Department I: Integration and Conflict
Director: Günther Schlee

Integration and Conflict
Günther Schlee

1. Introduction

This part of the report tries to clarify some basic concepts of current studies on integration and conflict, as well as some which might not be so useful but which are nevertheless commonly used. These basic concepts comprise types of actors as opposed to the object of contention and passive victims, they comprise identity and difference and the social categorisations derived from them – in both their limiting and enabling capacity for the people using them – and they comprise the logic of identification, in terms of the costs and benefits of being the same or being different.

A very widely used concept and thereby a topic which cannot be ignored – though of limited analytical value – is ethnicity. Ethnicity is a complex means of identification based on a plurality of features. The list of criteria used for defining one ethnic group might differ from that used to define another. One might therefore doubt that ethnicity is one social phenomenon and suspect that it is a blanket to cover a variety of different social phenomena. In some settings, there are no ethnic groups even in the widest possible sense, because cultural discontinuities used to circumscribe groups elsewhere cannot be found in these settings and cultural variation takes the form of continua instead.

A closer examination of our conceptual tools reveals that they are sufficient to ask relevant questions about the changing composition of collective actors and the dynamics and logic of identification in hostile and peaceful forms of interaction. The department aims at answering such questions in a more systematic way than is usual in the discipline.

2. Necessary Distinctions: parties in conflict and objects of conflict

Those who discover the 'true' reasons for a conflict behind the alleged ones may be said to pursue an enlightened activity and to contribute to the critique of ideology. When we find that the conflict in Iraq was not about freedom, but about oil, we believe to have detected the tougher, more real, more important reason for war. Undoubtedly, naming the resources involved is an important part of explaining a conflict.

There are studies of great merit in which conflicts are treated from the point of view of the resources contested. One chapter deals with conflicts over oil, the next with those over water (Klare 2001). By naming the resource, however, we have only addressed one aspect of a conflict.

By way of illustration I will give a cynical example in the literal sense ('cynical' is derived from *kynos*: 'the dog'.)

Three dogs are served a feeding bowl. None of them wants to share peacefully; each wants more than a third. None of them is strong enough to chase the other two away on his own. Dogs One and Three bare their teeth towards Two. Two puts his tail between his legs and runs away.

What part of the conflict have we explained by naming the disputed resource? It was about eating, that much is true. But the more interesting problem is that of the borders drawn between the conflicting parties. Why One and Three against Two? Why not Two and Three against One? Or One and Two against Three?

To account for this problem is an ambitious task. We are not in the least able to predict which dogs will form an alliance against which. Even if we knew the story of the three dogs (Are two of them from the same litter? From the same kennel? What kind of experiences have they made in past alliances with each other?), we would not be able to make predictions of this kind if we had not beforehand studied on a broad basis which of the three levels of experience (kinship, origin, social learning) is more relevant for dogs in situations like this than others.

In constellations of conflicts, we have to differentiate between two kinds of distinctions: the distinctions between the parties in conflict must be distinguished from those between the conflicting parties and the object in dispute. The latter distinction is not always as simple as in the case of the dogs and the food in the bowl. The conflicting parties and the object of their dispute might be creatures of the same species, for instance human beings. If two women are fighting over one man, then this is a conflict between two persons, not between three. The third person is merely object of the conflict, just as the cattle snatched from each other by African pastoral nomads, or oil wells fought over by modern states which are not considered conflicting parties.

This is not as trivial as it may sound. A confusion of these two kinds of distinctions (party vs. party/party vs. object) occasionally leads even noted scientists to analytical mistakes. Cassanelli and Bestemann (1996) deny that the military conflicts in Somalia can be explained by referring to clans and lineages. Class is said to have taken the place of clan membership as the relevant criterion of distinction, particularly in the river oases in the southern part of the country. The distinction between peasants (in part former slaves) and central and north Somali who dominate them militarily is believed to be a class distinction.

So far, so good. A more thorough reading reveals, however, that the peasants in the south are as contested a resource as their land is. North Somali and central Somali of nomadic origin used to challenge each other's access to the fertile estates of the south, and whoever managed to seize power over these often also made their former owners submit to

their will as forced labourers. Cassanelli and Besteman (Besteman 1999, Besteman/Cassanelli 1996) in fact stress the peaceableness of the peasants and the fact that they are the victims of this conflict, but not themselves actors in the conflict. Now, whoever wants to recruit north and central Somali to make them fight against each other, regardless of whether he is a traditional leader or city-based warlord, and regardless of what the conflict is about, be it camels or airports, has to take clan membership and alliances between subclans of different clans into account. In what respect is class membership considered to have taken the place of clan membership in its significance? The class distinction exists between warriors and their prey, the peasants. If the patterns of alliances and oppositions among the fighting groups themselves are to be explained, one still has to rely on studies of clan structures. With their thesis of a replacement of clan structures by vertical strata (class), Cassanelli and Besteman have confused the distinctions between the parties in conflict with those between the parties and the object of the conflict, the bone of contention.

For someone who wants to investigate the actors' logic of action, the patterns of identification behind the opposing fronts, and the calculations on which alliances are based, the question of the contested resource is of rather secondary importance. Whether solidarity on a larger scale is oriented towards religious affiliation, language, nationality or province, or whether (on a smaller scale) I prefer to rely on my brother instead of my classmate, sometimes has very little to do with the object of the conflict for which those alliances are instrumentalised – be it a bank robbery, an election campaign, a war over oil or a war over arable land. The entire field of problems regarding the composition of the conflicting parties and the criteria used to define friend and foe, is at best touched on by the issue of the nature of the contested resources, but not explained by it.

This is the reason why Department I, 'Integration and Conflict', approaches this issue particularly with regard to the main question of identity and difference. According to which features does one classify ones friends and allies as similar to oneself? Which differences are referred to in order to draw a distinction between the enemies and oneself? What are the forces which shape these classifications? How do they change, how do they take new interests or new scopes of action into account?

3. Integration

Integration is by no means the opposite of conflict. It is possible to integrate into a conflict. There is a tendency in people to increasingly resemble their enemies. In Lahore, at the Indian-Pakistani border, the flags are lowered every night. This is accompanied by vigorous parade-step and frightening stamping. The own national symbolism is cele-

brated to impress one's enemy. What is directed against one another, however, is at the same time perfect interplay. The movements of the Indian and the Pakistani soldiers are exactly synchronous. One is the mirror image of the other. Even their uniforms are similar. They differ in specific emblems, but not in cut or overall impression.[1] If we compare the iconography of violence in wall paintings, the parades and songs of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, we find how much they resemble each other. In fact they only differ in certain diacritical features (Kenney 2002). Opponents adapt to one another. They develop a common language of symbols in which they fight one another. And this adaptation not only concerns symbolism, but also violent forms of conflict: escalation on one side leads to escalation on the other. Forms of social organisation develop under military pressure coming from similar forms in the neighbourhood. Early states might be an example for this. Furthermore, below we will briefly discuss age-group systems, which also seem to emerge in reaction to each other.

On the one hand, it is therefore possible for enemies to become increasingly similar, on the other hand, we have known since Durkheim, at the latest, that peaceful integration frequently results from quite different components mutually supplementing each other. On this broad scale, therefore, integration means embodiment within a larger systemic context – not necessarily acculturation or adaptation, but also integration into a heterogeneous whole, and not necessarily into a peaceful whole.

Social identities are often defined by their bearers in dissociating themselves from each other. Take religion. Different religions have claims of truth incompatible with each other, and they compete with each other for followers. Yet the common designation as 'religions' creates not only a conceptual, but also a political link between them. By subsuming a series of phenomena, including complexes of ritual and belief no-one has thought of as 'religious' so far, under the term 'religions', it becomes possible to discuss and administratively regulate the role of religions in society, and the relation of religions to each other as well as to politics and society. By way of the designation as 'religions', furthermore, a kind of meta-religious system develops to which individual religions adapt and which puts belief systems of different kinds under pressure to pose as 'religions'[2].

[1] Source: a TV feature.

[2] 'Religion' is a highly culture bound concept of doubtful universal applicability. Cf. also the essay on *North-East Africa as a region for the study of changing identifications and alliances* in this volume. It might be convenient in the Siberian context to regard shamanism as a 'religion' alongside Christianity and Buddhism. But if we look at some other sub-systems into which we conventionally compartmentalise 'culture', it might fit just as well into 'medicine', while the great tradition of Buddhism (as distinct from its popular varieties) might rather be a 'philosophy' than a 'religion'. Buddhism is a classical example for discussing definitions of religion. (Durkheim 1912, Spiro 1966: 88 f)

Another important classification of this kind is ethnicity. Although for ethnic groups, the same is true as for religions – that is, that ethnic groups are not only defined in opposition to each other, but also adapt to common meta-ethnic systems in which they communicate with each other via their distinctions – popular opinion is that ethnicity has rather a high potential for conflict. For the media, ethnicity has downright become a universal explanation for recent conflicts. For this reason, I will first of all give some explanations regarding ethnic groups.

4. Ethnic Groups

The fact that in Germany the science investigating humanity in its diversity is called *Ethnologie*, suggests that everywhere there are ethnic groups between which this kind of relation can exist, in fact that ethnic organisation is the universal system of classification of mankind. This also corresponds to the popular view: the human race consists of peoples, and peoples consist of individuals.

As always, the problems arise when we look closer. If in a pre-colonial African village, situated at a riverside, the inhabitants were asked who else resembled them and who apart from their own village belonged to them, they would possibly answer that the residents of the next village downriver and also those of the next village upriver could quite easily be understood, their language was very similar to one's own and their customs were quite similar as well. One village further in each direction, however, this was not the case, they would say. In the next village one would receive the same answer: the residents had a feeling of belonging to the inhabitants of the village first visited by the questioner, and to those of the next village, which by the residents of the first village were felt to be quite different already. And so on: every one has a feeling of similarity or belonging towards their immediate neighbours, but not towards more distant neighbours. What we have here is a continuum: language and culture change gradually, and also the feeling of belonging shifts continuously (Elwert 1989: 445).

In contrast to this, the existence of ethnic groups is based on discontinuities. Ethnic groups are not continua, but groups, large groups usually. Groups have group boundaries; they do not merge into one another. In case of double membership one is simultaneously a member of two different groups. In the case of ethnic groups, these boundaries are marked by cultural discontinuities. Language, occupation, customs, and traditions frequently very abruptly differ when one moves from one ethnic group to another. Often it is precisely the neighbouring parts of two ethnic groups who most strongly stress the differences, by referring to the same features the observer has noticed himself, or to quite different ones. Ethnicity is expressed at the border (Barth 1969).

In many places, continua were interrupted and borders drawn only under colonial influence. Bible translators picked out one dialect and

this way triggered a linguistic standardisation in the course of which neighbouring dialects were annexed to it. This way, linguistic continua were divided into different languages. Administrative officials needed tribes according to which they could organise their districts, and continua were of no use to them. Many modern ethnic groups originate from such processes in colonial times (Lentz 1998), others date further back, others less far. Somewhere, there are continuously processes of ethnogenesis taking place. Ethnogenesis is always an interethnic process, because ethnic groups distance themselves from each other. Often, perceptions of members of third ethnic groups enter into the process of the drawing of borders between two ethnic groups; this was, for instance, the case when the English or the French made such classifications.

According to what criteria ethnic borders are marked is different from case to case, but there is always a plurality of features. If it only concerns religion, the group is called a religious group, if it only concerns income related activities, the group is called an occupational group. Characteristically, there is a combination of history, language, customs, norms... Most frequently, but basically mistakenly, language is attributed the function of a dominant feature for ethnicity. When Europe was divided anew after World War I, in some places the language census even replaced the questioning of the population for their preferred affiliation (Dench 1986). With regard to the relation between language and ethnicity, however, it must be said after empirical examination that every conceivable possibility may indeed occur in reality.

There are ethnic groups, and also ethnic groups drawn up as nation-states, i.e. nations, which almost exclusively refer to their language. More recent debates on a German *Leitkultur* ('leading culture') in the context of immigration provided proof of the helplessness of those who wanted to attribute contents or values to Germanness beyond the language, which were to be compulsory for immigrants. Are not the democratic values compulsory for all of us? Certainly, but in what way are they specifically German – are they not compulsory for the French, as well? Similar things are true for the 'Christian-occidental' origin of parts of our culture. Furthermore: do we want to establish this for the agnostic? How will a normative realisation of this be squared with the freedom of religion guaranteed by our Basic Law? What is the talk of a Christian occident supposed to mean for our Muslim and Jewish fellow citizens? What remains, therefore, is the language.

At the other end of the range there are ethnic groups whose members have no common language, but who doubtlessly are ethnic groups, because they behave as such and can refer to a series of common features, on exactly the plurality of features, which make up the ethnic character

of a group. Our last report[3] discusses the Garre in North-East Africa as an example for such a group.

If there exists an ethnic feeling of unity based on other features, an ethnic group may tolerate a high degree of linguistic heterogeneity. Minimal differences in dialect can on the other hand be build up into evidence for a different ethnic character, if nationalist agitation is aimed in this direction. The most recent splitting up of the Serbo-Croat language into 'Serbian', 'Croatian' or even 'Bosnian' may serve as evidence for this.

5. Change

Reference to different features like language, religion, or the diverse real and supposed elements of the history of an ethnic group or its precursor populations opens new scopes for politics of identity. Leaders of ethnic movements or cross-border commuters pursuing some kind of matter in neighbouring ethnic groups can stress linguistic or religious common grounds as required. Linguistic-nationalist movements can become religious movements and vice versa, according to which ideology is in demand at a given time and where support is demanded: movements of this kind can 'switch', i.e. they change their frame of reference of identification (Elwert 2002).

A situational 'switching' or a change of ethnic affiliation via identification efforts stretching over years or even generations, is also possible for individuals or small groups. In Anatolia, religious borders run diagonally to linguistic-ethnic ones. There are Turks, Zaza-speaking Kurds, and Kurmanji-speaking Kurds, and in all three groups there are Sunnite Muslims and Alevites. Only after migrating to Germany have many Kurds realised the heterogeneity and wide distribution of 'Kurdishness'; some of them had previously believed that all Kurds spoke Zaza and were Alevites like themselves at home in their valley in Dersim. But not only is a strengthening of Kurdish consciousness imaginable in this situation. In this new context of Turkish citizens living in Germany, it may occasionally be more advantageous to refer to religious common grounds between Sunnite Kurds and Turks or between Alevite Kurds and Turks (Firat 1997).

Different groups of nomads live in an area of extensive, dry lowlands in northern Kenya; they speak Cushitic languages and keep sheep, goats, and most importantly camels, which among some of them are the object of rituals and a central part of their lives. The Garre live here, and next to them live the Oromo speaking Gabra and Sakuye, as well as the Rendille, who speak a language similar to Somali. The differences in costume and habitus between these ethnic groups are also distinctive. Some of them are Muslims; others adhere to an archaic sky god who

[3] Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Report 1999-2001: 58.

has thunder and rain at his command. Due to military spreading on the one side, and dispersal and new groupings on the other, numerous clans are today represented in more than one of these ethnic groups. The term for 'enemy' and for 'member of a foreign ethnic group' is the same in each of the languages spoken in this area. Livestock theft and war are not infrequent among these nomads, although one has to reckon with some of his enemies being clan brothers due to interethnic clan relations. If one knowingly got involved with clan brothers, they would avoid direct confrontation, but if they do not know, they do not care.

Even if the interethnic clan relations cannot help to avoid war, they do occasionally help to cope with the consequences of robbery and war. In one seemingly paradoxical case, Rendille who had been attacked by Gabra found refuge with other Gabra who were their clan brothers. There they also received camels by way of compensation for the ones stolen by the other Gabra.

Not only victims of war seek refuge with other ethnic groups, but also people impoverished by livestock diseases, or people in whose own area it failed to rain, the pastures surrounding the water holes are overgrazed, and the livestock is in danger of dying. In this context, interethnic clan relations forge important links between ethnic groups. That does not mean that one automatically becomes member of another ethnic group just by being accommodated by clan brothers. At first, one remains a guest with a foreign language and foreign customs, being from foreign descent. Admission to the host's ethnic group can be performed ceremonially at some point in the future, or it can happen gradually by the force of habit over the years and generations.

For centuries, such changes of ethnic affiliation have happened frequently. Victims of poverty and persecution find refuge with neighbouring ethnic groups. Other people are captured. Generations later, other refugees from war and famine, who know about descendants of a clan brother living with a neighbouring ethnic group, follow them. Nomadic groups also divide into regional grazing communities horizontally to clans, if for instance it has rained in two areas situated at great distance from another. Regional clusters of this kind might suffer a different political and military fate and turn up again in different alliances or ethnic groups. Due to processes of this and other kinds, clans and clan fragments are re-grouped into ethnic groups, which have not previously existed in this form.

An important variable in this re-grouping is the size of the developing entities. Ethnic groups which are too small can be wiped out entirely and might later only be found in the traditions of origin of individual clans among their triumphant neighbours, just like those members of expelled ethnic groups who were left behind. To be able to assert oneself as an independent political entity under the circumstances prevailing in

north Kenya and south Ethiopia requires an ethnic group of a certain size, with sufficient potential for mobilisation. None of the ethnic groups in this area can afford to comprise less than 20 000 members without collaborating with a dominant neighbouring ethnic group, and at the same time accepting their protection as well as the disadvantages resulting from dependence and a lower status. The larger groups also foster alliances with each other (Schlee 1984, 1985, 2000).

The advantages connected to a bigger size are so obvious that one might ask oneself why the most forceful ethnic group of this area has not wiped out, expelled, or assimilated all the others a long time ago. It happens all the time that smaller groups face the option of joining a bigger one or of being annihilated. Why does this process not simply continue until – in a particular area or in any frame of reference whatsoever – there is only one ethnic group left? Which factors are responsible for different ethnic groups continuing to exist next to each other?

6. Costs of Coordination

One factor limiting size is the fact that size is not free of charge. That is true for ethnic groups as well as for any other groups. The costs involved in coordination rise with the number of relations to be fostered. This number, on the other hand, rises exponentially when the size of the group rises arithmetically: Two people have one relation to each other, three people have three relations, four people have six, and five people have ten relations to one another, if each person has one to each other person. Of course, the latter is not the case for large groups, and even for smaller groups only to different degrees. Groups are structured internally: Not every person has direct contact to every other person. This way, the costs of communication remain tolerable, and at the same time possible gaps develop within the group.

The costs of communication depend on the technology of communication. New technologies can make communication cheaper and this way make bigger organisational connections possible. One example for this is the introduction of script. In relation to a constant amount of knowledge, script reduces the costs necessary for efforts of memory and for the passing on of this knowledge. More complex tax systems, as well as political and military organisations based on them, are only made possible by script. By using script, a successful coordination of the activities of a larger number of people becomes possible.[4] States with a bureaucracy usually comprise larger populations than scriptless groups in areas not controlled by a government, not only nominally, but also in terms of perceptible influence. The computer is a major step in the further development of script. The connection between group size and costs of com-

[4] On organisational changes brought about by writing cf. Goody 1987: 54 ff, Assmann 1992.

munication remains the same, only the scale shifts. Problems of communication which might lead to splits emerge without script in case of growth by the thousand, while with script they emerge in case of growth by the million.

7. Control

An important form of communication is the acquisition of knowledge about whether a person receiving any payments or services from another person will render the expected service in return. Furthermore, as someone who performs their share in communal tasks, people would like to know whether everyone else, or those ordered to do so, perform their share as well, and whether the norms agreed on are observed. Another term for this kind of acquisition of knowledge is control. In small groups in which everyone knows everyone by sight, control does not require technological support or special forms of organisation. However, in larger societies, especially in the ones which are not uniform, but internally complex, every member expects a particular kind of behaviour and particular services at particular times from people he does not even know. This requires organisations, which guarantee control. The problem of control intensifies with the increasing size of social entities.

8. Trust

If norms are inspected for their observance and enforced, they are called laws, if not, they are called morals. The place of control for laws is taken by trust or the imposed demand of trust for morals. There are people who regard observance of morals as something higher than law-abidingness enforced by threat of punishment. The problem with morals, however, is that their mode of operation is immoral. They are always beneficial for those who violate them, just as trust is always beneficial for those who break it first.

If we agreed on leaving our cattle in a meagre area and not driving them to where it has rained, so that the grass can regrow there, and I am the only one not keeping to this agreement, then my cattle will eat the best grass. If we agreed on each paying five Euros into a cash-box for coffee, and I do not keep to it, then I am the only one getting the coffee for free. If you trust me to pay back your credit, and I do not, then I have the money and you are left with nothing. Your trust was useful. Only, it was useful for me, not for you.

To compensate for this mode of operation of morals, which is opposed to their objectives, control sneaks into morals, too. Pressure of observation is generated, one's good reputation and the possibility of losing it are appealed to, and social sanctions are imposed. The difference between moral norms and laws disappears to the same degree that this

happens. If the difference is maintained, however, moral always refers to the system of norms less controlled, and more dependent on trust.

If I do not know a person, it is an unreasonable demand to trust him. If, however, I know at least his father, his boss, or clan elders, I have someone to complain to, should the occasion arise. Trust, therefore, not only depends on size or manageability of groups, but also on their internal structuring and hierarchisation. Trust among individuals, among equals, is particularly difficult.

This is valid for international relations. Technically, all nation states are equal and sovereign; none can force another to do something. International jurisdiction is weak and has no staff of enforcement. It can only ask individual nation states or their military alliances to enforce their decisions. Accordingly intensive is the way the states observe one another, as to whether they justify the trust imposed on each other. Frequently, they do not. But even striking violations of norms are often ignored or rhetorically embellished, because it is impossible – or not desirable – to sanction them.

The Somali are another example. The modern state failed again and again there, or showed unforeseen developments. Here, we speak of the conditions under which many Somali still live as distant from the state. There, all male Somali are equal. If one of them is killed, a hundred camels have to be paid as reparation, no matter whether it was a baby or an old man. Does this sum really have to be paid? It has, to escape vengeance. If one's own group is strong enough to repel the strike of revenge or to prevent it by intimidation, then the reparation is not paid. The Somali do have a traditional system of norms and a notion of right and wrong. Only, they do not have a central institution instructed to enforce the rights. The victims have to take care of that themselves. If they are not able to, they are in the right, but they do not get their rights. In this respect, the Somali act like nation states. Clan cohesion is important for the Somalis' ability to assert themselves. Smaller groups join larger ones as *sheegat*, as 'those who name': they name the ancestor of the stronger, allied clan as their own. They become adoptive clan brothers.

Appealing to fraternity creates trust. And trust is beneficial to those who break it first, as we have seen. In Kenya, there are entire clan groups descending from captured women. Darood Somali had joined the Warr Day-Oromo as *sheegat* and grew strong under their protection. When they were strong enough, they massacred their protectors and stole their livestock and their women. That means that mistrust is reasonable, and this divides groups. The reverse effect of morals, i.e. the rewarding of a breach of trust, therefore, also leads to a group mosaic with smaller pieces – and this in a world so hostile, where the advantages of size are so obvious.

It is these analogies between segmentary societies and international systems – both characterised by the absence of law enforcing mechanisms – which have led to cooperation with various law institutes within the Max Planck Society about the theme *Retaliation, Compensation and Punishment: dealing with wrongs with and without super-ordinate institutions.*

9. Sharing Costs

Certain costs decrease in spite of increasing costs of communication and administration with growing group size. The costs of an institution can be divided by the number of those entitled to its use. By way of a tax system the users pay for the institution, and the more other people are involved in this, the cheaper it gets for the individual. This is a decisive reason for the roads in Africa being in a worse condition than the ones in Europe. One kilometre of road is much more expensive per person reached by it in Africa than in Europe. For the building of a modern infrastructure, Africa is underpopulated. Of course, the pleasure of decreasing costs per head fades when the number of users increases to the degree that one gets caught in traffic jams. This leads us to another crucial factor limiting group size: crowding.

10. Crowding

The example used by Hechter (1987) to explain his idea of 'crowding' is a golf club in the country. A large membership in a club reduces the costs for the individual. Membership subscription can be lowered without the financing of the clubhouse or other conveniences being affected. However, if the crowding gets too massive, the leisure value decreases. One has to wait until it is one's turn to play. In the clubhouse service takes longer, the noise level increases, the atmosphere becomes tense. Many of the better-off members of the club will wonder whether it might be preferable to be a member in a smaller, more 'exclusive' club and in return accept a higher club subscription.

The factor of sharing costs favours larger groups until the tolerable limit of the reverse factor, the 'crowding', is reached. On the consumption side, i.e. if the focus is on dividing up benefits brought by an institution, less people involved are preferable, because this way more remains for the individual. To illustrate this connection, we will leave the distinguished surroundings of the golf club and proceed to the less distinguished company of a band of robbers.

11. Distribution of Booty

A band of robbers must be big enough to overpower their victims, to defend their territory and their booty against other gangs, and to face up to the police. If it is not big enough, the members had better join other bands of robbers or recruit members among sons of peasants not

entitled to an inheritance. But once a gang has reached the necessary size, each further yokel turning up and wanting to be admitted to the band is a nuisance. If the band is larger than necessary, the booty has to be shared among more people than were required to make it. Attempts will be made to give less to some persons or to leave them out of consideration. There will be quarrels which will lead to a split (reduction of band size) or maybe even to a gang war (reduction of the total number of robbers). Another possibility is betrayal. A part of the gang gets 'busted', and this way the police is instrumental in reducing one's co-robbers in number.

'Distribution of the booty' as a limiting factor to group size cannot only be applied to bands of robbers:

1. A person who wants to establish a coalition has to assemble 51% of the votes – or maybe some more to be on the safe side, because you never know who will be in bed with influenza during a ballot. To enter into an unnecessarily big coalition, however, would mean to give away posts of ministers to brokers of votes which are not needed for the ballot.[5]

2. An entrepreneur has to consider how many partners he wants to give a share in his venture. If he regards the risk as tolerable, he will want to invest as much of his own capital – or from a manager's perspective, to keep the influence of the organisational areas controlled by himself as high as possible – so that he will have to give away as little as possible of the profit.

3. A conqueror will not want to win more allies than he requires to achieve his military objective. Otherwise he would have to share the conquered area and newly acquired sinecures with persons he did not even need.

Recognition as an ethnic minority is advantageous in many countries. This might concern seats in regional parliaments, or hunting and fishing rights reserved for 'traditional' hunters and fishers, or property rights to old tribal territories, the value of which has increased, because the outskirts of the city have reached them or because mineral resources have been found there, or it might concern a special legal status which permits opening a casino. To be recognised as an ethnic minority, a group must appear in public, must have access to the media, and must bring a certain political influence to bear, for instance in the form of a concentrated vote potential. Even if this does sound paradoxical, a certain group size is necessary to qualify as a minority. If, however, the aspired status is achieved, one will not want to share the acquired resources with too many other persons. There will be a discussion as to whether a blood ratio of one sixteenth is sufficient to identify someone as a member of the minority, or whether it should be insisted on an

[5] The theorem of the 'minimal winning coalition' originates from Riker (1962).

eighth; and as to whether members have to be recognised who do not even know the old language and customs. To use the sociological jargon: efforts of 'purification', 'culturalist discourses', and 'rhetorics of exclusion' can be expected.

The unwillingness to share will be articulated most strongly by those who in case of a splitting have the biggest chance of keeping sole access to, or at least the lion's share of the booty, and who consider themselves payers and not beneficiaries of redistribution to the weaker members. Within states, separatist tendencies are not only to be found in marginalised and exploited areas (which, to stay with the image of the band of robbers, are not members of the gang, but victims), but frequently precisely in areas doing well economically. For the latter, the disadvantages of staying together outweigh those of splitting up. Nobody volunteers to share. One example for a 'strong' area having parted from the rest of the country is Slovenia, the successor state which was the first to free itself from the Yugoslavian confederation. The *Lega Nord* of Italy also is driven by the unwillingness to drag along the economically weak southern part of the country.

Apart from the question whether one wants to give someone else a share of the booty, the question whether one is able to is also important. Post-colonial states in Asia and Africa, often furnished with arbitrary borders, had to fabricate national cohesion with ideological efforts ('nation building'). These states have created elites bound to them by a promise connected with education. Those who attended school, learned the official language, and acquired certain abilities, were sure to find work. Those who went to university could even expect to acquire a leading position in the public sector. This worked for the first generation of graduates of the educational institutions, because the former colonial powers had left many vacancies. The state's rewards for loyalty were occupational opportunities and maintenance payments (Gellner 1995). The second generation of graduates was locked out. The growth, the 'development' promised by politicians, had failed to happen. The stagnating economy had become a zero-sum game: Every person who found a job took it from someone else. This is one of the most important causes for the violent disintegration of states, which we can observe in many parts of the world. Every larger entity must provide the individual (or at least those individuals who are politically influential) with a disproportionately big advantage, otherwise it will disintegrate back into smaller entities. Who cannot pay for loyalty does not deserve it.

12. Niches

Let us assume that the band of robbers visited by us above somehow managed to evade the described tendencies to split. Perhaps a charismatic leader appeared among them who invoked cohesion. The band grew bigger and bigger and undertook one successful raid after the

other. At some point, booty became scarce. The robbers' success petered out. All peasants had already been robbed several times. They were completely impoverished by now and had no more to give. Instead, they asked to be admitted to the gang themselves. Development planners call this the overuse of a resource.

Other examples for an overuse of resources are nomads who, deprived of their mobility, let their cattle graze in the remaining area until the vegetation cover is permanently damaged; farmers who shorten the fallow period and exhaust the soil because of farmland becoming scarce; states who tax their citizens to a degree which makes it impossible for them to develop economically any more. If, however, the robbers do not rob everything and the peasants have something left for the following year, if the cattle eat only as much grass as can regrow, if the farmers succeed in preserving the fertility of the soil, and if the states impose taxes only to the extent that their citizens can continue to lead a productive life and still pay their taxes in the following year, then we call this a 'sustainable use of resources'.

The robbers only have a certain area of roaming around their robbers' castle at their disposal, and they cannot raid peasants living further away without secure retreat and without getting in the way of other gangs. The nomads cannot just move on, because agriculture has spread and other parts of their former pastures have been fenced in by ranchers. The farmers do not have access to primeval forest they could clear any more, and they are also not strong enough to expel other farmers from their land. The states cannot simply conquer other peoples to continue imposing taxes after ruining their own peoples. The lack of domestic economic power will prevent a military success. If all this is the case, and if none of the described alternatives are given, then we speak of limited niches. The robbers, the herders, the farmers, and the states all have to make a living in their respective niches. The use of resources has to be sustainable for the reason that it takes place in limited niches. This is also a factor limiting growth.

Niches are not only limited; they also differ from one another. The concept originates in ecology.[6] Two animal species cannot permanently exist next to each other in exactly the same ecological niche. One of them has an adaptive advantage, however small it may be, it will reproduce more and thereby sooner or later drive out the others entirely. If they do not differ in habitat, they will differ with regard to their food. If they also share the same food, one species will be diurnal, the other nocturnal. Human societies are also able to coexist peacefully if they make use of different niches. In many places, the herders and the farmers are ethnically different: they speak different languages and follow

[6] For Pius Mutie's application of this type of reasoning to Maasai/Kamba relations, see the essay on "Three dyads compared", this volume.

different customs.[7] Ethnic groups have specialised into different occupational niches and this way avoided competition.

13. Trade

A consequence of the differentiation of occupational niches of neighbouring ethnic groups is that each group has something the other one does not have. Trade becomes an important form of interethnic integration.

Between the Maasai and the Kikuyu in pre-colonial Kenya, the differentiation between occupational niches was incomplete.[8] The Maasai (to be exact, only certain groups of Maasai, but those living in close proximity to the Kikuyu) lived as specialised cattle nomads in the plains of the Rift Valley. The Kikuyu had withdrawn to the wooded highlands and cleared fields there. Kikuyu and Maasai therefore took separate occupational niches as farmers and herders. The Kikuyu, however, continued to keep cattle, whereas the Maasai believed God had given all cattle to themselves. In the sector in which the occupational niches were not separated, there was competition, where they were separated, exchange took place.

The relation between Kikuyu and Maasai was characterised by a latent war and concurrent trade. The Kikuyu had an age-group system they had in part copied from the Maasai, and which among the latter had probably developed under east Cushitic influence. Age-group systems spread to enable the filling of continuous areas. They are effective instruments for recruiting units of young men for raids on neighbouring ethnic groups. The latter are forced by this to develop an organisation of this kind themselves, either to defend themselves or to create a balance between robbing and being robbed. (Incidentally, this is how early states spread, too.) The units of the Maasai and the Kikuyu undertook raids aimed at the cattle owned by the respective other ethnic groups. They did not miss an opportunity to capture girls. All males among the enemy were killed. At the same time, there was a kind of market-peace for the women. Kikuyu women could wander to the lowlands undisturbed with their crops in baskets, which were held by a strap across the forehead, to exchange them for animal products.

Trade between the Kikuyu and the Maasai was an exchange of products between producers. Other forms of interethnic relations occur around professional traders, i.e. people who only buy and sell and do not produce themselves. With remarkable frequency, traders are of foreign descent (Stichweh 1992). This is not quite a universal phenomenon, but there are considerably more traders of foreign descent than

[7] For examples see the projects of Dafinger (Fulbe/Bisa), Pelican (different subethnicities of Fulbe versus Grassland Semibantu).

[8] Mutie comes to a similar conclusion with regard to the relationship of the neighbouring Kamba to the Maasai.

tailors, or policemen, not to mention farmers. The Phoenicians in the ancient Mediterranean, the Jews in medieval Europe, the Chinese in South East Asia, Hausa[9] and Lebanese in West Africa (Peleikis 2001, 2003), the Greek in Sudan, Yemeni and Somali in Kenya and Tanzania[10] are all examples for tradespeople who are ethnically different from most of their customers. The historic circumstances which made them become traders are different for each of these examples. However, there seem to be generally applicable factors which favour traders and their customers belonging to different ethnic groups, for this pattern is a frequent one, and it often survives for long stretches of time.

Why is it advantageous as a trader to be a foreigner? Rural societies in many parts of the world are characterised by an ethos of equality and redistribution. The household with many children will delegate work capacity to the one predominated by older people. Everybody who works is fed, and those who cannot work any more are fed, too. If the productivity of the individual households is measured, the result is a jagged curve, if the consumption is measured, a flat curve: due to redistribution, ups and downs are evened out. Risks like illness, pests, and hailstorms are counterbalanced this way. If someone becomes too rich in spite of redistribution, they must not show their wealth. Otherwise they might be suspected of witchcraft or malicious magic: they are said to have the souls of their victims work in their fields during the nights, or the like. They are said to appropriate vital energy of others who in turn awake tired in the mornings or even become ill and die. Rural societies ensure that no individual stands out. If a member of a local peasant ethnic group opens a shop, they cannot evade the demands of general solidarity and the constraints of redistribution. They must grant credits, at least until the next harvest, and that harvest might in the end not have been too good. Bankruptcy is only few months in coming. The constantly repeating fate of rural shops in local hands can be summarised in the lyrics of a verse on a wall:

God made Man.
Man made money.
Money made many men mad.

The trader of foreign descent, on the other hand, is able to evade the constraints of redistribution and does not need to listen to tough luck stories: “Your problem”. In Indian shops in East Africa, there are fre-

[9] The Hausa form one of the ethnic elements of the studies of Pelican and Grätz.
[10] The Somali traders in East Africa frequently stem from soldiers who stem from Somaliland (now studied by Markus Höhne) where they were recruited by the British in colonial times. They comprise World War I veterans. This group in itself and in its offshoots forms an important part of the international Somali diaspora studied by Isir and Günther Schlee (see essay by Glick Schiller et al., this volume).

quently printed pictures on the walls, which express the shopkeepers' philosophy. On one picture, a fat Englishman in old-fashioned, too tight tails is portrayed. He is sitting on an overflowing money chest, and his belly bulges over his belt. He wears a big grin under his top hat. The caption is "I sold for cash". On the picture next to it a gaunt figure in rags can be seen: "I sold for credit." A little further there is a framed motto: "Do not mix friendship with business".

Under Idi Amin, the Indians were expelled from Uganda. The action was disastrous for the country's economy, but it was very popular, supported by the angry masses. Examples of violence against minorities of tradespeople, of murder, robbery, and arson around the world could be given in abundance. The more the traders dissociate from the society of the majority, the more they leave the community of solidarity and protection of this majority. If they integrate too much into this community, however, they become subject to the demands of solidarity and to the constraints of redistribution.

This is what H.-D. Evers (1994) has called a trader's dilemma: If the trader defines himself too much as a foreigner, he risks his life, if he becomes too much a local person, he loses his profit. Tradespeople of foreign descent always live on the edge between these two forms of failure. They have to be foreign enough not to be obliged to grant credit. If they are too similar to the local population, conversions to other religions or sects may occur to create this difference. If the foreignness is not to change into hostility, it has to be counterbalanced by a certain degree of charity. The Aga Khan hospitals and other social institutions might have contributed a lot to the members of the Ima'iliyya sect being accepted in many parts of the world. This way, interethnic relations of this kind continue to be re-balanced.

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
Research Areas of Department I "Integration and Conflict"
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1 Des Moines, Iowa, USA
2 Manchester, New Hampshire, USA
3 Omsk, Russian Federation
4 West Belfast, Northern Ireland, Great Britain
5 England
6 Berlin, Leipzig, Seroop & Halle, Saxony-Anhalt, Germany
7 Germany
8 South-Kazakstan, Kazakstan
9 Shalek, Kazakstan
10 Köhne Ürgench, Turkmenistan & Xo'jayli, Uzbekistan
11 Macedonia
12 Markazmat, Uzbekistan & Aravan, Kyrgyzstan
13 Rumitan, Uzbekistan
14 Kitob, Uzbekistan & Panjakent, Tajikistan
15 Mazar-i Sharif, Afghanistan
16 Cairo, Egypt
17 Mali
18 Chad
19 Burkina Faso
20 Dar Masalit, Chad-Sudanese Border, Chad
21 Northern Benin, Benin
22 Blue Nile Region, Sudan
23 Central Ethiopia, Ethiopia
24 Sierra Leone
25 Northern Cameroon, Cameroon
26 Ghana
27 Sanaag & Sool, Eastern Somaliland, Somaliland
28 Gambela, Ethiopia
29 Ivory Coast
30 North West Cameroon, Cameroon
31 South Ethiopia, Ethiopia
32 Bay & Bakool, Somalia
33 Kenya
34 Jakarta, Indonesia
0 km
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Current Researchers:

Assefa, Getinet Gadena, MA, Addis Abeba 1999 (Indigenous Institutions and Local Development Initiatives: case studies from Gurage area of Ethiopia).
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Research area: 4

Former Staff:

Feyissa, Dereje Dori, PhD, Halle/Saale 2003 (Ethnic Groups and Conflict: the case of Anywaa-Nuer relations in the Gambela region of western Ethiopia).
Current position: COE (Centre of Excellence) Research fellow, Department of Anthropology, Osaka University.
Research area: 28

Nicolas, Andrea, MA, Berlin 1999 (Amhara and Oromo Ethnic Identity in Shewa region of Ethiopia).
Research area: 23

Tadesse, Wolde Gossa, PhD, London 1999 (Warfare and Fertility: a study of the Hor (Arbore) of Southern Ethiopia).
Current position: Programme Officer: the African Rift Valley (Ethiopia), The Christensen Fund, California U.S.A.
Research area: 31

Asia

Orang Betawi, Orang Jakarta, Orang Indonesia. Construction and transformation of ethnic and transethnic identity in Jakarta

Jacqueline Knörr

At the centre of my current research are processes of (re)construction and transformation of cultural identity of both ethnic and transethnic reference in Jakarta, which are taking place primarily in relation to the categories *Orang Betawi*, *Orang Jakarta*, and *Orang Indonesia*.[1] These processes are being investigated in their historical as well as in their current social, cultural and political context.

Orang Betawi and *Orang Jakarta* are the two categories of people to whom Jakartan culture and identity are ascribed and by means of which Jakartan culture and identity are being differentiated. The notions of *Orang Betawi* and *Orang Jakarta* imply concepts of culture and identity, which – although being associated with specific kinds of people – are not restricted to them. Both *Orang Betawi* and *Orang Jakarta* are related – although in different ways – to the concept of *Orang Indonesia*, referring to the national context. Processes taking place with regard to these (interrelated) concepts are linked to questions of (re)configurations of cultural meanings and forms of their social representation.

The Betawi are considered to be the original inhabitants of Jakarta. Many of these people had originally been brought to Jakarta (then Batavia) as slaves by the Dutch colonisers from the 17th century onward. Being descendants of diverse South East and East Asian groups (including large proportions of Indonesians), they created a new culture and identity of their own through processes of creolisation during the period of colonisation. As a group they were long considered backward, unwilling to modernise and anti-urban. Most of them had had little access to modern education during the period of colonisation and stuck to their traditions more than those in closer contact with the colonial elite. Consequently, it was not the original inhabitants of Batavia who came to be the Indonesian elite in Jakarta after independence but rather people of mostly Javanese origin. As unpleasant reminders of colonisation, they were long ignored by both state institutions and other ethnic groups residing in the city. Until the 1970s, especially the urban Betawi were

[1] *Orang* (indon.) = human being, also used as a classifier to mark the following term as being of a human nature (especially if this would otherwise not be clear, as e.g. for the Orang Jakarta). *Betawi* = derived from Batavia (Jakarta), *Asli* (indon., derived from *Asal* (Arabic) = origin, original, indigenous, real -> *Orang Betawi Asli*: the original, real Jakartan. The group of people are called *Orang Betawi* or simply *Betawi*, sometimes also *Orang Jakarta Asli* or *Jakarta Asli*. I only use the classifier *Orang* when emphasising the category of people in relation to other categories of people.

likely to hide their Betawi identity in public due to the negative stereotypes attributed to them. They often ascribed themselves to one of the other ethnic groups in order to decrease social discrimination and achieve upward social mobility.

However, since the early 1970s the Government of the City of Jakarta has changed its attitude toward the Betawi, who have since received both special attention and promotion. Research on their culture was initiated and steps were taken to promote their (folk) culture. Special residential areas were reserved for them in order to maintain their customs and enhance the practice of their traditions. What are the reasons for this change of heart?

I argue that both the state institutions and the Betawi themselves have discovered the social and political integrative potential that lies in the creole concept of Betawi group identity and culture. During the processes of creolisation, many features of the different local cultures – both foreign and indigenous in origin – were incorporated into the emerging culture of the Betawi. This made and still makes it possible even for those not belonging to the Betawi ethnically to identify partly with their culture since traces of their own respective ethnic culture can easily be identified. Also, this mixture of cultural features symbolises common history inasmuch as some of the Betawi's forefathers had at some point in history also been forefathers of others, who were creolised. By promoting Betawi-ness, the State promotes the original inhabitants of the nation's capital without excluding the ethno-historical cultures of the other ethnic groups residing in Jakarta, since they are all somehow part of Betawi-ness. Thus, the notion of Betawi can – more than any other merely ethnic notion – communicate both ethnic and trans-ethnic reference of culture and identity. Thus it emerges as increasingly powerful in the multi-ethnic context both of Jakarta and Indonesia.

Politically more important is the fact that, as a creole group, the Betawi represent a multitude of ethnicities due to their historical background and at the same time demonstrate the capacity of creating one group on the basis of ethnic diversity. This two-fold representation matches the national motto of "Unity in Diversity" (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) – a vital element of the Pancasila state ideology – very well. The Betawi example demonstrates that ethnic diversity does not necessarily have to result in conflict, but, on the contrary, can lead to integration through the development of one common identity. The Betawi are put forward as a body of evidence that "Unity in Diversity" can actually work.

For those in Jakarta who are neither ethnic Betawi nor Javanese nor closely attached to yet another ethnic group, Betawi-ness counterbalances what Niels Mulder (1996) has called "this very vital Javanese-Indonesian mongrel culture" of Jakarta, which, notwithstanding its

vitality, only serves as a potential source of identification for the urban Javanese. Because of the connection of Javanese culture with political power and dominance in the national context, which is especially visible in Jakarta, Javanese culture, mongrel or not, has its negative connotations and as such cannot function effectively as a pool of either urban or national identification for the majority of people living in Jakarta. Betawi-ness, on the other hand, is not (yet) connected with ethno-political predominance – rather the opposite – but mainly with purely cultural and historical features and events. In combination with its creole character, which ascribes to it both ethnic and trans-ethnic reference, it is much more easily accessible as a source of identification for all Jakartans without being a threat to other ethnic identifications. It is an alternative to both this Javanese mongrel culture and to no Jakartan identity at all. Thus, due to its creoleness, Betawi-ness encompasses different ethnic backgrounds as well as specific Jakarta-ness. As such it can serve as a source of both ethnic and trans-ethnic identity for all Jakartans, integrating them as *Orang Jakarta*, a form of self-ascription enjoying increasing popularity.

There are many different medial forms representing the revival and (re)construction of Betawi-ness. The Betawi's contribution to the arts, their role in the maintenance of indigenous culture during the period of colonisation as well as their religious virtues as devout *orang selam*/Muslims are all revalued in the light of *Betawi*-ing Jakarta and, to some degree, nationalising the Betawi. Due to the Betawi's status as the original inhabitants of Jakarta, the Betawi culture also manages to supply the nation's capital with some degree of indigenous and ethnic tradition.

The Betawi themselves make use of their new (privileged) status by eagerly re-interpreting who and what is Betawi in order to increase both their group size and their influence. As a result of the increased awareness of both the neglect they had formerly encountered and of their political potential as the re-discovered *Orang Asli*, the original inhabitants of Jakarta, their commitment is becoming increasingly politicised as well, including demands for positions in the political sphere.

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The Central Asia Group of Department I

Variations on Social Identity and Ethnic Differentiation

Meltem Sancak and Peter Finke

Introduction

The Uzbeks are the most populous group in Central Asia and for geographical and historical reasons occupy a central position in the ethnic configuration of the region. The Central Asia projects of this department try to investigate the causes and consequences of this particular standing by looking at the manifestations of Uzbek identity at various sites (inside and outside of Uzbekistan) and in relation to and demarcation from other indigenous groups.

Islam is often regarded as a binding force among the peoples in Central Asia, although its meaning varies within the region. Uzbeks and Tajiks, who are performing a common ceremony in this picture, have a reputation of being more religious than the formerly nomadic Kazaks, Kyrgyz, and Turkmens. (Photo: M. Sancak , 2001)

This intermediate position probably also contributes to the fact that their ethnogenesis is more complex and contested than that of other groups in the region. Over the centuries, Uzbeks – although in their majority not called by this name – steadily absorbed members of other groups. As a result, Uzbek identity and society exhibit large differences depending on (historical and present-day) local ethnic constellations (cf. Schoeberlein-Engel 1994).


Uzbek Populated Areas in Central Asia
international boundary
national boundary
lake, the sea
research site
areas where Uzbeks form the dominant population
areas where Uzbeks live among other ethnic groups:
K Kazaks
KK Karakalpaks
KG Kyrgyz
T Tajiks
TK Turkmens
P Pashtuns
areas without or with minor Uzbek population
KAZAKSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
IRAN
Shymkent
Marhamat
Aravan
Panjakent
Kitob
Rommitan
Mazar-i Sharif
Xo'jhayli
Köhne Ürgench
N
50°
55°
60°
65°
70°
75°
45°
40°
35°
0 km
500 km

The aim of these projects is to combine a historical approach of looking at the changing importance of various groups over time with an ethnographic account of the meaning identities and group affiliations have for people in everyday life situations. External forces of assimilation and individual motives of changing one's identity have to be weighed carefully against each other. Furthermore, a formal change of group membership is not equivalent to a change of one's identity as a personal attachment to others. Attributing identity solely to overwhelming power and/or calculative self-interest does not pay sufficient attention to cognitive and ideological aspects.

Historical and Political Background

The arbitrariness of Soviet nation-building policy has been well described in the literature. From this point of view, it seems to be a miracle that the dissolution of the world's largest state did not end in bloody confrontations between various artificially created ethnic groups. In some way, the national delimitation project seems to have been successful.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union borders acquired a new physical meaning. Because Tajikistan and Uzbekistan mutually closed their borders, inhabitants of the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley (one third of the state's population) have only one road for travelling to other parts of the country. In winter the road is often closed after snowfalls. (Photo: P. Finke, 2001)

This is most striking in the case of the Uzbeks. In spite of their mixed origin (cf. Baldauf 1991), the various groups readily took part in a process of 'Uzbekisation', which proved to be more compelling than other, similar attempts. The modern Uzbeks thus became successor and fulfillers of an ongoing process of Turkification, which characterised the history of the region for the last one thousand years. Being Turkic-speaking but at the same time adapting to an Iranian-originated cultural pattern – as the Uzbeks exhibit in contrast to other Turkic groups –

proved to be highly advantageous over the centuries. At the same time, the relatively vague definition of this concept made ethnic conversions easier than in the case of, e.g., tribally organised societies like the Kazak or Turkmen (cf. Finke 2003).

The current process of nation-building in post-Soviet Uzbekistan can, to some degree, be considered as being grounded in this hybrid character of Uzbekness. Unlike neighbouring states, no aggressive ethnic policy is pursued. Instead, the multi-ethnic population of Uzbekistan is described as the incarnation of all previous civilisations in Transoxania. The choice of specific national heroes and symbols, often following Soviet politics, emphasises the common cultural heritage of different groups – explicitly including pre-Uzbek periods – rather than ethnic diversity and competition.

Objectives and Hypothesis

Since 1969, when Fredrik Barth published his *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, anthropologists became increasingly aware that ethnic identity may not be strongest in the centre but rather at the edges of any particular group, where it interacts with other groups. The Uzbek case – comparable to that of the Fulbe throughout West Africa (cf. Diallo and Schlee 2000) – is an excellent opportunity to study this claim as they settle in the geographical centre of former Soviet Central Asia and constitute the major minority in all of Uzbekistan's neighbouring states. This provides an opportunity to compare the various manifestations of Uzbekness in different settings with each of the different ethnic constellations and socio-economic conditions.

It will be shown that ethnic identity, but also cultural expressions and social organisation, vary in each setting in accordance with the respective components which contributed to the local manifestation of Uzbekness. In each case different variables should lead to a unique formulation of collective identities and the composition of social networks.

Another aspect to be investigated by this group of researchers is that of the relative attractiveness of various identities. Over the centuries, the cultural pattern that today is primarily represented by the Uzbeks – namely Turkic-speaking, sedentary, and (more or less) devote Muslim – came to be a rather successful one. As an intermediate between Turkic-speaking pastoralists and Iranian-speaking peasants and urban dwellers, being Uzbek provided the maximum number of potential interactors.

The assimilation of many Tajiks and members of other (ethnic) groups taking place in Uzbekistan is merely one case in this broader picture. It is the aim of our project to check this hypothesis by looking at the situation in places where Uzbeks form a minority and/or not the titular group. Evidence from the field suggests that even in these cases people tend to become Uzbek rather than the other way round. This is

especially the case in multi-ethnic settings where Uzbekness provides an advantage because of its hybrid character and its relatively easy accessibility. Its transmission is primarily a question of cultural behaviour and territoriality rather than of genealogical connections.

Many studies on ethnicity tend to focus on the interaction patterns between various actors and their utilisation of social borders or permeability for that purpose. This approach underestimates the importance of emotional and ideological attachments people may have to specific groups. The usual explanation of ethnic boundaries as either primordial or instrumental fails to integrate these aspects into one coherent model. In our research we try to enhance approaches grounded on the analysis of self- and group-interests (e.g. Hechter 1987; Landa 1998) by taking the historical and political frame as well as the cognitive dispositions of the actors involved more into account.

In the oasis of Bukhara Uzbeks and Tajiks have intermarried for centuries. Today, it is hardly possible to find any family that is not of mixed ancestry. Most individuals are also bilingual. (Photo: M. Sancak, 2000)

Research Conducted in Uzbekistan

So far, research has been concentrated on Uzbekistan. Starting in 2000, Meltem Sancak and Peter Finke have conducted field research in four different sites, each located in one of the historic oases of the country and each peculiar in terms of ecological and economic endowment, historical events, and ethnic configuration. Together, the four cases provide a representative cross-cut into the complexity of identity formation in Uzbekistan.

The primary field sites thus far have been the oasis of Bukhara (Buxoro) and the Ferghana valley, with secondary sites in northern Kashkadarya province and the southern part of the Republic of Kara-

kalpakistan. Each of these locations highlights a particular aspect of Uzbek ethno genesis and identity. Like the Bukhara oasis which is famous for the close intermingling of Uzbeks and Tajiks. Cultural differences are hardly recognisable, neither in emic nor in etic perspective. As both groups tend to intermarry very frequently and to be bilingual, they may be consi dered one common (though bilingual) social entity.

In other settings, like the Ferghana valley, the situation is characterised more by differentiation and competition, although it is far from being on the edge of civil war or widespread Islamic fundamentalism, as it is often portrayed in the media and some scientific reports. Scarcity of land and high population density, however, contribute to the image of tense and potentially violent social interaction. Again, however, ethnic demarcations do not necessarily play a very prominent role in this.

Northern Kashkadarya presents a very different picture. This is one of the regions where formerly nomadic Uzbeks still form a significant and distinct part of the population. The old-established sedentary Uzbeks prefer to interact with local Tajiks instead of what they consider a culturally backward group. Social boundaries may be more clearly defined than in the Bukhara case, but are characterised by niches rather than competition.

A Turkmen family in southern Karakalpakistan. Ethnic minorities in Central Asia are under increasing pressure to adapt themselves to the new nation states. At the same time, interactions with co-ethnics on the other side of the borders, who are very often kin related, have often become difficult. (Photo: P. Finke, 2001)

Finally, southern Karakalpakistan, situated in the heart of the historic Khorezm, has a very mixed population, with Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Kazaks, and Turkmens accounting for similar percentages. With the exception of the latter, who are marginalised, all groups form one social (and

partly linguistic) field, although intermarriage is not as common as in Bukhara. The experience of the ecological and economic crises in the Aral Sea basin and the fact that they are being ignored by the central government unites people rather than placing them in opposition to one another.

Future Research Interests: the Uzbek 'diasporas'

These findings will be tested by looking at Uzbek minorities abroad, that is, outside of Uzbekistan. Uzbeks constitute the major indigenous minority in all neighbouring countries, i.e. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. In many cases, these minorities form local majorities. In addition to that, smaller Uzbek diasporas are found in Russia, Turkey, and other places like China (Xingjiang), where Dru Gladney has identified the contribution he wants to make to this comparative effort.[1] In 2003, Tsypylma Darieva started her project on Uzbek identity in the province of South Kazakstan. Other researchers at the MPI for Social Anthropology, namely Johan Rasanayagam, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Irene Hilgers, Julie McBrien, and Mathijs Pelkmans from Department II, are engaged in an intensive mutual exchange of ideas with us and are studying complementary aspects within Uzbekistan as well as in neighbouring states.

The central question for future research will be if the described process of Uzbekisation is reversed in other countries (i.e. if minority Uzbeks associate themselves with the respective majority). Fragmentary impressions of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan lead to the conclusion that the Uzbek minority in both states has distanced itself from the respective titular nation. There is little assimilation in either way, although if so, it is again in the direction of Uzbekness. This is even more the case in parts of Tajikistan (Bashiri 1998).

The assimilation of Uzbeks by the respective titular nation is hampered by several factors. Firstly, it seems that there is little desire to assimilate on the part of the Uzbeks since no great advantages are at hand, and culturally it would represent, from the Uzbek point of view, a step backwards. Secondly, groups like the Kazaks and Kyrgyz are not

[1] Dru Gladney, Professor of Asian Studies and Anthropology at the University of Hawaii, has been at the MPI for Social Anthropology from May 2003 to January 2004. His stay was co-financed by Departments 1 and 2. He has worked here on his new book (Gladney 2003). Dru Gladney opposes the widespread representation of non-Han groups as marginalised minorities in China. He locates China and Chinese culture not in some unchanging, essential "Chinese-ness," but in the context of historical and contemporary multicultural complexity. He investigates how this complexity plays out among a variety of places and groups, examining representations of minorities and majorities in art, movies, and theme parks; the invention of folklore and creation myths; the role of pilgrimages in constructing local identities; and the impact of globalisation and economic reforms on non-Han groups such as the Muslim Hui. In the end, Gladney argues that just as peoples in the West have defined themselves against ethnic others, so too have the Chinese defined themselves against marginalised groups in their own society.

exercising much pressure in this respect. The conception of group association and identity transmission is in both cases to a high degree influenced by genealogical aspects, which impedes the incorporation of others.

It is intended to study the way Uzbeks conceptualise their social identity and their embeddedness in local settings when they do not represent the dominant titular group. The sites for this part of the project will include regions where Uzbeks are part of the indigenous population, as in southern Kyrgyzstan, northern and western Tajikistan, southern Kazakstan, northern Turkmenistan, and northern Afghanistan. In each of these, it is expected, will Uzbekness achieve a different meaning as it contrasts and articulates itself within a particular setting. The same is true for diaspora locations where Uzbeks came as refugees during the early 20th century or as travelling merchants in the post-Soviet period.

The bazaar in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, has always been a major trading post also for people from neighboring Uzbekistan. Now that economic politics draw apart and border crossing is getting more and more difficult, this is also changing. Both states follow different transformation approaches, which leave their impact not only on the bazaar but also in everyday life economic decisions.
(Photo: P. Finke, New Year 2000/2001)

Altogether it is hoped, this cluster of projects will analyse the different variables that account for the respective manifestation of ethnic identities and its internal variations. Political, economic, and demographic factors clearly play an important role in this, but so do cognitive, ideological, and emotional ones. The concept of being Uzbek, broadly defined, provides an excellent case for this because the internal heterogeneity of the group as well as the heterogeneity of the locations they inhabit make a broad comparison of factors and ethnic constellations possible.

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Uzbek Ethnicity between Loyalty and Conflict in South Kazakstan and Russia

Tsypylma Darieva

This project is divided into two phases and deals with interethnic relationships and identity options among urban Uzbeks in Kazakstan and Russia. The first phase of the research concentrates on the Uzbek minority in South Kazakstan, while the second serves as a contrast field for comparison and deals with the Uzbek migrants and trade minority in Russia. The aim of the comparative analysis of two case studies in different settings is to understand different social spaces of Uzbek identity and how they affect interaction between minority and national majority in poly-ethnic everyday life. Uzbeks as well as other ethnic groups face changing administrative frames in both settings. Especially post-Soviet Kazakstan has experienced rapid and profound political and social changes which forced the government to redefine national identity politics and reshape its relationship with ethnic minorities. Since in 1991 in a period of a forced process of nation building in Kazakstan, Uzbeks have experienced contested redefinitions of their status and belonging between 'autochtonous population', 'ethnic minority' and 'diaspora'.

The main question of this project is how Uzbeks as an expatriate minority in Kazakstan perform and negotiate their identity in everyday life in terms of a growing tendency towards nationalisation in the host country and isolation from the homeland Uzbekistan. How do the rhythms of ethnic amity and enmity interact in urban space where residence, work, travel, communication and consumption bring people into constant contact? How is the notion of *Uzbekchilik* reproduced outside of the territory of the national homeland? With reference to strategies of integration into the identity of the majority, the question is which elements of identity markers are mobilised or 'played down' in private and public spaces, and how does this occur? How does this influence the strategy of identity representation? The next topic of study concerns the question of the idea of construction of homeland memories in localities and how it is transmitted or not transmitted through generations. How are the locally produced myths of a contested homeland, its symbolic landscape and attributes related to regional, national and transnational borders? The third theme are transethnic connections such as trans-Islam and trans-Turkic identity options and how they affect local interethnic relationships. These points are of interest because they carry the integrative power for the construction of common Islamic and Turkic identifications. The comparative analysis should contribute to the anthropological theory of a production of urban ethnicity, Central Asian multiculturalism and nation-diaspora identities.

The ideal of the new Kazakhstani 'interethnic harmony' is depicted in government publications. At the centre of the picture, which gives the impression of a family portrait, is the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, dressed in European costume. He is surrounded by a group of children in 'ethnic look' costumes representing different ethnic minorities. The state tries to promote the concept of ethnic diversity with the purpose of maintaining peaceful ethnic relationships. The model of relations in the 'multicultural family' of Kazakhstan between the titular ethnic group and other ethnic groups seems to have a rather hierarchical paternalistic character. (Photo: A. A. Amirova (comp.), published as title photograph of Mezhetnickeskie otnosheniia v Kazakshstane. Almaty: Tsentr vneshnei politiki i analiza, 2001)

Europe

Lost Objects: ethnicity, consumption and gendered spaces in Macedonia

Rozita Dimova

This new postdoctoral research project will focus on the local and transnational processes that have led to ethnic conflict in Macedonia among people divided along religious (orthodox Christian vs. Muslim), ethnic (Macedonian vs. Albanian), class, and gender axes. The study will document the reformulation of class, ethnicity, and gender since the constitution of independent Macedonia in 1991 when both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians experienced losses of privileges along class, ethnic, and gender lines. For Macedonians it is the disappearance of the 'working class' prevalent during the communist Yugoslav Federation that has caused loss of class privileges such as a state-sponsored, comfortable lifestyle. The unprecedented pauperisation of most of the people and the conspicuous presence of a few nouveau-riche, manifested by a conceited display of commodities, has changed the social and physical space between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in contemporary Macedonia, which has, in turn, engendered strong ethnic tension. For Albanians, the presence of young college-educated Albanian women has changed the cultural fabric of the traditional Albanian family. Many newly-educated women, for instance, now earn more than the men in their households and reject traditional values such as having a collective family budget, or accepting arranged marriages with Albanian men only. Because women are still viewed as the bearers of Albanian culture, due to their reproductive (biological and social) function, fear of losing their culture and lineage has been fostered among the male Albanian elite. My project seeks to unravel how the articulation of class and gender losses affects ethnic tension in the country.

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Simultaneity of Migrant Incorporation: Halle/Saale (Germany) and Manchester (USA)

Nina Glick Schiller, Evangelos Karagiannis, Ayse Çaglar, Thaddeus Guldbrandsen

Through a comparative ethnography of the transnational ties and migrant incorporation in two small cities of approximately 200 000 residents, Manchester, New Hampshire in the United States and Halle/Saale in Saxony-Anhalt in Germany, we are exploring three interrelated hypotheses: 1. multiple forms of transnational connection accompany rather than preclude or inhibit the adaptation and integration of international migrants into a new nation state; 2. migrants develop processes of simultaneous incorporation and transnational connection regardless of the specific legal status they carry in the receiving society, the official public policies that regulate migration, and the way newcomers are conceptualised in specific national ideologies; and 3. migrants from different nation-states in diverse and very different world regions and cultural backgrounds will seek simultaneous incorporation and transn ational connection.

The object of our research is to better understand migrant simultaneity, defined as multiple incorporation. At the same time that members of migrant populations and their descendents foster or construct social networks across state borders, they also actively become incorporated into a new locality. Incorporation, in our approach, is a process of building social relationships so that an individual becomes embedded in multiple and diverse networks. That is to say, these individuals set up social relationships by means of which they fit into overarching systemic connections established through daily activities and institutions that structure life in the new locality and across borders. This form of connection reflects a concept of integration developed by Schlee (2001:43). This view of incorporation challenges the way in which migrant integration is commonly conceptualised within German discourse and public policy about *Ausländer*. These discourses stress that it is only through a form of cultural change that foreigners can become a part of Germany. Public discourses in the US stress multicultural assimilation or the need to revitalise some form of an assimilationist project, while US scholars document transnational connections. However in the US, the topic of simultaneity is only now being addressed by researchers and is not part of policy debates about migration.

Both Halle/Saale and Manchester are experiencing a new wave of migration from all over the world. We have chosen to explore the incorporation of migrants from six different nationality groups that can be found in both cities: Vietnamese, Russians, Iraqis, Congolese, Bosnians, and Nigerians We cannot assess the extend to which whole populations of migrants manifest simultaneity. We can document the existence of

simultaneity among diverse populations and in two very different receiving societies, contributing to a very different understanding of the dynamic between migrant settlement and transnational connection.

The project builds on two years of previous exploratory fieldwork in both locations by Nina Glick Schiller that explored small cities and their institutional structures as contexts for new migrations. Prior research was funded by grants from the University of New Hampshire and institutional support from the MPI of Social Anthropology. The current project, which begun in Manchester in January 2003 and in Halle/Saale in March 2003, is funded by the MacArthur Foundation, USA, under a human security initiative. We posit that immigrants and refugees are unacknowledged but vital actors in maintaining and building human security in a global context of increasing economic disparities and civil disorder. Migrant networks sustain local communities all over the world through family support, funds, skills, and resources for agriculture and business, local development, health, and educational projects. However, this sustaining of home communities by migrants does not mean that they resist incorporation within the new lands in which they live.

In our understanding, migrants may be incorporated locally and transnationally through institutions or individually. To explore institutional incorporation, we are examining religious organisations in Halle/Saale and Manchester and their transnational connections. To research individual incorporation, we are identifying three households in each group and tracing the daily activities and personal relationships of the members of these households. Our indicators of individual incorporation, locally or transnationally, include: 1. Relationships that maintain life including activities that produce income, educate, house, or provide social support. 2. Relationships that provide legal status. 3. Membership in social institutions rooted locally or nationally. 4. Relationships that maintain or provide social status.

We are using both participant observation and interviews as research methods. Researchers in this project include four anthropologists, Nina Glick Schiller, Evangelos Karagiannis, Ayse Çaglar, Thaddeus Guldbrandsen, and student researchers drawn from the Institute for Social Anthropology of Martin Luther University and the University of New Hampshire.

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Ghanaians in Germany – transnational social fields and social status

Boris Nieswand

Ghana has become one of the major African countries of migration to Western Europe and North America over the last 40 years. Stimulated by economic and social crises from the late 1960s to the end of the 1980s, many Ghanaians left the country to look for better opportunities abroad. Although most Ghanaian migrants live in African countries, during the 1980s and 1990s significant Ghanaian populations emerged in Great Britain, Canada, the USA, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. Ghanaians make up one of the biggest sub-Saharan African populations in Western Europe (Ter Haar 1998). According to official figures, more than 23 000 people with a Ghanaian passport live in Germany today.[1] The great majority of Ghanaians came between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. During this time Germany, was relatively attractive for migrants claiming asylum because of its relatively liberal procedures and its labour opportunities. After 1993 the inflow of Ghanaian migrants was reduced significantly by the restrictive migration policy implemented by the German government. Over the last decade, the large majority of the Ghanaians have secured their legal status.

Migrant House in Ghana - a symbol of success. (Photo: B. Nieswand, 2003)

A 'localising process' has started which expresses itself in the form of family foundation, the emergence of afro-shops and Ghanaian initiated churches. Ghanaian migrants' life-worlds with their own institutions have emerged in many larger German cities.

[1] Bundesamt für Statistik (2002).

From 'Brain Drain' to 'Diaspora' – A paradigm shift in the discourse on migration in Ghana

In the 1990s, it was estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of Ghanaian citizens were living abroad (Peil 1995: 365), which would correspond to between two and four million people based on the current size of the Ghanaian population. In particular, it was qualified people such as teachers, engineers, nurses and doctors who left the country, which had a negative impact on its economic and social system. But migration also has a positive effect on Ghanaian society. As in other emigration countries, remittances of and trade relations with migrants have become more and more important for the economic development of Ghana and the well-being of many families. One indicator of the importance of Ghanaian migrants for their homeland is the volume of remittances. In 2000, it was estimated that the value of remittances came to between $300 and $400 million.[2] After cocoa, gold and tourism, remittances are the fourth largest source of foreign exchange.[3] The economy of Ghana is dependent on this financial input. The importance of the relatively wealthy migrants in the 'diaspora' and the need to strengthen their attachment to the home country has been recognised by political and social elites in Ghana: the patriotism of Ghanaians abroad should be used as a resource for 'developing' the country. In the context of a policy of inclusion, Ghanaian politicians and some of the so-called traditional authorities have started to travel quite frequently to meet 'their people' abroad.[4] These acts of including the Ghanaians abroad are a symbolic statement: all Ghanaians, in Ghana and abroad, should participate in the 'Ghanaian development project'. In this respect, Ghana has become a deterritorialised nation-state. After independence in 1957, the official political doctrine was that Ghanaians are the people living in Ghana. Now it seems to have been reversed; Ghana is wherever Ghanaians live. The discourse about migration has changed significantly. In the 1980s it was dominated by brain drain. Migrants were officially perceived as people leaving their country in the lurch in difficult times. Additionally, the fact that these migrants were claiming asylum in other countries was perceived as shameful for the country and migration acquired connotations of political opposition. Now, the dominant policy of inclusion is accompanied by a nationalist discourse that regards migration as a possible means of supporting the Ghanaian nation-state project. Migration has changed from being a threat to being a resource for the country.

[2] Corporate Ghana. The pulse of the Nation (2001), July/August, 9, p.18.

[3] In fact, the significance of migrants is probably even greater because not all remittances are covered by official figures and a large part of what is regarded as tourism is actually migrants returning for home visits.

[4] Normally these events are connected with fund-raising activities.

The Paradox of Migration – living in two life-worlds

After Ghanaian independence in 1957, migration to Europe was dominated to a great extent by state-sponsored students. The new state was involved in a 'project of modernity' and the future elite, the 'fortunate few' (Clignet/Foster 1966), were to be educated abroad and to return to take up important positions in society.

During the period of economic decline and political crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, migration ceased to be a state undertaking and became an individual attempt to get out of the system. The remittances migrants send home regularly and the cars, money, nice clothes and consumer goods they bring with them on their visits have a clear message: if you want to improve your standard of living and if you want to participate in a symbolic modernity, go abroad. "*To look for greener pastures*" is a common expression in Ghana to refer to the act of leaving the country for economic reasons. Migration has become more and more important as a means of status production. The more the local status system is integrated into the global system, both by family members living abroad sending remittances and by the liberalisation of the Ghanaian market, the more individuals have to get involved in the global system in order to maintain or to improve their position in the local status system. Integration into a wider global system is evidenced by the consumer goods sold on the local markets and by visible manifestations of success, like cars, clothes and houses, which are associated with migrants.

Going to the global centres is equated in Ghana with a gain of status, which has to be performed at home.

To use Goffman's stage metaphor (1990), Europe is the backstage, where you may stop performing social status in order to accumulate money to perform your social status at home, which was itself achieved by travelling to Europe. This leads, in fact, to the consequence that many migrants who are not able to fulfil the expectations of their families do not go home.[5] The 'silent collaboration' between migrants and their friends and family members 'at home' reproduces and maintains a social reality in which migration is equated with prosperity and access to global modernity.[6] Both sides keep silent about the backstage, the means of image-production.

In Germany Ghanaians experience marginalisation in different ways. Coming to Germany means becoming 'socially coloured'. Most of the Ghanaians in Berlin have problems finding a job fitting their qualifica-

[5] It also explains why deportation is such a serious social catastrophe. It is not only because people get humiliated or hurt by violent procedures, but also because they are not able to save face at home.

[6] Because of the disparities of wages and currencies, migrants in fact are acquiring wealth according to the Ghanaian standard by doing menial jobs in Europe. A secondary school teacher in Ghana, for instance, earns, converted into Euro, about 60 € and he is not perceived as poor.

tion and are forced to take on work which they would not take on in Ghana. Moreover, the asylum procedure through which a large number of the Ghanaians in Germany have gone has produced "spoiled identities" (Goffman 1986). Finally, the language skills of the Ghanaian migrants are devalued.

To put it briefly, I would like to argue that we can only understand the "life-world" of migrants if we acknowledge the "simultaneous incorporation" (Glick Schiller/ Fouron 1999:344) of migrants into two societies and two social status reference systems. The migrants are perceived as socially successful, modern and wealthy in the Ghanaian context and *at the same time* as backward, poor and marginalised in the German one. The gaining of status in one context is achieved by a loss of status in the other. This is what I would like to call the 'paradox of migration': living in two status systems with contradictory attributions of prestige at the same time, a condition which is deeply rooted in the process of migration itself. Because the site of status production is not the site of consumption, there is a structural incentive to maintain integration in both systems. Local migrants' organisations with a transnational orientation are of crucial importance for processing the 'paradox of migration'. During my fieldwork I became interested in two kinds of institutions; the churches and the Ghana Union.



Religious poster published by Abikorm Productions, Nigeria.

Processing the Paradox (I): Localising 'long distance nationalism'

The Ghana Union started in Berlin in the 1980s as a support and advocacy organisation for Ghanaians, who were suffering under an increase of police activity against asylum seekers and illegal migrants in Berlin. In the second half of the 1990s the Ghana Union stopped its work, partly because more and more migrants were successful in securing their legal position. When the Ghana Union was re-established in 2001, its orientation was significantly different.

One important reason to reactivate the Union was to provide a contact organisation for the representatives of the Ghanaian nation-state, who became, within the framework of their policy of incorporation, increasingly active among Ghanaian migrants world-wide. The Ghanaian em-

bassy in Germany expressed its wish for an organisation which would be able to link them up with migrants in Berlin. The new government wanted to display its democratic and transparent attitude to the 'Ghanaian diaspora'. By doing so, it tried to connect the attachment of the migrants to their families and their home-contexts with the interests of the nation-state. The paradoxical status link that bridges the two life-worlds should become discursively 'nationalised'. In a time of decreasing development aid, migrants and their remittances are becoming more and more important for the financial well-being of many so-called 'Economically less Developed Countries'. This is well noticed by the Ghanaian government and transferred into political practices. In Berlin, many migrants are interested in participating in meetings with Ghanaian officials because they are gaining symbolic recognition and promoting migrant specific interests (i.e. customs regulation, double citizenship, etc.). Additionally, by reinforcing their national identity, their individual projects are reintegrated into a collective project of national development. Within this discourse it is possible to overcome the implicit accusation of leaving their country and the people at home in the lurch. Meeting the president or the ambassador conveys the impression that these migrants are well respected people whose project of migration is individually and collectively successful. Inside this transnational social field, the status ascriptions are rearranged in a way which temporarily factors out the described paradox of migration.

Processing the Paradox (II): Charismatic Christianity and the construction of identity

The denominational structure of Ghanaian-initiated churches in Germany is very heterogeneous. Quantitatively, Charismatic churches are the most important churches among Ghanaians in Berlin. One reason for this is their significance in the context of the construction of identity.

Within these churches a strong emphasis is placed on a practical and rhetorical modernist discourse that deals with central experiences of migration, reflects them religiously and empowers the believer to further action. On the one hand, the Charismatic churches stabilise migrants' identities, because they construct a symbolic background against which migrants can experience themselves as 'modern' and 'successful' and communicate this to relevant others. On the other hand, the empowerment and prosperity discourse of these churches promises to provide believers with the spiritual means to overcome the symbolic, material and legal obstacles to the affirmation of the constructed self-image.

The ambivalence of this discourse – caught between the individual claim of participation in a symbolically constituted modernity and the reality of not having achieved this completely – reflects the Ghanaian paradox of migration – being a 'successful migrant-entrepreneur' and a

'marginalised poverty-migrant' at the same time – and promises to overcome it.

Religious and national identities provide possibilities for the construction of self for the migrants, with which they are able to reinterpret themselves in the context of migration. Although these religious and national sets of identities provide "a field of situational identification to an intelligent actor" (Schlee 2000: 5) in everyday life, on an organisational level, Charismatic Christianity competes with national identity discourses under the condition of migration for the same resources (i.e. membership, money, dominance in the local arena). The success of Charismatic Churches among Ghanaian migrants may also be linked to the process of becoming disenchanted with the Ghanaian nation-state as the agent of the development and modernity Ghana has experienced over the last decades.

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The People Themselves: the everyday making of ethnic identity in discourse and practice in the context of conflict in West Belfast, Northern Ireland

Olaf Zenker

Northern Ireland has become almost synonymous with conflict and violence, especially outside the region and in world media coverage. It is thus not surprising that the 'Troubles', as the conflict is locally known, have constituted a dominant theme of research within the social sciences. As McGarry and O'Leary convincingly argue in their seminal work *Explaining Northern Ireland* (1995), this conflict is rooted in a variety of differences regarding aspirations of political belonging, ethnic identities, religious backgrounds and practices as well as economic ine-

qualities – despite the fact that the Troubles are quite often inappropriately reduced to a single factor and then simply depicted, for instance, as a 'religious war' between Catholics and Protestants. Against this backdrop, the conventional labelling of the two conflicting communities as 'Catholics' and 'Protestants' is not to be misunderstood as referring only to religion as the underlying cause of their Troubles.

Given the preoccupation with conflict in the media as well as in research, ethnicities in the North of Ireland have almost invariably come to be seen as essentially conflicting ones. In other words, by focussing on the Troubles as the phenomenon to be explained, local ethnic identities such as 'Irish', 'British', 'Northern-Irish', 'Ulster', etc. have tended to be regarded as rather unproblematic givens, which partly or exclusively explain the conflict precisely because they are assumed to be intrinsically in conflict. Although this dominant focus on 'ethnicities in conflict' has provided valuable insights into the situation in Northern Ireland, it has also tended to somewhat misrepresent the overall picture by highlighting the perspective of only one rather radical but articulated fraction of Northern Irish society. This fraction consists primarily of male working class members, who have been disproportionately involved in the regional conflict, both as perpetrators and as victims. Without negating the importance of this perspective, it is vital, however, to take other local perspectives into account that do not frame ethnicity and conflict in the same way. In other words, when investigating local ethnic identities rather than the Troubles as the phenomenon to be explained, as this research project does, it seems preferable to treat the Northern Irish conflict as a crucial context, to which the making of ethnicity relates in diverse ways, rather than as its ultimate 'essence'.

In addition to this bias towards conflicting ethnicities within the research on Northern Ireland, another preoccupation which is more directly linked to recent studies of local identities can be identified. This literature predominantly focuses on discursive constructions of identity, and thereby (often implicitly) treats 'practice' as a mere enactment of these conceptions. However, it is arguably more plausible, in theoretical terms as well as closer to empirical observation, to conceptualise the discursive and the practical levels as only partially independent phenomena, which mutually shape one another without either being reducible to the other. In this sense, both 'discursive consciousness' and 'practical consciousness' have to be investigated in their dialectical relationship regarding their impact on the everyday making of ethnic identities.



This research project aims to overcome these two shortcomings, first, by shifting the focus of investigation from the rather small group of key players in the Troubles such as political parties, state officials, communal leaders and paramilitaries to the broad category of 'the people themselves'. In other words, ordinary and more representative people with divergent backgrounds in terms of class, gender, and age are seen as constituting the relevant point of reference for studying the everyday

production of ethnicity. However, this characterisation has to be qualified. Given that the city of Belfast is highly segregated in terms of religious background, and since West Belfast as the research location for everyday participant observation is almost exclusively Catholic, 'the people themselves' are correspondingly likely to be Catholics only. It is in this sense that the term 'Catholics' is used in the following to demarcate the reference group which is studied regarding its ethnic identities.

Second, the project seeks to focus specifically on the dialectics between discourse and practice in constituting local ethnicities and in making the latter relevant in different social contexts. In operationalising the latter point, two complementary research questions can be derived: First, in what sense do practices within the whole range of everyday activities contribute to 'practical identities', and to what extent, by whom, when and why do these 'practical identities' become represented within ethnic discourses? Second, what kind of ethnic discourses do exist, by whom, when and why are they constructed and activated, and in what sense do these 'discursive identities', in turn, structure and orient everyday practices?

Translating this general approach into a concrete research programme, the project scrutinises everyday discourses and practices among Catholics in West Belfast within several dimensions of social life in terms of their interrelations to ethnic identities. Within the political dimension, the conflict in general and everyday experiences of violence in particular is, of course, of great importance. One process, which can be singled out exemplarily here, consists of the effects of the recent peace process. On the one hand, the constitutional and violent struggle during the Troubles has led to a degree of factual reduction of structural discrimination against Catholics and to crucial concessions on the part of the British government in terms of acknowledging the right of political self-determination of the Northern Irish people. On the other hand, the political process of peace talks and mutual convergence has also resulted in broad public recognition, even among many Republican hardliners, that the political unification of Ireland is not an immediate option. How does this ambiguity of political success and failure feed into the present making of ethnic identities? Does this situation weaken the nationalist project of Catholics and does this, in turn, lead to a diversification of ethnic self-ascriptions among them? Does perhaps ethnic identity as such become less important in everyday life – both in discourse and in practical experience?

In the economic dimension, recent class developments deserve particular attention for on the one hand, the decline of the local manufacturing sector in the 20th century has led to general economic hardship in terms of high levels of long-term unemployment, particularly among the traditionally dominant working classes. On the other hand, this situation has somewhat changed and become more heterogeneous since

the imposition of direct rule by the British government in 1972. This is so because the British government has since then dramatically increased public expenditure and thereby employment opportunities in the public sector. It has furthermore adopted an interventionist policy, providing substantial assistance to private companies in the province. This policy has allowed an upward social mobility for a considerable minority of both Protestants and Catholics, resulting, for example, in the emergence of a significant Catholic middle class. Yet, the majorities of both working classes have remained unaffected by these changes, and hence been largely left to their economic hardship. These developments have several implications for the making of ethnic identities among Catholics: how does the emergence of a Catholic middle class transform the formerly strong link between the Republican project and ideals of a socialist world order? Does upward mobility lead to a more moderate stance in terms of political aspirations and, by implication, of ethnic identities? Does the recent increase in class differentiation diminish the relative importance of cross-class ethnicity among Catholics – in other words, is perhaps class becoming more important than ethnicity?

In the religious dimension, the distinction between Catholics and Protestants is obviously fundamental. Comparing Catholicism and Protestantism, a locally relevant difference consists of the fact that every Catholic belongs to only one church, whereas 'Protestantism' is a generic term covering dozens of religious denominations. In other words, the numerically dominant Protestants actually constitute a 'majority of minorities', in which religious belief has considerably less integrative force than among Catholics. In terms of social significance, the Catholic Church has exercised a considerable influence on its community in Northern Ireland – especially through education, which is still highly segregated and exclusively church-run in the case of the Catholic community. Apart from teaching a strong 'Irish' reading of local society and history, the Catholic Church has also vehemently propagated conservative moral values in, for instance, rejecting contraception, divorce and abortion. However, its moral authority lost much of its former appeal locally, when the Catholic Church in the Irish Republic experienced several scandals in the early 1990s including some prominent priests being disclosed as fathers, homosexuals or child-abusers. Reading these religious configurations in terms of their influence on ethnic identities, one might wonder, first of all, what Catholicism actually means from the native point of view. Is it perceived only as a religion which can be easily adopted on pure grounds of belief? Or is it seen, rather, as constituting a social community one can identify with, and does this imply an ethnicised notion of belonging through myths of descent? How do Catholics themselves handle this ambiguity, which is aggravated by the fact that 'Catholic belief' and 'Catholicism by descent' tend to be coex-

tensive due to almost exclusive patterns of endogamy? And how do people then deal with cases of conversion? How do people process their ethnic identities, often strongly related to the unifying force of Catholicism, when some (as the recent Northern Ireland Census 2001 indicates) are increasingly alienated from the Catholic faith and the Church? Are their moral values changing, and what does this mean for the values projected as defining their ethnicities?

Finally, the 'socio-cultural' dimension encompasses two aspects to be mentioned here. One consists of the concrete socio-structural patterns of interaction and resulting interrelations. How are these structured by the high level of residential segregation in Belfast, by situational contexts such as work or leisure, as well as by values and role models related to kinship, gender, age, 'imagined communities', etc.? What practical experiences of sameness and difference are enabled and predisposed by these factors and how do these experiences, in turn, inform collective identities? The other aspect relates more specifically to forms of 'Irish culture' and to the recent Gaelic revival in West Belfast in particular. Since the 1970s, the Irish language has increasingly gained momentum in Belfast by being pushed by activists in growing numbers of Irish-medium schools, social clubs and cultural centres. Recently, even an institution for promoting Irish-medium businesses in West Belfast was established. Other facets of 'Irish culture' consist of traditional music sessions in pubs, for example, or of locally popular Irish sports such as Hurling or Gaelic Football. What is of interest here is the potential of this 'culture' for practically enacting and experiencing sameness and difference, as well as for allowing contesting discursifications of these experiences of identity. To put it differently, the diverse facets of 'Irish culture' may imprint quite diversely on the making of ethnic identities – and it is these identity-related implications that have to be explored on both the discursive and the practical level.

Using methods such as participant observation, interviews, pragmalinguistic conversation analysis, network analysis and archival research, the project seeks to address these and other questions on the basis of fieldwork. In so-doing, it promises two potential gains: First, the project aims to contribute to the theorising of ethnicity by conceptualising discourses and practices as dialectically shaping forces, the actual interplay of which is to be determined empirically. Second, it seeks to provide a more differentiated and thorough understanding of the empirical realities of everyday ethnicities in Northern Ireland, which, while strongly informed by the ongoing conflict as phenomena *sui generis*, cannot be reduced to it.

West Africa

Refugees and Changes in Local Governance on the Chad-Sudanese Border (Dar Masalit)

Andrea Behrends

Dar Masalit (the "home of the Masalit") historically was and still is an African frontier area. In pre-colonial times it served as a buffer zone flanked by the empires of Dar Fur to the east and Ouaddaï to the west. It then became a point of contact between French and British colonial regimes in the late 19th century and, since 1912, the national border between Chad and Sudan runs through its western part. Today, post-colonial national politics influence regional processes on either side of the border, resulting, among other effects, in continuous transnational movements. It is especially this flow of people to and fro across the national border as labour migrants, traders, and in particular as refugees which is of central concern to this project.

Although conflicts between Masalit farmers and formerly nomadic Arab herders have been frequent in this region since the late 1950s, their problematic relations recently led to armed clashes on the Sudanese side of the border. As a result of these conflicts, Masalit, and, in smaller numbers, Arab refugees have continuously been crossing the border to Chad since 1997, numbering up to over twenty thousand. Many of these refugees were received by relatives in Masalit and Arab villages respectively. But some of them, in particular those who fled from more distant areas (up to fifty and more kilometres from the border), settled in separated sites close to existing villages, but not among the autochthonous population. In 1998 the United Nations High

Young Arab with her child. (Photo: A. Behrends, 2001)

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started to assist in the region, first with an 'urgency programme' that entitled refugees as well as the local population receiving them to food, soap and medical goods. By mid 2000, UNCHR switched over to an 'integration programme', which does not include the distribution of goods, but instead encourages the formation of farming cooperatives in order to make permanent settlement in the region an attractive option for the newcomers.

Sudanese Masalit refugee with her Chadian host. (Photo: A. Behrends, 2001)

With the aim of defining integration/dissociation strategies and changes in identity patterns of different groups along the lines of ethnic and/or national identities, this project follows a threefold approach: first, to investigate into social and political histories of autochthonous Masalit and Arab settlers in the region; second, to observe the reasons for different strategies of integration and dissociation applied by both, refugees and settlers; and third, to consider the meaning of the national border to both ethnic groups and the meaning of this region to the respective central state regimes of Chad and Sudan. Here, the interplay of local, national and international actors concerning governance processes, the impact of decentralisation, and changes in the notion of citizenship come into closer focus. Starting from the assumption that ethnic and national identities are constructs based on certain historical, structural and collective givens, this project proposes to review the existing theoretical literature dealing with transnational migration and frontiers as well as identity formation in regard to refugee situations to develop a theoretical input consistent with my ethnographic findings.

This research project started in mid 2000. The research took place in the Chadian cities of N'Djamena and Abéché as well as the Chad-Sudanese border close to the border towns and military posts of Adré (Chad, Prefecture Asoungha) and El Geneina (Sudan, Darfur). The following preliminary findings were gained during three consecutive field trips in late 2000 and early and late 2001, lasting about three months each.

Brief Summary of Preliminary Findings on the Micro-Level

The starting point for this research project was a refugee movement, which started in 1995 following conflict and fighting between Arabs and Masalit on the Sudanese side of the border. The attacks were carried out by Arab horsemen who originated from outside the immediate border area, and by Masalit farmers who attacked these Arab groups as well as their Arab neighbours who had been settling in the border region for several decades (and of whom the Masalit thought that they had hosted the strangers who had launched the attacks). After having taken refuge in Chadian border villages, most refugees only had a very vague idea of what had caused the fighting, but they clearly remembered the attacks on their villages, where people were killed and houses and fields burnt, and the loss of property and agricultural yields as well as of lifestock which resulted from them. Both Arabs and Masalit took refuge in Masalit and Arab villages on the Chadian side of the border.

Clay figures of horsemen with and without guns are sold on the markets as toys for children. (Photo: A. Behrends, 2001)

The results I am presenting here, are concerned with the changes that were caused by the conflicts and consequent refuge and hosting of refugees. Although no further fighting was noticed on the Chadian side of

the border, formerly more or less friendly relations between Arab and Masalit neighbours were recently broken off. Two significant areas of change can be noted: first, the changing strategies of legitimising contradictory claims by the two groups; and second, the internal structural changes inside the Arab and Masalit communities related to the integration process of the refugees and the access to international agencies:

1. Whereas previously both Arabs and Masalit had managed to solve intra- and interethnic conflicts by turning to their respective local power-structures, these mediatory ways of conflict resolution between the two groups were cut off after the recent fighting and influx of refugees. To legitimise contradictory claims, e.g. on land, Arabs and Masalit now make use of different power structures. The Masalit, who claim the ownership of all land in the border region as their autochthonous territory, still try to solve intra- and interethnic conflicts (like cattle theft, field damage, access to water holes) through their hierarchical local power structures reaching from village headmen to paramount chiefs. The Arabs, whose power structures are less hierarchically organised than those of the Masalit, look for direct access to the local institutions of the state, in this case the prefecture or the police brigade. As a result, the land of the Arab village and its surroundings were recently declared their property by the then sub-prefect in charge – and against the will of the neighbouring Masalit who still think of the land as their own.

2. International assistance was offered to both Masalit and Arabs after the influx of refugees, first by the UNHCR and the WFP[1] in form of medical and food aid, and one year later in the form of an agricultural programme, organised by two different NGOs. The reaction of the Masalit and Arab population in the two villages made internal differences in the two groups evident: while the Arabs were hardly interested in the agricultural development programme offered by the NGOs, the Masalit competed with each other – between villages but also within the same village between refugees and locals – for privileged access to these programmes. Due to this fact, the integration of refugees took longer in the Masalit village, despite of their postulated harmony and seemingly well functioning integration strategies, while the Arab refugees came to be regarded as 'normal village members' sooner and without anyone mentioning their former refugee status.

Why are the Masalit, who, compared to the Arabs, did not have access to the local institutions of the state to defend their interests, so highly interested in having access to international power structures which circumvent both the local state institutions and their own hierarchical local power structures? It seems that the privileged access to local and national state institutions, which the Arabs have, renders international assistance less attractive to them. Among the Masalit, whose power

[1] World Food Programme.

structures are more hierarchically organised and where integration is more difficult, international institutions that circumvent both local power structures and state institutions are much more attractive for reaching a better status in the community.

This leads to the following requisites for investigation into existing literature and future field research: The focus of the project now lies on redrawing the lines of alliance between different local groups, and on analysing the influence of the two national regimes of Sudan and Chad – and their local representatives – on the two groups in conflict. As a basic assumption, the atmosphere of tension and conflict which has prevailed in this particular border region since the late 1950s is regarded as determining today's strategies and the interdependency of different sets of actors as well as the emergence of new political associations in the recent conflict between Arabs and Masalit.

Further Approaches

Further field research for this project will be carried out in 2004. While the former research had taken place mainly on the micro-level, the larger perspective, and here mainly the governing sector, will be in focus. By interviewing regional, national and international representatives of various state and non-state organisations, institutions and agencies, the findings and results of my analysis so far will be tested and elaborated on.

Social and Spatial Orders: farmer-herdsmen relations in south east Burkina Faso

Andreas Dafinger

This project focuses on the question of how two major ethnic groups, the agricultural Bisa and the agropastoral Fulbe in southern Burkina Faso, share a common environment and negotiate resource use and social and political relations through the construction of a common local identity. Specific attention is paid to the role of the state and transnational (aid-)organisations as major and rather recent actors in this discourse on the definition of bonds and boundaries of a common socio-political landscape. The project is embedded in a wider context, and links to other studies carried out within the department, as well as within and beyond the MPI for Social Anthropology. Conferences and workshops were organised around the central issues of the study and with the intention to create a network of comparable projects: A workshop on the relations between landholding and landless groups in sub-Saharan Africa gathered international researchers to present their studies on differing modes of appropriation of land; a major issue in farmer-herder relations. Based on these topics (farmer-herder relations and land rights), the Cameroon-Burkina comparison led to a series of pres-

entations and publications. A more general view of the politics of landlessness will be available in the workshop proceedings.

A panel on issues of governance (organised jointly with A. Behrends and J. Eckert) helped link several projects at the MPI for Social Anthropology with a wider academic public. It related the crucial issue of national and transnational interference on the local level to developments in other regions and helped refine the microstudy approach. Another trajectory the study followed was the comparative analysis of power relations which linked the discourse on land and land rights to national and transnational political issues.

Preliminary findings

On the one hand, relations between farming and herding populations in the research area date back as far as 300 years and are characterised by a high degree of economic, social and political interdependency. Conflicts between and within the groups tend to be essentially low-level conflicts, with well-established conflict resolution mechanisms.

Inside a farmer's compound. (Photo: A. Dafinger, 2000)

Recurrent challenges to and renegotiation of spatial and social boundaries are essential to this process and create a framework of shared local identity (integrating herders and farmers alike). At the same time, such conflicts serve to externalise intra-group relations, thus regulating internal relations and reinforcing intra-group cohesion, as the research has shown. Local bonds between farmers and herders create settings that crosscut the prevalent ethnic dichotomies (e.g. Fulbe may act as placeholders for farmers in potential cultivation areas, preventing uncontrolled expansion of neighbouring farming communities).

On the other hand, an increasing number of violent clashes and aggravating conflicts over the past two decades gave rise to a general im-

pression of deteriorating relations. This view is shared by parts of the local population, by officials, and by international agencies.

The fieldwork confirmed both the continuing importance of low level disputes as a means of integration and an escalation of conflicts. A differentiated analysis of settings and actors, yet, challenges the assumption of a unilineal process of deteriorating relations. Aggravated conflicts are limited to a specific group of actors, and do not necessarily affect existing bonds. Conflicts as a whole do not seem to aggravate, but one rather sees a new set of conflicts emerging (over new resources; or on different levels), in addition to existing and continuing forms of embedded conflict resolving mechanisms.

Aggravating conflicts can generally be related to a set of factors: Different (generally weaker) inter-group relations exist between resident and newcomer populations, i.e. larger numbers of herders who settled in the region after the draughts in the 1980s and have not managed to engage in close relations with neighbouring farming communities. This coincides with a change in legal and economic frameworks, i.e. the enforcement of administrative and land reform, as well as an increasing demographic pressure, the involvement of donor organisations, and a decreasing economy of both farmers and agropastoralists. Those herders who are least embedded in local social networks are at the same time most affected by the expansion of cultivated areas.

The continued existence of embedded conflicts rather seems to help limit the spread of violent (aggravated) conflicts, as in part suggested by G. Elwert's typology of conflicts drawing on degrees of embeddedness and violence.[1]

The project, thus, follows a twofold approach: It engages in the description and analysis of recurrent low level conflicts and interprets them as an integrative force. A second focus looks at violent clashes and conflicts that go beyond local (embedded) conflict resolving authorities.

As preliminary findings suggest, actors and causes for conflict differ significantly in both cases. Where actors can be found on both ends of the scale, their respective role differs accordingly (e.g. as local authority vs. part of a nation-state administration).

Established patterns of dealing with conflictive situations are employed only to a very limited degree when dealing with organisations and administration, and in aggravated conflicts.

New resources, as it appears, not only tend to lead to new (i.e. more) conflicts, but induce a different quality of conflict. Use rights of new resources are not negotiated between local actors and potential users, but invoke third parties (organisations, administration, etc). Arguments

[1] Elwert, G. 2001. "Conflict, Anthropological Perspective," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.* Edited by N. Smelser and P. Baltes, pp. 2542-2547. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

employed in local discourse tend to change their meaning in this process: While higher mobility (of the herders) and territorial identity (of the farmers) are considered to be of mutual benefit in the local arena, the territorial approaches of organisations and the state favour agricultural communities and lead to a differential integration into the newly arriving[2] state, with pastoralists often excluded from resources provided by the state and organisations (schools, wells, health care etc). It is a prime target to identify causes and factors that delimit two types of conflict and focus on actors who oscillate between different layers of conflict and conflict resolution.

Agropastoralist women milking their cattle. (Photo: A. Dafinger, 2002)

To do so, the project necessarily draws on the comparison with other settings and regions. Comparison along thematic as well as regional lines provided, and continues to provide, an ideal testing ground for the major hypothesis (e.g. the aggravation of local conflicts through the emergence of a changed legal framework). Thematic comparison mainly draws on issues of 'governance', the 'arrival of the state' and the impact of national and transnational organisations (such as donor agencies). A further layer of analysis deals with intra-site diachronic comparison: With Fulbe herders being highly respected as warriors and slave-hunters up to the past turn of the century (1900), colonial 'pacification' has brought a change in attitude and a transformation of power relations on the local level. The assessment of this process will determine whether the recent development may be interpreted as suggested, i.e. a qualitatively new set of relations and conflicts, or if administrative and land reform have only accelerated existing tendencies.

[2] Most parts of rural western Africa see the 'arrival of the state', at a time when states are called to retreat. This process of decentralisation encourages transnational organisations to act as Trojan horses implementing national legislation and administration.

Pastoralism, Migration and Identity: The Fulbe in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire

Youssouf Diallo

The tendency of people to continuously move for ritual, economic and political reasons is one of the most enduring characteristics of the history of the West African savannah. This project contributes to the study of the conditions and forms of pastoral mobility in Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Two interrelated topics, which the project investigates, are the dynamics of identity and statehood as a field of interaction between peasants and pastoralists. Our principal concern during the fieldwork, carried out intermittently, has been to observe and collect data on cattle husbandry, livestock policies, land use, mobility patterns of the Fulbe, and the modalities of their relations with sedentary groups. The description of the project given here deals with the main outlines of patterns that have been found out, some of them (migration patterns, conflict, cooperation, etc) being still at work.

The present situation of the Fulbe cannot be properly evaluated without a reference to the past. Oral traditions about pastoral movements in the border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Côte d'Ivoire suggest that the mobility patterns of the Fulbe are historically rooted. In addition to being old, these mobility patterns prove adaptable to new social and political conditions.

Fulbe woman in western Burkina Faso. (Photo: Y. Diallo, 2001)

As the West African ethnography shows, the Fulbe are usually separated from sedentary groups by ethnicity, occupation, and religion (Islam). Conflict and integration – or cooperation – are the general but

permanent characteristics of the pattern of their interactions with sedentary peasants. In a changing pattern of relations, the basic question, therefore, is who is inside and who is outside, or who cooperates with whom.

Information available suggests that strategies of exclusion and integration of Fulbe evolve alternately, according to circumstances and social status, or that they may be used in different ways by the state, societies and sedentary groups with which pastoral nomads interact. In former times, the pastoral expansion led to the cultural assimilation of non- Fulbe populations and their incorporation into Fulbe state formations. But the migration of Fulbe pastoralists and their specific adjustment to new contexts also resulted in their partial or total assimilation into village communities and earlier sedentary states. Some Fulbe shifted from cattle husbandry to agriculture and changed their ethnic identification after having adopted the culture, language and traditions of their hosts, while others mixed with local populations through intermarriage and gave rise to new 'ethnic groups'.

A comparative analysis, combining oral traditions and written sources, seems to be helpful in understanding these processes. A limited comparison is likely to enable us to draw up a tentative typology of political integration and exclusion of the West African Fulbe pastoralists. We are thus looking into the position of early pastoral nomads in ancient sedentary states and administrative systems – e.g. the Bambara and Mossi kingdoms in Mali and Burkina Faso respectively – in order to compare it with their current position in post-colonial states. This approach implies that the actions of modern governments must be considered. The political economy of cattle husbandry also involves international relations between the Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali) and the coastal countries. Fulbe pastoralists are considered wandering producers that governments and development planners try to control if not to settle. The case of Côte d'Ivoire, where the state implemented an attractive pastoral policy and encouraged the Fulbe to involve in the market economy, is an example of tentative politics of control and integration of pastoral nomads into post-colonial states.

Moving into new contexts leads to new arrangements with local groups. Various forms of cooperation and institutional arrangements binding together Fulbe pastoralists and peasants have been noted. In western Burkina Faso and northern Côte d'Ivoire, the basis of grouping is the village community. Access to land seems to be the predominant factor of the integration of strangers into the Bobo, Bwa and Senufo village communities. Therefore, independently of the state intervention, the Fulbe always negotiate with customary landowners in order to stay in villages and exploit natural resources.

Conflict represents the other facet of their relations with local peasants. For the purpose of the analysis, we may distinguish between dis-

pute, conflict of interest or competition, and violent conflict. This distinction is a matter of degree; reality is more complex since the boundary between these forms of conflicts is always fluctuating. Also, the outbreak of violence depends on how the actors themselves handle a situation of dispute. A dispute between a pastoralist and a peasant may escalate into a violent conflict which may involve members of their respective ethnic groups.

In our area of study, crop damage and natural resource competition are the main reasons for conflict between pastoralists and peasants. As a result, rights to residence, grazing rights or rights to water may become fragile and even contested. The pastoralists may ultimately be evicted from their residence in a hard conflict situation. In northern Côte d'Ivoire, we have noted that right to residence tends to lap where Fulbe cattle repeatedly cause crop damage. In the whole area of study, there is evidence suggesting that the state control over land is nominal. Vacant land does not exist in the 'traditional' conception. Indigenous peasants usually encroach on land delineated by the state as forest zone or seen as empty space to be allocated to pastoral groups. As the Ivorian example shows, the state intervention for controlling and delineating pastoral zones in order to promote cattle husbandry and at the same time reduce peasant-pastoralist conflicts had had a limited impact on the relations between the two groups.

Fulbe woman going to the weekly market in Koona, western Burkina Faso. (Photo: Y. Diallo, 2001)

The pastoral mobility may have political consequences. In West Africa, interest groups of peasants are stronger than that of Fulbe pastoralists regarded as 'strangers'. This aspect is illustrated by the Ivorian case. Although they have the support of the central government – because they are supposed to hold a crucial role in the national economy – the presence of the Fulbe in Côte d'Ivoire has become a matter of political controversy. There are indications showing that the recent politicisation of peasant-pastoralist conflicts is connected with the intervention of a range of interest groups trying to take political and economic advan-

tages of pastoralist-peasant interactions. Among these are local politicians, administrative officials, traditional hunters and civil servants.

The writing of the preliminary results is in progress. It is our hope that the study, in its final shape, will contribute to the anthropological and historical understanding of the West African Fulbe.

The Social and Cultural Context of Small-scale Gold Mining in West Africa

Tilo Grätz

At the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties of the last century, new mining sites developed simultaneously in several regions of West Africa. Illegal forms of exploitation with simple technologies and gold trading (smuggling) developed beside small enterprises controlled by the state or licence holders. This recent growth of small-scale (artisanal) gold mining is related to massive waves of labour migration into rural areas, above all in Mali, Niger, Benin, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. The exploitation of new mining sites and the reopening of abandoned deposits led in most cases to the rapid establishment of new immigrant communities with new markets, increased circulation of money and the spontaneous development of infrastructures and services. Recently discovered mines also led to the massive immigration of petty businessmen, traders, barkeepers and those offering other services, including prostitution. Within a short period of time, small villages have become large settlements; new settler communities have emerged in all mentioned countries.

The migration to the gold mines can be seen as a reaction to a situation of crisis, especially in the agricultural sector, with fewer job opportunities, the effects of structural adjustment, and the general devaluation of the currency in 1994, causing higher living costs. Other factors relevant to some areas are droughts and civil wars, or social problems linked to communal disputes, marital problems, and criminality.

In most cases, there is a considerable divergence between the official state law – as is developed, for example, in the Code Minier – and local practices, especially significant as regards the access to resources, labour organisation and the legitimacy of mediators. As a consequence, conflicts often emerge between gold miners and state authorities, but also between locals and immigrants, and between interest groups among the miners themselves concerning the rights to exploitation and settlement. Often, there is a similar chronology of events: an initial period of serious conflicts is followed by period of stabilisation and 'working arrangements' between all actors.

The gold mining communities of these new mining frontiers consist of people of extremely heterogeneous social and ethnic origins. The research project examines processes of social, economic and cultural

change induced by these small-scale mining booms in West Africa. It describes the particularities of mining communities, identity processes, and conflicts over resources as well as the relationship of miners to the central state. A specific focus is given to aspects of migration, labour organisation, conflict resolution, risk management and modes of social integration. Local particularities as well as global dependencies of gold mining communities, especially with regard to the international gold trade (Grätz 2000) are explored as well. The major question of the project is how social order is created and maintained in socially and ethnically heterogeneous communities and how these communities sustain themselves in relation to adjacent peasant communities and the state. This summary will refer to some selected results of my study.

The central field site is the southern Atakora mountain region in northern Benin. I knew the region from previous field studies and witnessed the sudden beginning of a veritable boom in the middle of the 1990s. Thus, I was better able to evaluate the dimensions of change that were brought by the massive immigration of miners, the mushrooming of mining pits, the quick establishment of huge markets and the overall monetisation of that rural region, hitherto not very much integrated into the realms of market production. It was the Atakora region were I stayed for longer periods of field research, on and off, and where my study went into various ethnographic details: gold production, economic flows, property issues, conflict regulation, local history and religion, migration patterns and biographies, every day life and festivities, conflicts as well as modes of sociability in the adjacent villages that I could observe, with all the respective changes over time (including the end to the boom-period) over a period of several years (1999-2003). Furthermore, a comparative perspective, based on multi-sited fieldwork, was chosen. Thus I also integrated my findings from other mining sites, especially those from Burkina Faso and Mali, into my overall assessment of the changing face of mining in West Africa. My methodological approach also comprised the study of networking processes, periods of direct participant observation (working with small mining teams) and the tracing back of migrants to their home regions.

A central approach has been chosen with the economic and social anthropology of risk. I argue that risk is a major heuristic category to explore the life-world of gold miners and – related to systems of risk-sharing – a key to understand the creation of cohesion despite divergent interests in an extremely heterogeneous community (Grätz 2003a). Some ethnographic depictions may clarify this point.

Generally, miners work in small teams headed by a team chief, in most cases the owner of a shaft or pit. The teams are mixed in terms of ethnic and regional origins of the workers, hired on the basis of individual abilities and perseverance. The owner may work with trusted organisers and/or work himself in various phases of the gold extraction

process. In any case, he is a kind of small-scale entrepreneur, investing in equipment and the maintenance of his/her workforce, and is generally rewarded with half of the yield. Some small-scale investors may run several shafts, 'sponsoring' the teams. Hierarchies in small-scale gold mining seem, however, to be shallow and flexible: a shaft owner may fail and hire on tomorrow as a simple worker, and vice versa. A gold trader also acts as 'sponsor', i.e. a moneylender trying to bind clients and diversifying income opportunities.

This system of risk-sharing is similar at all mining sites in West Africa that I could explore, especially in reef mining. Different are the wealth of the gold deposits to be tackled and the period involved in exploiting them. Such a social contract comprises a kind of 'trade off': the more uncertain the yield, the more the possible gain for the team chief in case of success. Because of the uncertainty of the yields, there is the risk for the entrepreneur of getting only part of his investment back. On the other hand, he has to supply for the basic needs of his labourers whatever the yield. Sharing in this context means the sharing of the yields according to the division of roles – the investor as head of the team receives the biggest part (50% in most cases). Further shares for all members are divided according to contributions in work and skills. Provided that the venture was successful, there is always a minimum guaranteed share, irrespective of illness, etc., but the share may also vary according to the individuals' work ethic.

Most miners regard these arrangements as fair and risk-sharing for two main reasons: first, the shaft-owner may lose almost all of his investments in case the shaft is not prosperous at all – but at least the workers were maintained during work. In case the team is successful he consequently earns a higher proportion and may deduct his expenses, and second, he (should) know best how to organise the work, including the rental of pumps etc, but also its defence against competitors – preconditions to its success.

Elements of a moral economy are important aspects of the rules and modes of organisation in many mining teams. Institutions like friendship point to an ethic of equal sharing and camaraderie. There are also more concrete institutions that help to guarantee benefits for all and organise redistribution. The fact that mining entrepreneurs, team leaders or successful traders are supposed to contribute to fund raisers (French cotisations, caisses) for times of need is important because this limits their accumulation. This is often required as a sort of insurance. Small scale mining is at the same time linked to global market economy. James Scott (1976) applied the concept of moral economy (also developed by Thompson, 1971) to the subsistence ethics of an Asian peasant society. Moral economy refers to the social distribution of risks and institutions of reciprocity in a given society and discusses the moral standards guaranteeing the subsistence of all. My usage of the concept

differs from Scott's account. I do not assume a general contradiction between the two ideal concepts. I detect some components of the economic and social fields, which follow more closely straight standards of risk minimisation and common values guaranteeing a minimum degree of subsistence for all. Other economic practices represent transitional and partly contradicting modes of labour organisation, especially small entrepreneurial logics. I subsume them under the notion of a patronal mode of labour organisation, which shows the interrelation of elements of market logics and moral standards.

It seems that parallel logics may even be a precondition to the persistence of the economic system of gold mining that develops within the proliferation of markets (in both senses) vigorously promoted by numerous gold traders, market peddlers and service providers, all often former gold miners.

Gold miner in West Africa. (Photo: T. Grätz, 2001)

We are dealing with a new socio-economic field in the making, different from agro-pastoralist economies, marked by dynamic shifts in migration and a growing professionalisation of translocal actors with various backgrounds. Miners, traders, service workers and others are related in chains of interdependency. Even though there are many conflicts over access to resources, a minimal cohesion as well as processes of social integration into the mining community emerge.

Many normative rules and institutions concerning the organisation of labour, access to natural resources, hierarchies, profit sharing as well as conflict resolution (Grätz 2002) 'roam' from one camp to another, while being partly shaped by local institutions and social structures. This transnationalisation of a very particular legal field has an important side-effect: It enables migrant miners from heterogeneous backgrounds, and newcomers in particular, to relate more easily to others. It promotes a rapid development of a minimal social order and trust in the newly established mining camps.

These scattered mining camps and their markets develop rapidly in rural areas, where social and cultural change is thus introduced inevitably in a manifest, brutal and unparalleled way. We are dealing here

with the emergence of a multi-local economic and social sphere, shaped by the specific method of gold extraction and labour organisation, but also by the distribution of incomes, linked to spheres of circulation and consumption. It is a very particular socio-economic field (or socio-technical system, Pfaffenberger 1998), organised between equitable corporate modes and entrepreneurial economic logics, fellowship – and patron-client social relations. It is neither related to institutions of agro-pastoral domestic production, craftsmen's enterprises or trading networks, but dwells on many norms and rules of these different economic fields. Parallel to that, we witness a particular socio-professional identity of miners in the making, shaped through the permanent liminal migrant situation in the camps, specific norms of sharing, modes of communication as well as a discernible lifestyle. I argue that this kind of identity emerges both from labour and risk sharing processes in gold production, specific codes and patterns of sociability in the mining camps and as result of pressure and stigmatising discourses from outside (Grätz 2003b).

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Friendship and Kinship: on the difference and relevance of two systems of social relationships. The case of the Fulbe societies of northern Cameroon and northern Benin

Martine Guichard

This research project is part of an interdisciplinary project conducted in cooperation with the Universities of Bielefeld (Departments of History [PD. P. Schuster] and Biology [Prof. F. Trillmich]), the University of Göttingen (Department of History [Prof. F. Rexroth]), the University of Luzern (Department of Sociology [Prof. R. Stichweh]) and the MPI for Social Anthropology (Department I, 'Integration and Conflict' [Prof. G. Schlee]). It is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

Summary of the Overall Project "Freundschaft und Verwandtschaft: zur Unterscheidung und Relevanz zweier Beziehungssysteme"
(see also www.freundschaft-und-verwandtschaft.de)

Over the last few years, mass media and popular advisory literature have shown special interest in friendship. It is said that in our modern, complex, and flexible society, friendship represents the truly adequate form of modern interpersonal relationships. It appears noteworthy that the potential of friendship relations is often highlighted by reference to ancient philosophical and idealised concepts of friendship. This almost necessarily leads to considerable discrepancies between proposed and realisable friendships. Furthermore, the praise of friendship explicitly or implicitly suggests that relations based on kinship and family have lost some of their importance in societies during the 20th century and therefore have largely had to be replaced by friendship. Thus, the present praise of friendship repeats the fear of Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl of a disintegration of kin and family ties in modern society. Taking into account the present debate, our research will focus on the structure and importance of kinship and friendship in sociological, medievistic, socio-anthropological and ethological perspective. By using a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, we expect important insights into the social potential and the proneness to crisis of both systems.

Normally, the dichotomies of ascription versus voluntarism, and permanency versus dissolvability are regarded as hallmarks of the difference between the two systems of relationships. The question of how these relations begin, how they can be delimited, and what the precise relation is between the two concepts has so far rarely been examined – even in an international perspective. In our interdisciplinary project it is this problem that will be investigated in a comparative manner. Using historical and intercultural comparisons, we will analyse these two systems of relationships. In addition, we will deal with the analysis of the specific forms and patterns of differentiation of friendship and kinship as developed in modern societies.

In the sociological projects, we will examine the thesis that friendship may function as a transitional formula accompanying new social relations for a while until these are transferred and absorbed into differently named and newly conceived social institutions. Using the recurring historical and modern prominence of friendship themes, we will examine in a comparative manner how far relations of friendship, resp. kinship, can be taken. Friendship, according to our hypothesis, will be overtaxed as soon as it is asked to perform everything that is better done by other forms of relationships. At the same time, one may claim that kinship functions as a kind of invariant alliance by default within the increasing complexity of social relationships, thus constituting the only non-contingent relation which may be used without major cost.

Within the medievistic, socio-anthropological, and ethological projects the focus is also on a comparative analysis of relationships. These projects focus on the phenomena of the interpenetration of friendship and kin relationships. Traditionally, these disciplines have attributed a dominant role to kinship. However, friendship (or cooperative relations) has moved to centre stage more recently. In the existing comparative evaluations of these two systems of relationships, however, a tendency to favour one or the other can be observed. In the present project the aforementioned disciplines hypothesise that the importance of kinship as a system creating relationships in animal and human (historical and non-western and so-called simple) societies has been over-emphasised. Ontogenetically, relational systems become established as parent-offspring and familial relations which enable the people involved to build up a bond which is based on trust and friendship with kin as well as non-kin. The structure of such systems of relationships will be analysed in a comparative way in our project.

Within the cooperation of our disciplines we will investigate

- which historical and cultural variants of the distinction between friendship and kinship can be observed,
- which specific and different efficiency the different construction principles of these relationships imply,
- if a difference in the importance of kinship is discernible with regard to cooperative relationships in human populations on the one hand, and animal populations on the other, and in how far 'friendships' can be documented among animals, which mechanisms they rest upon, and whether the mechanisms leading to friendship resemble each other in humans and animals; and last but not least
- in how far common properties of the specific efficiency of kinship and friendship in human and animal societies can be clarified by the cooperation among the participating sciences and humanities.

Outline of the Social Anthropological Project

The relationship between kinship and friendship has hardly been discussed in anthropology until now. One reason for this is the traditional interest of scientists for social institutions and for strongly formalised relationships. Particular interest has thus been directed towards kinship. Friendship on the other hand has been very much undervalued. Even today, it remains a social category that is neglected by research.

To date, friendship has primarily been studied in 'complex' or western societies. These societies are considered particularly appropriate fields of study because it is assumed that they are marked by the shrinking importance of kinship as a community-structuring factor. The increasing interest in friendship in the last years does not really include a shift in regional focus: works on friendship in non-western and so-called 'simple' societies remain rare. In fact, many anthropologists are of the opinion that these societies leave little room for friendship as an autonomous form of relationship. This view is nourished, among other things, by the fact that the kinship idiom is often used by the actors for describing friendships with non-kin. But this practice does not coincide with a real elimination of the difference between kin and non-kin, or friends respectively.

The assumption that non-western societies have a very limited space for friendship will be challenged critically here. It will be demonstrated that this form of sociability is also a central element of the social structure there. Evidence thereof can already be found in earlier works on friendship. These works will also be discussed in the context of this project that will seek further confirmation of this thesis from new empirical research to be conducted in the Fulbe societies of northern Cameroon and northern Benin.

Another focus of anthropological research will be on the interpenetration of friendship and kinship, and on the verification of the hypothesis that many cases of assistance that have to date been understood as kinship-based, are in fact built on friendship; it will also be examined, based on cost-benefit calculations, under what conditions friends instead of relatives are recruited.

Since, due to a 'kinship-bias', friendship among kin has seldom been mentioned in the literature, it will be necessary to verify the above formulated thesis not only through a systematic re-evaluation of the literature but also through empirical studies. As already mentioned, fieldwork will be carried out in northern Cameroon and northern Benin. These regions have been chosen because institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of friendship can be found in both. The inhabitants of both regions are primarily farmers and cattle herders or agro-pastoralists. The latter belong to the Fulbe who are well-known, on the one hand, for their far-reaching friendship networks and their 'stock friendships'. They are also well-known, on the other hand, as a prime

example for the institution of hospitality: many Fulbe could hardly stay in the villages if the farmers did not accommodate them.

Because friendship and kinship have generally been studied in isolation from each other, there is hardly any data on their overlapping. In order to fill this gap and to do more justice to the multiplicity of relationships between kin, it will be useful to initially collect precise information on assistance practices among relatives in general: only then will it be possible to develop a set of principles of the 'emotional economy' of mutual assistance and then to isolate the assistance provided based on personal sympathy and friendship established within the sphere of kinship.

The relevance of this sphere in the selection of friends will also be studied in comparison with that of non-kin. The latter can be roughly divided into actors belonging to the same ethnic group and ethnic strangers. The meaning of friendships between members of each of these categories will be simultaneously explored and set in relation to one another. In a further step, the question will be discussed of who among the kin and non-kin are in practice 'better' friends. Although indicators exist that would allow one to say that distant or non-kin would come first, this has to date never been specifically studied. A typology of locally existing friendship categories will also be developed. Finally, an analysis of the strategically motivated preference of friends over kin when assistance is required will be carried out.

During the field study (two periods of six months duration each), data collection will involve the following methods: apart from participant observation, informal conversations, including above all guided and narrative interviews, will be held. Selected cognitive anthropological methods will be used in registering friendship categories in an intra- and interethnic comparison. For the study of solidarity and cooperative behaviour, samples will be taken and individual sociograms as well as mobility diagrams will be made that will serve the recording of friendship networks. A gender and generation conscious perspective will be maintained for all these procedures. A processual approach will be of primary importance.

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Integration and Conflict as Dimensions of Cultural Forms: the etiology of the rebel war in Sierra Leone (1990-2000) on the background of cultural tradition and historical experience
Jacqueline Knörr

Jacqueline Knörr is currently finishing up her project entitled *Orang Betawi, Orang Jakarta, Orang Indonesia: construction and transformation of ethnic and transethnic identity in Jakarta*.

In my future project, I will be dealing with dimensions of integration and conflict in the aftermath of the rebel war in Sierra Leone (1990-2000). I will investigate the war against the background of cultural tradition and historical experience that have resulted in a cultural order of dissimulation, which is a central phenomenon of the current cultural complex in the Upper Guinea Coast of West Africa. Conflict and integration are seen as complementary dimensions of culture. It is the same – and not opposing – values and beliefs within a given culture that may result in either social integration or conflict, depending on the respective historical, social, political, and economic context and experience. Consequently, one has to look at how a war was waged in a given society – at the conflictual dimensions of culture that is – in order to find its complementary dimensions and potentials of (re)integration and (re)conciliation.

My approach will make use of etiological concepts. The war was experienced by Sierra Leoneans as a 'national disease' that needs to be cured by employing both 'traditional' medications – e.g. in the form of secret society rituals aimed at cleansing and reconciliation, and 'modern' cures – e.g. in the form of advanced institutional control of political actors. In the same way disease and health are seen as two dimensions of the human condition, conflict and integration are seen as complementary dimensions of social interaction.

Just as one needs to know the reasons for a disease to find the right medication, one needs to know the reasons for a conflict to find its cure. It is the aim of this project to partake in finding a cure.

Integration and Conflict: the Mbororo and neighbouring communities in North West Cameroon
Michaela Pelican

In January 2002, I returned from my field site in North West Cameroon where I had spent 14 months researching interethnic relations and identity politics among Mbororo (agro pastoral Fulbe), Hausa and Grassfields people. Extensive discussions beforehand and mutual visits with colleagues working on related issues in Burkina Faso and Benin helped to broaden the scope of and to integrate comparative perspectives into my research. Back in Halle/Saale, I benefited from participat-

ing in internally organised workshops and international conferences that centred on themes relevant to my dissertation and on topics cross-cutting departmental boundaries and linking up individual researchers' interests.

In the following I will outline two comparative projects that form an integral part of my PhD work and have subsequently been turned into dissertation chapters and (forthcoming) publications.

a) Comparative Perspectives on Farmer-Herder Relations, Land Rights and State Policy in West Africa

Land Rights and the Politics of Integration: pastoralists' strategies in a comparative view is the title of a co-authored working paper (MPI for Social Anthropology Working Paper Series No. 48) by Andreas Dafinger and Michaela Pelican. The idea of a comparative article emerged as a result of the workshop *The Landed and the Landless? Strategies of territorial integration and dissociation in Africa,* organised by Andrea Behrends and Andreas Dafinger and held at the MPI for Social Anthropology in May 2002. Subsequently, we developed a theoretical framework to explain commonalities and differences in farmer-herder relations in South Central Burkina Faso and North West Cameroon.

In both research sites, the herders are Fulbe agro pastoralists and form ethnic minorities within farmer-dominated societies. But while one case is marked by peaceful integration, the other is increasingly conflictual. These differences are interpreted via a background of different legal systems and modes of land use. In Burkina Faso, the historical and political setting supports an ideology of a *shared* landscape. This is best illustrated by the interspersed settlement pattern of farmers and herders who together form local communities, continuously negotiating spatial and social boundaries. In North West Cameroon, on the other hand, the territory is *divided* into exclusive farming and grazing areas. Here farmer-herder relations are largely guided by colonial and post-colonial legislation which has been introduced with the aim of reducing conflicts over land and landed resources. We argue that a *shared* use of land and landed resources encourages integration through permanent low level conflicts (Burkina Faso case), whereas a *divided* landscape and the allocation of exclusive land titles increases the potential for violent clashes (Cameroon case). Actors' strategies differ significantly in the two settings. In the Cameroonian example, herders increasingly follow a dynamic and vocal approach, making explicit claims to exclusive tracts of land, becoming engaged in local politics and political networking. The Fulbe in the Burkina Faso case, on the other hand, lay emphasis on keeping a low profile, adhering to an ideology of exit: they claim their rights to specific resources, but do not claim an overall, territorially perceived ownership of all landed assets within a delimited area.

In more general terms, it becomes clear from the above comparisons that where land is primarily an economic asset, exclusion of others and struggles for exclusive ownership may be an adequate strategy. Where land is a social value, helping to define social relations and positioning groups and individuals in the social hierarchy, sharing out the land to non-landowners may be much more profitable. In both cases the nation-state plays an important role, by providing opportunities and by more or less encouraging divided use of the land. It is also the state, along with an increasingly market oriented economy, that will determine the prospects of these systems.

b) Property Concepts and Human-Animal Relations in an Agro Pastoral Community

The workshop *Collective and Multiple Forms of Property in Land and Animals* organised by Günther Schlee, Patty Gray, Florian Stammler and Michaela Pelican and held at the MPI for Social Anthropology in August 2002, joined participants from Department I and II with the aim of comparing concepts of property rights in land and animals and practices of animal husbandry across different ecological zones and political settings.

In my paper I focused on human-animal relations from economic and cultural perspectives. This overlapped thematically with Brian Donahoe's (Indiana University, MPI for Social Anthropology) presentation on Siberia[1]. Applying Tim Ingold's[2] theoretical framework of hunting versus pastoral populations to his case material, Donahoe illustrated how human-animal relations among the Tozhu-Tyva are characterised by trust and respect, while among the Tofa, wild animals and domesticated reindeer are mainly seen in terms of their economic value, i.e. to be dominated and exploited. A similar shift in the human-animal relationship seems

Kinship diagram of a Mbororo cattle herd by Michaela Pelican, August 2002

[1] Donahoe, B. 2002. 'Trust' or 'Domination'? The Tozhu-Tyva and the Tofa and their differing relationships to the reindeer they raise and the wild animals they hunt. Paper presented at the workshop *Collective and Multiple Form of Property in Land and Animals*. Halle/Saale. August 19-21, 2002.

[2] Ingold, T. 2000. "The Perception of the Environment," in *Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skills*. London, New York: Routledge.

to have occurred among the Mbororo in North West Cameroon. The Mbororo conceive of their cattle as basic production means in terms of livelihood and social status. At the same time, they have personal and close relationships with their animals, especially those belonging to inherited cattle lineages. Socio-economic and ecological conditions over the past century have encouraged meat over milk production, to which the Mbororo reacted with economic diversification and increased market production. In many families, a part of the herd is designated for social and economic reproduction and a part for market production. Accordingly, the two sections underlie different herd management rationales which entail divergences in human-animal relations (e.g. in terms of naming systems for animals). From a theoretical perspective this implies that the shift from trust and respect to domination and exploitation in human-animal relations is gradual. Potentially and practically both attitudes co-exist, though applied to different herd sections.

The case study on the peri-urban Fulbe in North Cameroon presented by Mark Moritz offered an excellent opportunity for regional comparison.[3] Moritz illustrated how changing ecological conditions in Cameroon's Far North made intensification necessary, and how pastoral intensification coupled with Islamic notions of private property led to an individualisation of livestock ownership. In North West Cameroon, ecological and economic conditions as well as the interpretation and instrumentalisation of Islamic ideology take different forms. Here Islamic ideology has been invoked to determine the women's economic role, namely their involvement in the sales of milk and milk products. This part of Mbororo pastoral economy has become conflated with antagonistic interpretations of pastoral and Islamic ideologies and is a key issue in the debate on what it means to be an 'authentic Pullo' (sing. of Fulbe) or a 'good Muslim'. In comparing Fulbe strategies in North West Cameroon and Cameroon's Far North, it becomes clear that, though situated within the same country, historical and political backgrounds, ecological and economic conditions, and the wider social settings vary significantly. Just as these conditions differ and change over time, pastoral practices and ideology remain in flux, offering a wide variety of potential strategies and alternatives.

In addition to these two endeavours I worked on other topics relevant to my dissertation, namely on the role of interethnic friendship as a factor of social cohesion (see also overarching essay by Guichard, Heady, Tadesse, pp. 7-17) and on the manipulation of discourses of cultural difference in the struggle over political power. Furthermore, I edited part of the visual material collected in the field and produced an

[3] Moritz, Mark. 2002. Individual Livestock Ownership in Fulbe Family Herds: The effects of intensification and Islam on pastoral production systems in the Far North of Cameroon. Paper presented at the workshop *Collective and Multiple Form of Property in Land and Animals*. Halle/Saale. August 19-21, 2002.

ethnographic video documentary in cooperation with Judith Orland (see report of the MPI Visual Group). Selected sequences of the visual data are integrated into my thesis for analytical and illustrative purposes, reflecting the multimedial character of my dissertation work. In the same way, the comparative and complementary endeavours find expression in substantial parts of my PhD thesis and have significantly contributed to the refinement and precision of my theoretical arguments.

Screening of the edited video footage to the population in the research site, Misaje, 2001. (Photo: M. Pelican)

Changing Chadian Power Dynamics
Stephen P. Reyna

The MPI for Social Anthropology has studied transformations in the power dynamics within Chadian institutions over the last half century. Such analyses involve documentation, first, of the changes to the force resources available to institutions and, second, of the exercise of these resources to achieve different powers. Certain findings concerning Chadian power dynamics stand out.

There have been two, major kinds of change in the distribution of power among Chadian institutions since Independence (1960): The first of these concerns the power of the central government; the second that of a transnational corporation. A civil war began in Chad (1966) that pitted rebel movements against the central government's army. This began a cycle of first decline and then growth of central government's powers. Roughly from 1966 through the late 1980s, the military force of numerous rebel factions greatly curtailed central government abilities in all realms of social development. The Weberian state, one where the central government enjoyed a monopoly over violent force, largely disappeared; replaced by what many referred to as a 'failed' state. However, starting in the late 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, the

central government's military was increasingly successful against rebel factions. The reestablishment of the Weberian state was substantially aided by the victors in the Cold War (France and the US), and was largely achieved by 2000.

Concurrent with the cycle of governmental decline and growth was another set of events that arguably resulted in the replacement of the Chadian government by a US transnational corporation as the most powerful institution in the country. Chad is directly south of Libya; that country has oil; and so, it has long been reasoned, should Chad. French enterprises, to test this reasoning, began oil prospecting in Chad at the end of the colonial period. An American transnational, Conoco, took over exploitation in the 1970s, and found oil in southern Chad in 1973. Exxon-Mobil replaced Conoco in the 1980s and discovered commercially exploitable oil deposits in the Doba Basin (1989). Over the next decade negotiations were conducted between Exxon-Mobil, the Chadian government, and the World Bank concerning how to bring Chad's oil unto the global market. These were completed by the end of the 1990s. Construction of 300 oil wells in the Doba Basin and of a 1070 kilometer pipeline south through Cameroon to the port of Kribi began in 2000. This construction was completed in the summer of 2003, when the first oil began to be pumped. Chad had been integrated into the global economy as a petrostate and Exxon-Mobil had arguably become the most powerful institution in the country. This is because its force resources included more capital than competing institutions and the ultimate support of the US government.

MPI for Social Anthropology research has analysed certain consequence of the rise to power of Exxon-Mobil upon Chadians in the oil producing zone. These consequences from the phenomenological perspective of villagers living near Exxon-Mobil operations have been strongly negative. Villagers have experienced these operations as threatening. The threats are experienced as challenges to the survival. They worry that Exxon-Mobil could cause loss of their farmland, pollution of their water, loss of purchasing power, abuse by security services, and declines in health and educational opportunities. Certain informants described this experience of threat as being like *kon*, which is the emotion of deep suffering. Research suggests that the villagers perceived threats are justified.

Finally, it is suggested that the relationship between Exxon-Mobil and the central government could spark violent opposition to both sets of institutions, leading to another cycle of state decline.

North-East Africa

North-East Africa as a Region for the Study of Changing Identifications and Alliances

Günther Schlee

North-East Africa, for the purpose of this little overview, will be regarded as comprising Ethiopia and the countries surrounding it, in a clockwise enumeration: the Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. Examples of clusters of interethnic relations in smaller parts of this huge area, often cross-cutting international boundaries, were presented at two conferences at the MPI for Social Anthropology in 2001 and 2002. The results of these conferences are currently under analysis and are being prepared for publication[1]. A broad synopsis of ethnic and other identification processes in all these countries, undertaken by scholars from an even wider range of countries, shows that there are both parallel processes at work in quite different settings[2], as well as interconnected conflicts and indirect alliances which span the entire region.

Whereas anthropologists usually focus on single villages or districts, particularly following narrow definitions of local 'cultures' or 'societies', for the present purpose I shall write a paragraph or two on each of the states of the region. Although states and statehood may not be the main subject of anthropology, it is clear that they significantly affect the lives of ordinary people everywhere in the present-day world, and that a local society can no longer be studied as if it were not affected by these wider relations, if indeed it was ever fruitful to do so. In the case of North-East Africa it can be shown that mutually contradictory ideas about what should shape the territory of a state – cultural discontinuities or colonial boundaries – and which principles citizenship and internal administrative units should follow, are a constant source of conflict.

Since the demise of the Mengistu-Regime in 1991, Ethiopia has changed its former provincial boundaries, which systematically cross-cut ethnic divisions, according to just the opposite principle: They were made to fit these ethnic divisions and to form ethnicity-based federal

[1] Schlee, Günther and Elizabeth Watson (eds.), in preparation, *Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa.*

[2] For example Ethiopia and Kenya, largely independently of each other, have moved towards making ethnicity the principle of their internal structuring. This leads to similar problems in both cases.

states. The largest of these is Oromia[3], but as not all people who speak Oromo claim Oromo origins or identify with Oromia, its eastern boundary with the Somali region of Ethiopia has many contested stretches.[4] In the southwest of Ethiopia there is a particularly heterogeneous region (partly due to a higher level of linguistic and cultural differences, partly due to a higher degree of attention paid to the usual levels of difference) where the resulting units were too small to justify separate statehood. The result is a conglomerate: the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. Within it we find the same problems as in the rest of Ethiopia, only on a smaller scale. There are titular nations of certain districts, and as elsewhere in the case of larger units, people have more rights in 'their own' territories. The phrase 'nations, nationalities and peoples' is borrowed from the Ethiopian constitution. This constitution does not, however, attempt to define the difference between 'nations', 'nationalities', and 'peoples'. Hierarchies derived from these categorisations locally, tend to be contested. Tadesse Wolde (below) describes how some groups ended up as plantation labourers and others as land owners depending on whether they happened to live in their 'own' ethnic territory or not.

In the Sudanese borderlands (Beni Shangul, western Oromia) we find tendencies of assimilation of small groups with separate languages into larger units (Arabic speaking Muslims/Oromo). The alternative, namely preservation of the distinct features and striving for proportional (or overproportional) political representation as minorities, is another option. Here we find the paradox that a group should not be too small if it wants to achieve minority status. It needs a certain political weight to do so. Also, being a minority requires a certain size.[5] Whichever strategy is adopted – assimilation or preservation of separateness – in a political system which works as an 'ethnocracy', ethnicity never gets off people's minds. Essential rights like access to land or education are affected by the question to which group one belongs.

Eritrea, formally separated from Ethiopia since a referendum in April 1993, is based on an entirely different legitimisation. The colonial history under the Italians is given a positive twist and a modernist self-

[3] In Department I, the projects of Getinet Assefa, Georg Haneke, and Andrea Nicolas touch on various aspects of Oromo ethnicity. In a way the results of Nicolas' field research can be seen as a negative incidence against a backdrop of ethnicised social relations: the adjudication by elders she describes is based on a system of norms shared by Amhara and Oromo, and mediation happens on the family level, regardless of ethnic affiliation.

[4] Getachew Kassa in Schlee and Watson (eds.), in preparation; Schlee, Günther and Abdullahi Shongolo 1995.

[5] Günther Schlee and Getinet Assefa have collected data on the Anfillo of the Dambi Dolo area in Western Oromia in November 2001. Their findings suggest that the Anfillo are a negative instance to illustrate that a minority needs to be of a certain size to successfully adopt a minority discourse. They were too small for this and are undergoing a rapid Oromoisation process.

image is projected. Ethnicity is played down. Since numerous ethnic groups straddle the boundary between the two states, according to the nation-state logic applied to the federal states of Ethiopia, the respective populations in Eritrea and Ethiopia should belong to the same territorial units and the location of the boundaries does not make sense. (Schlee 2003 b). In the recent war between the two countries, however, recourse was rather taken to colonial maps. Matters of collective identity here are closely interwoven with international law and problems of acceptance by international bodies.

One can find a parallel to the Eritrea/Ethiopia case in that of Somaliland/Somalia. Since the breakdown of the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu in 1991, the former British colony Somaliland has emerged as a de facto independent unit again. The continued statelessness, as well as continued extortion and intermittent factional fighting in the remainder of former Somalia, provide little incentive to the Somalilanders, who have got used to relative peace, to join that wider unit again. Somaliland combines different clans in the boundaries of a former colony, while the rest of the country is divided into the power spheres of warlords who in the recruitment of their supporters are bound by a clan and subclan logic. In a way, clan territoriality here parallels the ethnic territoriality Ethiopia applies with mixed success and dubious outcome. It is obvious that the two principles clash where clans straddle the boundary between Somalia, the area of territorial clans, and Somaliland, the territory based on colonial boundaries, and such conflicts have already occurred.[6]

Another parallel exists between Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries have turned into systems in which political representation is based on ethnicity, either in the form of straight dominance of one or the other ethnic coalition, or in the form of such dominance being mollified by proportional representation ceded to smaller groups. The two systems differ in formalities: in Ethiopia, the rights of ethnic groups are enshrined in the constitution, in Kenya they have evolved through political practice in disregard of the more universalist notion of citizenship laid down in the constitution. Throughout the rule of president Moi (1978-2002), Kenyans got more and more used to political leaders being the spokesmen of ethnic groups, claiming exclusive rights to districts for their ethnic groups[7], and denying adversaries access to these dis-

[6] Markus Höhne, a PhD student at the MPI, has taken up field work in the Sool and Sanag regions of eastern Somaliland, which are also claimed by "Puntland".

[7] The partial fit of district boundaries with 'tribal' areas goes back to colonial days and is not an invention of the Moi period (Schlee 1999). What changed in the Moi era was that the emphasis on 'nation building' of the early period of independence gave way to an increasingly open struggle about the 'national cake' along ethnic lines.
See the essay on 'Three dyads compared' in this volume for a discussion of ethnically based districts (Maasai versus Kamba) in Kenya.

tricts. One of the culmination points of 'majimboism', or ethnic federalism of the Kenyan type, were the 'ethnic clashes' (killings, arson, and expulsions of Kenyans from other areas) in the Rift Valley Province in the early 1990s. The government of the new president, elected in December 2003, still has to fight suspicions of ethnic favouritism.

In the Sudan, the north-south conflict has long ceased to be the only game played. There are fissions in both camps and even cross-cutting alliances. Oil has come in as a new bone of contention. The Sudan is the playing ground of oil interests, religious organisations – often with international links like the ones to protestant churches in the US – international organisations like the UNHCR, and international NGOs. All this is interwoven with co-ethnics in western Ethiopia, both long-term residents and refugees, and the Southern Sudanese/Western Ethiopian diaspora in the US. Ideologies and communication networks developed in the diaspora, and finances stemming from there often escalate conflicts in Africa.[8]

The potential of local conflicts to combine through indirect alliances and to contribute to the escalation of an international war has been illustrated by the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1999/2000. An Oromo movement with a political agenda inside Ethiopia allied with one faction in southern Somalia, which was supported by Eritrea, and Ethiopia in turn directly and indirectly intervened in Somalia. States and ethnic movements, especially those in other states, instrumentalise each other.[9]

This quick overview has shown some of the reasons why, sadly for its inhabitants, North-East Africa can be seen as a laboratory for the study of changing identifications and alliances, quite often in violent settings.

The analytical perspectives applied to this setting comprise

- the categories used for identification
- the process of constructing and changing identifications
- the strategies guiding these processes, prominent among them considerations of group size and relative strength.

Prominent among the criteria used for the delineation of larger scale groups commonly referred to as 'ethnic' is the language. Not only in post-World War I Europe, but also in African colonial administrations the linguistic census has often simply replaced the democratic decision process of opting to belong to one or the other 'nation' or 'tribe'. But there are cases where a stable 'ethnic' identity has nothing to do with language. The Garre, living in the area where Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia meet, partly speak Oromo, partly Garrex Kofar, partly Rahan-

[8] Christiane Falge at the MPI for Social Anthropology has completed her field research on Nuer in Gambela, Western Ethiopia, and the USA.

[9] Schlee and Abdullahi Shongolo: chapter on 'Recent conflicts' in *Islam and Ethnicity in Northern Kenya*, in preparation; Schlee: "Brothers of the Boran Once Again: on the fading popularity of certain Somali identities in northern Kenya", a contribution to the ASA conference, Arusha, 2002.

weyn. The latter two are closely related forms of southern Somali, mutually intelligible but kept neatly separate by their speakers. Mutual intelligibility is not given between these and the Oromo language or with Standard (Northern) Somali, which is also spoken by some Garre.

All these languages and dialects belong to the Cushitic family, but when two Garre who do not share any of these meet, they might also opt to communicate in a non-Cushitic language like Swahili or English. This does not prevent them from having a 'Garre' consciousness, from trying to keep internal peace, and from being perceived by others as one ethnic group.[10]

Very often ethnicity is a complex notion involving language plus other identifiers like 'history' and 'descent'. It is a rather ideological notion shaped by two centuries of European nationalist writings, the sediments of which have also been washed ashore in Africa. Which parts of real or imagined history are appealed to and which criteria are used to claim a unity of 'descent' vary from case to case and cannot be generalised. Dereje Feyissa's analysis of Nuer versus Anywaa 'ethnicities' describes the two as not just being different ethnic groups, but as having two different types of ethnicity. Not only do they use different features of the same criteria, but differ in their views of which kinds of criteria are relevant (Dereje 2003, see also the essay on *Three dyads compared* in this volume).

Ritual is often used as an ethnic marker. Between the Rendille and Samburu of Northern Kenya there is a mixed zone, where people are bilingual, have economic ties to both sides and are of mixed descent. But a clear decision has to be taken at one point: whether one participates in the Rendille or the Samburu age set promotion rituals.

'Religion' is another criterion for the definition of large-scale human aggregates. As an analytical concept it has the disadvantage of not being a universal category. It is highly culture bound. The word itself (Lat. *religio* – 'being tied backwards to') suggests a dualism between this world and another world, and a link between the two. In other words: it suggests the existence of a supernatural sphere (and thereby also nature) or a transcendental God (and thereby also a profane world). The dualism can be phrased in many ways, but it is by no means clear how many people beyond the Zoroastrian/Judaeo-Christian/Muslim cluster believe in it. Contrary to 'ritual' and 'belief', which we may find in some form everywhere, 'religion' is not a universal (cross-culturally' applicable) category and therefore not suitable for comparative anthropology.

In many contexts, 'religion' is perceived as something modern and is closely tied to the equally 'modern' nationhood discourse. For the traditionalist Oromo, it is important to have an Oromo religion, and there-

[10] Some would say a separate group from the Somali, some a somewhat different part of wider Somali society.

fore they re-categorise their beliefs and ritual practices – most notably those of the *gada* generation set system – as a 'religion'. As there is no word for 'religion' in the Cushitic language of the Oromo, they borrow two Semitic concepts: *haimanot/imaama* (the same word in Amharic and Arabic, respectively) and *diin* (Arabic).

'Religion' is equally important in the context of the "vernacular modernity"[11] of the Nuer. Conversion to Christianity (and from one sect to another) and re-shaping prophetic traditions along the model of Christian churches play an important part in claiming to be 'modern', educated, and fit for leadership. It also provides links to American Protestant churches, mostly of literalist and charismatic persuasions. The polemics by the Northern Sudanese Islamist government that the groups active among Southern Sudanese have the mentality of 'crusaders' might in some cases not be far off the mark. Christiane Falge[12] has found that the church affiliation closely matches (and thereby duplicates, re-enforces) the segments of the Nuer descent system.[13] Charismatic protestant churches, often of pentecostal inspiration and with North American links, play a major role in social change in Africa and beyond. They are one of the cross-cutting themes of the departments of this institute.[14]

Identity construction is done with all these elements: appeals to linguistic similarities and differences, shared history or ritual practices, and many more. As social identities have to conform to conventions and have to be plausible to be of any use in mobilising people or appealing to their solidarity, identity change always requires work: identification labour, and skill: virtuosity in the handling of social symbols. Re-identification is often gradual. It requires time and persuasion by repetition.

We can distinguish two types of change in social identities:

- Individuals or groups claim different identities situationally or permanently ('conversion'). Or
- The identities themselves change.

The second occurs, for example, when a group undergoes a change of status and the features defining it undergo a change of meaning. Being Amhara before 1991 was being modernist, pan-Ethiopian, and Ethiopian-as-such, 'universalist' so to say, in the Ethiopian context. With the

[11] A concept Christiane Falge has borrowed from Donham 1999.
[12] Current PhD project at the MPI for Social Anthropology on "Religious Identity and Conversion among the Nuer in Ethiopia and the USA".
[13] In other cases, religious affiliation might transcend clan-, ethnic or national affiliation and thereby provide links across such boundaries.
[14] Apart from Christiane Falge's project within Department I, these churches play a role in the projects of Data Dea, Andrea Nicolas, Boris Nieswand, and Nina Glick Schiller. In Department II, Mathijs Pelkmans deals with the influence of North American brands of protestantism in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia.

take-over of power by the Tigray-dominated EPRDF and the establishment of ethnic federalism, the Amhara became one ethnic group among many.

The two processes (changing one's identity and identities changing) can, of course, co-occur. While history goes on and gives new meanings to social categories, people move from one such category to another.

There is a quantitative dimension to identities. If someone speaks a rare language but belongs to a widespread religion, say one of the 'world-religions', an appeal to solidarity along religious lines might lead to a wider mobilisation.

But also within a given dimension, say the linguistic *or* the 'religious'[15] dimension of identification, one can appeal to smaller or larger units. In the same way as one can either pick a rare dialect or an entire language family as the linguistic unit with which one identifies, one can move up and down the scale in the field of organised religion: from small sects or brotherhoods to wider church affiliations or even to the level of the monotheist sister religions. The same game can be played with all other forms of identification: smaller and larger units of putative descent, etc.

To address the question of why people play identity games involving size, we must ask in which circumstances it is advantageous or disadvantageous to belong to a large or small group. To understand the material dimension of these advantages and disadvantages, we have to ask what the game is all about.[16] In real-life games like military conflicts, politics, economic competition, the marriage market or pushing competitors and their herds from one's grazing grounds, one usually speaks about resources when trying to say what the competition is about. One can distinguish different kinds of resources, e.g. the essential resources one needs for survival or to liberate oneself from poverty, and resources for building status or acquiring power. Power itself, apart from being an ultimate aim for some people, can be regarded as a resource needed for obtaining access to other resources. The state often is a resource and therefore the bone of contention. Ethnic and other networks compete for public sector salaries and kickbacks, i.e. the legal and illegal rewards of public office.

It is obvious that it is advantageous to belong to a big group or a strong alliance if one wants to acquire such resources. On the other hand, it is obvious that one only gets a small share of whatever one has obtained if one has to share it with many people. An analyst of identity games would therefore expect a more or less regular alternation be-

[15] Without quotation marks in a Judaeo-Christian context, with quotation marks to mark an outside and possibly misleading perspective in many other contexts.

[16] Different languages use different metaphors for what the game is all about. The French call it *enjeu*, which is anything which is in the game, the English expression *bone of contention* evokes the image of dogs fighting over a bone, while the German *Spielball* makes one think of two teams of players trying to get into possession of the ball.

tween inclusionist and exclusivist identity discourses. While striving for a resource one would mobilise many people and appeal for a greater degree of solidarity, once in possession of it one would try to limit the number of people with whom one has to share and deny some former allies their part of the loot, at least on an equal footing.

There are paradox cases, which appear to contradict this principle. The Anywaa of the Gambela Regional State of western Ethiopia are by no means in secure possession of the riverine flood-lands essential for their economy and of the political offices their new federal state provides. Increasing numbers of Nuer contest these resources. The Nuer have the more viable system of bridewealth payment, they increase biologically and they do so by assimilating others. The Anywaa would do well if they did likewise in order to build up a counter-weight. Instead, they adhere to an ideology of purity and exclusion, which limits their own numbers (Dereje 2003). Possibly our model is too simple. We might have to complement economic rationality by a kind of mental economy, which takes into account plausibility, consistency, and moral and religious pay-offs. There might be people who refuse to let go their values and beliefs until they die out with them.

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Value Systems, Institutions and Development in Ethiopia: Gurage and Oromo compared[1]

Getinet Assefa

My research focuses on value systems, particularly those related to concepts and practices of reciprocity and mutual-aid among different groups of people, which are often stressed as necessary for the attainment of development at individual, communal, regional, national, etc. levels. In Ethiopia, one such model of communal action that seeks to change the conditions under which people exist is the mobilisation of migrant communities through ethnic-based associations.

The growth in urbanisation in Ethiopia over the last century has resulted in population movements into new areas where various forms of interactions between different ethnic, religious and other groups have been taking place. At the same time, this process has facilitated the emergence of indigenous non-state institutions to help migrant communities cope with challenges in their new environments. The purposes of these institutions range from assistance given in times of difficulties, such as at bereavement or during illness, to facilitation of community development in the migrants' areas of origin. One of the (implicit) values such as assumptions about the basic structure of the associations and of the larger socio-economic world in which the migrants live and the associations operate, which are of course (explicitly) defined in their laws, traditions, and customs, is to support the associations by way of contributions of financial, material, labour, and other resources. In this way, the concept of development is intertwined with the survival strategies of migrant communities and offers the opportunity for its analysis as part of the socio-political and economic processes in which they live.

In terms of their structural set-ups, these institutions constitute part of a larger, non-state structural complex that coexists with structures of the nation state. As such, these institutions have for decades been part of everyday life of people in Ethiopia. Urban-based self-help associations trace back their origin to experiences of reciprocal help in agricultural and other activities and resource pooling for communal purposes such as roads and bridges construction and community security services in rural areas. Most of these associations have been established in the urban setting of Addis Ababa with the aim to mobilise members mainly along ethnic lines for undertaking local and regional development activities in targeted rural areas. My research aims at understanding these institutional complexes, their purposes and the ideals they use to rally membership and consequently to realise their (developmental) objectives.

[1] A PhD Research Project at the MPI for Social Anthropology and Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany.

In a previous research, I analysed the impact of some of these associations on development in the Gurage area in central Ethiopia. My interest then was to problematise local development and issues of concerted actions at community level. The findings indicated that locally based institutions offered people to solve practical problems such as lowering costs of economic exchanges, providing social support in times of crises such as during bereavement, providing support related to migration, etc. These institutions make up a significant livelihoods facilitation mechanism operating side by side with state agencies and the conventional market system. It was then suggested that a thorough understanding of such institutional complexes is necessary to reach a better analysis of local realities affecting development. The research concluded that development needs to be analysed using a comprehensive institutional model containing the market system, the state apparatus, and the civil society sector, under which indigenous institutions and other organisations such as NGOs could be categorised.

The new research focuses on ethnic-based associations as institutions that seek not only to solve practical problems but also serve as sites for imagining communities with various social identities. The research investigates the extent to which individual and shared values of identity have been used to facilitate development through these associations. More specifically, the research seeks to find out which aspects of identity are considered important for undertaking development. It asks whether relations based on ethnic belongingness or shared local origin serve the causes of development better. In this sense, it asks whether ethnic-based associations form concerted actions to criticise the limited development initiatives and distribution of results by the nation state and other organisations, or simply form institutional alternatives coming out of natural processes. By way of these and other questions, the research studies the approaches adopted by various ethnic associations, enquires about the relationship between them and the state, and investigates how differential approaches, if any, of the state towards different associations have affected their evolution over time, the conceptualisation of identity, and the development initiatives based on communal actions. The research takes a historical approach to examine the responses of the three successive Ethiopian governments to the establishment of these associations and how they have shaped later developments.

Examples of the Self-help Development Association of the Gurage and Mecha and Tulema Association of the Oromo (both established in the 1960s) are used to study ethnic associations for what they are and what they do, what concept of identity they use to promote development, and how they relate to and are perceived by the state. The associations are looked at as forums and instruments of interaction, between members and with the state, respectively.

Boundaries of Sacred Power: religion and integration in south west Ethiopia

Data Dea

This project proposes to investigate the significance of various traditions of religiosity in south western Ethiopia with special reference to the question of integration. Particularly in the recent history of this part of the Horn of Africa, there developed an increased interaction and contestation between the Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, multitudes of Protestantism, Islam and networks of 'spirit mediums'. Each of these connects a set of actors across social space while at the same time drawing boundary between members and non-members. A salient feature of their interaction in this region, perhaps like in many other regions, is that one set of such religious group tries to 'socially expand' while other set(s) of religious actors react so as not to 'disappear' from the socially significant space, and at other times not to lose their dominance in this contested space. This project intends to look at the 'cross breeding' of ideas as well as the boundaries between these religious institutions, and to examine the ensuing patterns of interaction of people across variously defined boundaries.

The project emerges from the ethnographic background I have become acquainted with in the process of doing research in various parts of southern Ethiopia as well as growing up in the region. I shall refer to one recent field encounter in Dawro which raises a number of anthropologically important questions, some of which have been overlooked by ethnographic research in this region. While doing fieldwork in Dawro for my doctoral thesis, I took the opportunity to 'participate' in a night-long indigenous religious ritual. It was hosted by a person locally referred to as in Dawro language *Sharetcho* (spirit medium) – an 'indigenous' religious leader similar to the *Kallu* of the Oromo or *Eqo* of the Kaffa.

A spirit medium in Dawro, standing next to the central post of his ritual house, holding a spiritual stick he inherited from his father who was genealogically an Oromo but politically categorised as an Amhara. (Photo: D. Dea, 2000)

At the culmination of this night-long ritual, at about midnight, the *Sharetcho* started speaking in tongues, which was not understood directly by the believers around him and hence had to be 'decoded' by an 'interpreter', who on this occasion was the *Sharetcho*'s senior wife. One person, who was there by accident, as it were, whispered to me that the *Sharetcho* was speaking the language of the *Kaffa*, one of the Omotic speaking groups neighbouring the Dawro. Looking at his genealogy, however, I learned that this *Sharetcho* was of Oromo descent. It was his late father who had come to Dawro from Shoa sometime in the 1920s. His father chose to identify himself as an Amhara in Dawro at a time when to be Amhara was to be highly privileged (unlike today, at least in the south). Some of his family members still now consider themselves as Amhara and are considered as such by most local people around them. But the *Sharetcho* himself says he is Dawro now and downplays his genealogical connection to Oromo and political connection to Amhara. He justifies his being Dawro on the account of being born in Dawro from a Dawro mother and all that this entails. He speaks Dawro as his native language, speaks only rudimentary Amharic, does not speak Oromo and is in no way different from most Dawro of 'similar class'. Moreover, he hosts one of the most powerful Dawro spirits known as *Awayonto* of a locally dominant Dawro clan. This raises important questions about the levels at which he has been integrated into the local society.

He is also, like his father, 'officially' a member of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church but in 1999/2000 there arose a serious dispute between the Orthodox Church and the *Sharetcho* around Waka town – the historical capital of Dawro. While the full complexity of such disputes is yet to be investigated, it is useful to note here that in the background of this dispute between the *Sharetcho* and Orthodox Church is the Protestants' social and theological challenge to the Orthodox Church, relating to increased conversion and accusations of the Orthodox Church about befriending Satan (in this case the *Sharetcho*). This dispute was settled (perhaps temporarily) after a prolonged negotiation but raised interesting questions and left important legacies. Noteworthy for closer consideration in this respect is the existent to which the outcomes of religious contestations are critically swayed by historical and sociological factors.

In the Omotic speaking southwest of Ethiopia, local religious figures like the *Sharetcho* are considered *gesha* (pure, sacred) spiritual leaders by many locals, while many other locals (especially those who subscribe to a 'protestant modernity') consider them a wicked force of witchcraft, demons or the relics of an old tradition, which does not fit modern life circumstances. Nevertheless, the *Sharetcho* not only continue to offer an alternative perspective for many people on how to deal with the natural-cultural-supernatural forces that affect people's lives, but these powerful persons also constitute an important knot in communication

routes, friendship networks and in the formation of alliances over wide geographical spaces and across seemingly rigid political boundaries.

There are some intricate sets of practices around the institution of *Sharetcho* that deserve greater attention. At this stage we can raise a few questions focusing on a few selected themes. One such theme relates to investigating, with some historical depth, how religious ideas (especially those without the organisational and technological resources of Christianity or Islam) have spread in southern Ethiopia and how that might relate to the interconnectedness of the various 'ethnic groups' of the region. Note, for instance, that in Dawro only one *Sharetcho* is considered the main 'representation' of a clan's spirit and all others who might be representing this spirit anywhere else (including those among neighbouring ethnic groups) are expected to come to the main *Sharetcho* with offerings at an annual celebration.

Since the *Sharetcho* networks rely to an important extent on clan/kinship networks which extend beyond ethnic/political boundaries, in this research I shall draw on already available findings of other researchers of the MPI for Social Anthropology (notably that of Schlee and Wolde) on how clanship works in this ethnographic region. On issues such as ethnicity and Protestantism as a practice of modernity, this project will also relate to the works of Feyissa and Falge in Gambela, a region to the west of my proposed main field site.

We can hypothesise in this connection that there has been a shift in the nature of the relationship between the religious and political institutions in recent Ethiopian history: the stronger the central state, the weaker the powers of religious institutions. This is a reversal of an older state of affairs where the stronger the central state was, the stronger was the position of religious institutions as well. But this hypothesis applies to 'official religious institutions'. What happens when a one-time official religion comes to be defined as an 'unfit religion' (by virtue of being the religion of the politically less powerful)? How is sacred power distributed between the 'official' and 'non-official' (subaltern) religious offices?

By combining historical and ethnographic methods, I intend to do multi-sited fieldwork among more centralised and hierarchically organised former kingdoms of Omotic speaking societies: Kaffa, Wolaita and Dawro. The main reasons for such a focus are: firstly, although the rulers of these polities were considered divine kings in some of the literature, it is far from clear how the secular tasks of the kings and the sacred roles (of the *Sharetcho*) co-existed or cooperated. For instance, in Kaffa the highest sacred institution was that of *Gumbachino* and not that of *Kafa-tato* (king). A variation of a broadly similar pattern is observed in Dawro and Wolaita, where the king used to consult and even take blessings from the *Sharetcho* of certain clans. It is curious then to know how the *Sharetcho* as an institution fared in the years following

the abolition of kingship. Secondly, looking at what happened to the institutions of the formerly centralised polities might shed important light on the nature of so-called national integration: how deep or shallow its ideological impact was, how social space was disputed beneath, as it were, the field of coercive force and the transformation of the relationship between the political and religious institutions.

Nuer Vernacular Modernism in Ethiopia and the USA
Christiane Falge

This project is about the ambivalence contemporary Nuer have in their approach toward the undertaking that some define as 'joining the world'. From the discussions I had with several Nuer on that desire to become part of a wider world and other related concepts, I learnt that as much as they are attracted by it, they also associate it with a loss. Next to the loss of cattle, becoming modern stands for the loss of many other things related to a domestic mode of production as a symbol for a 'traditional'[1] way of life with people marrying, reproducing and having enough to eat. Equally, it stands for a way of life in which, as the Nuer say, 'the world is good', but, at the same time, people die in disputes over cattle. A good number of Nuer say, however, that their contemporary world is no longer good and that in this context they want to join 'the world'.

Young Nuer singing Christian songs in the refugee camp Pinyudo. (Photo: Ch. Falge, 2001)

The experience of refugee camps, the relief industry, the new Ethiopian state, as well as the Nuer out-migration to the USA made them part of a wider, global world. While on the Sudanese side, the state is non-existent, the Ethiopian state is launching a national inclusion project. In the face of the experience of loss after nearly half a century of civil war, Nuer society is presently reaching out for its share in the national cake. It remains to be seen whether a fair distribution of this cake will compensate for their cultural loss or prove the state's failure. [2]

[1] By 'traditional' I am referring to the former, less urbanised way of life.
[2] An example for the failure of state inclusion and its disastrous consequences is given by Rottenburg in the case of the Nuba of Sudan (Rottenburg: 9).

Thus, especially Christians see a supplement to their subsistence economy in this new world, and some even find it attractive enough to give up their cattle and become 'poor'.

Christian Church leaders during Christmas in the refugee camp Pinyudo. (Photo: Ch. Falge, 2001)

In looking at the Nuer, I attempt to describe the path that led them to engage in a broader cultural conversation about changes related to their encounter with the modern world. Their transnational networks have contributed to their idea of a new world in which war, destruction and a lack of modern facilities do not seem to exist. On the one hand, they imagine a world of peace and development, ultimately achieved through education and new modes of employment; on the other hand they are aware of the mercilessness of the global economy connected with this world. With ongoing social change, however, some Nuer groups claim they are no longer the Nuer they used to be (*'ci kon la nueeri tee wal'*), which at the same time functions as a legitimising strategy to enter the modern world.

The Nuer have consistently been considered the most backward by their Arab, Ethiopian and Nilotic neighbours and are now trying to catch up through government jobs, wage labour and the establishment of transnational networks. In a cultural conversation about their imagined place in the world, they both blame their ancestors for their 'backwardness' and come up with a new vision of the future. In this paper I will mainly focus on representations of the 30-40 % Nuer Christians in Ethiopia, who promote this vision in the form of vernacular modernism.[3]

Considering the level of ambivalence toward the new world, rather than talking about two separate entities the project describes the drawing of borders between different realms and shows boundaries that are characterised by a simultaneity of old and new.

Ethnographic data has been collected in the transnational social field of the Nuer consisting of refugee camps, villages and the diaspora in the USA during 13 months of fieldwork from 2001- 2002.

[3] There are no official figures on the exact number of Christians in Gambella. The mentioned figure is based on estimates by the Gambella Mekane Yesus Synod.

Reference
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Identities in Ethiopia and the Struggle for the Nation State
Georg Haneke

The Horn of Africa has been destabilised by the recent conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia and by the many internal conflicts in countries such as Somalia or Ethiopia. Apart from the war against Eritrea, another reason for the difficult situation in Ethiopia is the fact that the country is ruled by the Tigrean minority, with consequences for all parts of the society, including repression, monopolisation tendencies on all levels, and obstruction of access to financial and political power resources for most people in Ethiopia.

The bordertown Moyale. (Photo: G. Haneke, 2001)

The project area was the Kenyan – Ethiopian Highway in southern Ethiopia. A road of this kind not only divides a country and its ethnic groups but also connects the centre, the cities and the periphery. This particular road is used as a communication line transporting central state decisions and developments to far away parts of the country, but also as a trade and smuggling route connecting the hinterland of Somalia to the south eastern regions of Ethiopia. An advantage of using a road as a unit of observation is that it allows the exploration of different ways of life: from the crowded capital of Addis Ababa as the trade and power centre of the country, to agricultural areas and rural towns, to

the nomadic societies of cattle and camel herders in the south, from western consumer attitudes to traditional ways of life. Apart from being the lifeline of the south, the road is used for military purposes, namely to control the area, and – depending on the political circumstances – as a route for refugees.

Slaughtering of a billy goat in Borana society. (Photo: G. Haneke, 2001)

Although Ethiopia comprises dozens of different 'tribes' and languages, the vast majority belong to only four main groups: the Tigre (ca. 5% of the whole population), the Amhara (ca. 15%), the Somali (ca. 15%) and the Oromo (ca. 40-50%). Unlike the Somali, who are struggling for a degree of autonomy approaching independence in the Ogaden, all other ethnic groups claim Addis Ababa as their capital. The Amhara, as the former rulers and the elite of the country, claim political power with pan-Ethiopian ideals. Many of them mistrust both the Tigre and the Oromo, and are convinced that the Amhara are the only people who are able to rule the country in the long run, as they did under the emperors. The Tigre have ruled the country since the fall of the communist regime of Mengistu (1991). They confiscated most of the weapons of the army and started controlling the rest of the country. Today, in many parts of Ethiopia they are seen as occupiers because a coalition government of different liberation fronts failed soon after the fall of the Mengistu regime. Since taking over the government in Addis Ababa, the Tigreans have started to monopolise power in every sense. Media and all levels of administration were made to toe the line, circles close to the government monopolised economy, the absence of human rights, repression and a permanent control by the secret service became conspicuous. The largest population group are the Oromo. Although the

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the military and political arm of the Oromo opposition movement, claims their own nation state, the struggle is not as strong or as successful as some of the leaders, especially those in exile, had expected. The reasons for this are different levels of identity among the Oromo.

The Oromo do not seem to be as homogenous as some of the other peoples of Ethiopia might be. Although, according to many of my informants, some main criteria – such as a common language, a common history, a common system of social structure, a common consciousness of belonging to a discriminated group or common demarcations to others – can be pointed out, a strong common Oromo identity does not seem to exist. Identity markers are far stronger on micro levels such as family or sub-clan based daily life practices. For most people it is more important to receive support from brothers and sisters of their own family or other small units than to have a political idea of a 'Free Oromia'. On a meso-level, clans and sub-ethnicities are the most important basis for any identity. The feeling of belonging to such a unit of this kind is much stronger than an uncertain belonging to the Oromo people. On the meso-level, co-existence with other ethnic groups needs to be organised and requires processes of negotiation, e.g. to gain access to resources. One proof that sub-ethnicity based identities are more important than the idea of being Oromo is the number of clashes between the former.

It is obvious that identity is multidimensional. In the case of Ethiopia, the struggle for the nation state will continue in various but complicated ways, especially against a background where identities can shift easily, not only from smaller to larger units but also between other demarcations such as profession, religion, education, social status, etc. The research will discuss and compare some different theoretical concepts of identity, ethnicity, nation, and nationalism that can be observed in the context of struggling for the nation state in Ethiopia.

Identity and Conflict in Two Regions of Eastern Somaliland
Markus V. Höhne

Somaliland, a region in northwestern Somalia, seceded from the collapsing Somali state in 1991 based on the former colonial boundaries of the British Protectorate of Somaliland.

The majority of the population of Somaliland belongs to the Isaaq clan-family. The Isaaq dominated the Somali National Movement (SNM), the guerrilla faction that fought against the oppression of the former Somali government in the south since 1982. Members of other clan-families live in the west and east of Somaliland; the majority of them opposed the SNM during the civil war, in which genealogical orientations were decisive.

In the following process of peace and reconstruction during the 1990s, genealogical cleavages deepened by the preceding violence were bridged. To the present day, the framework of a stable democratic state was built under the guidance of traditional authorities, intellectuals, former politicians and military leaders, who are not all Isaaq in origin, and are supported by a large part of the population. So far, Somaliland looks like a 'success story'. The down side is that the Republic of Somaliland is still not recognised internationally. The government in the capital of Hargeisa lacks the resources to implement its politics; and important roles of the state in the fields of legal practice and public security have to be taken on by local authorities to be effective. Even more problematic is the fact that the whole course of politics is contested in some remote areas, where the Somaliland state has only marginal power and other political orientations are prevalent. However, in daily life, pragmatic identifications are necessary to be able to conduct all kinds of transactions, from the social to the economic sphere.



The study will focus on the construction of everyday and political identity on the local level, on how they intermingle and how processes of identification are linked to conflict.

For an everyday identity, various features such as genealogical affiliation, collective and individual memory, economic ties, and personal experiences such as education and friendship have to be considered.

Regarding political identity, two options exist: On the national level the government in Hargeisa evokes a Somaliland identity, based on colonial history, civil war and recent political developments. This identity is said to unite all people living in the territory of Somaliland. On the international level, but also in the territory of rump-Somalia, the national identity of Somalia is maintained; actually on the *14th Peace and Reconciliation Conference for Somalia* in Nairobi, endeavours are being made to establish a united Somalia once again.

On a local and regional level, these options for political identity compete. Central questions are: How do people deal with this competition in everyday life? How is their behaviour influenced by conflict? In which way does their behaviour produce conflicts?

These questions can be addressed by investigating and comparing the situations in Sanaag and Sool, the eastern regions of Somaliland at the border to Puntland. With regard to everyday life, important structural similarities, but also some differences can be observed in these regions. Both regions are basically nomad land at the periphery of the state of Somaliland. Traditional and other local authorities gained new importance in the last decade, and life is regulated very strictly by pastoral nomadic and Islamic norms.

Regarding genealogical structure, Sanaag is much more heterogeneous than Sool. In Sanaag people belonging to different clan-families, the Isaaq and the Darood, live together. While the Isaaq are territorially and, to a large extent, ideologically connected with Somaliland, the Darood clans of the region have strong genealogical ties to the neighbouring Puntland. The Isaaq and Darood clans fought on opposite sides during the civil war. Genealogy, memory and some historical orientations divide their members. In contrast, Sool is almost exclusively inhabited by one clan belonging to the Darood clan-family. Here, collective memory and historical views are more consistent among the population.

According to the colonial boundaries, both regions belong to Somaliland. At the same time, the leadership of the neighbouring Puntland claims parts of the regions as belonging to its territory according to clan affiliations. But this conflict is not restricted to a historical, partly primordial notion of belonging. Puntland still considers itself a part of Somalia and therefore opposes the independence of the Republic of Somaliland. Thus, on a political level, the Somaliland and the Somali national identities clash in these regions, with all international, national and local implications this may have.

Bearing in mind the genealogical heterogeneity of Sanaag, it could be expected that political conflict escalates much more fiercely in everyday life in this region than in Sool, with its clear-cut genealogical structure. Empirical evidence from the two regional capitals, however, shows exactly the opposite.

In Erigavo (Sanaag) the violence is under control; people live side by side and obviously manage to transcend tensions. On the administrative level, the town, and along with it the whole region, is linked to Somaliland. Representatives of the government in Hargeisa are present and have some influence, for example regarding the regulation of the public water supply in town. Nevertheless, normal daily conflicts are dealt with using pastoral-nomadic and Islamic strategies. State administration and local modes of political authority co-exist.

In Lasanod (Sool), genealogical homogeneity does not lead to clear internal and external orientations fostering peace and stability. There are representatives of Somaliland and Puntland in Lasanod, but none of them have any real authority. The number of men carrying guns in public is large. Conflicts and violence within the community escalate quite frequently. Traditional and other authorities have a hard time trying to maintain public security and to find a path towards lasting political and social stability.

The basic question is: Why is the situation more stable in Erigavo (Sanaag) than in Lasanod (Sool)? I suggest that an answer can be found by looking at the practical and political identifications as well as the strategies of conflict settlement used by individuals and groups in the two regions.

Comparing the very different situations with respect to identification and conflict in the two neighbouring regions of eastern Somaliland by various methods such as participant observation, interviews and ego-centred network analysis can

- shed some light on the role genealogy and other forms of orientation play in contemporary Somali society;
- contribute to the research on identity and conflict in a 'non-ethnicised' field in general.

Mediation on Demand. The instituton of elders in Ada'a (central Ethiopia)

Andrea Nicolas

Ada'a, the research area of my dissertation project, is situated in eastern Shewa at the slopes of the Central Ethiopian Highlands. It is inhabited by members of the Oromo and the Amhara ethnic groups. In this setting of a peasant society, where ethnic 'borders' are regularly crossed by intermarriage and living in joint settlements, old men do possess a high status, emphasised by certain rules for addressing them, and demonstrated by good manners and respect for them. They have a right to bless the younger generation and perform various functions in their community, such as the conflict settlement among disputants. They employ special procedures and rituals to reconcile conflicting parties,

most of them families disputing over cases of insult, brawl, and disputes about property, bride-kidnapping or killing. The prescriptive procedures differ in each of these cases and reflect the severity and the possible consequences of the instance concerned. It is of special interest for the project to document such regulations or models of action and to show how and why elders apply them. As it turns out, the rituals and courses of action already have a potential for appeasement in their form and language. They are by far not as arbitrary as they might appear at first glance.

Elders discussing a case of homicide in Ada'a Liiban (Ethiopia). (Photo: A. Nicolas, 2001)

In serious cases of quarrel and bloodshed, for instance, particular time intervals have to be observed in the course of the continuing mediation activities by elders, thus leaving time for the quarrelling parties to calm down. Also, the procedure stipulates that it must not be the perpetrator's side, but a third party – the group of elders – who contact the injured's family and enter into negotiations with its representatives. This can avoid acts of revenge and an immediate face-to-face confrontation of the persons involved in the conflict. Certain formal speeches, promises and confessions of guilt by the perpetrators' elders are to induce the other side to yield to the request for reconciliation, etc. A whole spectrum of communicative strategies is used here in order to restore peace, since, despite their respected role in society, success of the elders' endeavours is not guaranteed. The aim of mediation is not primarily to punish guilty persons but to reconcile the families or groups involved.

In serious cases this would mean the reintegration of the perpetrator and his relatives into local society.

My past long-term fieldwork in Ada'a has resulted in a rich ethnographic data-base on the research area, and the analysis of the material provides a promising basis for theoretical and comparative reflection. Above all, the obvious absence of ethnic conflict is noteworthy. It stands in contrast both to the relatively high degree of ethnic consciousness of the Oromo and Amhara in the area (which is partly due to recent political developments in the framework of a new ethnic-federal state of Ethiopia) and to the situation in other areas of the country where tensions and even ethnic 'cleansings' have been reported for the same two ethnic groups. This fact deserves a closer examination. Absence of ethnic conflict is not tantamount to absence of conflict in general. Cases of conflicts I recorded, include killings and other serious incidents. These, however, were not expressed in terms of interethnic but of inter-family conflicts, with one family belonging to the one, and the other family to the other, or both families belonging to the same ethnic group, depending on the specific case. This non-ethnic 'classification' of a given conflict keeps conflicts on a lower scale, since it is obvious that an ethnic group can potentially mobilise more members for its support than a single family.

Landscape in Eastern Shewa (Ethiopia). (Photo: A. Nicolas, 2001)

An ethnic labelling might otherwise have led to a 'bush fire' of intergroup violence following the same incident. It seems surprising that the ethnic affiliation of the conflicting parties is of no or little importance to the (otherwise quite vivid) 'revenge activity' in the Ada'a area. But a closer look at the legal and procedural setting provides an explanation for this phenomenon. If Oromo and Amhara had each maintained their own, ethnically distinct, laws and procedures, ethnic affiliation would definitely matter, since this would determine which procedure and which law has to apply in a case at hand. But the members of both eth-

nic groups have – over a long historical period – developed a joint, or at least largely shared legal sphere. People make use of the same institutions, and the procedure to be applied in a case of crime or accidental injury of another person is basically the same for everyone. Ethnic affiliation, therefore, becomes a minor factor for the elders' problem of solving the conflict. In this context, it appears to be a task worthwhile to explore how in the course of time apparent 'enemy groups' are capable to build up such central institutions as the elders' mediation.

While many anthropological efforts have been made to explain conflicts and their 'roots' and causes, it seems similarly important to explain peace, where it persists. There is no reason to believe that members of one group would per se have more peaceful and harmonic predispositions than members of any other group. So, what are the 'roots' of peace? The Ada'a material shows that here, as elsewhere, conflict is not absent, but it is kept on a certain level and later on actively settled by representatives of the much respected status group of the elders. The elders' readiness to invest time and much effort into the reconciliation of estranged families is not entirely unselfish, although they do not profit immediately in a specific case. They have an interest in 'law and order' in their society in general, because it protects everyone, including their own family. By generalising individual interests, the concept of a 'public good' emerges. For the protection of this public interest, institutions and procedures are introduced. Sometimes, the question of what would happen if these institutions did *not* exist may deliver quite a good answer to the question of what they are for. Elders' mediation in Ada'a maintains peace.

Transcendental Worlds and Pilgrimages – the limits of politics in the *Awliya*-Cult

Sven Nicolas

My dissertation project deals with a widely practised spirit possession cult in central- and southern Ethiopia commonly referred to by its followers as the *Qaalluu*-, *Uqabi*- or *Awliya*-cult. In its specific local form of *Ada'a*/*Shawa*, this religious institution is composed of countless charismatic mediums and their respective followers and comprises a certain kind of divine advocacy of so called *awliya* (from Arabic) or *ayaana* spirits. These spirits are intended and enabled by the mercy of God to read for those people who ask correctly for advice from a heavenly "Book of the Truth" the causes for their troubles and conflicts, as well as the measures to solve them in keeping with the ideal of the 'Early Creation'. So the primary motivation for this religious practice is to acquire and to share a divine transcendental knowledge of the Self and, based on this privilege, to shape and correct one's own social behaviour accordingly. This is not about magic and manipulation, but about divine judgements

and their execution. An immanent part of these pragmatics encompasses, therefore, the necessity of morally and socially acceptable solutions.

A typical medium in the *awliya*-cult is usually visited by a number of different spirits. They all have their own individual personality: they all speak with different voices, in different languages and dialects, use different formulas; they have got all their own specific set of ritual rules concerning the place and time of performances, a certain type of ritual cloth and food, etc., and they are differentiated according to gender, religious adherence, and ethnic identity.

The sanctuary of Sheikh Hussein in Bale (Ethiopia). (Photo: S. Nicolas, 2002)

The only – but rather important – point restricting the performative freedom of the spirits derives from the view that they always appear as an individual refraction of a whole, all encompassing identity. As an illustration: The spirit *Tokolash*, for instance, is always female, always speaks with a high, drunken timbre, always likes candies and so on; otherwise, the initiated people would have no means of recognising her. Nonetheless, *Tokolash* of cult A is different from *Tokolash* of cult B because they both entertain specific one-to-one-relationships with their respective cult-followers as a reaction to the particularities of their local characters and capacities.

The different spiritual refractions of spirits and adherent cult groups meet regularly at the events of frequent pilgrimages, like the central pilgrimage to *Faraqasa/Arsi*. In the course of my field research it became obvious that those locally limited cult groups actually had a radius of action and thinking reaching far beyond their original home regions. What is astonishing in this respect is the actual pilgrimage practice of the majority of people, who travel in local groups consisting of one medium and his/her home audience. Regardless of the pluralistic and foreign surroundings, one encounters a relatively low level of direct inter-

action and melting with the Other. In addition, in the case of *Faraqasa*, a spiritual leadership and consequently the opportunity for a direct conversation with the higher spiritual level are presently lacking. Bearing Victor Turner and his theory on the antistructural power of pilgrimages in mind[1], it seems difficult to understand why the pilgrims invest so much time, money and energy to do in principle the same as they do at home in a distant location.

What is, then, the significant aspect of going on pilgrimage for the *awliya*-cult?

The corresponding conceptualisation outlined below attempts to create an understanding of why the presence of a combined complex of spirit possession and pilgrimages in the Ethiopian context is far from being arbitrary, but constitutes the central basis for the *awliya*-cult in its concrete local expression. A detailed analysis of the interrelations between local and supraregional dimensions of action and argumentation can thereby help us to draw a complex descriptive picture of a religious practice which might be called eclectic, syncretistic and integrative, which would then stand alongside simple and general assumptions made about those features.

Possessed medium at the Irecha-celebration in Eastern Shewa (Ethiopia). (Photo: S. Nicolas, 2002)

[1] Turner, Victor; 1969. *The Ritual Process*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Finally, deriving from an initial survey of my field material (2001-2003), the subsequent preliminary set of theses on the boundaries and limitations of politics within the *awliya*-cult can be summarised as follows:

- Every claim or argument – irrespective of whether it is made by a spirit or by a human participant in the system – must frame itself with reference-producing compatibility – or otherwise will not stand up to scrutiny.
- The criteria for compatibility are fixed traditional values of high social esteem representing – as common sense or tacit conventions – the basic constituents of an ideal and just community. Such reference-principles as seniority, kinship ties or an appreciation of spiritually-sanctioned hierarchies both constitute and mirror an identical map of pilgrimage.
- This horizontal localisation of the reference points of a sacral speech act provides the followers, in their turn, with the possibility for evaluation. The experience of pilgrimage as a field for comparison and decontextualisation is indispensable for related identity checks. Here – and only here – the indirect polling of a political project that claims transcendental authority is performed.
- The quality of syncretism, often attributed to such types of religious institution, is in the present case neither an amalgam nor a hybrid construction, but nothing more than a relationship of independent components.

Ethnic Groups, the State and the Religious Landscape in south western Ethiopia

Wolde Gossa Tadesse

My research in south western Ethiopia covers three interrelated subjects. These are:

- inter-group relations and the relationship between groups and the state in terms of property
- the study of local non-state (indigenous) structures of power, which control property and much social and cultural life
- the situation of a variety of religions found within the region.

Political structures in the research area are characterised by the prevalence of hierarchically ordered sets of generations. Younger generations supply their seniors with meals (Tornay 1998), drink and sacrifices (to the dead). Thus, they continually look backwards in time in order to move forward. I liken these practices to the act of rowing a boat facing backwards in order to be able to move forward in the opposite direction. Understanding these structures is key to understanding the dynamics of social and cultural reproduction in the region.

Kinship and generations are the routes through which these offerings of food, drink and sacrifices to ancestors are organised. The venues for such kin and age-based events are the house and wider public spaces. Provisions and offerings are organised both domestically as well as in the public domain. The house, the lineage, the clan and the generation, which combine to form the groups I work with, reproduce the same principle of feeding seniors and ancestors in their respective domains in order to reproduce over time. Creative power, blessings and political power are handed down to younger generations in exchange for offerings. Negative attributes such as infertility, misfortune, discontinuity and collapse of order are feared to result if the flow of offerings to seniors and ancestors is interrupted.

Offerings are consumed at selected sites: river banks, valleys, streams, on paths, lake shores, mountain tops, forest groves, peace-making sites, fields and mountain pastures. As the venue for communication between generations and as the source of livelihood, land is revered and considered sacred. It is kept potent by a temporally punctuated sacrificial rhythm which complements offerings to seniors and ancestors. Both women and men have sacrificial roles to play (Kashe in Gamo; the wife among the Hor).

Mountain settlement and fields. (Photo: W. G. Tadesse, 2001)

In my research area state political structures and indigenous non-state political structures coexist with a strong bias among the local population towards the latter. At the same time, Christian religious movements of various denominations, NGOs with varying religious and secular affiliations, and political organisations affiliated to the ruling party and those opposed to it compete fiercely to capture the hearts and minds of individuals. Since the early 1990s, people in Ethiopia have been reorganised along ethnic lines. These peoples have been hierarchically ordered in relation to one another as well as to the state. In the

new ordering of peoples, ethnic groups are graded into nations, nationalities and peoples. This has benefited larger ethnic groups and has given them the lion's share of political and economic power. Smaller peoples have remained marginalised and have been lumped together territorially into one larger entity, to become minorities within the larger ethnic groups. This sort of categorisation and reconstitution of groups has produced an ideology of development designed to reproduce inequality. The idea's originators, on the other hand, believe that categorising peoples in such a manner creates an ideal situation for fostering political equality and equity. Local people's lives over the last decade, however, have shown that they are experiencing neither economic equity nor political equality.

My research, carried out in this political and economic context, focuses on south western Ethiopian groups such as the Gamo, Konso (pop.) and Hor/Arbore people. Regarding the first theme, my preliminary findings indicate the following: with respect to property, the attitude of the peoples towards the state has changed. There is increased suspicion of the state as upholder of justice and defender of the law. This is a process that has taken over a century to develop and which materialised particularly when the state appropriated much irrigable fertile land from groups in the south without consultation and without due legal considerations, in order to establish state-owned plantations as well as to distribute the land to outside others. These lands were originally privately owned by members of some of these peoples. In 1975 the revolutionary government (1974-1991) nationalised all land and became the largest landlord in place of the landowners it had abolished by law. Gradually the state appropriated mountain pasturelands and escarpment woodlands for forestry projects while tightening its grip on fertile lowland fields. This resulted in farmers being squeezed off their holdings and pastures, which contributed to low yields of food and growing land insecurity. Subsequent political developments reinforced the deteriorating situation without heeding the possible consequences. Groups that had similar land tenure and ownership rights in their own territory were forced to become plantation labourers. Groups became fractious as a result of such developments and often engaged in violent confrontations. Inter-group violence between Konso and Gato, between Zayse and D'irashe and many others testify to this. In pastoral areas too, similar processes of appropriation have taken place (Miyawaki 1997), for example in Tsamako and D'assanech country, creating much pressure on pastures and resulting in a movement of herders in the direction of lesser resistance and often causing bloody clashes among herders, between herders and plantation owners, and between herders and the forces of the state. In response to this, cultivators in Gamo and Konso have diversified their means of livelihood by out-migration, trading and resorting heavily to non-farming activities such as weaving,

which they have practiced for many generations for domestic use, but now practice with strong emphasis on the marketability of their products. (Tadesse 2003)

Competition for resources has intensified between the state and agricultural groups and what groups in the south hope is that the state will heed local knowledge, recognise indigenous tenure and end its involvement in day to day farming activities. They also hope for an end to farmer's time being taken for forced labour and for voluntary military service, thus allowing farming and herding productivity to reach the levels of the mid-1890s (the pre-conquest period).

Trade networks linking various peoples and markets are widespread and their operation is superimposed on pre-existing networks of friendship. (Galaty and Bonte 1991, Sobania 1991, Tadesse 2002) I argue that pre-conquest economic structures are resurfacing and are showing resilience after years of latent inactivity or activity within limited geographical areas. These complement non-state political structures. Trade routes connect the region with the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Lake Turkana region and Southern Sudan. For a few decades after the conquest period, these routes were inactive mainly because of slave raiding and brigandage by the conquest forces. But after a calmer period following the exit of the Italian colonialists these routes were back in use. With the growth of modern transport in the early seventies, roads had nearly made caravan routes redundant – until the late seventies, when police check-points mushroomed and forced traders back onto the caravan routes. Trade routes and networks operate today with the help of institutions such as the Fuld'o in Konso which guarantee the secure flow of traders and property. They regulate and control relations between customers and traders as well as relations between the traders themselves. They are efficient and effective in their exercise of authority and contrast starkly with the institutions of the state. Due to their focus on ethnicity, institutions of the state are inward looking and are generally inefficient. The Fuld'o and other similar institutions, on the other hand, operate beyond ethnic borders and use the national *lingua franca* to communicate with others. They are supra-ethnic, whereas state institutions are ethnic. In the same way as they are organised through networks of trade and friendship, these groups are also connected in terms of religion. On the other hand, the region is also characterised by brief periods of warfare waged between certain members of specific groups. The kind of warfare waged does not aim at securing territory or water resources, but rather at capturing mystical power and cattle from predefined, 'preferred' enemy groups (Tadesse 1999).

In the same way as indigenous and state political structures coexist, so do many religious practices in this region. Practices of making offerings to ancestors and seniors described above form the core of religious ideology. At the same time, in Gamo for example, we witness dual

forms of indigenous religious practices (Beni Woga and Essa Woga) that are not totally exclusive in that they share venues and symbols. A third practice, that of Orthodox Ethiopian Christianity, shares spaces and symbols with the old indigenous religions, thus benefiting from the appropriation of the timelessness and respectability of the old Gamo religious practices. Rather than viewing these practices as simply syncretic as is commonly done elsewhere, my findings show that the interweaving of various religious practices has served to legitimise certain practices in specific contexts. One result of this is that followers of the indigenous religions often take part in the celebrations of the Orthodox Church, hence avoiding exclusiveness between religious faiths. Other religious groups are making serious efforts to claim a place in the religious landscape and often begin by attacking the core ideology of local religions, thereby attempting to build exclusive religious spaces.

From my research to date it is therefore clear that inter group relations of war and peace cannot be understood without taking into account the wider picture of state-local relations as well as the complex inter relations between various religious traditions and practices.

Depiction of the Abyssinian Conquest (Frobenius Collection). (Photo: W. G. Tadesse)

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Training, Applied Research and Practice

Training, Applied Research and Practice

Günther Schlee

The Max Planck Society aims to promote basic research irrespective of its potential for immediate application. Nevertheless, findings may have applications in the field of applied science and may be relevant to public policy. Questions about usefulness are also raised by universities. The majority of Max Planck directors have been university lecturers for many years. The appeal of their new position derives from its releasing them from teaching and other university obligations and in giving them more space for research. The System Evaluation of German research, however, has suggested the closer integration of university and Max Planck activities. In addition, recent developments in research funding, which require that Max Planck researchers apply for funds from the same institutions as their University colleagues, either in competition or in cooperation with them, has brought Max Planck Institutes closer to universities again and has made them answerable to them to some degree.

The partly contradictory expectations and demands arising from this situation may lead to dilemmas, but they have not done so in the case of the research theme of Department I, 'Integration and Conflict'. The following examples show that the activities of this department are interesting for other segments of society, both inside and outside academia.

This section, which describes the outreach of the department to other institutions, starts with a contribution about training university students, before turning to the Somali peace process as a field of practical application, and finally describes a project being undertaken in cooperation with the German Technical Aid (GTZ) which has a research, a consulting, and a training component.

Teaching While Researching: student researchers in the simultaneous incorporation project

Nina Glick Schiller

Faced with limited funds and the need to train students in anthropological research methods, the research on new immigrants in Halle/Saale, Germany and Manchester, USA has worked with student researchers for the past two years. In Manchester, an undergraduate student field work project based at the University of New Hampshire has brought students into the field. In Halle/Saale, students from the Institute for Social Anthropology of the Martin Luther University Halle-

Wittenberg who have completed a field methods course have been enlisted as researchers. In both cases, students are being asked to engage in participant observation and to interview migrants. The UNH fieldwork project has been taught twice, each time with ten students. Six MLU students have been enlisted as field workers for work that extends between July and December 2003. Each student will work closely with two migrant households to gain a sense of their daily activities and the ways in which, and the degree to which, migrants both become part of the life of the city of Halle/Saale and maintain transnational ties.

To date, student researchers have proved able and enthusiastic field workers. Two aspects of student's involvement have proved significant in the project's success. First, students take the work seriously because the activities are not class exercises but part of the tasks of data collection. Because they know they are responsible, the students have proved responsible. Secondly, when students are confronted by the life experiences of migrants and refugees, some of whom are only a little older than themselves, they develop a whole new perspective on migration.

Often in the training of anthropologists there is a significant gulf between theory and practice. Even with a course in research methods, students have little direct experience until and if they launch their own research. This form of student involvement is providing students with direct knowledge of the research process.

The Somali Peace Process
Günther Schlee

The international community's focus on Somalia has been rather reduced since the failure of the UN intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. It was stimulated again by the terrorist attacks against the USA on September 11, 2001. Since then, it has become a universal diplomatic credo that stateless territories need help in regaining their statehood, so that international terrorists cannot establish bases there. Thus, funds for new peace initiatives for Somalia have started to flow once more.[1]

Since October 2002, Günther Schlee has spent a total of 88 days in six different periods at the *Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference* which started at Eldoret/Kenya and was continued at Mbagathi/Nairobi. He was appointed by the IGAD, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, as an advisor to the peace process and was attached as a resource person to the *Committee on Land and Property Rights*.

The regime of Mohammad Siad Barre (1969-1991) was marked by a continuous shrinking of the clan base of government, which eventually incorporated the president's clan almost exclusively at the expense of all

[1] For some effects the "war against terror" had in India, see Julia Eckert, this volume.

other clans. The external workings of this shrinking coalition were marked by violence of genocidal proportions, the internal workings by favouritism and misappropriation of public and private property.

When the government was expelled from the capital in January 1991, the country slipped from misrule into statelessness. Faction-based violence has dominated Somali politics ever since. First, the violence focussed on the appropriation of the foreign aid sponsored state. When it became apparent that such a state would not re-emerge in the foreseeable future, violence targeted elements of the infrastructure where fees could be collected like ports and airstrips, agricultural land and the peasants cultivating it, who were reduced to forced labour, and any business which could be appropriated or from which money could be extorted. Appropriation was often accompanied by downgrading, meaning that things were not put to their optimal use but to the one with the quickest returns; that they were plundered. Factories, ships and aeroplanes were dismantled and sold as spare parts and scrap metal, buildings were used without maintenance.

The *Committee on Land and Property Rights* had to address the issue of government buildings occupied by militias, urban residential plots which came to be located within the sphere of power of the militia of a different clan, so that the owners could not approach them, clans expelled from their pastures by other clans, agricultural villages occupied and reduced to serfdom, the open range and the sea floor misused for dumping poisonous waste against payment to individuals – who also sold fishing rights which did not belong to them – and other such matters.

Without going into technicalities here, it can be stated in a summary fashion that the *Committee on Land and Property Rights* adopted a strict line of restitution of property which has changed hands by violent means since 1991, and a policy of compensation for property which cannot be restituted or has been damaged. As to the Siad Barre period, the law of that time, inspired by socialist ideas, is respected and so are transactions in conformity with it. Many transactions which were illegal even by the standards of that time, however, will have to be reversed.

The task of the Committee consisted of devising a plan for settling property issues after the establishment of a transitional national government. Theoretically, the proposals of the committee, in the meantime approved by the plenary, will be part of a peace agreement and will be binding for the government, born of the same process. Certain elements of the whole procedure are hypothetical such as whether such a transitional government will ever be formed and, if so, whether it will honour the other parts of the agreement of which it is itself a part.

From the start, the peace process in Kenya has been beset by a number of inconsistencies. The 'leaders', a euphemism for warlords, were courted by diplomats and journalists first and were attributed a key

role. Instead of involving them in the process and putting them under some pressure by exposing them to critical questions posed by the Somali public and human rights organisations, they were shielded in separate residences, surrounded by their own followers, and given the role of grey eminences. They were engaged in discussions of power sharing before the powers to be shared were even defined by the committee working on a draft constitution. Whether a Government formed by them or by people of their choice will have the will or the capacity to put into action any of the resolutions of the peace conference remains to be seen.

Their qualification for participation in the conference was the armed power they command. It was said, rightly perhaps in the light of the outcome of the last peace process in Djibouti, that a peace agreement ignoring the warlords would not be respected by them and would therefore not lead to peace. The armed power the warlords hold is used for extortion, and the proceeds of this extortion are reinvested in armed power. The warlords invited for the peace conference were chosen because they are the most successful players of this game. That this is a feature which disqualifies rather than qualifies them for peaceful rule is one of the many contradictions of this peace process. Whether a state can be built with the worst selection of people imaginable for this purpose in key positions is a historical experiment the outcome of which is more than uncertain.

Conflict Analysis as Part of a Rural Development Programme in Southern Somalia: practical work and PhD training

Günther Schlee

The Mesopotamia of Somalia, the land between the rivers Jubba and Shabelle, is the largest fertile area in the whole country, because of its potential for both rain-fed agriculture and irrigation. It has therefore also been the most contested part of the country. Under the military dictatorship which lasted until 1991, large chunks of land were taken from smallholders and appropriated by people close to government circles. In the stateless period since, the area was the arena of expulsions and occupations. In some cases, farm owners were taken as war spoils along with their land and were reduced to forced labour on what used to be their property.

In 2003, the European Union agreed to finance a development project, *Improvement of farming systems in Bay and Bakool regions, Somalia*, which was to be implemented by GTZ IS[1]. It was started later the same year at

[1] GTZ, *Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit*, is the parastatal German development cooperation agency. IS stands for "International Services", the branch of the GTZ which carries out projects financed by supranational bodies like the EU and international agencies.

Hudur (Xudur), the regional capital of Bakool, while the security situation did not permit a simultaneous start in Bay, where factional fighting between different branches of the RRA (Rahanweyn Resistance Army) continued. The role of the Max Planck Institute is to identify potential areas of conflict in the context of improving natural resource management. Latent land conflicts can be expected to erupt when the land in question becomes more valuable by being included in development measures. Another task in the field of conflict analysis is to identify problems and to develop strategies in the field of reintegration of displaced persons and ex-combatants into rural society.

A memorandum of understanding between the MPI for Social Anthropology and GTZ IS specifies that Hege Magnus, a British trained[2] Norwegian conflict analyst, is employed by the project for a period of two years. She will receive support and advice ('backstopping') from Günther Schlee, who will visit the project area for two weeks each year. The expenses for the two analysts are covered by the GTZ IS for these two years.

After this, Hege Magnus, if she meets the conditions, will have the opportunity to evaluate her practical experience and to do additional field research to collect data which could not be gathered in the framework of the development project. It is planned to offer her a doctoral grant at the MPI. The 'backstopping' by Günther Schlee will continue in the form of academic supervision. Renewed visits to the field by both scholars will also enable a continuation of the dialogue with the other project workers, who will continue with the practical work. This second phase will be financed by the MPI for Social Anthropology.

Hege Magnus at an IGAD workshop in Addis Abeba, November 2002. (Photo: Conference photographer)

It is hoped that at the end of the entire five year programme the candidate, Hege Magnus, will have made an interesting contribution to the comparative analysis of conflicts carried out in Department I, will have acquired a doctoral degree, and will have work experience that qualifies her for elevated positions in technical cooperation, policy advice or diplomacy.

[2] Peace Studies at Bradford.