

2012 Stirling Lecture

The Turkish Nation-State and the Chimera of Modernity

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Tuesday November 27th

6.30 pm

Keynes LT1

followed by a buffet reception in Keynes atrium. All welcome!



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Stirling Lecture, University of Kent at Canterbury, 27th November 2012

(Comments and criticism welcome: hann@eth.mpg.de)

Introduction

I came to know Paul Stirling and this campus for the first time in summer 1982, when Ildikó Bellér-Hann and I were preparing our first fieldwork in Turkey and were in need of expert advice. Paul was generous to us from that very first moment 30 years ago, and so it is a pleasure and a privilege to give this lecture in his honour. Paul was born just a few years after the Kemalist republic that he devoted his life to studying. When he died in 1998, that state was on the brink of a great transformation. In the eyes of many commentators, the “moderate Islamists” who have held power since 2002 have taken the country into a new era of political stability and economic prosperity. The best evidence in support of an upbeat diagnosis is the fact that Turkey has been hardly touched by the financial crisis that has had such massive consequences over the last five years everywhere else in Europe. This seems indeed to be a new epoch, and this is highly convenient for my purposes tonight. When Paul began his pioneering fieldwork in central Anatolia in 1949, the massive changes imposed “from above” in the 1920s had not yet had much impact on the villages where the majority of the population lived (Stirling 1965: Ch. 12). His passing half a century later coincides with the passing of the era of Kemalist *modernity*. So we can place Paul’s work in a clearly demarcated historical context: he was the outstanding anthropologist of the making of a *modern* Turkey, of the processes of *modernization*; and this is the cluster of terms I wish to problematize in this lecture – modern, modernity, modernization.

In his first fieldwork, supervised in Oxford by Evans-Pritchard, Paul documented a peasant world that was about to disappear as a consequence of the systematic development policies of the Democratic Party, which triumphed in the landmark general election of 1950. The anthropological moment among the wheat-growing farmers of central Anatolia was not so different from that of Malinowski, barely a generation earlier, among the yam cultivators of the Trobriand Islands:

“Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position, that at the very moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity.” (1922: xv).

Unlike Malinowski, Paul Stirling returned to his field sites repeatedly. He followed the migrants of Sakaltutan to Adana on the Mediterranean coast, and as *Gastarbeiter* to Pforzheim in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. Here at the University of Kent, in the unified intellectual community of anthropologists and sociologists which he founded and led from 1965, he supervised numerous doctoral dissertations by Turks about Turkey. Many of these students, and the colleagues with whom Paul cooperated most closely in Ankara, were influenced by the Marxism of those decades. They were highly critical of exploitative relations, both those which persisted in quasi-feudal forms in the countryside and those which took newer forms in capitalist factories. Paul shared their moral unease, but found their analyses and policy prescriptions dogmatic and simplistic.

From today's perspective, both the bourgeois proponents of capitalist modernization and their Marxist critics had much in common, above all a rather linear view of progress. But how could it have been otherwise when Anatolian worlds were being so radically transformed before their very eyes? There was plenty of room to argue about the precise mechanisms of change and the social justice of the outcomes, but the statistics of literacy, migration, nutrition and mortality told an unambiguous story. The end-point of this linear teleology was none other than Europe: after all, Turkey was not just a full member of the NATO military alliance but from early on a prospective member of Western Europe's supranational political community, initially known as the Common Market, and still known as the European Community when Turkey formally applied for membership in 1987.

The ruling party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*), is still nominally committed to this goal of EU membership. This party grew out of earlier "religious" parties suppressed by secular power holders (ultimately by the generals in successive military interventions). Although the AKP has tinkered with some details, it cannot challenge the constitutional foundations of the republic, which will celebrate its centenary just a decade from now. And yet, in spite of these continuities, there have been major changes in substance as well as changes in style or ethos since Erdoğan came to power in the post-Stirling era. In this lecture I want first to consider continuity and change in three intimately related spheres, the political, the economic and the religious. Paul Stirling preferred to analyse something rather different, which he variously termed "information explosion" and "cognitive proliferation" (Stirling 1993: 12-3). I invite you to reflect on the criteria for "modernity" in each one of these spheres, ask if we should recognize a second modernity in the post-Stirling or Erdoğan era, or if it is high time to jettison this slippery term altogether.

1. *Polity*

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its replacement by myriad nation-states, one of which was Mustafa Kemal's republic, is a case commonly invoked to exemplify the emergence of political modernity. For example, according to Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism an efficient industrial society requires a uniform "high culture" that can only be assured through a homogenizing educational system controlled by the state (Gellner 1983). The Ottoman Empire was typical of the multicultural polities of the Agrarian Age, and the Kemalist republic of the modern world of nation-states. (Incidentally, it seems to me quite likely that Gellner has an unacknowledged debt to Stirling in formulating this general model of nationalism with Turkey as a prominent illustration. They were colleagues for many years at the LSE and remained in contact after Paul Stirling's move to Kent; Stirling was Gellner's main adviser during his doctoral research in Morocco, the work which led to Gellner 1969.) Long after former subject peoples of the empire such as Greeks and Bulgarians had successfully adopted new national identities that corresponded more or less accurately to territorial borders (the fit was never as exact as in Gellner's ideal-type of complete "congruence" of culture and polity), most speakers of Turkish across Anatolia had no clear sense of their national identity. The Kemalists changed this in the early decades of their rule. They began dramatically by expelling many of the non-Turks in the course of what was euphemistically termed an "exchange of populations" with Greece (Lausanne Treaty, 1923). The Kemalists continued by writing a new national history, creating new symbols, (many of them focused on Kemal himself, who adopted the name Atatürk,

“father of the nation”), purifying the language (and even changing the script in which it was written), and creating the institutions necessary to disseminate the new identity (not only schools but also the *halk evleri* and the *köy enstitüleri* under the influence of the Soviet “culture house”). The strength of Turkish national identity is something which strikes most visitors to the country, even beach tourists and Manchester United football fans. Its continuous rise during decades in which the strength of English/British national identity was evidently waning fascinated Paul Stirling, though to my knowledge he never explicitly addressed this theme. In short, during these decades, the nation-state emerged as the uncontested “container” of Turkish society, thus fulfilling a criterion that is just as basic to sociologist Anthony Giddens’ (1987) vision of “modernity” as it is to the vision of anthropologist Ernest Gellner.

The most basic problem was that, even after implementation of the Lausanne agreement, Gellner’s “congruence” was empirically even more remote from the realities of Anatolia than the cartographic complications of Macedonia and other parts of the Balkans. Kemal’s republic recognised minorities on a limited basis according to the principle of the Ottomans, i.e. religion. Relatively small numbers of Jews and Eastern Christians, mostly Greeks and Armenians, have persisted, especially in Istanbul. After many decades of suppression, it is nowadays gradually becoming possible to uncover more details of the history of non-Islamic communities in other parts of the country. I shall return to religion later: Islam dominates, but it is by no means homogenous. In addition to this diversity, secular sources of diversity are rooted in ethnicity. The Kurds form by far the largest minority, but in the inventory of Peter Alford Andrews there are 50 others (Andrews 1989).¹ In contrast to the religious minorities, none of these enjoys any legal recognition and protection from the state to this day. The situation is extremely complicated, in part because within the Kurdish movement there are some activists who identify separate groupings on solid linguistic criteria (notably Zaza). In other, smaller minority communities, not all members accept the classifications of Andrews; for example, Hemşinli are sometimes loath to be associated with Armenians, despite linguistic and historical evidence (Simonian 2007). Some members of minority groups acknowledge this affiliation while insisting that they are nonetheless Turks in a full sense (i.e. not merely citizens of the Turkish state). This is the case with the Laze of the east Black Sea coast. To some observers in Europe, these positions are simply wrong, the result of several generations of nationalist brainwashing. To these critics, it is self-evident that Lazuri speakers constitute an ethnic group, closely related to other Mingrelian speakers in Georgia and not to any Turkish ethnic or ethno-linguistic group. Against this, it can be countered that this particular “container” is itself of modern construction, radically different from the religious basis of group identity in Ottoman days, when Laze migrants generally communicated in Turkish and already considered themselves to have a complex, double identity (for further discussion, see Bellér-Hann and Hann, 2001).

When we carried out fieldwork among these minorities on the east Black Sea coast, the subject of ethnicity was still sensitive, almost a taboo. We pursued our enquiries discreetly, concluding that there were strong pressures in the direction of assimilation and that “ethnic identity” was not a very salient issue in the region. Certainly it was not as salient as activists outside the country would like it to have been. Much has changed in the last two decades. Laze artists have become well known on the national stage, the language can be heard regularly on the regional radio,

¹ The project which led to this conclusion by Peter Alford Andrews was funded by the German Research Council and based on painstaking enquiries among migrants in Germany. It would not have been possible to conduct this research in Turkey, either then or now.

and it can even be read in books and other publications. Such *de facto* recognition is not enough to satisfy activists, mostly based in Germany, who insist that a modern state must recognise its minorities *de iure*, and then follow up with measures to create Laze schools, revert to original Laze settlement names, etc. Many Laze themselves show no inclination to support such demands. Meanwhile for the majority of Turkish citizens, with a very strong patriotism inculcated in them thanks to the nation-state container, such comments from outside the country are perceived as unwarranted attempts to undermine national unity, regardless of whether the group in question consists of 100,000 Laze or 15 million Kurds. This majority is distinctly unsympathetic to Western calls for declaratory recognition of the 1915 genocide against Armenians. It remains emphatically loyal to the earlier model of modernity, the nation-state model imported from Europe in the form of the Wilson doctrines after the First World War, even if Europe itself seems now to have moved on from that model and to be trying to impose another, based on some version of multicultural recognition. In short, in this rather fundamental dimension of politics the criteria of modernity have shifted; there is no consensus today on how to move forward.

2. Economy

Of course neither political nor economic modernization began with a *tabula rasa* in the 1920s. In the case of the economy, very significant changes took place in the last decades of the empire which paved the way for the bourgeoisie that emerged after its collapse. But can one use the term bourgeoisie at all, in a context in which the commanding heights of the economy were firmly under the control of the state? The policies of the early republic were greatly influenced by the Soviet Union, in economic planning as in many other spheres (Keyder 1983). The modifications which took place in the era of multi-party politics after 1950 increased the extent of the market principle, but the state did not relinquish much control. This was particularly clear in the rural sector, where the state determined purchasing prices for agricultural commodities and subsidised essential inputs. These policies, in combination with protection against foreign imports, did much to raise the standard of living of those who remained in the villages, without significantly diminishing the incentives to migrate to new, more lucrative and more exciting employment opportunities in the industrial sector, both at home and abroad. Paul Stirling documented the consequences of these policies in his important article "Turkish village revisited" (1974). A few years later, he made an ethnographic film for the Open University that took him back to Elbaşı and Sakaltutan but also to the migrants in Adana and Germany (*A Time of Change*, 1981).

A more decisive lurch towards the market took place following a period of military rule in the early 1980s, after Turgut Özal's Motherland Party had won the elections of 1983. Özal deserves to be up there with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the political pantheon of neoliberalism. Well trained in Texas, he certainly understood economic theories better than either of his better known contemporaries. However, constrained by the axioms of the republic and the generals, Özal had to proceed cautiously. He did not abolish the support prices, nor the state enterprises which dominated production in sectors such as tobacco, sugar (Alexander 2002) or tea (Hann 1990). But he did open these sectors up to private competition, and he did shift the national economy away from import-substitution towards the global market. With these steps, he prepared the way for a more thorough embrace of the market by the governments of Erdoğan after 2002. After further large-scale privatization, private capital is ascendant and need no longer live in fear of the state. This is clearly

visible in the rural sector, where support prices have been abolished and nothing disturbs capitalist property relations, previously unknown in Anatolia (see Aydin 2005, 2010). If Paul Stirling were alive to witness these most recent developments, he would probably bemoan the paucity of ethnographic investigations in the countryside. Today's ethnographers are more likely to be studying NGOs as organs of "civil society" in Istanbul than villages on the Anatolian periphery. If we assume charitably that anthropologists go to where the action is, perhaps this is already impressive evidence for the changes that have taken place in Turkey in the post-Stirling era.

The economic growth rates are undoubtedly impressive. Does it then follow that Turkey, in this era of market dominance, has accomplished a new modernity in this sphere, after the mixed performance of the mixed, state-led economy of the earlier Kemal-Stirling model of modernity? Eren Duzgun answers in the affirmative: from her "political Marxism" standpoint, what we are now witnessing is "more the consolidation of a relatively novel capitalist project than a mere transition to another form of modernity" (2012: 144). She argues that familiar Western models of the bourgeoisie are inappropriate for comprehending its rise in Turkey, where the economy was thoroughly embedded in the political sphere in Ottoman days, from which it could hardly escape in the early decades of the republic. But not all experts agree that this fundamental detachment has taken place even today. Karadağ (2010) sees Turkish neoliberalism in terms of a more "oligarchic capitalism" in which entrepreneurs continue to rely on political linkages ("cronyism", "corruption"). This debate is continuing in the pages of the *Archives européennes de sociologie*, and the jury is out. What is clear is that, here too, the criteria for modernity have been shifting: away from the rationality of the central state towards the realism and coordinating capacity of the market. According to Duzgun's historical materialist criteria, the tendency is deplorable, but it is still somehow progressive. According to those of Transparency International, no linear trend is observable; the new Turkey does not score much better than the earlier one either in the sphere of democratic politics or in that of market economics.

3. Religion

So far I have argued with respect to the polity and the economy that the criteria of Kemalist modernity have been called into question in the Erdoğan or post-Kemalist, post-Stirling era. Neither the homogenous nation-state nor the state-led economy seem viable options in the epoch of multiculturalism and neoliberalism, and so the great Anatolian experiment has to be resumed on some new basis. So far, the state has made few concessions to multiculturalism and rather more to market economics, but the future in both spheres looks uncertain. Let us turn now to the sphere of religion. Surely here we shall find less muddled confusion, since the criteria for modernity are more robustly straightforward. In modern societies, according to standard social science theories, religion is one differentiated sphere of the social system, separate from other sub-systems such as politics and economics. According to most versions of secularization theory, religious faith becomes a matter of private conviction and has no place in the public sphere. French secularism is not the legacy of extreme Jacobinism but the logical fulfilment of Enlightenment ideals. As we know, this has an easy test in France: prohibition of the *burka* in public places sets the contemporary standard.

Mustafa Kemal's actions in this domain were decisive and long-lasting. He abolished the Caliphate, instituted secular law codes based on those of Switzerland, and created new state institutions to administer religion and ensure that it did not stray outside its proper domain (*Diyanet*

İşleri Bakanlığı – see Shankland 1999). These measures undoubtedly cut deep into life-worlds. The institutions of the local state and agricultural support prices did not affect everyday life in the same way as the regulation that no woman could work as a teacher or civil servant so long as she wore the traditional headscarf. Such restrictions on the dominant religion contributed greatly to the success of non-Kemalist parties once competitive elections were allowed. Parties with an explicit commitment to taking Islam back into the public sphere were at least partly responsible for provoking the military interventions of the late twentieth century, only to be banned in their wake. The pendulum, however, never swung all the way back to its previous position. Contrary to the usual assumptions that modernization implies secularization and a weakening of religious observances, religion in the Kemalist republic showed no signs of withering. Recep Erdoğan himself (b. 1954) had a strongly religious education in Istanbul, graduating from an *imam hatip* high school before proceeding to study economics at Marmara University. These high schools (nominally for the training of state-controlled *imams*) were greatly strengthened in the 1980s under the governments of Turgut Özal, who combined his neoliberal economics with very visible demonstrations of his faith.

We can thus see that, as in the economy, the changes of recent years in the religious domain did not come from nowhere: they have precedents in the policies of Özal's Motherland Party. I remember amplification of the *ezan* increasing in the 1980s and 1990s, as an aural statement of the faith of the nation. It nevertheless seemed to many Turks like a revolution when, after its leaders had been imprisoned and banned from politics by the soldiers, Erdoğan's party won a decisive victory at the general election of 2002 and, after he finally assumed power in March 2003, his wife and daughters were regularly pictured in public wearing their headscarves. The former Mayor of Istanbul has softened his policies and retained the basic structures of the *Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı*, but the public climate has undergone a sea change (even if, here too, the basic Kemalist taboos are still observed and civil servants are still unable to wear the headscarf).

It is instructive to follow the commentaries on these developments, both at home and abroad. The Turkish intelligentsia is by no means unified: one increasingly influential response since the 1980s has been to insist that veiling is not inherently incompatible with modernity, the argument developed on the basis of empirical investigations in Istanbul by sociologist Nilüfer Göle (1996). This links up with a wider trend among Turkish intellectuals to recover the heritage of the Ottoman empire and even to open up the previously secret histories of dark episodes in the republican period (the ethnic cleansing of Christian communities, massacres of Kurdish rebels, etc.). Outside Turkey, the reforms undertaken by the first Erdoğan government found numerous admirers. Some European leaders were sufficiently impressed by general measures to strengthen the rule of law and economic and political reforms to return in a constructive spirit to the endlessly stalled project of EU accession. They concluded that the moderate Islamism of Erdoğan's party was a valid expression of Turkish cultural traditions, not inherently less liberal than the equivalent Christian traditions of numerous Western democracies, and greatly preferable to the dogmatic, nationalist secularism of the militant Kemalists.

Once again, this causes confusion inside Turkey. Those loyal to the Kemalist legacy ask: how is it possible that Europe, locus of the enlightenment and modernity par excellence, can now say to us that our teachers and ministers should wear the headscarf, because that is our cultural tradition? Veterans of the early Kemalist decades collect memorabilia of that period and feel "nostalgia for the modern" (Özyürek 2006) that they feel to be slipping away. (I note in passing that Özyürek, like Göle, is the daughter of a prominent Kemalist politician.) But it is not only the established secular elites

who feel threatened. As noted already, Islam in Anatolia is by no means homogenous. Heterodox Alevi communities, whether Turkish, Kurdish or Zaza speakers, feel that the country's expanding "religious freedom" is a serious threat to their autonomy and security. Numerous measures of Erdoğan's second and third governments have provoked criticism from Western leaders, but also from diaspora Alevis. The state has not extended its sympathy for the market model to the sphere of religion and continues to ban Christian proselytising. In short, significant changes have taken place in the religious sphere as in every other sphere, but the direction of change is not so clear and the standard of what is to count as modern is thoroughly muddled.

4. Paul Stirling's "social cognition"

What would Paul Stirling say about all these developments? So far I have chosen to emphasize topics on which he does not actually have such a lot to say, at least at first glance. Thus he tells us almost nothing about the Armenian communities which were uprooted barely a generation before in the immediate vicinity of the settlements he studied. He did write about the peasant economy, but the system of support prices was not yet in place when he began his fieldwork and in later work he addressed only its indirect effects through migration and wealth creation. Paul did not see himself as an economic anthropologist, let alone a political economist, always distancing himself accordingly from the neo-Marxists. As for religion, again there is rather little in his published works to indicate that this anthropologist, with his own deep religious roots in English Methodism, was ever able to grapple effectively with this domain (but see 1993: 13-4).

At this point I have to conclude provisionally that Paul Stirling did not contribute significantly to specialist knowledge of Kemalist Turkey in any one of the three domains I have been talking about. Instead, I think he did something quite different and more ambitious. He was always interested in a holistic appraisal of social knowledge, and more specifically in how this expanded in the course of modernization and what we nowadays term globalization or "transnational networks". British social anthropology offered him no strong body of theoretical work on which to draw. Perhaps this helps us to understand why, in spite of his very strong interests in the theory and epistemology of our discipline, he devoted so much of his energy to the other end of the spectrum: "applied anthropology", "GAPP", with its long-running campaigns to promote "anthropology in policy and practice". ("We need to make sure that our students find jobs".)

The attempt to formulate a holistic theory of accelerating social change is evident in the famous box diagram which accompanied his contribution to Lucy Mair's *Festschrift* in 1974, in which box number 11, "knowledge, beliefs and skills", is by far the largest below the level of the national level changes in the economy and in politics (boxes 1 and 2). In his later years, stimulated by Michael Fischer's arrival in Kent, he found "cognition" to be the term he needed to tie together the diverse forms of social knowledge he had observed and participated in during the decades of modernization. "Social cognition" referred to the total knowledge that people had of their social worlds. As those village worlds were transformed with the arrival of the first tractors and the departure of the first migrants, and as new worlds were created in the cities, Paul wanted to understand and explain the flux of social knowledge: which bits of knowledge were retained and, perhaps after a lag, could eventually facilitate adaptations in the new contexts (cf. Fischer 1994). It was thus not surprising to discover, using quantitative techniques, that the propensity to marry a first cousin could rise in the

city, where migrants could not take the risk of forging alliances with complete strangers. He also probed into the sources of new knowledge, and he asked what knowledge if any might disappear for good. Overall he was convinced that modernization brought a massive expansion of social cognition, and that this was emancipating. He remained optimistic about this to the end of his life.

Was he right? Some observers even then were less sanguine, and perhaps today most would suggest modifying this optimism in numerous respects. For example, recent studies of Anatolian migrants in Germany have documented darker aspects of urban adaptation (Schiffauer 2000, Sutterlüty 2010). The increase in cousin marriage turned out not to be a temporary blip. Crimes of “honour” persist in Berlin Kreuzberg, where Turkish and Kurdish women continue to wear the headscarf, to acquiesce in patriarchal structures that discriminate against their daughters, and to occupy narrower life-worlds than the first generation of *Gastarbeiter* in the sense that they interact only with members of their own community (in so-called “parallel societies”, much debated in the German mass media). I think Paul would have been extremely interested in and concerned by these developments. He would have wanted to place them in the wider context of life in Germany. If religious enthusiasms and “traditional” forms of behaviour are nowadays more conspicuous in Kreuzberg than in Kayseri, might this be a consequence of the deep sense of discrimination and alienation experienced by the second and third generation, which was halting the “natural” expansion of cognition? Might we, on closer inspection, find that some quarters of Kayseri, Istanbul and Ankara are not so different from Berlin and Cologne in these respects? At this point, Paul might have suggested that, since we simply do not know the answers, we urgently need more empirical investigation of the facts on the ground. But sheer ethnographic description would hardly suffice: there would have to be a model (perhaps he took this with him throughout his career from the early Evans-Pritchard, notably Evans-Pritchard 1940). Paul fretted constantly about the difficulty of specifying causal models in the social sciences, but this was the challenge: to comprehend social knowledge in its entirety, and to explain what we are more likely nowadays to term “subjectivities” in terms of sociological processes, specifying all the relevant variables of the model as rigorously as possible.

Conclusion

I have briefly considered continuity and change in four spheres and conclude that one fairly coherent package often labelled “modernity” has been replaced by a contemporary *mélange* in which all four elements look quite different. Does this add up to a new package, a “second Turkish modernity”? The trouble is not only that the pace of change in the various spheres is different, but even the basic directions are far from clear. The embrace of market economics seems unambiguous and irreversible, but the occasional gesture to multiculturalism and qualified secularity seem more ambivalent. This does not look like a coherent package: the increased assertiveness of Sunni Islam poses direct threats to the religious heterodox, but indirectly it may also inhibit the expression of many secular forms of diversity, including ethnicity. In some urban pockets, both at home and abroad, where social networks revert to the size of the old village networks and the values of the village are asserted more vigorously than they ever were by the peasants, we may even have the impression that time’s arrow has gone into reverse.

At this point we might begin to wonder: is Turkey really more or less modern today, now that the wives of the President and Prime Minister are free to go about in headscarves? Where is the causality here? There is no box for headscarf or veil in Stirling's famous diagram! Most anthropologists have an implicit tendency to what the late Alfred Gell called "temporal cultural relativism" (Gell 1992). At some level, they know that time marches on, that neither headscarves nor neo-Ottomanism can undo the changes brought by Atatürk's modernity, but rather both are to be understood as consequences of this modernity. But if their informants tell them that it is now modern (*çağdaş*) to grow beards and wear veils, anthropologists feel obliged to respect this information, and even to prioritise it ahead of their own previous "analytic" definition.

In any case, *is* there a robust analytic definition to be had in the case of a term such as modernity? The Ancient Greeks apparently considered themselves modern. Quite objectively, they did achieve some significant breakthroughs in their time, though arguably no greater than the parallel phenomena of the Axial Age in India and China. After going to the field around the same time, Jack Goody, a contemporary of Paul Stirling, gave up his later studies of postcolonial modernization in Ghana in favour of *longue durée* East-West comparisons across Eurasia. For him, modernity is always a "shifting target", as East and West alternated in technological and scientific leadership over the centuries (Goody 2004).

And yet industrialization does seem to entail a break with these cycles, a veritable "great transformation" in the extent and speed with which changes affected the entire population. This was the Kemalist achievement in the Stirling era, Turkey's "first modernity", if we can call it that. For the moment, Turkey's "second modernity" is being held together by a buoyant economy and by what Jenny White in her latest book calls "Muslim nationalism" (White 2012). Patriotic sentiment is strong and shamelessly manipulated by the authorities. Negotiations with the EU proceed on the back-burner, but economic vigor now leads many Turks to question whether this goal, for so long the ultimate yardstick of their successful arrival in the modern world, is actually a place where they would want to be.

I think Paul Stirling's sharp mind had a strong preference for linear, cumulative development in both society and in scholarship. I recall a lecture he gave in Cambridge in the late 1980s on social anthropology as a cumulative body of knowledge. The audience, familiar with Ernest Gellner's lectures but already exposed to the "writing culture" debates, was polite but sceptical. Paul was no more sympathetic than Ernest to the spirit of postmodernism, which I think worried him more in his final years than the economistic reductionism and political dogmatism he had combatted among his students (and also certain colleagues) in an earlier generation. But I think he would have been flexible and sufficiently non-linear to engage seriously with recent "multiple modernities" theorists; he would have read with interest the works of those now uncovering hidden memories, perhaps even in the villages he himself had studied; he would have acknowledged the validity of anthropological studies of consumption and the media; he might even have been ready to pay more attention to religion. But all of this would remain subordinate to his goal of understanding "social cognition", which he would have wished to distinguish carefully from the adoption of a radically different "cognitive map". He would surely have drawn a line at searching deep into Anatolian varieties of Islam for "ontological" differences. I think he would have seen such efforts not as a higher form of anthropology but as a romantic delusion which would play into the hands of those wishing permanently to exclude Turkey from The EU on cultural/civilizational grounds.

Paul left us a very clear statement of his science and his values in the final paragraphs of his introduction to *Culture and Economy*, the volume he edited just a few years before his death (Stirling 1993).² After noting that many Turks, both intellectuals and village informants, had become increasingly “suspicious of modernism and progress” during the decades in which he had been following these processes more closely than anyone else, he concluded:

But I do not want to reverse it all. I would not want my best village friend’s *gelin*, who was saved by caesarian in the Kayseri University hospital, to have died with her child, as she would have in 1950. Nor do I want people to be walking in the snow without shoes, shivering because their supply of cattle dung cakes has run out before the end of winter, nor seeing their children weedy from malnutrition. The extollers and the denouncers of modernisation, or capitalism, are both highly selective. How can anyone make an overall moral judgement on all these processes of change? They have happened: the results are there.

As an anthropologist, I am part of a collective effort to understand them. I find the complexity incredibly difficult to analyse. As a moral person, I have my own firm views and I hold that understanding social processes is relevant both to judgements, and to framing successful policies at all levels. But I also hold that understanding – achieving ‘truth’, that is, less misleading models of social processes – is a separate and morally neutral task.

(Stirling 1993: 14-5)

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² These concluding remarks are taken from the final paragraphs of my Introduction to the volume of papers I edited in his honour shortly after moving to Canterbury in the early 1990s. See Hann 1994.

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