of an emerging trans-nationalism and the changes that are entailed by it.

Over 22,000 persons with Ghanaian passports, reside legally in Germany, which means that they form the largest group originating from Africa south of the Sahara among immigrants in this country. In Europe, Germany is second only to Great Britain in number of Ghanaians. It is an

open question, why and how so many Ghanaians came to a non-English speaking country with weak colonial ties to Ghana. In addition to the examination of trans-national connections, special interest will be paid to "local migrants' cultures" and their central institutions such as churches, afro-shops and alumni organisations.

Within the framework of the empirical research, which is conducted in both Germany and Ghana, the concept of 'social space' shall be used heuristically. Social spaces can be identified at two different but reflexively connected levels. Firstly social space can be considered as the space, in which interaction takes place and which is created by interaction. In a world connected by telephones, the Internet and airplanes social spaces become increasingly incongruent with physical space. Secondly, especially within diasporic discourses place may become primarily a matter of imagination. The home village and the home country are just as much objects of imagination as is Germany or the world.

Furthermore it is assumed that the dynamics of integration and disintegration of social units and space are one of the central theoretical problems in analysing migration processes. But integration has at least two different meanings that are relevant in this framework. Firstly, integration refers to the in/out-group processes, which create social cohesion and expectations of similarity and internal solidarity. The production of we-groups on a local level as well as the maintenance of social relations over long distances will be studied in the context of Ghanaian migrants in Germany. Secondly, integration refers to a basic order of shared codes and implicit assumptions that enable interaction. Implicit rules of interaction within 'trans-national social spaces' shall be a focus of examination.

It is well known in the social sciences that migration has catalytic effects on identity. The relation of identity and diaspora affects the sending country as well as the receiving country. Diasporic life seems to stimulate the construction of identities. The dynamic process of identification and constructing identity discourses – linked to the homeland on the one hand and to the adopted land on the other – opens up a complex field for scientific research.

Homeland Ties and the Incorporation of Foreigners, Halle, Germany and Manchester, USA
Nina Glick Schiller

This study investigates immigrant incorporation and homeland ties in two small cities that have seen themselves as culturally and racially homogenous and that are now facing an influx of immigrants, Halle, in Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany and Manchester, in New Hampshire, USA. The particular focus of interest is the institutional nexus that the city offers to newcomers and the ways in which these institutions serve to reinforce or

reconfigure the identities of persons who were born outside the territorial borders of the country in which they are settling or whose parents came from elsewhere. In the United States such persons are generally considered 'immigrants', while in Germany they are considered 'foreigners', whether or not the individuals themselves have an intention or a desire to settle permanently in their new home, and whatever complex set of political and economic motivations have caused them to leave home. In both settings, an institutional nexus and a legal set of rights and restrictions encompass such individuals and provide the context in which settlement occurs, personal networks are reconstituted, home ties are reinforced or abrogated, and identities are reconstructed. In both settings the local institutional nexus may connect newcomers not only to their new location of settlement but also to representatives of the state they left behind or to religious, political, cultural or economic organisations or networks of their homeland.

The research explores the following questions: (1) What kind of reception do newcomers and their children receive from the political, educational, economic and religious institutions of the city, including the local representatives of federal bureaucracies, the voluntary organisations pledged to provide services, the police and the media; (2) To what degree do newcomers try to become incorporated into the city, to what degree do they succeed in their incorporative efforts and how are their incorporative efforts facilitated, mediated or countered by their homeland ties; and (3) What kinds of identities do newcomers assume in the process of settlement and integration and the reconnection with family, region or nation left behind.

Pressing questions of both theory and public policy of the nation-state within a world restructured by globalisation are at the heart of this proposal. 'Globalisation' can be defined as the intensified integration of the world through systems of production, distribution, and communication. Logically, globalisation processes that bind together places, economies and people in common networks of communication might be expected to make both loyalty to nation and identification with a territorially based state passé. Instead, globalisation and the revitalisation of identities linked to locality seem to go hand in hand. In countries of immigrant settlement around the world immigrants and a vocal section of their children become well incorporated in their new land but also become long distance nationalists, committed to taking action on behalf of their homelands.

'Long distance nationalism' can be defined as a set of ideas about belonging that link together people living in various geographic locations and motivates or justifies their taking action in relationship to an ancestral territory and its government. While the fact that continuation of home ties and the growth of long distance nationalism among immigrants reinforces rather than contradicts contemporary processes of glob-

alisation has become apparent, there is little understanding of just why this is the case. It is clear that similar processes of identification have developed in countries with very different institutions, laws and histories of immigration such as the United States and Germany.

The preliminary research indicates that these seemingly different institutional frameworks contain within them similar processes of identification, differentiation and the constitution of alterity. However, to understand the extent and importance of this similarity it is important to compare the initial establishment of the nexus between newcomers and the institutions they find in their location of settlement. Yet, to date, almost all research on immigrant incorporation and homeland ties has been conducted in cities where immigrant institutions and homeland networks are well established. This research by examining the institutional nexus in smaller cities without recent histories of immigrant incorporation, is exploring systematically the relationship between the development of patterns of incorporation and the development of social fields and ideologies that link immigrants to their native land.

Somali Migrants in Europe
Günther Schlee

The Somali have the reputation of being a highly mobile and very enterprising people. The majority of them are pastoral nomads. If Somalia still existed, it would be the only country on earth with a nomadic majority (just over 50 percent). Possibly under the influence of these pastoral traditions but in different economic specialisations, Somali have spread all over east Africa and Yemen, in the service of British colonialism but also prior to and independently of it. Migration to Europe and North America started on a small scale in the form of students and other people looking for training opportunities, some of whom found employment and/or marriage partners and stayed in the target countries. Out-migration increased under the oppressive (in the north, genocidal) regime of Siad Barre and culminated after the collapse of Somalia in 1991. Apart from recent migrants, there are also old Somali communities in other African countries, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Migrants in Europe come from all these places, but permission to stay is often made conditional on plausible claims of coming from Somalia and having been affected by the civil war there.

The project was formulated while the author was still at Bielefeld University. It owes to Bielefeld links to globalisation theory and the sociology of knowledge. The early versions (1996, 1998) of it, were, in fact named "Globalisation from below: strategies and mental maps of African migrants in Europe" (www.eth.mpg.de/People/Schlee/Project01.pdf). In this framework a study of another group of African migrants, Ghanaians in

Germany, was also proposed. This component has now evolved into Boris Nieswand's doctoral dissertation project (above). Key factors underlying globalisation processes, such as diminishing transportation and telephone costs and new communication media, affect the lives of Somali migrants (highly educated and illiterate people alike) a great deal. In the field of knowledge one of the central questions is: What is Somali specific knowledge and what is migrant specific knowledge? Some skills and strategies might stem from Somali traditions while others might be adjustments to the diaspora situation and shared by migrants of other origins.

Within Somali communities, and by comparison to other groups, one can observe quite different patterns of integration, both internal and with the host societies. Pre-1991 migrants tend to differ from post-1991 ones. Clan politics and the divisions of Somalia are also reflected by the Somali disapora.

A key participant in this project is the wife of the author, who is a Kenyan Somali. Most of the networking is done through her and her linguistic and social skills are intensively used.

4. Dimensions of Comparison

Conflict versus Integration / Conflict as Integration

The theme of the research programme of Department I is "Integration and Conflict". Wherever groups of people who consider themselves to be different from one another enter into contact with one another, be it through migration, markets or media networks, the question arises as to how and within what fields of action they can and want to communicate and interact with one another. If these groups fit into overarching, systemic connections, one speaks of integration, whereas interaction that openly aims at damaging the opponent, whether violently or beneath the level of violence, is known as a conflict. In the conceptual pair "integration and conflict", "conflict" may be understood as the counterpart and opposite of "integration"; where integration fails, conflicts arise. From certain perspectives however, this contrast vanishes. If one sees how even in open warfare, opponents become similar in terms of their rhetoric and symbolism down to the details of their attire and threatening gestures, how they traverse the same degrees of escalation in reacting to one another and how they end in the same generalised barbarisms, then one recognises that conflicts too, are systems of communication into which one can be integrated. Opponents who have been in deadlock for a long time are finally only distinguished from one another in that they negate one another by having a plus or a minus: A negates B and B negates A. Through their warlike engagement with each other, the enemies have become integrated into the same system of symbols, they have become

culturally similar to each other. It goes without saying that this does not mean social or political integration. What they share are the forms and expressions of enmity and maybe the arms used to fight each other.

How similarities are developed through conflict can be shown in the case of Northern Ireland, where among Catholics and Protestants (not so different from each other initially if compared to levels of cultural variation found in Africa) similar forms of marches, parades, socialisation of young militants, and a similar form of iconography, e.g. murals, have evolved in response to each other. In the case of former Yugoslavia as well, violent ethno-nationalism has evolved in response to each other.

In the context of this research programme, processes of learning from the enemy, or becoming like the enemy (below and above the threshold of violence) have to be taken into account in the projects dealing with Ethiopia for example. Here the very process of defining oneself as an ethnic group and claiming special rights in a given area often appears to be triggered or even necessitated by one's neighbours doing the same. Open access to resources – agricultural, mineral, or political – only works if practiced by all users. If some actors start with "enclosure" (to remain in the imaginary of the commons), the others will be forced to do the same. Self-representations directed at a global audience (minority discourses, victimologies) may also be learned by ethnic or other political movements from each other (Falge and Feyissa working on Ethiopia/southern Sudan as well as Behrends and Reyna, working on Chad are likely to come across such phenomena as well).

Integration should not be confused with homogeneity. The above examples of enemies that have undergone assimilation to each other show that being similar does not necessarily mean being peaceful and cooperative with each other. On the other hand being different does not mean being at odds with one another. Difference can be a vehicle of integration. There are multi-ethnic communities that derive their potential for being a community from their heterogeneous character. A team leader among gold diggers in a camp in northern Benin told Tilo Grätz that he preferred to have migrants from anywhere in his team and did not include too many members of the local resident groups. The latter, if they became too strong, might claim a disproportional share of the gold with the argument that the land from which it came was theirs. While difference is often thought to cause conflict, in this case multiple differences, the fact that the elements to be integrated come from elsewhere, without a preponderance or domination of any single group and especially not by the groups which might have a claim to a special status as autochthonous, is the basis of peaceful integration on a rather egalitarian basis. The team leader who talked to Grätz seems to have classified people in the same way everyone else did in that region: he made the distinction between autochthonous and allochthonous and had several ethnic categories at his disposal, but he did not use these categories for discrimination or exclusion

but for composing a mixed team. He systematically cut across these categories.

While difference is commonly associated with conflict, it may also be conducive to integration, though a comprehensive theory explaining under which conditions difference leads to integration and under which conditions it leads to conflict remains to be developed. A start has been made: "*Integration durch Verschiedenheit*" (Integration through Difference) is the title of a recent volume edited by Horstmann and Schlee (2001).

In yet other cases, ethnic difference seems neither to be a vehicle of nor a major obstacle to societal integration. The part of central Shewa (Ethiopia) studied by Andrea Nicolas is populated by a bi-ethnic community of Oromo and Amhara. Since the Oromo expansion in the sixteenth century (which affected northern Kenya – Schlee - just as well as the far western reaches of Ethiopia, close to the area studied by Dereje Feyissa and Christiane Falge), Oromo have penetrated into Shewa, initially as pastoralists with their herds. At some point this situation might have resembled that which Martine Guichard and Michaela Pelican observe in Cameroon now and what Youssouf Diallo studies in contemporary northern Ivory Coast: interaction between immigrant pastoralists (in these later cases FulBe), and local peasants. The Oromo then gradually took to the plough, so that a bilingual peasant community of Oromo and Amhara developed. Shared institutions – such as elderhood and legal procedures – seem to date from an early period. Today there are multiple institutions that bridge the ethnic (or should one just say: linguistic) gap: funeral societies, church parishes, saving associations, work groups etc. Membership in any one of these is voluntary, though membership in at least one, or better several of them is obligatory, if one wants to avoid social and economic isolation. In terms of "identities" one can say that ethnic identity (which in earlier periods might here have had a realistic ring to it even more than today, because, after all, the Oromo came as warlike invaders from elsewhere and spoke a different language) is complemented or compensated by other identities or forms of membership: by religious criteria, locality, or participation in voluntary associations.

Such complementary links are also provided by the Peasant Associations which date from the Derg period (the socialist period 1974-1991) where a cross-ethnic membership has been maintained. Usufruct rights have been frozen and have even become hereditary. Although the area now belongs to the new federal state of Oromia, no Oromo from elsewhere can claim land rights to the detriment of Amhara on grounds of their ethnic affiliation. This forms a vivid contrast to Gambella in Western Ethiopia (Dereje Feyissa's research area) where land is claimed and people are evicted precisely on these ethnic grounds.

Types of Societies; the global and the local

Like processes of integration, conflicts can be studied all over the world. For practical reasons and in order to reinforce cohesion between individual projects, the researchers of this Department have chosen to focus on the north-western quadrant of the Old World. This area includes the northern half of Africa, mostly the sub-Saharan part of it, and the western half of Eurasia. Within this region, the individual projects form clusters: they are grouped within certain zones, as shown on the map, above. The focus of the research is clearly on agrarian societies and societies with a recent rural background. This is just what one would expect of anthropologists, although for some time the anthropological gaze has increasingly been directed at western societies as well. Industrial and post-industrial societies also play a role in this context. Two projects, those on African migrants in Europe, deal with entirely new phenomena. Through processes of globalisation, in particular related to falling transportation and communication costs, to single out just two important factors, the migration of Africans to industrialised countries, their activities there and their connections to one another, have taken on quite new forms. The research on immigrants into Germany from the east and southeast, carried out by Nina Glick Schiller, deals with industrial societies as well, and takes globalisation into account. Cheaper travel back and forth, and lower telephone charges give long distance migration a quite different and maybe less "final" or dramatic a character than even ten or twenty years ago.

The majority of the projects situated in rural settings, are also dealing with global forces. "Isolated cultures" were largely a fiction of some strains of early anthropological writing even then, and in the present world colonial, post-colonial, and global ideas of peoplehood, church and NGO links, international media and other forces from beyond the local cannot be ignored by anyone.

Dimensions of Identity: an illustrative case

The broad spectrum of recently begun individual projects raises the hope that they will provide ample possibilities for comparison. From this broad spectrum a single project will be described in the following in order to illustrate the questions addressed by the Department. Problem dimensions derived from this description will then be traced to other projects. The project in question is being undertaken by Dereje Feyissa, a PhD student from Ethiopia who is doing research in Gambella, at the westernmost tip of Ethiopia in the lowlands on the Sudanese border. Among smaller groups, the Nuer and Anywaa (Anuak), who are Nilotic people, inhabit both sides of the border here. Both live primarily by agro-

pastoralism, though the former are mainly pastoral while the latter live mainly by agriculture. For decades the region has been affected by the civil war in the Sudan. At times the south Sudanese SPLA (Sudanese People's Liberation Army) had their bases here. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has a strong presence here, as have many international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who are active in the refugee camps. This is the framework of local identity politics; i.e. the grid of conditions made up of advantages and disadvantages within which one adopts and bestows certain group definitions and evaluations on oneself and on others. Members of ethnic groups that straddle the Ethiopian-Sudanese border often enjoyed benefits if they managed to be counted as Sudanese. This meant that in the camps they were able to enjoy aid deliveries or were even included in the quota of people who were allowed to enter the USA as refugees. The real heroes of the local communities are those who have managed to do this and who return on visits. Dressed in smart suits, wearing ties and speaking with a broad American accent, they hold court in the best hotel in town. This continues to be the case even today.

In addition, since the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991, new forces have entered into the game. The new system, described as an "ethnocracy" and "Bantustan" policy by its opponents, has redrawn the administrative boundaries based on ethnic criteria. Now government positions are filled by members of those ethnic groups from which the regions derive their names or who are dominant in that region. Furthermore, local committees that are subject to proportional representation along ethnic lines have been created. The old Amharic elites have been forced to retreat. They have been replaced by some few Tigrean "advisors" of local politicians representing the new central powers in Addis Ababa. Under earlier Ethiopian regimes (socialist as well as imperial) the Nilotic peoples were marginalised. Given the new positions available, it has suddenly become worthwhile for them to be counted as Ethiopians, since one has to be not just Nuer or Anywaa but specifically Ethiopian Nuer or Ethiopian Anywaa in order to occupy these posts. There is particularly among the Nuer a high proportion of people who have come relatively recently from the Sudan, whether as refugees or by way of pastoral nomadic expansion, migrating upstream along the Baro, the Gilo and the Akobo rivers, following the pasture and the water. Consequently powerful exclusion strategies were invoked: the Anywaa styled themselves as the autochthonous population while the Nuer were guests from the Sudan. But even among the Nuer, certain clans denounced other clans as "Sudanese".

Besides ethnicity and nationality, religion became a further criterion for exclusion from group membership or inclusion into it. Ever since the Jesuits tried to convert the monophysitic Ethiopian Christians to Catholicism in the 16th Century, this was prohibited. Christian missions other

than the Ethiopian-Orthodox ones were only permitted in non-Christian areas on the margins. This policy resulted in a relatively high density of missionaries in these areas, the result being that today many Anywaa or Nuer are Protestant Christians, which, however, does not necessarily mean that they have relinquished their older beliefs. The ethnicisation of politics in Gambella has also brought with it a split in the Protestant Church, which is now divided into a western and an eastern church. The western branch stands for Nuer, the eastern for Anywaa.

Both "integration" and "conflict" are generally perceived as social problems or problems of policy. In practical life, we have integration policies, conflict resolution and other ways to handle both integration and conflict. If one attempts to analyse this pair of concepts and what they stand for scientifically, then a new concept quickly comes to the fore, namely "identity" and the complementary concept of "difference". Herein, and contrary to widespread popular understandings, identity is in no way connected to essential, inner or real values. Historical and situational factors influence who people as agents categorise as the same as themselves, i.e. as belonging to the same collective identity: and who they consider to be different, i.e. as belonging to a different collective identity. Likewise, the content attributed to an identity can change even if the collective of persons to whom this identity is ascribed remains more or less unchanged. In its self-presentation one and the same group can foreground religious features (to put it crudely: if religion happens to be "fashionable") or it can take recourse to linguistic characteristics and develop a language nationalism (e.g. if "ethnicity" is in fashion). Thus inclusion and exclusion are not to be described as a rigid model but rather in their historical and situational dynamics.

The Gambella case allows us to discuss the nature of the identities that are instrumentalised and inserted into current political debates. A large part of these identities contain references to some sort of descent. Thus we are dealing with smaller and bigger descent groups. The clans, who are in competition for pasture among the Nuer, are such descent groups, since the relations between them are discussed in the idiom of genealogical tradition, often with mythical overtones. The amount of 'reality' contained in these traditions and whether ideologies of descent are independent of neighbourhood, i.e. proximity in space, are questions much discussed in Nuer ethnography. The aspect of real or believed common descent cannot be omitted from the analysis.

In the same way, the ethnic groups composed of such clans, e.g. the Nuer and Anywaa, are descent groups. Thus we have descent groups nested within one another; several descent groups with a lesser degree of inclusivity are contained within groups with a greater degree of inclusivity. Actual processes of ethnogenesis may run across descent groups; if, for example, clans unite to form a political community and decide to be "brothers" rather than actually descending from a common ancestor. Yet

the resulting ethnic group nearly always describes itself as being of common descent.

The clan origin-myth is linked to a song that the leopardskin-chief sings, while accompanying himself on a gourd-rattle.
(Photo: G. Schlee)

There are various rules about what constitutes descent. The Anywaa and Nuer who are close neighbours differ considerably in their notions. The Anywaa emphasise "blood". For example, they consider it important that the patriline of the mother should also be Anywaa for somebody to claim to be fully Anywaa. By contrast, the Nuer adopt large numbers of captured children and even adults into the group. Any man who bears the characteristic tribal scars running horizontally across the forehead is Nuer, even if he was only kidnapped by the Nuer as an adult and initiated later. Nuer myths are populated by foundlings (to whom magical powers are occasionally ascribed) and their adoptive fathers.

According to the conviction of the Anywaa the Nuer adopt foreigners for better or worse. They also marry more women – of both Nuer and other origin – and have more children. They are expanding numerically in order to expand territorially (which they are then forced to do). The Anywaa are not the only ones to hold this view. As early as 1961 the American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins wrote an article in which he described the segmentary lineage system of the Nuer as an instrument of "predatory expansion". According to Sahlins, many Dinka were conquered and adopted into the ranks of the Nuer, where they in turn be-

came agents of violent spatial expansion. 'Drang nach Osten' ('push towards the east', a phrase given in German in his paper) is the way in which Sahlins (1961: 338) described this dynamic.

Dereje Feyissa is currently trying to find out by means of micro-censuses of hamlets, whether this stronger demographic growth that the Anywaa ascribe to the Nuer can be substantiated by numbers or whether it is a mere myth fed by xenophobia (similar to the "yellow peril" or the "flood of refugees" in Germany).

As we have seen, in addition to clans and ethnic groups, identifications with modern nation-states play a role in Gambella. They do so in a changing structure of rewards. Religious identifications are also significant, but are perhaps less determinant than in other places. Here the church structures seem primarily to mirror ethnic fragmentations by means of a different medium. In contrast, in other places, the drawing of new boundaries based on the narrowing of dogma and the rigidifying of religious practices runs across ethnic groups, clans and families. Thus the distributions of characteristics can duplicate and reinforce one another or can criss-cross one another. A typology of these forms of identification is a first important step towards the comparative examination of conflicts and their resolution or avoidance.

Overarching Themes: identities over time

Identities over time, or processes of identity change, can be put into a typology.

A basic distinction needs to be made between people changing their identity and identities changing. It is easy to become Nuer, and many Nuer are of recent Dinka or Anywaa ancestry. But ideals of Nuerhood or the distinctive features of being a Nuer have hardly changed in the process. The Nuer have assimilated others and the resulting mixture of people has not resulted in a mixture of cultures. Original culturally particulars were discarded in the process of becoming Nuer. Nuer identity was hardly altered by the admission of others. Of course, Nuer identity is not totally unaffected by time. Today, being a Nuer means something different from what being a Nuer meant at Evans-Pritchard's time, but these changes are due to politicisation, militarisation and global forces rather than the admixture of Dinka or Anywaa culture.

Assimilation is directed at one of the original forms, say B is assimilated to A. Homogenisation has a wider meaning: A, B, and C can develop into something which is intermediate between them or closer to one than the other. What these processes share is that in their course differences disappear.

Apart from disappearance of differences we have newly emerging ones: such as the rise of an educated elite in a largely illiterate environment or

class differentiation. There are, further, processes of deepening, widening or accentuating of existing differences, such as church affiliation, being largely congruent with clanship, becoming an additional marker of clan distinctions among the Nuer.

Alongside such processes of transformation of identities, we can find the reproduction of difference. In northeastern Africa there are areas in which small-scale identities with clear cultural markers have been preserved over long periods. Even where individuals can cross over from one of these units into another, the boundaries between these units tend to remain stable, i.e. continue to be delineated by the same markers (Barth 1969: 23). In spite of the processes of Nuer assimilation which have just mentioned, wide areas in north-eastern Africa are characterised by a small-scale mosaic of peoples which has remained stable over time as far as the approximate size of its units and the level of difference between them is concerned. These considerations have also played a role in the planning of a conference (see p.70).

The Sudanic zone of West Africa is a fragmentation belt. This climatically uniform zone, connected by routes of trade and pilgrimage stretching from the Senegal to the Nile, contains languages as different from each other as languages from anywhere on earth. Languages of three unrelated families (Afro-Asiatic, Nilo-Saharan, and Niger-Congo) are spoken in this region, and the level of differences between the branches of these families are in many cases much greater than those between the different branches of the Indo-European family. Hundreds of clearly distinct languages have survived in this area despite many cases of linguistic assimilation or of adoption of the language of a neighbouring group or a lingua franca.

Linguistic differences often correlate with different features in other domains of culture, with complex ethnic identities, and these in turn tend to be linked with different professional specialisations and status categories. In the research area of Youssouf Diallo, in the north of the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, social diversity is reproduced by the acceptance of new arrivals with special technical skills. The Senufo and the Bobo-Bwa farmers maintain an ethnic and ritual differentiation towards blacksmiths, griots, weavers and FulBe herdsmen.

All social identities are historically formed. They change over time and individual people or constituent groups can change their allegiance from one wider social entity to another. But change is not related arithmetically to time. Some identities change faster than others. In certain cases clans have been found to be more stable than ethnic groups, so that clearly distinct ethnic groups are made up of different combinations of fragments of the same old clans. In other cases ethnic labels remain constant but clans are subject to constant fission or fusion and change at an increased rate. A general theory which explains the speed of change of social identities remains to be developed. But what we can say about the

zone under study, is that there must be strong forces at work which reproduce difference and which maintain heterogeneity. In the period when most of Europe and much of South Asia has come to speak languages of just one language family, the words for 'brother', 'daughter' etc. being almost the same in English and Baluch, a mosaic of distantly related and totally unrelated languages has been maintained across the northern half of Africa. Some of the factors that may have led to this preservation of heterogeneity may be elucidated by an inquiry into the uses different people make of the differences between them.

Landrights, rights of access to other resources, professional specialisations and prerogatives might lead us to the material forces which reproduce differences and the interaction between groups defined as different in this context. We may find that difference may be an integrating force by combining mutually complementary elements into a major systemic context. (This will be the theme of another planned workshop discussed in the last section, p.69.)

The study of identities over time therefore has to examine a number of different types of change and the conditions for them as well as near-identical reproduction of identity/difference and the conditions for it.

We will continue with different categories of identities not defined by how they change but by what marks them. Such markers include reference to a state, a religion, or to putative descent.

"Nation", Citizenship, Residence Status

Identity games in which the acceptance by a "nation" state and the access to resources conditional on resident status (including recognised refugee status) or citizenship are at stake, are studied by a number of other projects. The theme of Nuer in America, which we have briefly touched in connection with Dereje Feyissa's project, will be covered more fully by Christiane Falge. The three projects dealing with different groups of migrants in Europe (Nieswand, Glick Schiller and Schlee) also study such games. In all these cases special emphasis has to be put on the role of the "diaspora" in politics and the economy in the countries and areas of origin. Being or not being a rightful citizen or resident of a country is also a problem faced by FulBe pastoralists in the Ivory Coast (Diallo) and Ethiopia (see below).

Religion

Religious affiliation can intertwine in a complex way with other identifications. The ethnic divide between Nuer and Anywaa in Gambella seems to be accentuated by church organisation rather than the emphasis on

different beliefs. Their originally shared church organisation has split into a western and an eastern branch along the ethnic divide between the two peoples. In other cases intensification of ritual practice, "rigidification"[4] of beliefs, and other forms of religious differentiation which involve much more than mere organisational labels, play a much larger role. The different FulBe sub-ethnicities in Cameroon (Guichard, Pelican) are set off against each other by different kinds and degrees of adoption of Islamic practices, especially those involving the female dress code and female spatial seclusion. These religious developments have important implications for the economic roles of ethnic and gender categories of people. The increasingly rigid application of Islamic rules prevents FulBe women from selling milk from house to house in non-FulBe neighbourhoods. FulBe women thus lose a source of independent income: beef production gains in importance in comparison to milk production and the proceeds from the sale of slaughtered animals remains in the hands of men. Such processes of change in religious identity, in this case rigidification of a formerly flexible form of adherence and practice, have to be studied in connection with new forms of articulation (integration by complementarity) of FulBe communities with the wider society, including both other FulBe and non-FulBe groups. Rather than remaining largely autonomous subsistence oriented milk producers, FulBe pastoralists become beef producers for urban markets. In southern Ethiopia, a Boran-Oromo identity has been contrasted in local discourse with Islam, which has been interpreted as part of Somali identity and a feature of the enemy (Schlee/Shongolo 1995). In Jimma, another Oromo area further to the northwest, the attribution is done inversely. Islam there is part of an Oromo identity in a non-Islamic environment (Popp 2001: 389).

Religious conversion can, in a Weberian perspective, deeply affect a person and provide him or her with new value orientations, with new ideas about the direction and meaning of life. On a larger scale the change in religious orientation towards certain varieties of Protestantism going back to the sixteenth century have been accompanied by new forms of economic ethics, the secularisation, first, of the criteria by which one ascertained to participate in God's grace, which became mundane criteria such as wealth, and later the secularisation of all possible spheres of life and new forms of rationality, short: the development of the "spirit" of capitalism, have been linked to religious change (Weber 1993 [1905]). In this type of theory – which, however, by no means can be read as religious determinism – religion has to a large extent the role of an independent variable. Religious facts are taken as given or explained by other

[4] I use the term rigidification (*Rigidisierung)* for the process of religious and customary beliefs and practices becoming more rigid. The development of new orthodoxies and ascetism in Protestant sects might serve as an example. In Islamic contexts I use *rigidification* to replace the misleading term *Islamisation,* which is inappropriate in many cases, especially with reference to societies that have been Muslim for a thousand years.

religious facts and are used to explain developments in the extra-religious domain.

The Comaroffs (1991, 1997) have studied conversion in a different setting, with a focus on a later period, and they have written their books, almost a century later than Weber, in a more explicitly constructivist and more "discourse" oriented fashion. They describe how one of the brands of Protestantism described by Weber was taken by missionaries from Britain to the Tswana on the South African frontier. In their theory it is more difficult to disentangle dependent and independent variables. It requires several substantial volumes to be laid down and defies reduction to formalised models. They describe a complex interplay of economic, political and religious forces in Britain, among the Tswana, and between the two. While the emergent Weberian Protestant capitalist can be said to have been affected by religious doctrines at the core of his (rarely her) personality, where they set an incessant drive into motion to organise his entire life in a methodical fashion and to tirelessly seek material gain, it is more difficult to discern from the writings of the Comaroffs what "really" happens to the Tswana in the process of conversion.

The Comaroffs speak of the development of "personhood" rather than of changes in personality. Personhood refers to participation in society as an independent individual and to the set of rights attributed to such an individual. Its diagnostic features are located on the level of discourse, often legal discourse. But the struggle of the mission was about recasting "Southern Tswana patterns of production and consumption, their dress and domestic appointments, their aesthetics and architecture, their bodies, minds, and mundane routines, their orientations towards money and the market. All of these things came together in the construction of the right-minded, right-bearing, propertied individual…" (1997: 61). And the Comaroffs leave no doubt that this construction resulted in structures and not just in constructs. The effects were real. Since 1913 "the European sense of private property had made deep inroads into [the wealthier, title-holding] segment of the [Tswana] population, as had the language of rights altogether. […] The modernist, right-bearing subject was not inscribed in landed possessions alone, however. S/he was invested in a *total* social persona." (1997: 383, 384)

The process the Comaroffs describe extends over a century, is clearly directional, and supported or otherwise shaped in a constant fashion by political and economic colonialism. In those areas of north-eastern Africa where colonialism was shorter or more remote and state intervention intermittent, short, brutal, predatory, and free of elaborate efforts of persuasion, no or fewer such deep changes are to be expected.

No deep changes of personality and no different forms of rationality, let alone different types of logic, have been discovered thus far by researchers in this Department. Reasoning, in Europe, Africa and Asia, among literate and illiterate people alike, seems not only to follow the same logical pro-

cedures but also to be determined in the vast majority of cases by similar rationales. People appear aware of advantages and disadvantages in terms of material life or prestige that are associated with different religious options. People who fail to rise as high as they expected in a new religious hierarchy after conversion might try another church or convert back to their old beliefs (Cases can be provided by Christiane Falge's research on mission churches among the Nuer). Others are perfectly happy with being Christians or Muslims in town while adhering to more localised forms of belief and ritual in their nomadic hamlets or in their villages.

There is, apart from the material and the political economy of conversion, a mental economy and there is complex interplay between spiritual gains and losses and gains and losses in other spheres. New religions, i.e. religions that are new in a certain region, often need to "buy" acceptance by concessions. The rights of daughters to inheritance granted by Islam may be ignored if in conflict with earlier more purely patrilineal modes of transmission. Or the local brew of beer may be declared to not really be an alcoholic beverage. More firmly established religions can afford to show a more rigid face.

For individual actors who opt for a rigidified version of a religion there is the following trade-off: spiritual gains may include the hope, or the certainty, to belong to the elect, pride may derived from higher standards of morality or the performance of more elaborate or arduous rituals; spiritual losses may include the fear of the consequences of the neglect or rejection of an earlier set of beliefs and rituals and – with a social twist – isolation from those who still adhere to these. In terms of identity politics rigidification can be an instrument of exclusion. Those not abiding by it can be excluded from a religious hierarchy or even from political power in the wider society. Examples for religious rigidification of elites abound in the history of the FulBe and the states they have founded.

In the context of religion, the present group of researchers thus focuses on religious identities as means of inclusion and exclusion, on social identities, "superficial" identities, so to say, we bear on the surface of our bodies in form of dress codes or ornaments, or those we communicate to others verbally or by ritual. These identities are bounded. One belongs to a religious group or not, one is inside or outside a defined category. This has been described as the "container model" of identity. There are, apart from these either/or models gradualist or centripetal concepts of identity. You can be closer to the core of a religious group by excelling at their standards of excellence, by subjecting yourself to stricter moralities or more bothersome and lengthy rituals. Such closeness to the core may enhance your chances of rising in the hierarchy of that group.

Descent, "Descent", and Locality

Descent is defined by cultural rules which sometimes coincide with biological givens and sometimes not. We have already mentioned that Nuer and Anywaa, have different ways to recruit people into their descent groups. The Nuer practice adoption on a large scale.

Of course adoption creates a relation of descent just as is the case in our own law. Other kin relations derive indirectly from it: If I make somebody my son, my sibling's child will be his cousin etc. Adoption shares with marriage the feature that a willing decision underlies it and the further feature that wider reaching relationships result from it that are not willing decisions. Adoption differs from marriage in that once established, it is not a contractual but rather a kinship relation. Marriage may lead to husband and wife obtaining shared relatives, i.e. their children, but the marriage itself is not perceived as a kind of kinship in most societies, nor by anthropologists (see book titles like "Kinship and Marriage"). Relationships established through adoption, are, however just that: kin relations. There exist broad variations in the domain of culturally specific formulations of the distinction between contractual and kinship relations. For the moment we should simply note that this distinction has little to do with the difference between biological and non-biological relationships. In many African societies the "real" father of children is the one who paid the bridewealth for the mother. "Thieves have no children" indicates that secret liaisons cannot result in fatherhood in any meaningful sense. Adoption generates fatherhood, conception does not. In Europe one sometimes encounters the terms "real" and "merely social" associated with these opposing values.

The problem of descent versus locality: what causes the existence of localised descent groups, whether descent is the idiom to express relationships which are primarily constituted by spatial proximity and frequency of interaction, or whether and to what extent groups recruited by descent tend to be co-residential, has been much discussed throughout Africa. As a result of the present research, new evidence is provided from Central Asia. Descent as a factor of identification here appears to have been largely superseded by locality, especially among Uzbeks. These are often also indistinguishable from Tajiks, a person being Tajik as long as he or she speaks Tajik and Uzbek as long as the language used is Uzbek, so that in certain settings it makes no sense to refer to Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups. Rather, one finds localised bilingual communities. In terms of descent they are and describe themselves as mixtures of mixtures.

Language

This leads us to language as an identifying feature. In the context of the Uzbeks and Tajiks we have seen that linguistic affiliation refers to little else but itself. One is Uzbek or Tajik by speaking the respective language.

A Tajik family in front of their house. For centuries Uzbeks and Tajiks in Bukhara live side by side and, although they share the same cultural patterns and regularly intermarry with each other, their respective languages survived. (Photo: P. Finke)

In central Shewa, the Ethiopian research area of Andrea Nicolas, the situation might have been very similar before the recent politicisation of ethnicity. She reports that when she asked her interlocutors whether their grandfather was Amhara or Oromo, they responded by asking each other which language he spoke most of time. Amhara and Oromo share most elements of their culture, including monophysite Christianity, not including *gada* (generation-set) rituals which are peculiar to the Oromo. One can therefore view them as one bilingual cultural group.

While switching between Uzbek and Tajik appears rather balanced, in the Ethiopian context people who speak Oromo among themselves would more readily switch to Amharic when joined by an Amharic speaker who is ill at ease in Oromo while the inverse remains rare. Amharic, the language of the former Empire, still seems to hold a high cultural prestige in the heart of what now is the "Oromia" state of Ethiopia.

Language tends to be very important in the catalogue of cultural criteria used to mark the boundaries between ethnic groups. This makes the question of the relationship between language and ethnicity appear tautological in some cases. Where language is used as the primary marker of an ethnic boundary (Barth 1969), ethnic and linguistic units tend to be congruent. In post World War I Europe, the language census has in numerous cases simply replaced the declaration of political will of local communities in effecting boundary corrections between "nation"-states (Dench 1986). On the other hand, through the school system and the exclusive use of the majority language for administration, national languages or languages which enjoy a special status in certain areas, have been imposed on linguistic minorities (Gellner 1981). Congruence between linguistic communities and ethnic units/nations has thus been promoted on the interstate level by adjusting political boundaries to language distribution areas and on the intrastate level by extending a lan-

guage policy to these boundaries. In spite of fact that these processes have been at work for some time, still only a small fraction of the world's "nations" are linguistically homogeneous (Ra'anan 1989).

While in some cases ethnic and linguistic units are coterminous, at the other extreme we find ethnic units, well defined by other criteria, which have nothing to do with language. The Garre of north-eastern Africa conceive of themselves as one ethnic group because of their common genealogy and clan organisation, their shared pastoral nomadic culture and their not always fulfilled desire to keep peace with each other. The Garre are divided into four linguistic clusters, which crosscut other criteria of differentiation such as clanship. Some of them speak an Oromo dialect close to the one of the Boran, while some speak Af Rahanweyn and others Af Garreh Kofar. The latter two are closely related Somali-like languages but are kept clearly separate by their speakers. There are also Garre who speak Somali proper. Oromo is a different language, well beyond comprehension for speakers of any of these Somaloid languages. It belongs to the same Lowland branch of the East Cushitic languages as the Somali-type languages, but internal differentiation within this branch is high. The fact that the Garre are also divided among three "nation"-states (Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia), has nothing to do with this linguistic differentiation, since speakers of all four languages are found among the Garre of all three states. The only language spoken exclusively by Garre appears to be Af Garreh Kofar, but to the outside observer it is difficult to distinguish that language from Af Rahanweyn which is spoken by hundreds of thousands of non-Garre, namely Somali of the Rahanweyn clan-cluster. It does happen that Garre who do not share one of these Cushitic languages are obliged to converse with each other in their languages from totally different language families, like Swahili (Bantu) or English (Germanic) which they have acquired at school, an institution frequented by only a minority of them for mostly short periods.

Incongruence of linguistic classifications with ethnicity defined by extra-linguistic criteria tends to provide interesting cases of multiple or conflicting identities. In the Sudan we find speakers of Arabic and in Nigeria speakers of Hausa who have preserved memory of their FulBe origins. Elsewhere, such as in parts of Cameroon, the FulBe language, Fulfulde, has spread as a lingua franca among non-FulBe or has even become their only language.

This leads us to a more narrow theme: the interplay of FulBe and non-FulBe identities, i.e. specific ethnicities rather than general criteria of ethnic identification. The FulBe are a common theme in a cross-section of projects in this Department.

FulBe and Their Neighbours

One theme that recurs in all the Department's projects throughout Africa, both in the Sudanic Zone and in the Horn, as well as in Central Asia, is that of the relationship between nomads, former nomads or other mobile (agro-) pastoralists with the sedentary agricultural and urban populations. Across Africa, the pastoral element is often represented by one particular ethnic group, the FulBe. These stretch from Senegambia to Ethiopia, not as an undifferentiated mass but as speakers of various Fulfulde dialects who also form sub-ethnicities along religious and economic lines. They tend to be relative newcomers to a given area and are often a numerical minority. The ways in which they articulate with neighbouring groups or keep their distance from them are myriad and form excellent case material for the comparative study of interethnic relationships.

The interplay of migration and ethnicity becomes particularly visible in the FulBe case. Because of their historical eastward drift across the continent and because of their seasonal movements (in some cases only a few kilometres, in others a north-south range of 700 km), FulBe more often than others find themselves in new contact situations. They therefore provide an excellent test case for the Barthian hypothesis that ethnicity articulates itself in such contact situations, along the ethnic boundary (cf. project: Ethnicity and Migration along the Blue Nile, page 24).

Here one can study variation within a framework of similarity: one side being always represented by FulBe of one kind or another, the other mostly by people who regard themselves as having arrived earlier than the FulBe and having stronger and more legitimate ties to the soil. The interest in FulBe/non-FulBe relations predates the foundation of the Institute. Diallo and Schlee have published some earlier research in this area (Diallo and Schlee 2000).

These recurring elements in the research settings of the West Africa projects have led to a high degree of institutionalised exchange between these projects. The researchers held regular meetings and share an electronic mail box (lavachekiri@yahoo.com) that was made accessible from the individual field sites. The focus, of course, can differ from project to project. While market relations are given special attention by Youssouf Diallo and Michaela Pelican, Andreas Dafinger provided models and patterns of spatial relations. Forced and labour migration is a theme shared by Andrea Behrends, Youssouf Diallo and Tilo Grätz.

Not only in cases that involve FulBe and non-FulBe (but prominently in these) do interethnic relations often include individual relations: dyads of two individuals tied by special types of friendship. Friendship, in its relationship to the classical integrative forces found in the anthropological literature, namely kinship and alliance, has evolved as a research focus of the Institute.

The following chart illustrates how a relatively specific problem, namely forms of migration (internal, pastoral, labour) within one ethnic group, the FulBe, are tackled by three researchers in different settings with the aim of relating them to underlying causes and constraints.

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2"></td><td rowspan="2">forms of migration</td><td rowspan="2">ranges of migration</td><td colspan="2">causes of migration</td><td rowspan="2">Const-raints</td></tr>
<tr><td>internal</td><td>external</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pelican</td><td>restricted</td><td rowspan="3">local to re-gional</td><td rowspan="2">social

(social & demographic pressure)</td><td rowspan="3">ecologic

political</td><td rowspan="2">state policy/ political</td></tr>
<tr><td>Dafinger</td><td rowspan="2">internal</td></tr>
<tr><td>Diallo</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="2">competition over re-sources</td><td rowspan="2"></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>external</td><td>regional to transnational</td></tr>
</table>

Table: Forms of FulBe migration.

Tackling a Matter from Two Fronts: FulBe along the Ethiopian-Sudanese frontier

FulBe form a link between the Sudanic and the northeastern African research areas. In his research on Gambella, which, as we have seen, focuses on Nuer/Anywaa relations, Dereje Feyissa has also discovered pictures of, and oral reports about, FulBe who have come to this part of the western lowlands of Ethiopia, most recently in 1997/8. In 1996 Schlee collected information about the seasonal migrations of those nomadic FulBe (Mbororo) who had their northern turning point in his research area around Abu Na'ama, Sennar State, Sudan. They mentioned migrations across the Baro, Gilo, and Akobo rivers, i.e. well into Gambella and beyond, as one of their options if interethnic violence in southern Sudan did not allow a more westerly migration within the Sudanese borders. The type of seasonal migration described had a north-south extension of about 700 km. Some FulBe Schlee met in the Sudan were able to converse with him in Oromo, a language widespread as a lingua franca beyond Wollega, the western part of Oromia, in the neighbouring areas of Beni Shangul and Gambella. (Other interviews were conducted in Arabic and later, after Abu-Manga came along up the Blue Nile, in Fulfulde.) Comparisons suggest that the FulBe in both areas were representatives of the same groups.

Fig. 2: Mbororo transhumant routes in the Sudanese-Ethiopian borderlands. (map: G. Schlee)

Dereje and Schlee decided to explore more fully, both from the Ethiopian and the Sudanese turning points of these nomadic movements, why these cross-border migrations have ceased. Factors leading to this might include: (1) the 1997 invasion of northern Sudanese opposition forces into the Kurmuk area of Sudan from Ethiopian soil and the declining security situation for Mbororo migrants at the hands of the SPLA allies of those northern opposition forces; (2) fears of Islamism in Addis Ababa after the attempted murder of Egyptian president Mubarak there. The Mbororo, and other Sudanese, might have been (wrongly) equated with Islamist tendencies, (3) competition over pastures and other resources (such as market outlets) by local (agro-)pastoralists. This case might provide excellent insights into ethnic and national forces on both sides of the Ethio-Sudanese boundaries and the misperceptions as well as the mutual

instrumentalisation between them. The theme of religion, to which allusion has been made above, comes up again in this context, if only in the form of projection of fears.

A Brief Theory of Size

Identity discourses that stress different features (along the aforementioned dimensions of religion, language, putative shared descent etc.) and higher or lower levels of relatedness or organisation invariably have consequences for the size of the groups or categories of people they define. We can, to the extent that socially skilful actors manage to manipulate group sizes intentionally or if there are processes of selection at work which allow us to distinguish between successful and less successful identity constructs, look at identity politics of size from a utilitarian (rationalistic, economic) perspective.

A crude theory of size along these lines would be: You have to belong to a group or alliance which is large enough to allow you to achieve your aims, but not much larger. Whatever the benefits derived from mustering support happen to be (the loot from winning a war, being able to form a government after winning an election or being strong enough in the local council of elders to win all land cases) they would have to be shared with too many helpers if one's own group or alliance turned out to be larger than necessary. Such considerations put a premium on relatively large groups, larger than rival groups or configurations at whichever level of organisation we are talking about, but not much larger than necessary to defeat them.

This is a good explanation in terms of efficiency: it is short and explains a vast number of cases. But it is not a comprehensive theory on size in identity politics. There are discourses of smallness which defy this explanation or at least require further elaborations.

The minority rights discourse which has been globalised by UN agencies and non-governmental organisations puts a premium on being too small or too disadvantaged to play power games. The claim to protection of minorities is based on their weakness. If a small group succeeds in getting recognition as a minority and thereby succeeds in defending or enlarging its resource base, one can either subsume this case in our brief theory of size or not.

If one wants to subsume it, one can do so by defining "group" or "alliance" in such a way that the inter-governmental agencies, national and international, supporting media etc. who have helped the minority in its cause are part of the "group" or "alliance" to which it now belongs. This might stretch the concept "group" somewhat. Then, through a successful claim of smallness, the power base of the group in question has, in fact, become rather large. Those who like paradoxes might discern a paradoxi-

cal ring in this. For this sort of argument, however, the concepts of power and power base would also have to be stretched to comprise relationships which are lose and remote and only situationally relevant.

Or one might therefore reject this way of subsuming the minority case into our size theory as being far-fetched. One might feel that mere observational pressure by a global public to which one is connected by sympathetic media reports does not justify it to be included among all these rather vague, or merely potential supporters who are uncounted and not circumscribed by more clear definitions as members of a wider "group" or "alliance" of the minority group in question. But even from this angle, a measure of power or influence has been mustered by smallness rather than being large and the paradoxical ring is maintained.

Martine Guichard and Michaela Pelican explain that the concepts of autochthony and allochthony have been incorporated into the 1996 constitution of Cameroon. Autochthonous minority groups deserve protection against immigrants who might outnumber them in certain areas. But really small groups fail to get government recognition. By defining themselves in broader, more inclusive categories such groups enhance their chances of recognition. One needs to be large enough to be a minority. If the preceding paragraph ends in a paradox, this one might be said to lead to a paradox within a paradox.

Much more can be said about factors which influence group size. Crowding is one of them. It may make sense to increase the membership of a golf club to have more people sharing its cost, but if then one has to queue before getting a chance to play, the advantage of wider cost-sharing may be offset by the disadvantages of crowding. Also the costs of decision making rise geometrically with an arithmetic rise in group size. Now forms of control have to be established when a group grows beyond the level where face-to-face contacts and the quest for personal reputation are sufficient for maintaining a reasonable degree of compliance with rules and limiting free riding. Where groups of different size and institutional arrangements can be chosen by individuals, optimisation processes may occur, but these presuppose low exit and entry costs and easy movement (Hechter 1987).

The concept of trust is related in a complementary fashion to control. Schlee has shown that among the Somali there is a tendency to increase group sizes both by forging alliances with unrelated groups and by including more remote agnatic relatives in order to facilitate joint defence. Such advantages may be offset by the increased risk of treason. Mistrust therefore comes in as a limiting factor of group size (Schlee 2002).

But whatever else can be adduced to round off a theory of group size, the brief considerations which have been presented here show already the close links to any theory of social identities. Group sizes can be changed through strategies of inclusion and exclusion and these make use of discourses of identity and difference.

Material Symbols and Emblems

In interethnic contact situations, i.e. the setting in which hostile interactions or peaceful integration into a meta-ethnic system based on differentiation of niches are likely to take place, differences are often communicated by tangible objects. Material objects that mark social identities have symbolic or emblematic significance or both. Complex and emotionally laden fields of meaning attributed to an object make it a symbol. If it is just used to mark the difference of belonging or not belonging to a group or category, we call it an emblem.

A cross may evoke the sacrificial death of Christ and stir complex theological debates about who sacrificed him to whom and why. People may kiss crosses or shed tears over them. The cross clearly is a heavily laden cultural symbol. If used to make vampires go away, it can even be a magical symbol.

The same cross in red on badges on the arms of helpers at the scene of an accident may just help to distinguish those who have to be given privileged access to the victims from those who are just standing about. It is a mere emblem.

In the past, when anthropology or ethnology was to a larger extent than now practiced in or around museums, many of its activities concerned attributing poorly described and catalogued material objects to the right people. Peoples and cultures were distinguished by the types of artefacts they had and their styles.

Style, which remains recognisable irrespective of the objects to which it is attached, is indeed a marker of culture, not necessarily as bounded units but as discontinuities in the distribution of acquired features of human beings. Klumpp and Kratz (1993) have shown that there is a typical East-African pastoral woman silhouette, irrespective of which garments or ornaments create it. The details may differ, but the similarity of the total impression remains, creating a type for a region.

One sometimes wonders why it is so easy to identify pastoral FulBe all across Africa from afar, although, from closer by, they might differ in all the details of what they wear. Is it a preference for the colour blue, in one instance expressed in the garments, in another in tattoos? Is it that they often wear hats rather than headscarves, is it garments that underline rather than blur body shapes? Silhouettes again?

Clearly diacritic markers of identities or cultural features are, of course, more obvious to the analyst than vague and contestable notions of style. But even these do not just have one denotation. They stand for different things in the perceptions of different people.

Three parallel thick tresses of plaited hair along the length of the skull clearly mark somebody as a Pullo (sing. of FulBe) or, more particularly, a Mbororo in the Sudanic belt of Africa. In an interethnic context they might stand just for that. They are an ethnic marker. In a purely FulBe

context, where the FulBe/non-FulBe contrast is irrelevant, they might, however, identify their bearer as a member of an age-grade: younger men have such tresses, older men do not.

That ethnic markers are age and gender specific is extremely common. Religious markers are also gendered. In a period of rigidification of Islamic practices, women might wear veils and men beards, each in response to expectations by the other gender. There are no types of social identity, be it class, profession or whatever, which is not somewhere or sometimes visualised in material symbols. That the researchers of the Institute are equipped with up-to-date portable digital video equipment allows them not only to depict such visual symbols statically but also to record the scenes in which they play a role.

Not only what we wrap around or attach to the surfaces of our bodies' mark our social identities but also what we ingest into them. A brief glance back at the sacrificial death of Christ mentioned at the beginning of this chapter provides the prime example. Confirmation as a Christian and communion among Christians is achieved by eating his flesh and drinking his blood.

Whether this is done symbolically or through trans-substantiation is a matter of theological debate. While the Eucharist is a symbol and central ritual of Christianity as a whole, who is allowed to perform it with whom marks different churches off from each other (cf. Christiane Falge on 'segmentary Christianity').

Food in Egypt, as a national symbol ('Egyptian cuisine') – although a rather unlikely national symbol given the similarities of dishes across the Middle East - and also in the context of religion, class and lifestyle, is the topic of the dissertation project of Bettina Mann. She has shown that food is so charged with meaning and with implications for the social identities of those who eat it, that all researchers are encouraged to pay special attention to food in their respective research settings. Where there are different food taboos for religious communities and professional status groups laid down in explicit rules, such as in Ethiopia, the connection between identity and food is obvious. It might not be less important in less obvious cases.

Spatial arrangements, from the interior of houses to their location to each other, from profane courtyards to sacred precincts, from use rights in fields and pastures to the ritual topography of holy mountains or springs and the routes of pilgrimages, are another part of the lexicon of social identities. Andreas Dafinger has shown various levels of significance of settlement patterns among the Bisa of Burkina Faso and about the different (mental) maps of Bisa farmers and administrators on the one and FulBe on the other hand. Nomadic perceptions of space and the weakness of the concept of bounded territory among nomads is also a topic explored by Schlee in northern Kenya.

Fig.3: Department I: Heuristic matrix of comparative themes.

THEMES [1] **categories** key words *specifications*	Andrea Behrends	Andreas Dafinger	Youssouf Diallo	Tilo Grätz	Martine Guichard	Michaela Pelican	Stephen Reyna	BN [A] G.Schlee	Christiane Falge	Dereje Feyissa	Georg Haneke	Bettina Mann	Andrea Nicolas	NK [B] G. Schlee	Tadesse Wolde	John Wood	Peter Finke	Meltem Sancak	Boris Nieswand	Nina Glick-Schiller	SM [C] G. Schlee
CRITERIA OF IDENTIFICATION																					
"descent"/descent [2]	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X			X
language		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X	X
religion		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
locality	X	XX	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	XX	X
class							X	X	X	X		XX							X		
profession		X	X	XX	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		?	?			?	?	X
gender				X	X	X		X	X			X	X		?	?			?	X	X
age/generation	XX				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	XX	X	?	?	X	X	X	X	X
FIELDS OF INTERACTION OF IDENTITIES (1)																					
conflict [3]		XX	X	X		XX				X		XX			?	?					
conflict settlement	X	XX	X	X	X	XX	X			XX	X		X	X	?	?				XX	
interethnic conflict	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X		X			?						X
intraethnic conflict	X						X	X	X	X	X			X							X
civil war	X						X	X	X	X	X									XX	X
global forces [4]																					
policy					X					X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X
great powers [5]	X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X
intergovernmental organisations [6]	X																				
national policies		X					X	X	X	X	X			X			XX	XX		XX	
"nation building"	X	XX			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	?		X	X	?		X
ethnic policies/territoriality [7]	X	XX			X	X	?	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	?	?	
resource allocation/land privatisation											X	X					X	X			
development agencies/NGOs/churches	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X					X	XX	
migration																					
internal		XX	X	X	X			X	X	X									X	X	
pastoral migration/sedentarisation		XX	X		X	X		X	X	X				X			X				
labour	X		X	X				X				X							X	X	
forced migration/refugees	XX							X	X	X	X			X					X	X	X
transnational	X		X	X			X	X	X	X							X	X	X	XX	

THEMES [1] / categories / key words / *specifications*	Andrea Behrends	Andreas Dafinger	Youssouf Diallo	Tilo Grätz	Martine Guichard	Michaela Pelican	Stephen Reyna	BN [A] G.Schlee	Christiane Falge	Dereje Feyissa	Georg Haneke	Bettina Mann	Andrea Nicolas	NK [B] G. Schlee	Tadesse Wolde	John Wood	Peter Finke	Meltem Sancak	Boris Nieswand	Nina Glick-Schiller	SM [C] G. Schlee
FIELDS OF INTERACTION OF IDENTITIES (2)																					
binding forces [3]																					
kinship	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X
friendship	X	X	X	X	XX	XX	X	X	X				X						X	X	X
networks	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X				X	X	X	X	X
alliances																					
military/political [8]	X	XX			XX		X		X	X	X		X	X					?		X
marriage	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X		X
market																					
local	X	XX	X	X		X						X					X	X		X	
national			X			X					X	X						X			
transnational	X		X	X		X	X				X							X	X	X	
world				X			X					X						X			
"smuggling" [9]	X	X									X							X			

[A] BN: Blue Nile
[B] NK: Northern Kenya
[C] SM: Somali migrants

[1] Identity is the over-all theme of Department 1, its title "integration and conflict" can as well be translated into "identity and difference". All projects make use of synchronic and diachronic views of identity, which are not systematized in this table. Comparative aspects will better be elaborated in the text than in this table.
[2] Stipulated versus demonstrated descent.
[3] The categories 'conflict' and 'binding forces' cannot be subsumed under 'interethnic relations' because they also refer to intraethnic relations.
[4] To be understood as influences or interventions leading to international conflicts.
[5] To be understood as influences by other countries involved in global power struggles, e.g. former colonisers, former super powers.
[6] To be understood as multilateral organisations, e.g. World Bank, IMF.
[7] National policies dedicated to ethnic groups or territories.
[8] Contractual relationship against others.
[9] The term 'smuggling' has been problematized in a group discussion and is therefore only used in quotes.

Overview of Comparative Themes

The matrix above (Fig. 3) gives a more comprehensive overview about the criteria of identification which are relevant in the research areas of the individual projects of this Departments and the fields of interaction in which these identities are observed.

5. Methods

Methods used by the researchers include the usual anthropological techniques with a little twist brought about by new technologies. Participatory observation and the notebook, be it paper or electronic, provide the bulk of the data. But the recording of meetings, public rituals, or other events has been greatly facilitated by the use of small, inconspicuous and easy-to-handle digital camcorders. These can also be used to record in-depth interviews where they help in discourse analysis. This is because to see the gestures of the speaker may greatly enhance language comprehension and the contextualising interpretation of what has been said. For transcribing videotapes in the same way as phonotypists transcribe audiotapes from a dictaphone, a small technical innovation has been made: Foot switches have been attached to videorecorders so that the hands are free for typing.

The mapping of villages, fields or neighbourhoods is also a standard form of data collection. But nowadays portable Global Positioning Systems (GPS) allow to determine one's position by satellite with an error of only 4 metres, so that it is enough to walk around a field or along a road to have it drawn to scale on an appropriate map by the computer the same evening.

The most conspicuous feature of this Institute, if compared to university Departments or other institutions, is that the number of projects associated with it offers greater opportunities for comparative research. The remainder of this section on methods will therefore be devoted to forms of organising or facilitating comparative work.

It would have been desirable to give all researchers ample opportunity to visit all others at their field research sites to add first-hand experience and visual impressions to what they have heard about their colleagues' projects in the seminar room. This would have provided methodological stimulation and would have enabled the researchers to watch each other in the field situation, to learn about the different ways in which to deal with a situation and to allow for commentary. It would also have stimulated comparisons.

There are layers of comparison situated above the individual field project. At higher levels of generalisation, all projects should contribute to

'collective identities', 'property relations' or problems of 'legal pluralism' (to name the keywords of the three branches of the Institute) or to the level of theorising which combines these (Schlee 2000). These are generalising comparative frameworks. Other forms of comparison are situated not so much above as between the individual projects. There might be binary comparisons or research questions that only concern three or four projects. Especially this latter type of comparison would have profited from many mutual visits by junior scholars to their colleagues in the field across the different Departments and the whole geographical range from the bend of the Niger in the west to Chukotka in the east to know enough about each other to reach agreement on what is to be compared. Such an ideal, of course, would be difficult to realise by any organisation. The obvious constraints to putting it into reality would be time and money.

Activities organised in partial fulfilment of these ideal requirements follow:

The International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, at which two members of the Institute gave papers, was used by the Ethiopia group (which include Tadesse Wolde from Department II) to meet and discuss field research. One doctoral student, Dereje Feyissa, was visited by Schlee at his field site in Gambella. In March 2001 the "West Africa group", comprising researchers from as far east as Chad and Cameroon, met at Bobo Dioulasso, Burkina Faso. Hotel prices in African provincial towns are reasonable and it was possible to provide a comfortable and relaxed atmosphere for the researchers who, in some cases, had been working under rather harsh conditions. The alternative, a meeting in Halle, would have incurred higher expenses and it would have deprived the researchers of the opportunity to visit their colleagues at their respective field research sites. Three of them combined such visits with the trip to Bobo.

At this meeting a whole day was devoted to Schlee reporting on the Ethiopian research. Each researcher then had a day for him or herself. In the ensuing discussions, overlapping themes were discovered which led to the formulation of programmes for future conferences tailored accordingly ('The landed and the landless', planned for May 2002, 'Friendship, descent, and alliance in Africa', planned for November 2002). Additionally, the researchers discussed technical questions concerning the equipment and methodological ones concerning description techniques. Several researchers reported difficulties in collecting data on household economics and especially livestock holdings for example. People simply would not say, nor give reliable information about, how many cattle they had or where they were. For risk management and in meeting social obligations, the animals of one household could be dispersed widely. It was suggested to tackle this problem from the other side: the animal side rather than the humans. Where no headway could be made with the household as the unit of reference, herds should be taken as such units, a herd census should be made and the history of each cow collected. Eco-

nomic and social relations between FulBe pastoralists and their neighbours could then be described in the medium in which they themselves express these relationships: the bovine idiom. It would later be possible to link herd data to households.

In July 2001, a four-day seminar was held in a rural setting in Northrhine-Westphalia, at Borgholzhausen in the Teutoburg Forest. In addition to themes already discussed at Bobo-Dioulasso, newly organised projects were presented and comparative aspects were explored. This seminar was especially instrumental for the writing of the present report. Uninterrupted meetings in other locations (where participants are not expected home in the evenings) with shared food, drink, and peripatetic discussions (walks or excursions) have been found to be especially productive for all types of work above the single-project level.

6. Widening the Comparative Framework

It has been attempted, through conferences and other forms of exchange and cooperation, to widen the comparative basis for theory building beyond the Institute. One way of doing so has been by contacting scholars who have worked in sites neighbouring the research areas of Institute members and convincing them of the relevance of our research questions so that they may pay attention to the same aspects. This not only generates comparability, it also completes a regional picture by proceeding in a mosaic like fashion from given cases to neighbouring ones with which they are interrelated. The possible gains of understanding provided by this procedure outweigh the disadvantage of possibly not having independent cases, as required by certain types of analysis such as statistical ones.

The interior area of the Horn of Africa provides an ideal setting for the study of identification processes and changing alliances. The southern and western parts of Ethiopia, the north of Kenya and Uganda and the eastern Sudan comprise numerous language communities belonging to three of the four African macro-families (Niger-Kordofanian, Afroasiatic, Nilo-Saharan), they comprise Muslims, Christians and followers of a great number of other belief systems which for statistical purposes are often lumped together as "animists", they comprise political and military units of the most different types, ranging from "nation"-states to segmentary lineages and groups defined by sharing an age grading organisation. Other regions of Africa, like the area around Lake Chad, show a similar diversity but it would be hard to find a region with a greater variety.

A conference was thus prepared for the period of June 5-9, 2001, with a follow-up conference planned in March 2002. The results of these meetings will have to be presented in a later report. These meetings bring to-

gether researchers who have worked on interethnic relations in this area. We confine ourselves to a relatively small part of the African continent so that in addition to offering comparisons with each other the different cases also inform each other directly. Some of the groups studied by different researchers are at war with each other or share enemies. They might be exposed to the same policies or oppressive measures by the same states. By the concentration on a limited area we aim at exploring a mosaic of interrelated cases.

Participants of the conference on "Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-Eastern Africa", organised by Günther Schlee, 5-9 June 2001.
(Photo: MPI for Social Anthropology)

Contributors were asked to focus on changing systems of identification, on interethnic relations including relations to the state or states, the ethnic make-up of states or the equations drawn between 'ethnicity/ethnicities' and 'nation/nations'. They were also asked to be prepared to invest some time in re-writing their papers after the workshop, because we bring many people together who have worked in areas of study neighbouring each other in the field, in order to see which patterns emerge in a regional picture. Contributions should therefore react to one another.

The participants and the titles of their contributions are listed in the chapter "Conferences, Workshops, Colloquia" (pp.177-186).
(*Günther Schlee*)

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