Anthropological Approaches to Friendship

In the last two decades social anthropologists have rediscovered friendship as a field of study. At the present much more attention is paid to Western societies than to non-Western ones. The latter are often considered as being less friendship-oriented than the former because they correspond with settings, in which kinship continues to be the main set of relationships upon which communities are structured. The regional bias in the anthropology of friendship also reflects the view that friendship is a product of modernity. As Silver states, friendship is a relationship the expansion of which “requires the very impersonality of administration, contractualism and monetarised exchange over against which it is culturally distinguished” (1989:293). This kind of friendship may be a “luxury” (Paine 1969:508) that seems to be unaffordable in non-Western societies.

Such a view seems to be nurtured by the fact that many anthropologists tend to seek for a ‘pure’ and ‘distilled’ essence of friendship that they associate with close friendship. They tend to forget that this kind of relationship is rare, even in the social settings where they themselves come from. At the same time they appear to ignore works such as that of Monica Wilson (1951). In her study devoted to the setting of age-villages of the Tanzanian Nyakyusa, she has stressed that the “enjoyment of good company” is a central value that is extended to “the mutual aid and sympathy which spring from personal friendship” (p. 66). Wilson also points out that such a relationship is seen as a great source of wisdom and as important element forging character. We clearly need to think more deeply, and less ethnocentrically, about the meanings that can be attached to the idea of friendship.

‘True’ or ‘real’ friendships have frequently been defined as being expressive or emotional and distinguished from instrumental ones. This classical opposition, which has been revitalised by Wolf (1966), is rather one of degree than an absolute one, for all friendships are both expressive and instrumental. These two aspects have also been discussed in theories of reciprocity derived from economic anthropology. In this context friendship is usually seen as a series of interactions and exchanges involving a more generalised form of reciprocity than the reciprocity observed in a bargaining relationship which is governed by the principle of tit-for-tat. Particularly influential are two streams of exchange theo-
ries which are respectively known as interdependence and equity theories.

The advocates of interdependence theories (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Homans 1961) predict that the rewards must outweigh the costs and that the evaluation of outcomes determines the level of satisfaction in a relationship. On the other hand, they stress that the process of assessing satisfaction involves comparisons with the outcomes in the past, those anticipated in available alternative relationships as well as comparisons with what other people are receiving from this relationship. An extension of this theory is the investment model that focuses on commitment (Rusbult 1980). Here it is argued that commitment within friendship does not only depend on satisfaction, but also on how much one has invested in the relationship. Investments are defined as resources such as time and emotional energy that would be lost if the relationship is ended. Thus, investments increase commitment to a relationship by making it more costly to end it. In contrast to these approaches, equity theories (Hatfield and Traupmann 1981), postulate that satisfaction is a question of fairness. Instead of predicting that we will be satisfied with a relationship as long as its benefits outweigh its costs, equity theorists posit that satisfaction is only felt if we perceive that our outcomes are comparable to those of our partner.

All of these theories have been criticised for neglecting the subjectively felt meaning of friendship and for failing to take into consideration that a friend is someone whose company one enjoys, “someone who understands one and who can explain one to oneself” (Paine 1969: 507). This depiction, idealised as it is, remains an important issue in friendship, at least in those which are labelled as close in many societies. But friendship has many faces in our cultures as well as in others. Not all great friends are persons with whom one can speak about many things, sometimes (e.g. in the case of certain stereotypically benevolent relatives) they are people who one avoids meeting.

Accounts of friendship in non-Western societies have been appearing since the thirties. The writings of this period as well as those published in the two following decades focused on somewhat exotic forms of friendship, namely those entered into ritually or ceremonially. These institutionalised friendships include such phenomena as best-friendship, blood-brotherhood, bond-friendship, trading-partnership and co-parenthood, especially those forms of spiritual kinship established through baptismal rites of the Roman Catholic Church. The first attempts to discuss these institutionalised friendships comparatively were made in the late fifties and in the sixties. Eisenstadt (1956) hypothesises that they mostly arise in kinship or caste-dominated societies and are related to “some tensions and strains inherent to these societies” (p. 91). He posits that their function is one of social control and social integration. An alternative view is that the social function of in-
institutionalised friendships is primarily one of communication (Burridge 1959, Paine 1974).

Another early attempt to approach friendships from a comparative point of view was made by Cohen (1961) who proposes a typology of both friendships and societies. By classifying the latter along a continuum of decreasing solidarity and of increasing materialism, he seeks to demonstrate how degrees of solidarity coincide with degrees of commitment between friends. Cohen's model is questionable in many respects. For example, one should wonder to what extent the kind of friendship he gives the most importance to in his typology, namely that which is institutionalised, constitutes a category that is more relevant than other forms of friendships.

While providing diverse typologies (Wolf 1966, Du Bois 1974), anthropologists have sought to offer a definition of friendship having cross-cultural validity. These relationships are described in most of the literature as voluntary. But this is mainly true where friendship is weakly institutionalised. Further defining qualities and gradients of friendship are affectivity and instrumentality, intimacy, trust, durability and the dyadic-polyadic element.

**The Risk of Theoretical Fragmentation**

There is a deep question here. Are the kinds of friendship described by the various theoretical and empirical accounts really different varieties of the same thing, in which case it would make sense to try to integrate them into a single overall framework? Or are the relationships involved in, say, trading partnerships, compadrazgo, and informal companionship so different that it is not really sensible to seek a theoretical approach that could apply to all of them?

Similar questions were debated two or three decades ago in the field of kinship studies, and given a very influential answer by Schneider (1984). He argued that the complex of ideas that members of western societies attach to kinship do not necessarily have anything in common with the ideas in other societies. Indeed, so he claimed, some societies may not conceptualise the relationships involved in conceiving and rearing children as a special social sphere at all. It seems to follow from this that there can be no universal theory of kinship. The consequences of Schneider's critique were far reaching. The number of research projects that were explicitly concerned with kinship plummeted, at least in America, and topics that would once have been dealt with together in the framework of kinship have often since been studied under separate headings such as personhood, gender, and network analysis. Schneider's critique also reinforced anthropology's persistent tendency towards ethnographic particularism: the reluctance to consider theories and explanatory principles that might apply to all societies.
The variety of kinds of ‘friendship’, when we compare them between and within cultures, is at least as great as the variety of ‘kinship’ systems. Does that mean that friendship studies are doomed to a similar state of theoretical fragmentation, and ethnographic particularism? We believe that the answer to this question is ‘no’, but not because friendship as such can be successfully studied as a separate topic. Instead we think that the solution to the theoretical difficulties of both friendship and kinship studies may lie in widening the focus of study to include both.

This was the idea behind a workshop on *Friendship, Descent and Alliance. New perspectives on social integration and dissociation in changing African societies* which was held at MPI for Social Anthropology in December 2002. The conference was organised by Youssouf Diallo, Martine Guichard and Tilo Grätz who are currently editing the different contributions into a book. The papers presented at that conference showed some interesting parallels with some of those presented a year earlier at a conference at the Institute on *Family Organisation, Inheritance and Property Rights in Transition: comparative historical and anthropological perspectives in Eurasia* organised by Chris Hann and Hannes Grandits. Many papers presented at that conference will shortly appear in an edited volume in the Institute’s new series on *Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia* (Grandits and Heady 2003).

In the following pages we will draw on examples presented in these two conferences to argue for a more comprehensive approach that looks at the interactions between different aspects of social integration, and also seeks to draw parallels between social formations in different parts of the world.

**Towards a More Integrated Approach**

Although many African societies clearly do assign a greater role to kinship than is common in most of Europe, part of the value of both conferences was the opportunity they gave to challenge overdrawn contrasts between the respective places of kinship and friendship in European and African societies. Many papers in the 2001 conference emphasised the importance of kinship relationships in reproducing the social structure of European societies, by passing on both property and social position between different generations of the same family. Indeed, kinship institutions appear to handle the transmission of property between generations in all European societies, since even where, as in Russia or in parts of Sweden or the Alps, much of the property was owned collectively, the right of access to the commons was inherited on kinship (or adopted kinship) lines. This raises the interesting possibility (discussed by Goody 2003) that some role of kinship ties in transmitting property and privilege between generations might well be universal, in effect
constituting a lower limit below which the influence of kinship ties cannot permanently decline.

In the 2002 conference Guichard (2002) argued strongly for the universality of a certain aspect of friendship, namely the experience of mutual commitment arising from a sense of mutual empathy. Friendship in this sense can be combined with relationships including kinship and trading ties (see Galaty, J.G. and P. Bonte 1991). She therefore argued that friendship and kinship should not be regarded as binary opposites – drawing on her own fieldwork among the Fulbe, and on a critical examination of several ethnographic texts which exemplify how anthropologists can undervalue the role of friendship in the relationship between people who are also kin.

Armed with these background findings, we can now start comparing societies, in both Europe and Africa, not in simple terms of whether they are more friendship- or kinship-oriented, but in terms of the different ways in which they organise kinship and friendship ties into overall systems of relationships.

Military Organisation, Age-sets, and Exchange between Generations

Prior to his time at MPI for Social Anthropology, Wolde Tadesse (2002) has worked among the Hor people, a pastoral people of south-western Ethiopia (pop. 3,850). Although age organisation and kinship are two different ways of constituting social ties, Hor age organisation uses kinship ideas and terms in the reproduction of society and culture. In doing so, it largely defines the space within which friendships can be formed. Coevals are classified into age-sets which are thought of as successive generations. At any one time there are named generation sets with varying numbers (due to age of members) which represent great grandfathers, grandfathers, a generation of fathers, and that of sons. There is also an unnamed generation of children and adolescents in line awaiting the retirement of a generation of fathers in order to be initiated and take power.

The different age-sets are mobilised through various means by the generation in power to protect the population, its animal property and its territory and to travel long distances on hunting missions and in order to secure ritual items used during prayers and in initiating major events. Such groups secure trade routes, establish friends in other groups, and jointly form raiding parties to benefit from raiding cattle from a third group to establish wealth and to be able to pay for bride wealth. Wealth acquired through such adventures, however, is channelled through rules established to benefit kinship relations.

A generation takes power after an elaborate initiation ritual and takes control of the economic, political, religious and military affairs of the
group and its dealings with other groups. The use of kinship labels for generations (such as grandfathers, fathers, sons, etc.) coincides with reproductive generations thus blurring the differences in the age and kinship system. At the same time, the relationship between age-sets is viewed as a relation between husbands and wives, attributing specific gender tasks to each position. Thus, among the four successive age-sets Obbarsha, Gidd’ama, Marole and Wattagna, the second set, Gidd’ama, are said to be the wives of the senior age-set but are husbands to the third age-set. The third age-set, Marole, are considered wives of the second age-set but are husbands of the fourth and youngest age-set.

Age-set organisation provides an interesting angle from which to view friendship. The relation between seniors and juniors is a relation of power and is often characterised by tension. This tension becomes evident when junior age-sets commit offences. The whole age-set is held responsible for the offence of one or more of its members. Occasionally a whole set is flogged or is fined for the fault of its members. At times the most junior age-set have to give service to members of the three senior age-sets. For example on occasions requiring the roasting of a bull for communal consumption during a meeting the junior age-sets, symbolic wives of senior age-sets, give service to seniors. Under these stressful conditions it is often difficult to form a relation of friendship but rather a relation of respect, obedience and that of observing rules.

The relation of friendship among members of a single age-set however contrasts very strikingly with the above case. Often members of an age-set are brought up together and build their relations through various bonds. They share joyful moments and bitter ordeals and their destinies are tied together to the end of their lives. They form various types of friendships, which allow them degrees of closeness, mutual security, support and trust. Some friends go to the extent of taking blood revenge upon the death of their friends by outside enemies and this is regarded very highly. Friendship terms such as bami, miso, abujal, in Hor stand for various degrees of friendship and they are established ritually. These are established mainly within age-sets and members of outside groups rather than across age-sets.

In such a system it is hard to say whether an age-set is a unit in a kinship-based structure, or a collectivity united by ties of friendship. It is perhaps more helpful to note how both kinds of tie combine to strengthen the sense of solidarity and shared identity among members of the same age-set – thus making age-sets an ideal form of organisation for waging war. This was one theme of the conference paper presented by Spencer (2002) on set organisation among the Maasai: arguing that Maasai military organisation had been strengthened over the last century and a half by an increasing emphasis on age-set solidarity and a decreasing emphasis on clan ties. An aspect of the central role of Maasai age-sets was that they themselves took on some of the charac-
teristics of kinship groupings – including those of exogamy and alliance. Thus Maasai men are not allowed to marry daughters of men belonging to their own age-set, so that the different age-sets are tied together by marriage alliances. In this system the different age-sets relate to each other as affines, in the same way as lineages are united by affinal ties in Lévi-Strauss’s (1969) system.

There are clearly close parallels between the actual affinal ties between Maasai age-sets and the metaphorical affinal ties between Hor age-sets. More surprising, perhaps, is the existence of parallels between east-African age-set organisation and the role of age-sets in much of pre-industrial Europe. European villages did not have named generation sets, but they did organise young unmarried adults into a separate group from both children and married adults. Young men often joined the group of young adults when they reached military ages, and in some parts of Europe people born in the same year, who were supposed to feel particular ties of comradeship, were referred to as each other’s ‘conscripts’ (Freeman 1973, Christian 1989, Kideckel 1993, Ott 1993). Heady (2003), writing about Carnia, a group of valleys in the Italian Alps, analyses a particular instance of this European age-set complex and highlights both its connections with military symbolism, and with the symbolic exchange of women between successive generations of men. Indeed the parallel with African age-set systems goes still further, in that the European societies cited here are ones in which lineage ties are played down in favour of an emphasis on the corporate village community.

The Role of the Quasi-kinship Ideology of Christianity

The age-group celebrations of Carnian young people exist in a kind of complementary tension with another solidary institution which combines the imagery of kinship with other forms of social ties: namely the Christian church. Christians are ideally united by ties of mutual empathy as fellow believers, but they are also members of a symbolic kinship group – brothers and sisters in Christ, and children in relation to the fatherly priests. The implications of this differ – but the differences are not between Europe and Africa, but between different societies within each of the two continents.

In some societies the kinship imagery of the church is amalgamated with that of lineages and clans. In Ethiopia, which was evangelised during the 4th century AD, saint’s names replaced indigenous names. Exactly the same identification between lineage and saint is characteristic of Serbian saints’ day celebrations (Mitterauer 2003). In both places, the point of Christianity seems to be the fact that it reproduces itself along kinship lines to naturalise itself hence renaming territories and sanctifying places and locations and beatifying individuals which under
normal practices (or in non-religious contexts) would have become senior kinsmen or clan leaders.

On the other hand, the metaphor of the Christian family can be used to replace real kinship ties with other non-kinship forms of relationship. Ogembo (2002) showed how this was happening among the Gusii, amongst whom church influence has combined with the spread of capitalism to undermine lineage ties and replace them with a growing emphasis on friendship ties. The contemporary role of Christianity amongst the Gusii has much in common with the earlier role of the church in Europe, as described by Mitterauer (2003). Although recognising that the church sometimes compromised with lineage organisation, Mitterauer argues that its role in medieval Europe was more typically to provide ideological cover for the replacement of lineage ties with commercial organisation in the towns and feudal organisation in the countryside. By providing a way of living these new relationships as a kind of quasi-kinship, it facilitated the move from kinship to non-kinship forms of social organisation.

Theoretical Implications

These two examples – of age-set systems, and the diverse implications of the ideology of Christian quasi-kinship – illustrate how difficult it can be to separate discussions of friendship and kinship into neatly separate boxes. They also show how a thorough treatment of the relationships that we loosely classify under the headings of friendship and kinship quickly leads on to discussions about property, trade, political organisation and religion. Though two examples are not themselves enough to establish a generalisation, these general points could have been illustrated from almost any of the papers presented at the two conferences we mentioned above.

Why are the implications of friendship and kinship so far reaching? At the risk of simplifying a very complex and diverse reality, it may be useful to highlight two rather broad points involving, first, the relation between macro- and micro-level social structures and, secondly, the limitations of rational self-interest as an explanatory theory of social relationships. The first point is that friendship and kinship links are formed within existing social and ideological structures, but at the same time they are among the most important elements from which those structures are built. For that reason both are subject to attempts at control from public opinion and from those in authority.

The second point takes us back to the discussions we summarised at the start of this essay. In general friendship and kinship ties frequently involve an element of pragmatic self-interest (for a discussion of this point in relation to kinship see Schweitzer 2000), but they also involve cognitive and affective dimensions that go beyond self-interest. On the
other hand practical affairs, whether of business, politics or war, frequently require an element of trust and commitment which it would be hard to generate through calculating self-interest alone. The necessary commitment is often sought by drawing on, or mimicking, the ties involved in kinship and friendship.

The nature of the relationship between rational calculation and the less rational, more emotive, aspects of social life is a question that has repeatedly surfaced in the social sciences. It was central to the work of both Durkheim (1964[1894]) and Weber (2002), and it has been reincarnated recently in the debates about the economic theory of family life (Becker 1998), the game theoretic analysis of co-operation (Henrich et al. 2001), and Putnam’s (1994) version of social capital theory. Of course, issues as big as these are never going to be resolved within a single work programme, but they do provide a useful link between our own work and that of other social scientists (including those in some other Max Planck Institutes). At the same time, as this essay has sought to show, they are topics to which comparative anthropological research can make a unique contribution.

References


Towards an Anthropology of Governance
Julia Eckert, Andreas Dafinger and Andrea Behrends

Most studies carried out at the MPI for Social Anthropology deal with situations in which states are undergoing major transformations. New regimes of governance emerge as results of globally induced structural reforms, privatisation, and transnational economic or legal integration. These processes affect local relations in a broad range of settings. The comparative study of different cases requires a shared definition and a joint understanding of regimes of governance, regardless of the respective foci, such as legal studies, the analysis of integration and conflict or changing property relations. Existing approaches to the study of governance are either normative teleological projects or analytically centred in European (or Western) settings of governance that do not allow for the adaptation to different historical and regional situations. We therefore want to assess these existing approaches and propose a definition and understanding of governance that is suitable for an anthropological analysis of processes of regulation, ordering and distribution.

Governance as an Analytical Tool

For an approach that can be made useful for anthropological research we define governance as the administration of access to and provision of rights, services and goods. This also entails the definition of categories of inclusion and entitlements that are explicit or implicit in governmental practices. The concept of governance focuses attention on processes of ordering and the capacities of steering and allocation in which various organisations have a claim. Increasingly, new loci of governance share in the administration of everyday life, in the organisation of access to and provision of services and goods; they all directly or indirectly involve themselves also in the definition of rights and entitlements.

We would thus like to use the concept of governance to assess these different processes of ‘de-centralisation’ and ‘privatisation’, and the various practices of exerting governmental power under one analytical tool. This concept of governance leaves behind conventional distinctions between state, civil society and the economy, between public and private, and does not privilege one organisation or institution, like the state, as the ‘natural’ or ‘right’ centre of governance. It is important to relocate the analysis of governance from ‘the state’ or ‘government’ into a field shaped by various actors that produce specific governmental regimes through their interaction.

The concept of governance is therefore suitable to describe situations in which ordering is neither restricted to the state, nor located in its ‘other’, that is in traditional or local/indigenous institutions. The con-
cept of governance transcends the opposition of traditional/local vs. state institutions that presupposes the self-evident location of control and authority either in the state or in ‘tradition’. Moreover, the relations between state and non-state agencies in governmental regimes are not necessarily oppositional and competitive; they may be cooperative, hierarchical or simply parallel. The autonomy of the individual agencies within such constellations can differ; the state is not necessarily the one that regulates the relations among the others. The state and its various agencies, however, are often deeply involved in the production of specific governmental regimes, and thus defining their own boundaries and limits. With a refined concept of governance we analyse the field of interactions that shape regimes of governance and the effect they have for different sections of society in terms of access and distribution, inclusion and exclusion.

The process of political and social integration of refugees in the Chadian-Sudanese borderland, examined by Andrea Behrends, for example, demands an approach that can account for the plurality of actors and institutions involved in governmental activities. These are local state institutions like the prefecture or police brigades, the military, but also rebel groups, representatives of various ethnic groups – present in the region or in exile – and international organisations and NGOs. Each of these organisations relates to different but specific sections of the local population based on their understanding of ‘target groups’: these might be one specific ethnic group, all people officially classified as ‘refugees’, or all ‘nationals’. Each of these groups also has different means of access to resources and they may compete over them. The concept of governance here opens up the perspective for the question of how the relation between the various governmental bodies also shapes the relations between different social groups.

In the Indian ‘mega-city’ of Mumbai (Bombay), matters of adjudication, law and order, crime and security are administered not only by state institutions such as the courts or the police but also by welfare-oriented NGOs, the heads of local branches of political parties, ‘community leaders’ with effective alliances in the governmental apparatus, and leaders of organised crime groups. The operative legal order in the city is more often than not determined by the interaction of these various institutions: they define legal institutions in their practices and through the frames of interpretation they offer for claims to rights and entitlements; they act on the specific interpretation and enforcement of a legal framework: they set rules and enforce sanctions. Julia Eckert looks at the emerging configuration of these organisations and traces the processes of how they were shaped by the (democratic) competition amongst political contenders. She examines how they affect the organisation of the state and ideas of citizenship, and how they delimit security and belonging differently for different section of society.
In the study of recent developments of farmer-herder relations in Burkina Faso, Andreas Dafinger describes how administration and governmental organisations generate new political and economic resources in rural Western Africa. One focus of research is how these institutions change and interfere with locally established forms of resource competition and distribution. New resources, such as wells, health centres or schools tend to bring their own mechanisms of distribution, access rules and mediation authorities, and transform the local social and political landscape. The state and transnational organisations are relatively new actors in the local arenas and locally established conflict resolution mechanisms do not always appear to be fully capable of integrating new forms of resource access and distribution control. A main target of the study is to explore how individual actors and groups manoeuvre between existing normative backgrounds and newly established forms of social control.

While these case studies range widely in their specific thematic focus, their regional setting and historic situation, they all ask the same questions about the role of the state as an actor in and as background for newly unfolding processes. The heterogeneity of actors involved in these changes (governments, administration, NGOs, local elites, international organisations etc.), the different scales (local, regional, or global etc.) and qualities of governance (material and discursive) require an integrative governance concept. The studies address how various governmental regimes affect different sections of (local or national) society differently, either by materially changing channels of distribution or by introducing new categories of entitlements and rights. They examine the processes by which relations among various institutions of governance are shaped and use an analytical concept of governance to look at steering capacities beyond the state and government and at how these capacities are constituted.1

**Approaches to the Study of Governance**

*a) Good Governance*

Governance as a concept has recently mainly been used to define certain standards of ‘good governance’. ‘Good governance’ as a concept and tool of policy advocates specific governmental regimes, that is, specific divisions of labour between state, local community, transnational or international and private (market) organisations as most beneficial for the efficient management of national welfare. It claims to be about the rational management of public affairs. Policies that are connected to

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1 The authors organised a panel at the 2002 EASA biannual conference to enlarge the scope of analysis and discuss various approaches to the study of governance in a comparative perspective.
incentives and sanctions of monetary or market access, aim to reconfigure constellations of the organisations involved in governance. Conditionalities connected to aid programmes transfer power to (sometimes newly and specifically created) non-state or international bodies, and involve them directly in governmental decisions on resource allocation.

This is the case in Chad, which, after having become an oil exporting country, was given a credit by the World Bank for financing the construction of a national pipeline. This credit was made conditional on democratisation and the monitoring by independent NGOs of moneys gained from oil returns. When the first returns were used by President Déby to buy weapons for the ongoing civil war, the World Bank installed an independent commission to watch over the organisation of the entire project and report suggestions for its improvement and organisation to the World Bank, the consortium of oil companies involved in the building of the pipeline and the government of Chad. It remains to be seen whether this new body of governance will have the desired impact in a country, whose regime still wants to support militia or ethnic groups on the one hand while at the same time maintaining the image of being internationally cooperative and following the dictates of 'good governance'.

Good governance policies also operate on a more subtle level of incentive structures in privileging specific forms of social organisation over others, which are less compatible with administrative structures of the state and other organisations.

In the Burkina Faso case, local communities were encouraged to become officially recognised and act as counterparts for the national and transnational organisations in the course of decentralisation and administrative reform. The aim was to incorporate local forms of leadership and social groups into the national administrative and political sector and achieve an even vertical distribution of economic and political resources. The official parameters defining such administrative communities stress the territorial dimension (i.e. communities that can be spatially delimited) in favour of those communities that already had a strong land-focused, territorial identity (namely farmers) and to the disadvantage of trans-spatially organised groups (i.e. pastoralists). Here, too, the mentioned reforms, despite being generally successful, also entailed a number of unintended side effects, resulting from the specific constellation that existed between some of the local actors. They introduced categories of social and political organisation that, because of their connection to resources (aid), affected actual practices of organisation and representation.

Whether 'successful' or not, developmental policies and development-related policy requirements ('conditionalities'), as well as the administrative organisation connected with specific economic models favoured, for example, by international organisations, will most probably affect
the relations between different state and non-state governmental organisations. An analysis focusing on governmental regimes can thus address the question how these are particularly structured by policies and discourses of ‘good governance’. The analysis of ‘good governance’ policies will help understand processes of the reification and realisation of policy concepts and categories in social action. They will shed light on the effect of such policies on governmental regimes of distribution and access, and the economic and institutional power behind the normative concepts embedded within them. The categories that become operative in the implementation of such policies are particularly relevant with respect to changing definitions of entitlement and inclusion. Our research shows that the reification and realisation of collective categories of community, nation etc. impact on modes of social organisation and the organisation of governance.

b) Governmentality

For the critique of such normative concepts of good governance as well as neo-liberal economics and its effects on governance, Foucault’s concept of governmentality has provided a framework for ethnographic investigation. In looking at issues of globalisation, governmentality and citizenship, scholars have explored the production of subjectivities in competing orders of “political reason with a notion of government, which addresses the domain of the political, not as a domain of State or a set of institutions and actors but in terms of the varieties of political reason” (Rose 1996: 41ff). In defining governmentality as a complex form of power that is constituted by institutions, procedures, analyses and strategies of knowledge and apparatuses of security, Foucault (1991: 102) focuses on social technologies that regulate population and produce subjectivities. Doubt exists, however, as to how far Foucault’s European-based historical deductions can be applied to regimes outside this context. In a broad interpretation, all forms of social organisation and social control, and most forms of rule rely to some degree on ‘the conduct of conduct’ rather than direct coercion. In this sense, governmentality would be coterminous with social control, a rather unsatisfactory breadth of the concept; in a more narrow interpretation of the governmentalisation of the state (connected to concepts such as population, welfare etc.) it remains questionable whether in our cases the social technologies have the same pervasive depth as in western welfare states. Moreover, we feel that analysing the genealogies of governmen-

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2 These questions are also a central topic in the research of A. Halemba and B. Donahoe working on different regions of Siberia (see report of the Siberian Studies Centre).

3 On this line of research compare, for example Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991), Rose (1993), Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996), and Wickham and Pavlich (2001).
tal reason, or dissecting the anatomy of governmental technologies does not account for the actual processes within which they become effective. An anthropological approach would seek to complement such ‘histories of the present’ with a perspective that also analyses the ways and processes by which these social technologies and ‘knowledges’ are put to use, the transformations they undergo in practice, their failures and the contradictions arising out of the contingent interactions of various strategies and agendas. Existing studies of governmentality give little attention to conflicting interests and practices even within one governmental organisation, the effects of their incoherence and thus the specific configuration of practices that come to play in a specific field at a specific time. Our research shows that governmental regimes are shaped by the unintended consequences of these. Nonetheless, we consider the exploration of the production of governmentality an important subject, not only in approaching western types of governance regimes but also with regard to transnational developmental policies and the categories of social organisation, efficiency and order that they operate with and that they introduce into different contexts through their practices.

c) A Processual and Practice Approach

We therefore share the emphasis of several anthropological studies for a combination of structural and choice-based approaches. Our research underlines the importance to address clearly particular strategies and the actors behind changes in governance regimes without identifying certain regime outcomes with particular interests but rather with the aggregation and the unintended effects of their interaction. This focus on the actors and the aggregation of their strategies appears as a major advantage of the anthropological approach that allows us to relate observable micro-political interactions and dynamics to processes observable on a larger scale of social organisation. Therefore, we focus on actors, their relations and how these have evolved historically, and the intended and unintended outcomes of their interactions.

The study of how strategies of agents are shaped and redefined in local discourses contributes to the understanding to specific local settings. At the same time, since strategies that are considered successful may be employed in other cases, the remodelling of organisations’ policies can be interpreted not only as the result of centralised decision-making processes, but also as the outcome of specific local constellations.

This idea of governance as shaped in its specific form by the interaction of various organisations and groups, by their various interests and their power relations, but also by the unintended outcomes of their interaction implies that governmental regimes are most likely always subject to change precisely because they are produced in the interaction of various actors. We thus advocate a processual and practice approach that also considers apparent stability of specific governmental regimes
as a process produced actively by those involved. The governance concept therefore also opens up a perspective that moves beyond assumptions that consider power to be imbued and situated in specific positions, which still prevail in much thought on governmental issues. Rather, we consider it necessary to trace the production of certain power relations, the processes of their persistence and possibly their specific forms of transformation.

**The Role of the State**

Such an approach does not make any presumptions about the specific role of the state or various state agencies in such governmental regimes. A preliminary classification allows to differentiate three patterns that see either a (partial) retreat (or ‘departure’) of the state; an arrival of state institutions and regulation; or the state as a persistent but ‘internally’ changing actor. Each of these major categories may be further differentiated, although on the empirical level boundaries between the ideal-types will be blurred. The effected shifts in the role of the state will differ depending on the context in which they occur and might mean even the simultaneous or incorporated forms of these processes, i.e. the simultaneous withdrawal and increased relevance of the state.

We seem to find evidence in our material for paradoxical processes regarding the role and relative significance of the state, that is, of the state increasing its role by devolving tasks to non-state actors.

These processes have normatively been valued differently by different theoretical and political approaches: Processes of ‘privatisation’ have been seen either as a *sign of* or a *solution to* state crisis; which specific processes of privatisation or de-etatisation, of retreat, arrival or structural changes of the state contribute to ‘better management’, and which lead to disintegration have not always been evaluated unanimously.

*a) Retreating States*

The processes of the formal or informal devolution of governmental competences of the state to alternative organisations can take at least three principal forms:

a) the devolution of state productive and distributive tasks to private organisations like charitable organisations or commercial enterprises – that possibly devolve informally also regulation as much as it is inherent in distribution and production;

b) the formal decentralisation and devolution of regulatory tasks in specific fields, such as personal status regulations or the devolution of regulation for and jurisdiction over the internal affairs of corporations, development projects and international NGOs;

c) the independent establishment, or persistence of parallel centres of governmental authority that wield control over specific territories, spe-
specific groups of people or specific economic spheres. They do not stand in a subsidiary or complementary relationship to the state but rather in a parallel and autonomous one.

We have observed that many of these processes affect certain configurations of governmental regimes simultaneously, and mutually affect each other. Internationally driven and financed policies to relocate certain governmental tasks (like education, health care or adjudication) out of state institutions often lead to their appropriation by ‘private’ or ‘community’ organisations that were not target of the initial policies, but which are strengthened in their significance in other fields of governmental activity as well.

Frequently such autonomy and the associated ruptures of the integrity of the ideal-type modern state, and thus signs of its failure, have been associated with the establishment of sub-state local fiefdoms of (neo-)traditional authorities, ‘big men’, warlords, etc. (Trotha 2000; Humphrey 1999; Schlichte/Wilke 2000). Many countries, but most dramatically those in postsocialist contexts, have seen state monopolies fall, to be taken over by semi-state and non-state organisations, which fill the vacuum a retreating state leaves behind. Such processes can be but are not necessarily intended by the governments involved. As Caroline Leutloff’s analysis of the reallocation of housing in Croatia (see report of Department II) illustrates, there may be fierce competition over the control of governance within the governments and its organisations. But infringements on state sovereignty have also been associated with the autonomy of transnational corporations and their regulatory autonomy and recently also with the ‘project law’, established by international development organisations (Benda-Beckmann 2001; Risse et al. 2000).

The state’s presence or absence, withdrawal or arrival, might also affect different sections of society differently, and might actually mean less access to state provisions for some groups and at the same time more access, or more control by state agencies, to others. The Chad research project showed how one party in the recent armed conflict had good access to state institutions on both sides of the Chadian/Sudanese border. This access served them in questions of land use or ownership of land and other legal or economical claims. The other party to the conflict had less access to and less trust in agencies of the respective states and thus came to rely on services provided by non-state organisations such as international agencies and NGOs, which had previously been given the right to operate in the region by the central state, but soon developed their own legal and institutional structures on the ground.
b) Arriving States

Processes of decentralisation and the engagement of new agents of governance, however, do not necessarily minimise the influence of the state. The arrival of non-government or semi-government organisations may also lead to the implementation of administrative norms and state regulation in fields, where the state and its own institutions had only limited impact before. Such organisations do not only act within the legal and political framework of the state, they often also actively propagate national rules and regulations. By providing new and competing resources, such organisations raise the incentive for local collective and individual actors to adapt to national administrative, legal and political conditions.

Andreas Dafinger’s study in rural Burkina Faso shows how land rights and administrative reform have become relevant on the local level only after donor organisations had started to set up a new infrastructure and to act as counterpart for local communities. The state was previously virtually non-existent as far as local land rights were concerned. Local communities and local political authorities tended to exist parallel to the state. The fact that the state was the ultimate landowner was not considered relevant by (and in fact remained unknown to) the vast majority of the population. Access to land was controlled exclusively by local elite groups. By giving up its exclusive claim and allocating limited property rights to these local groups in the course of privatisation programmes, the state created incentives for local groups to adapt to the administrative framework and be registered as administrative units within the territorial state. Donor organisations further supported this process by focusing on such nationally recognised communities in providing new economic and political resources, such as wells or health and education institutions.

To focus on the ‘arriving state’, i.e. the vertical expansion of the state through third party agents, more adequately describes the range of possible changes in the role of states in governance regimes.

c) Structural Changes in Persisting State Organisation

The emergence of new agents of governance may see yet a third pattern, the persistence if not increase of the state’s importance through controlling processes of devolvement. While specific tasks that the state used to handle are being outsourced, the state and its institutions maintain control and regulate access to these fields of governance formally or informally. Such control may however be exercised not by the government or the state as an integrated organisational complex, but by specific state agencies.

We advocate to part from the concept of the state as an integrated entity and to examine various state agencies and their individual strategies and roles among the actors that shape governance regimes. The
paradoxical processes of simultaneous withdrawal and increase of state presence should also be examined by analysing the emerging institutional compositions of statehood. What is of interest, and becomes accessible through our concept of governance is the question of what role which particular state agencies play, how they interact with specific para-state and non-state institutions and how this shapes a specific configuration of statehood. In India, we can observe an increasing role of the police in administering the governmental field; the police sanctions positively or negatively governmental activities of non-state actors. They also have a significant role in organising access to other state and non-state governmental agencies. They thereby become the gatekeepers for the provision of various services and the adjudicator of rights and entitlements for large sections of the urban Indian population.

This points towards a general trajectory of Indian state organisation that sees a devaluation of the distributive and productive role of the state and the agencies concerned with the latter, and an increased importance (also in terms of budgetary allocations) of state agencies of control and security. This, however, affects different sections of society differently: for the large rural population there might actually be a withdrawal of the state, as they were largely governed by the development agencies of the state that are now slowly being reduced – and are possibly replaced by private NGOs, the state denouncing all (capacities for) responsibility (Randeria 2002). For those sections of society that relied less on state provisions, state accountability and access to state guaranteed rights is partially increasing. However, particularly the Muslim population of India, but in a less explicit way also other minorities, are systematically being cut off from access to legal security and civil rights through the discourse of national security. They are faced by a situation in which they are subject to more control by but less access to the state. The domestic adoption of recent international discourses on security (i.e. the ‘war on terror’) have changed notions of the nation and shifted the idea of and expectations towards the state.

Histories of such state configurations will also provide a denser picture of state organisation than dichotomies like that of the weak vs. the strong state. Only then can we make conclusions about the influence of different state models or state conditions on local modes of governance and the relations between governmental regimes and specific organisations of the state system.
Conclusion

The concept of governance provides us with an analytical tool to examine the changing character of states and the increasing impact of national and transnational organisations that have become a major issue in social anthropological research. Existing approaches are only partially able to explain and describe the heterogeneity of governmental regimes and their effect on social life. A concept of governance that can be of use for comparative anthropological research focuses on various loci of capacities of steering and ordering, and on the processes that constitute such capacities. It examines the relations between and interactions of different organisations that co-operate in, compete over, or operate autonomously in the administration of allocation and distribution of rights and resources. It traces the impact of governmental categories on social organisation. The strength of a social anthropological approach to governance is that it allows to relate a micro-level study with an analysis of transnationally produced policies and to describe specific governmental regimes as the result of both intended and unintended consequences of the interactions of different actors within local, national or global political arenas.

References


Pathways of Migrant Incorporation in Germany
Nina Glick Schiller, Boris Niesswand, Günther Schlee, Ayşe Çağlar, Evangelos Karagiannis, Tsypylma Darieva, Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, and László Fosztó

In this report we examine five different pathways by which migrants with whom we have worked are incorporating themselves within Germany. Our approach to incorporation brings into the literature on migration the insight that social integration can take place within a process of social and cultural differentiation, a point that has been developed in work on ethnic identity in Africa and in US studies of multiculturalism and cultural citizenship (Schlee and Horstmann 2001; Flores and Benmayor 2000). However, rather than focusing on cultural and identity processes, we begin with an interest in the context of social relations out of which cultural similarities and differences are defined.

To differentiate our definition from the dominant discourse about migrant integration, in this essay we will speak of *pathways of incorporation*. In examining these pathways of incorporation, we note that migrants often live their lives in more than one nation-state at the same time. They are simultaneously here and there, a part of new land and other land or lands. We call this living with and across borders and making daily life decisions with a network of people that includes both local and transnational actors, ‘simultaneity’. Incorporation in Germany may be part of a pattern of simultaneity. In four of the five pathways we describe, migrants become connected through social linkages and various forms of identity to Germany that at the same time connect them to organisations, communication systems or identities that extend transnationally (Glick Schiller, forthcoming).

All five pathways challenge ways in which migrant integration is commonly conceptualised within German discourse and public policy about Ausländer. Our approach takes exception with three premises that underlie the dominant discourse in Germany on the integration of foreigners. First of all, dominant discourses about migration stress that it is only through a form of cultural change that foreigners can become a part of Germany. They focus on the cultural practices of foreigners.

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1 The ethnography in this paper comes from the following projects and funding: Boris Niesswand, doctoral student Department I, MPI for Social Anthropology; Nina Glick Schiller, Evangelos Karagiannis, Ayşe Çağlar, 2001-2003 funded by the MacArthur Foundation, Sidore Fellowship Program, Humanities Center University of New Hampshire, Vice Presidents’ Research Fund, University of New Hampshire; Günther Schlee, MPI for Social Anthropology, Ayşe Çağlar, Transnational Communities Project, Oxford University; Tsypylma Darieva, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Free University of Berlin and Humboldt University 1997-2001; Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, research project funded by Volkswagen Foundation, carried out with G. Straßburger and H. Unbehaun at the University of Bamberg 1994-1996; László Fosztó, doctoral student Department II, MPI for Social Anthropology.
within Germany, disregarding transnational connections or viewing them as an impediment to integration. From our point of view, incorporation into German society is not necessarily accompanied by cultural assimilation. The connection between cultural competencies and incorporation into social systems is empirically more complex than popular conceptualisations of integration may suggest. Secondly, incorporation in one society is neither empirically nor theoretically exclusive. Data from studies of migration indicate that incorporation into more than one nation-state at a time is a frequent phenomenon that must be addressed by theorists of migration. Thirdly, there is little evidence that simultaneous incorporation in more than one nation-state is a liminal state that will be overcome after successful integration. Rather there may be a direct connection between incorporation in a new state and maintaining cross-border incorporation.

Migration is part of the broader process of global integration that the world has experienced at an accelerated pace over the last decades. The increased mobility of human beings, information, money and consumer goods has changed, on the one hand, the way many people perceive their position in the world and, on the other hand, the social structures into which people are embedded. Especially in societies with a high proportion of migrants, personal networks have emerged that connect people in many different places in the world. These “transnational social fields”, understood as an “unbounded terrain of interlocking ego-centric networks” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999:344), produce new spaces of action and identification. These fields allow for and often facilitate certain types of incorporation within the new land of settlement. The fact that there are five pathways identified from our research highlights the weakness of past migration studies that tend to cast all patterns of migration settlement into the same mode arguing for a single model of migrant integration.

The five pathways we identify through our research can be called (1) Christian modernists, (2) local public foreigners, (3) familial networks, (4) vernacular cosmopolitanisms and (5) regional cosmopolitanism. In describing these five modes of incorporation, we draw from Boris Nieswand’s ethnography of Ghanaians in Berlin, Nina Glick Schiller and Evangelos Karagiannis’ ethnography of Nigerians and Congolese in Halle/Saale, Günther and Isir Schlee’s data on Somali in Germany, Holland and England, and studies of German Turkish media in Berlin by Ayşe Çağlar and of Russian media in Berlin by Tsypylma Darieva. Lale Yalçın-Heckmann contributes comparative points drawn from her research on Muslim labour migrants’ families and associations in Germany and France. We are not claiming that each migrant group participates in only one of these pathways, although we will discuss Christian modernism among Ghanaians and Nigerians, regional cosmopolitanism among the Ghanaians, public foreignness among Congolese, familial
incorporation among Somalis, and media incorporation among Turks and Russians. In all cases, organisations that an observer might initially understand as defensive, closed, ethnic or communal, prove upon ethnographic observation to develop activities, identities and social relationships that integrate participants both into German society and globally. Even if these observations are not applicable for all migrants across time and space, the migrants in these case studies have broader identities, visions, and connections than many, if not most, of their German neighbours.

1. Christian Modernists

Some African migrants, who practice a form of born-again modernist Christianity\(^2\), create organisations that make them part of Germany and that articulate a form of identity that links them not only to Germans, but also to the world beyond German borders. This stream of Christianity originated in the USA and spread during the 1980s and 1990s in many parts of the world. The movement is connected in West Africa to three social developments that converged at this time: a strong feeling of insecurity and loss that was connected to the decline of the local economy, an ongoing liberalisation of the local markets, which led to an increased visibility of consumer goods, at least in the large cities, and the experience of mass emigration. In this context a form of Christianity arose in which believers assert that success, prosperity, and the commodities of consumer capitalism are rewards of their personal relationship to the Holy Spirit (Marshall 1993). Together with other Pentecostal denominations, they stress the literal interpretation of the Bible, believing in the charismata (gifts of the Holy Spirit), and emphasising signs and wonders. However, born-again modernists use a symbolic code that connects the promise of signs and wonders to a 'global modernity' and its material rewards. For West African migrants to Germany, modernity in the form of life in Germany is religiously purged from its ambivalences.

Migrants settling in Germany who organise or join these churches participate in organisations that they see as part of a broader movement to bring real Christianity to Germany and to the world. The churches founded by the migrants are not, in their view, African churches but true Christian churches. A global social field of Christian Modernism has emerged in the last decades, which includes the transnational networks of the pastors and some of the congregants. The frequent use of media such as videotapes, books and audio tapes provides for many charismatic Christians all over the world access to a broader discursive

\(^2\) The form of Christianity to which we refer stresses the living presence of Jesus as evidenced by present day miracles and the necessity of combating demonic forces.
universe, which appears universalistic and global. At the same time, organisational networks in Germany link churches made up primarily of Germans, churches made up primarily of migrants, and Christian modernists in other locations in Europe and beyond. Our ethnographic data provide us with two examples of the Christian modernist form of incorporation, the charismatic churches founded by Ghanaian migrants in Berlin and a similar church founded primarily by Nigerians in Halle/Saale.

Boris Nieswand’s research among Ghanaian migrants in Berlin has shown that charismatic churches seem to be the most successful migrant organisations in terms of quantitative mobilisation and in terms of the degree of organisational structure. The churches are also incorporated in German organisational structures. At least four pastors in Berlin are approved by the largest German umbrella organisation of Pentecostal churches in Germany (Bundesverband freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden). This gives them a particular kind of authority in dealing with German officials in Berlin. In interviews the pastors stated that it was particularly important for them to become integrated in Germany and be formally recognised as ‘real Christians’ by German pastors. Furthermore most of the African-initiated churches in Berlin are part of an ecumenical organisation initiated by the German Evangelical Protestant Church. Two of the Ghanaian-initiated churches were offsprings of a church that is predominantly German and they still have a close relationship with it. These churches never identify themselves as Ghanaian or German but rather as international, an identity they emphasise by speaking of the fact that their members come from many nations, even though most are in fact Ghanaian. Some of these members are German women.

Members have a belief system as well as transnational organisational connections that make them global actors. During the field research in Berlin, Nieswand attended a religious conference of one of the Ghanaian-founded churches in Berlin. At this conference five pastors were present; a Ghanaian, who has lived for more than ten years in Germany, a US-American with half Nigerian and half Austrian family background, a German, who had lived for several years in Great Britain, a British woman with a Chinese family background, who is married to the German pastor, and her brother. This event made the global scale of the church visible to all members of the parish. One week after this conference a young Namibian woman testified publicly that the conference had strengthened her faith. She also announced the reward that was the evidence of God’s presence in her life: she had just received a scholarship from a college in the United States. This incident was celebrated as a success of the whole church. The discursive and the structural integration into a global framework became evident in this incident. It symbolised the role of divine power in a globalising world.
In their ethnographic research with English speaking migrants in Halle/Saale, most of whom come from Nigeria, Glick Schiller and Karagiannis also have located a Christian modernist Church that in several important respects resembles the Ghanaian-initiated churches of Berlin studied by Nieswand. The leadership of the church and the pastor, all of whom are Nigerian with the exception of one German woman, publicly identify the church not as Nigerian, African or German. Instead members see themselves as representing true Christians whose mission is to bring Christianity to Halle. Unlike the Berlin Ghanaian-initiated churches, this church in Halle keeps itself apart from German churches in Halle. However, it is hardly an isolated ethnic enclave. The pastor meets frequently with German pastors in Leipzig, which is the city of origin of his German wife and where he lives, and he has attended Pentecostal conferences there and in Berlin. The church has been formally registered in Germany, as is legally necessary, for more than five years. However, recently the church began working with a white German Pentecostal church in Magdeburg to become a formal member of a German Pentecostal organisation. The pastor and the members of the church committee, which leads the church, desire this level of official recognition, even though it means changing some of their internal organisational procedures.

However, as in the example from Berlin, this primarily Nigerian church is connected not only within Germany but also transnationally. Among its visiting preachers was an Indian pastor who is part of a global Pentecostal network of pastors, who currently resides in Kaiserslautern, Germany. This Indian pastor has visited more than once and has convinced the church to support his missionary work in India by sending funds on a regular basis. Through another global Christian ministry, this one located in the United States, the church sends funds to Christianise Israel. To encourage his congregants to contribute money for local and global church work the pastor cites a Nigerian pastor who has developed a congregation of thousands in the Ukraine. Several members of the church attended a pan-European Pentecostal conference in Berlin in June 2003 that was called to establish a European-wide organisation of Pentecostal Churches.

In a narrative similar to the one provided by the Namibian member of the Ghanaian-initiated church, one of the core members of the Halle church returned from the Berlin conference saying that the presence of people from all over the world at the conference was for her evidence of the power of God and the rightness of her beliefs. This question of evidence can be said to reflect part of the ideology of Christianity as a reflection as true modernism. The modern world is one of scientific evi-

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3 A Nigerian pastor in Manchester New Hampshire often cites the same example for the same purpose.
Believers maintain that God’s presence in the world today is proved by his constant miracles. Because believers trust in scientific evidence, the church emphasises on healing. The purpose of God performing this healing is not just to respond to individual faith but to provide testimony to Halle and to the world of the power of God.

Churches like these challenge the assumptions of those migration studies that portray migrants’ religions as defensive, restrictive and closed ideologies that stabilise the migrants against the background of their traumatic experiences of migration. Christian modernism is a transnational social field that, through modernistic discourse and global organisations, enables migrants to experience themselves as part of a larger project of ‘divine modernisation’, which is spreading throughout the world. Within this framework, the ambiguities and paradoxes of migration are made invisible. The churches emphasise integration and optimism, aiming at overcoming the hardships of migration rather than reflecting the traumatic aspects of migration. For some members of the churches in Berlin, incorporation takes the form of a range of professions from medicine to shop-keeping. Others are students or labourers, or they are unemployed. In contrast few congregants in Halle are employed and many are still asylum seekers. Their acquisition of permanent residency in Germany is often obtained through marriages to Germans. They seek divine assistance in their efforts to obtain legal residence by being granted asylum or finding a German spouse. People often pray for ‘passports’. The persistence of unemployment after obtaining legal status or of other barriers to legal status are attributed to the work of the devil and demons. These forces are dealt with by prayer and pastoral intervention that provides believers with access to divine deliverance from evil forces and subsequent redemption and prosperity. In both Berlin and Halle, believers are sustained by the promise of prosperity that follows from the holiness of Christian belief. This system of belief as well as the churches’ structures serve to incorporate the migrants into their new locality and social position in Germany.

The identification of Christian modernism as a pathway of incorporation cannot be facilely extended to all types and degrees of religious organisations in Germany that claim some form of global narrative of belonging and entitlement. Yalçın-Heckmann’s work shows that Muslim organisations are subject to much closer public scrutiny and at times even state surveillance by authorities because of their transnational links. Even the state-supported Turkish mosque organisation DİTİB (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği) is not immune from public and state surveillance in Germany. The openness to incorporating Christian churches introduced by Africans into the German society and the African migrants’ quest for being accepted as ‘real Christians’ (and not necessarily and primarily as migrants from Africa) must be seen within the
wider context of the established social, political and economic relationships between church and state in Germany.

Muslim organisations in Germany are under close scrutiny, not only by the general public and their German neighbours but also by the German administration and bureaucracy. Consequently, they are particularly sensitive to this public attention and concerned about self-presentation. The pressure in part leads them to becoming ‘Protestant’ in the sense of adopting the organisational structures of churches in Germany; it also leads them to distance themselves from and portray as ‘the other’ rival Muslim organisations. It may be that despite their dramatic differences in practice, Christian modernist churches formed by African migrants can still be encompassed as familiar and manageable because they are Christian. Islamic organisations can more readily be portrayed as alternative and secret because Islam has historically been defined as different and not included in modernity or in Europe.

2. Public Foreigners

A second pathway of incorporation into Germany is built around the development of a persona of cultural difference. Persons who follow this pathway participate in a series of public events organised to portray foreigners as simultaneously culturally different from Germans and yet welcome participants in a particular locality. Through performing their difference, the persons who adopt this pathway find themselves integrated into Germany but as foreigners. All ideologies of multiculturalism contain this tension. Belonging and integration come through recourse to differentiation. While ideologies of multiculturalism refer to groups, it is individuals as they become public actors in various ceremonies, rituals, and public programmes who most clearly experience this form of incorporation.

Only a few studies in Germany have succeeded in conceptually disentangling incorporation from assimilation and provided ethnographic documentation of a pathway of public foreignness in which cultural difference becomes an aspect of incorporation. Among them are Yalçın-Heckmann’s research on migrants’ associations in Bamberg in southern Germany and Colmar in France. These migrant associations have changed in ways that reflect the processual transformation of migrant society’s structure and demography (such as higher differentiation in occupational structure and increased access to better educational facilities). By functioning within German associational structures and imitating their activities, e.g., having Tag der offenen Tür (Open House), Turkish

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4 Thus the Alevis portray themselves and have come to be accepted as the representative of ‘modern Islam’ in comparison to the more conservative Sunni Islamic organisations such as the Milli Görüş (see Kehl-Bodrogi 2001). Alevis are certainly more easily incorporated into German society than their Sunni fellow migrants.
labour migrants’ associations have moved in the direction of becoming local public foreigners’ associations. This is especially visible in the organisation of religious associations, of Sunni mosques and of Alevi communal houses (cem evi). The contents of their activities too have changed from being Turkey-oriented to being oriented toward German society, as a way of being ‘publicly Turkish’ in Germany.

At the same time, their incorporation into Germany has not terminated but rather reoriented their transnational ties and changed the direction of these ties. Although the religious factions among the Sunni and Alevi associations are operating in transnational fields and in relation to the ideological positions of groups and politics in Turkey, their transnational ties have become increasingly European within the last fifteen years.

Glick Schiller and Karagiannis’ ethnography in Halle provides another example of pathways of incorporation as public foreigners in a form that does not preclude transnational incorporation either into other countries in Europe or to a homeland. Here we draw from the ethnography of Congolese and Angolan asylum seekers in Halle, focusing on a gospel choir to which we give the pseudonym ‘Praise God’. As asylum seekers, five of the six members of the choir had been legally integrated. However, they were not provided with German lessons (in fact only limited categories of persons such as Aussiedler with ‘German origins’ have been eligible for state supported language courses). They were not allowed to work, and they were not even allowed to leave their locality of residence without permission. The money they received barely covered rent and food, making the cost even of transportation within the city difficult. The Sozialamt pays their rent, and the total amount of money received by asylum seekers is less than the usual social welfare, i.e. the amount guaranteeing a life in dignity and provided in demeaning circumstances.

Yet members of the choir assumed the role of public foreigners in Halle. Members of a French-speaking church initiated by Congolese, they began to sing as a church choir but soon were invited to engagements outside the church. While they retained their church membership, they distinguished themselves from the church choir so that they could assume a more public performance role. The choir performed at various events in Halle where the presence of foreigners is acknowledged and celebrated. These included the opening ceremonies of the yearly celebration of the Week of Foreigners, held in the centre of the

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5 This research is part of a study “The Simultaneous Incorporation of Immigrants” comparing migrants in Germany and the United States. The MacArthur Foundation component of this research (2003-4) was initiated by Nina Glick Schiller and Thaddeus Gulbrandsen who, together with Peter Buchanan, are conducting the ethnography in the United States. Ayşe Çağlar, Evangelos Karagiannis, and Nina Glick Schiller have been focusing on Halle.
city and attended by the Mayor and various public dignitaries. When, during ‘African Week’ in Halle, the Vice-Mayor laid a wreath at the statue of Anton Wilhelm Amo, an 18th century resident of Halle who was the first African to study and teach in Germany, the choir sang. They also sang at various summer festivals held to celebrate cultural integration, and they officially represented Halle at Sachsen-Anhalt-Day, a festival where the Land Sachsen-Anhalt celebrates itself. In these performances the choir sang gospel music in German, English, French, and Lingalla. The songs that received the most enthusiastic public response are the ones sung in Lingalla with accompanying rhythmic dance steps. With the assistance of funds from a German foundation they have recorded a compact disc, a format that will allow them to disseminate their message and their identity as public foreigners far beyond Halle.

In this way the members of the choir gain a sense of themselves as both Africans and as part of Halle and Germany. Their performance, usually accompanied by small donations provides them with some money for personal expenses at least in the summer time. The performances are often arranged by Herr Pierre, an African employee of a large academic foundation and the president of a smaller political foundation. A very experienced public foreigner, Herr Pierre is adept at orchestrating these appearances and has been transmitting his expertise to the members of the choir.

The choir members also appear in another guise that brings them into public view as foreigners. They act as a soccer team in special tournaments organised to show unity between Germans and foreigners. The choir soccer team won the 2003 anti-racism tournament of ‘African Week’ in which teams of Germans and foreigners participated in friendly competition. As a reward they were presented with a cup during a gala at the conclusion of ‘African Week’ that was attended by a range of local Germans who over the years have participated in various activities organised to integrate foreigners.

Although this form of incorporation may seem to be merely local, rather than simultaneously transnational, it may actually facilitate transnational incorporation. Herr Pierre began a development programme in his home country with funds raised through his connections in Halle. Two of the choir members, who were brothers, communicated regularly with family members living in France and Belgium. Our ongoing research will teach us more about the possibilities of these connections and whether any of the funds earned locally through performances assist in maintaining transnational ties that facilitate transnational family or political incorporation. Certainly, research in the United States contains numerous examples of local public foreigners who are simultaneously long distance nationalists and use their local activities as a base from which to participate in nation-state building projects in
their homeland (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001).

3. Transnational Family Networks

It would be possible to say that Somalis live in Germany, but not as part of Germany. Many Somalis live within dense family networks that link them to other Somalis in Germany, transnationally to others settled in Europe, and finally back to Somalia or Somaliland. However, the situation is more complex than this summation would allow. In terms of their degree and kind of incorporation to Germany and transnationally, Somalis display variation by generation, by the period in which and the means by which they came to Germany, and by their relationship to the political situation in their homeland. Moreover, as people settle in Germany and produce families, they face the tasks of social reproduction, including the raising and educating of children within a German context. Consequently family life, however it may be organised to maintain transnational ties, still is shaped by the daily tasks of child rearing within Germany.

Clan identity structure predominates within family networks. Telephones, including mobile phones, serve as a constant means of communication. Visits among Somalis within Germany are very frequent. Video cassettes of marriages are exchanged among members of family networks. Audio cassettes of music recorded in the US and Canada circulate through Somali networks within Germany and transnationally. This use of audio tapes allows people to maintain their sense of oral culture. Often the tapes contain a sketch or joke or scene performed on tape. These kinds of interchanges develop and maintain a sense of a Somali life in Germany that extends to a diaspora settled in Europe and the Americas. Simultaneously, migrants organise themselves to send financial remittances homeward. When many siblings send small sums home to parents, the parents in Somalia can have a sizeable monthly income. Consequently, the Somali transnational family and its home ties depends on some kind of financial incorporation within Germany.

There are other forms of incorporation as well that are indicators of possible simultaneous incorporation. Some Somali establish a public presence through Somali organisations. It is only insiders who recognise that these organisations have a clan or regional focus and may be intimately linked to transnational family dynamics. Somalis who arrived before 1991 came as students, acquired education and often married German women. Members of these families participate in networks that incorporate them into German family and social life. However these Somalis often maintain dense networks of transnational ties including links to political processes in what they still consider to be their homeland.
Those who came after 1991 came as political refugees and became involved in transnational networks that have increasingly popularised Muslim ideas about the protection of women from outside influences. They have initiated in Germany a more restrictive set of practices than had been followed at home. To the extent that this is true, their more restrictive Islam is a product of their experience in Germany, where Islam and Somalis are challenged and marked as being different. Interest in Islam brings some Somali into mosques that pull in Muslims of many nationalities. However, we can hypothesise that, if the Somali were to become visibly involved in the politics of European Islam or in transnational Islamic organisations in Europe, the question of their organisational integration or incorporation into the German society may become more difficult.

At the same time, a few Somali have become incorporated into German institutions as public foreigners. As in the case of other public foreigners, incorporation into German institutions may reinforce homeland ties. For example, a Somali former student of Schlee is an official of the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). As an official of this organisation, he travels to Somalia. In this case, incorporation within German institutions increases a migrant’s contact with his homeland.

For most Somalis, however, it is family rather than religion or the path of public foreigners that form the medium of both their transnational connections and their incorporation in Germany. It is the Somali children who show the greatest degree of incorporation and it is through their children that parents find themselves on a pathway of incorporation. Children’s intense commitments to Germany expose their parents to the consumption desires of German youth. The oldest children of the first generation are generally still teenagers, immersed in German teen consumption and rebellious towards their parents who try to interest them in the homeland. Trips to visit kin back home result in teens who try to distance themselves from the Somali realities. It remains to be seen whether Somali youth will follow the pattern reported for second generation youth of other nationalities, who in significant numbers only become interested in homeland identities and political activities when they reach adulthood. It may be that the absence of a viable state in Somalia and the continuing clan divisions will keep second generation youth from any form of simultaneous incorporation that links them to a Somali homeland. It may also be that the racial and religious exclusion that these young people experience as they become adults will send them on transnational quests for identity, belonging, and political or religious engagement, similar to that reported for Croatian, Indian, and Haitian second generation members (Fouron and Glick Schiller 2001; Marr Maira 2002; Skrbiš 1999).
4. Vernacular Cosmopolitanism through Mediascapes

The communications sector developed by migrants provides another pathway of incorporation. In a seminal work on the immigrant press in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century, Robert Park (1971 [1922]) portrayed foreign language media as a mode of eventual assimilation, despite their transnational connections and their use of the mother tongue of the migrants. In contrast, in political debates about immigrant incorporation in Germany and elsewhere, the immigrant media is often portrayed as evidence of the failure of integration. Because German is not the dominant language of this media, it is assumed that these media create a closed moral community and perpetuate only identification with the ancestral land. In German official discourses consumption of foreign language media by migrants is still associated with ‘cultural ghettoisation’. Language plays an important role in the ethno-cultural model of membership in Germany. The debates and the new regulations about language competency tests in the 2002 version of the ‘Immigration Law’ (Zuwanderungsgesetz) in Germany and the fact that knowledge of German has served as an important criterion in allowing the Aussiedler to come to Germany, all indicate the importance of German language in the national imaginary in German society.

Research by Ayşe Çağlar with German Turks and by Tsypylma Darieva with Russian migrants who are Kontingentflüchtlinge of Jewish descent and Spätaussiedler of German descent outline a path of simultaneous transnational incorporation which Çağlar has called vernacular cosmopolitanism. These media help to create new forms of membership and identity that embed them in new localities and new urban affiliations that must be distinguished from more universal form of cosmopolitanism.

The German Turkish media are transnational, representing interests in Germany and Turkey and reflecting a process of interaction between the business interests and the state. These media also are shaped by policies of the European Union that allow immigrant groups to take the initiative to increase the permeability of the boundaries of political membership and identity in Europe. They create new cultural spaces for Turkish immigrants both in Germany and Turkey and have an impact on the public spheres in both nation-states.

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6 Although the political parties disagreed on various clauses of these laws, there was a wide consensus among the politicians and different segments of the population about the requirement that migrants must attend language courses and master the German language in order to acquire German citizenship.

7 Since the end of the 1980s, Turkish immigrants have started to refer to themselves as German Turks to underline their incorporation and belonging in both societies without erasing their difference. Turkish immigrants in other European countries adopt and campaign for similar forms of self address, e.g., the Belgian Turks in Belgium.

8 See Darieva, forthcoming.
Çağlar’s full-length study (2003) examines the political economy of media directed at Turks in Germany, as well as of Turkish media, in order to explore the question of the role of immigrants in European societies and the potential effects of transnational media on the cosmopolitan transformation of political communities in Europe. The emergence of digital technologies and international deregulation in the communications sector are changing the marginalised character of ethnic media. In the age of audience segmentation, more and more broadcasters are targeting ethnic communities across national borders. These media are not only taking an increasingly large share of the global communication flows; they are also becoming an important target for the global media conglomerates (Karim 1998:9; Guarnizo 2001:11-12).

It is possible to interpret some of the developments in media in Germany as being closely related with the emergence of a kind of ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ of German Turks, a form of simultaneous incorporation. Those who share this orientation maintain forms of identification and an outlook that extends beyond their immediate locality of settlement but is inclusive of its particularities; they retain multiple, uneven and non-exclusive affiliations that challenge the conventional notions of locality and belonging. Once cosmopolitanism is conceptualised in this way it can be extended to transnational experiences (Robbins 1998:3). However, while transnational connections can foster a vernacular cosmopolitanism, it can also hinder its development if the attachments forged within transnationalism fail to go beyond the topos of the ethno-cultural.

Nowadays in Berlin, Turkish is in the air. Despite the heated scholarly and public debates about the negative impact of the Turkish-language media on Turkish immigrants’ German competency and consequently on their integration into German society, increasing numbers of broadcasters provide services in Turkish (or in Turkish and German) to Turkish immigrants. Since the second half of the 1990s, the print and electronic media located in Germany increasingly target German Turkish consumers in German (Etap, Türkisch), in a mixed language of German and Turkish (Merhaba, TD1, TBB-Spiegel, Türk Ekonomi Dergisi, Güneş, etc.) and in Turkish (Metropol FM). Deutsche Telekom’s facilities provide access to Turkish private television channels through cable operators – such as Kanal D or ATV – broadcasted from Turkey. The ZfT (Zentrum für Türkei-studien) survey in 1997 on the media consumption behaviour of Turks in Germany found that 55.7% of German Turks sought information only through Turkish newspapers, while 38% did so through both German and Turkish newspapers. For television, the findings were similar to

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9 See also Çağlar 1998. The following text has been abstracted from Çağlar 2003.
10 There are nine daily Turkish newspapers available in Germany. They are the dailies based in Turkey, which have European editions. Hürriyet is the most important of these with a total circulation of 160,000 in Europe of which 110,000 are circulated in Germany.
the print media; the survey showed that German Turks utilised Turkish-speaking TV broadcasters, especially TRT-INT.

The initiatives and inclusion of services targeting ‘foreign’ communities in commercial media in Germany were perceived as challenges to the public-sector broadcasting. Public-sector broadcasters started considering programming for the ‘immigrant communities’ beyond their ‘dutiful community-work’ type of programming. Importantly, they initiated programming in a language other than German, but not in a secluded space in the tradition of public-sector broadcasting of the 1970s and 1980s. In this context the initiatives to include Turkish into the mainstream media and bilingual programming mixed in a ‘creolised’ way are noteworthy. It is worth focusing on Metropol FM to illustrate this kind of localised cosmopolitanism being developed among the immigrants (especially among the immigrant youth) in Europe from Turkey.

Metropol FM is the first radio broadcaster in Turkish outside of Turkey which is on air twenty-four hours a day. It has twenty-seven employees who speak German and Turkish and who are familiar with Berlin, German Turks in Berlin, and Germany (Interview March 2000). Metropol FM offers twenty-four hours of Turkish music and entertainment together with news and some information about the daily life difficulties of German Turks in Berlin. However, it is basically a Turkish music channel. Metropol FM became a quick success among German Turks. According to a recent study, 71% of the German Turkish Radio audience in Berlin listened to Metropol FM regularly (in contrast to 2.1% of SFB Radio Multikulti which is the multicultural programme of Berlin’s public broadcasting company). Although it understands itself as a commercial broadcaster selling advertising time and space, Metropol FM contributes to the formation of German Turks as a group with border-crossing multiple attachments and complex affiliations. Metropol FM presents itself as a German Turkish enterprise broadcasting for German Turks. In 2000, all the employers, other than the manager and the bookkeeper, were Turkish. All its programmes are produced in Berlin and familiarity with Turkish life in Berlin as well as with German and Turkish societies are crucial for its employment policy (interview A. Duyar, March 2000). It recognises German Turks as a group different from Turks in Turkey and Germans in Germany, and it fosters their multi-connectedness with other places in Europe including Turkey. News from Turkey is an integral part of their hourly news. However, more significant than news from Turkey, is the weather forecast in Turkey (integrated into the weather forecast they provide for Berlin and Germany). Both the news and the weather forecast help to synchronise Metropol FM audience with Turkey. The broadcasting is in Turkish, but there is a playful and a creative approach to language (both to Turkish and German), which gives rise to cross-overs between German and Turkish (which is already widespread among German Turks). In understanding and evaluating the
life-styles and the cultural formations of German Turks, Turkey loses its role as a yardstick. It becomes only one of the multiple references of this translocal group.

Metropol FM (also the journals Etap or Türkîş) provides the sites in which a kind of a vernacular or localised cosmopolitanism is forged. Although Metropol FM adopts the perspective of the local, the ‘local’ here entails multiple, uneven, and non-exclusive affiliations. Thus it represents an attachment within multiple attachments. The city is the location of these kinds of non-exclusive attachments that Metropol FM forges. Belonging to the city could not be conceived as belonging to a community with fixed boundaries. The fragmented nature of urban culture and its inherent openness play a crucial role in bringing the urban belonging to the forefront. There is for example identification with Berlin, but not necessarily with Germany. Different kinds of belonging are reflectively challenged and negotiated around the image of the city.

These developments could not be read as efforts that simply give expression to difference within the frame of a particularistic multiculturalism. They do not simply refer to an increase or growth of a secluded public sphere and to the arrangements taking place there. If we see not only political but also social and cultural activities as meaningful forms of participation (Benhabib 1992), these media can be understood as ways in which German Turks augment their chances for active engagement in Germany and even Turkey. The attempts to include immigrants into the national public both in Turkey and Germany could be interpreted as forms of cosmopolitan openings in these places – at least in regards to language – because of the boundary drawing role of language in the conception of the political community in these societies. The policies of accommodating transnational minorities carry a much stronger normative force and these societies show a profound change in the conception of national community in their attempts to come to terms with the challenges posed by these groups (Bauböck 2000:19).

Darieva’s study of migrants from the former Soviet Union to Berlin traces a similar trajectory of belonging. It becomes clear from her examination of the practices and the intended audiences of Russian newspapers in Germany that the term ‘ethnic press’ is inappropriate. Rather the Russian language press in Germany provides another example of modern communication networks that provides a vernacular cosmopolitan form of incorporation into Germany. Migrants from Russia in Germany who speak and read Russian constitute a new and significant group. Members of this linguistic group have different ethnic identifications and are officially recognised as Kontingentflüchtlinge of Jewish and Spätaussiedler of German descent. These two categories have a ‘privileged’ status in Germany in comparison to most other migrants. While Spätaussiedler are seen by the German government as historical co-
ethnics who ‘return’ to their homeland, the acceptance of Russian Jews represents a kind of moral reparation for the murder of millions of Jews during the Third Reich.

In this context, German integration programmes developed by ethnic-confessional institutions such as the *Jüdische Gemeinde* claim that new migrants should integrate and identify as purely Jewish, as they become completely German. The ties to the Russian language and culture are generally perceived by these institutions as barriers for successful integration into the German society. Russian speakers who are ethnically mixed have the duty to become members of the receiving society as religious Jews or cultural Germans, and in either case demonstrate full competence in the modern German way of life. Aussiedler are expected to understand themselves as fully German, denying their experience of several centuries of participation in and intermarriage into Russian and then Soviet society and its vast regional differentiation.

In her recent research on Russian language mass media and identity in Berlin, Darieva has analysed how Russian newspapers produced by migrants facilitate their social and cultural adaptation into Germany without giving up their connection to Russia. Two weeklies, numerous journals, two TV programmes and internet web sites in Russian offer information and practical help for newcomers in the land of settlement, regardless of their ethnic and residence status. Through developing their ‘own’ channels of communication, for example, newspapers such as *Russkiy Berlin* and *Evropa-Express*, the migrants from Russia create new public spheres and present social fields which provide at least two types of incorporations in Germany: intra-incorporation and trans-incorporation.

These media typically formulate a broadly conceptualised, inclusive definition of a ‘we-group’ that identifies the audience by language and alludes to specific geographical and symbolic linkages between two lands – the territory of the former Soviet Union and the territory of modern Germany. The post-Soviet immigrants’ media voice contains what can be considered a cosmopolitan attitude towards ethnicity, for example, through the newspaper’s symbolic motto “Our homeland is the Russian language”. In this alternative way we observe the incorporation of different ethnic and social ways of belongings. Not only Russian Jews and Russian Germans participate in the medial exchange, but also Latvians and Uzbeks who live in Germany.

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11 See Darieva, 2002.

12 With a circulation of 50,000 and 70,000 respectively, these two weekly are the most successful newspapers among the Russian speaking minority in Germany. Launched as a local Berlin newspaper in the summer of 1996, *Russkiy Berlin* expanded quickly all over Germany and, as a supplement entitled *We in Germany*, to the most popular Moscow weekly, *Argumenty i Fakty*, even into Russia.
Yet this incorporation can also be transnational. The weekly *Russkij Berlin* utilises transnational links that connect Berlin to the rest of Germany and to the territories of the former Soviet Union. In conceptualising its flow of news, this newspaper projects a new vision of location organised in three spatial dimensions: the land of settlement, Germany, is called ‘Our land’; the land which was left is called ‘1/6 of the world’ – the territory of the former Soviet Union; and the third zone has a local character connected to city life and the life of Russian speaking migrants in Berlin.

Through this social organisation of migrant media connections, and through its narrative and imagination of space Russian speaking migrants are connected simultaneously to contemporary Russia and their lost homeland, the ‘USSR’. Crucially, this specific cartography of the world contains no classical hierarchical mode of center and periphery relationships, which is typical for any structure of news. Looking not only at Russia but also at Germany, Russian modern diasporic media position themselves in a space in-between with strong local urban identification. The growing number of minority and migrant media in Europe provide a new media world that extends beyond the construction of ‘national imaginaries’ and contains multiple connections of in-between mediascapes.

5. Regional Cosmopolitanism

The pathway of regional cosmopolitanism refers more to incorporation through the use of imagination than to a structural mode based on social relations. However, since discourse and social action often are related in a complex process of causality, we include regional cosmopolitanism in this overview of the pathways of incorporation that emerge from our ethnography and that challenge the dominant conceptualisations of migrant integration in Germany. In Berlin, the division of West Germany and East Germany was very salient to Ghanaian migrants. The racist violence, which spread over Germany in the 1990s, was interpreted by the Ghanaians in terms of East and West. The West was perceived as a relatively peaceful and cosmopolitan area; the East as an area of violence and racism. Although this discursive distinction became blurred in everyday practice, it functions as a dominant scheme of interpretation, which has also produced certain kinds of action. It manifested itself for instance in the patterns of housing. More than 90% of the Ghanaians live in districts that were part of West Berlin before 1990.

For many Ghanaians the regional division between East and West Germany corresponds to the regional division between North and South Ghana. Northern Ghana is the peripheral region within the national framework. The stereotype about people from Northern Ghana is that they are rural, ‘uncivilised,’ and ‘uneducated,’ which is expressed
through their lack of English language skills. Furthermore, the Northern part of Ghana is less Christianised than the South and economically relatively weak. Most of the natural resources and important cash crops are in the South. Because, economically, the North is less integrated in the world market, people from the North are less likely to travel abroad. And finally, the Northern part of Ghana is associated with ethnic violence, because the most recognised incidents of ethnic violence have happened there. These attributes solidify in the emic concept of being ‘bushy’. Although being ‘bushy’ is not exclusively used to describe Northerners, the stereotypical Northerner is the prototype of a ‘bushy person’. A ‘bushy’ person comes from a rural place, has not travelled abroad, is poor, does not speak proper English, is not Christian, thinks only in ethnic categories, and as a result of all this tends to be violent.

This scheme of interpretation can easily be used by Southern Ghanaians to explain the racist violence in Eastern Germany and the differences between the West and the East. Eastern Germany is the economically weak part, the proportion of Christians (as defined through church membership) is low, and many people do not speak English and are less experienced in travelling abroad. Because East Germans are expected to have a ‘confined worldview’, Ghanaians expect them to think in ethnic categories, which lead, they believe, to a higher degree of ethnic motivated violence. They connect the media discourse on the higher degree of racist violence in East Germany to their folk theory about the perceived violence in Northern Ghana. Interestingly, this parallel results in a new space of identification. Cosmopolitan migrants from Southern Ghana, who are in fact the great majority of Ghanaians in Berlin, identify with cosmopolitan Germans from Western Germany and West Berlin. East Germans and Northern Ghanaians are becoming in this discourse the ‘uncivilised’ and ‘violent’ other from which one’s own identity is distinguished. Interestingly, migrants, who are normally expected to feel marginalised and racialised, are able to imagine themselves as part of a cosmopolitanism, by means of which they can emancipate themselves from the role of the possible victim of racist violence. By defining the East Germans as ‘bushy’ and consequently latently violent, an alliance between Southern Ghanaians and Western Germans is imagined. This identification works also the other way round, at least partly.

In the quarters with a high proportion of migrants such as Kreuzberg or Wedding, many Germans feel committed to the discourse of multiculturalism. The migrants, especially ‘black’ African migrants, become symbols of the cosmopolitanism of the city of Berlin. East Berlin with its low proportion of migrants becomes, in this discourse, the symbol of the confined and racist Germany. Therefore, the imaginary of cosmopolitanism opens up new spaces of integration and identification, which transcend temporarily the distinction between the ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped world’, or racial stereotypes like the ‘uncivilised African’
developed world’, or racial stereotypes like the ‘uncivilised African’ and the ‘civilised European’. Through transnational networks and global integration, migrants create new imaginaries of integration such as a regional cosmopolitanism, and use these to reposition themselves actively, becoming agents in their multiple modes of incorporation into Germany and the world.

Conclusion

The research summarised in this report makes it clear that there are many different pathways of incorporation being followed by migrants in Germany. In all cases these pathways discard dichotomies of cultural difference and articulate new ways of being German. In some cases such as regional cosmopolitanism it begins in the realm of the imagination as migrants rework home dichotomies of difference to position themselves as moderns within both German and global domains. This reworking empowers migrants as they establish social relationships in Germany and abroad. Other pathways such as ‘Christian Modernists’, ‘Public Foreigners’, and ‘Vernacular Cosmopolitanism’ offer sets of organised practices as well as identities that situate migrants within Germany without confronting the issue of becoming exactly like the Germans. These pathways of incorporation into Germany include organised sets of practices, social relationships, institutions, as well as claims to belonging and membership. An array of German public and private interests and institutions are participants in these various forms of incorporation. At the same time, public, commercial, and philanthropic actors and institutions situated across national borders also play a role. Even the Somali clan networks, where family connections would seem to keep migrants encapsulated in their own world, contain transnational connections, generational differentiation, and connections to German institutions. In all cases, what might appear on first examination to be ethnic, particular, linguistically bounded practices and identities were revealed through ethnographic investigation to contain pathways of incorporation that confront standard notions of membership and belonging within the boundaries of a single nation-state. These developments highlight pathways of incorporation that cannot be understood as simple integration into the ‘political community’. Instead new forms of ‘belonging’ and membership in Germany, Europe, and elsewhere are established by these pathways.

Some elements of the pathways of incorporation have heuristic power in other research settings beyond Germany and even beyond migration studies. Christian modernism appears to be a widespread strategy of incorporation for marginalised people. For example, ongoing field research carried out by László Fosztó in Transylvania shows that the Roma have adopted charismatic Christianity as a strategy of inclusion.
into Central European societies. Roma convert in significant numbers to Pentecostal denominations both in Romania and Hungary (see for example Lange 2003), where Fosztó will do comparative research. Though Roma could not be considered immigrants (at least not recent immigrants) in Central Europe, they have been historically marginalised. By adopting Pentecostal Christianity they align themselves with a narrative that makes them, as born-again Christians, central actors in the future of their societies.

Specifying these pathways opens up many further questions such as that of the significance of locality, including the type and size of the city and community. Yalçın-Heckmann’s research on labour migrants in the cities of Bamberg and Nürnberg shows that the size of the city, where a migrant community lives, and the available cultural and financial resources, affect their organisational structures and complexity. In a small city like Bamberg for example the labour migrants from Turkey who maintained face-to-face relationships with one another initially formed associations which reflected regional identities of migrants from Turkey. These associations changed their character with time. They became more diverse in terms of the members’ background and responded to the expectations of the younger generation of migrants. In contrast, in the metropolitan city of Berlin, almost all social groups and all kinds of identities (be it gay migrants, regional associations, or religious identities) could be accommodated simply by forming another association. Glick Schiller, Çağlar, and Karagiannis hope to explore the significance of the scale of the city on pathways of incorporation in future research.

The cases presented demonstrate that migrants manage to become incorporated in different local, national, transnational, regional, and global contexts at the same time. Being included in one national or transnational context is neither the precondition nor precludes inclusion in another. In the examples we have presented, migrants engaged in these various pathways of incorporation become part of Germany and other states and localities and make claims as members of these societies but not in the ways in which integration has previously been understood (Favell 1999).

The concepts of pathways of incorporation and simultaneity provide a framework for studying the complex interplay of being part of different local and social settings in different political and geographic locations in the course of migrants’ everyday practices. This perspective contributes, in our opinion, not only to a more adequate representation of the migration phenomena in particular but also provides a more flexible conceptualisation of the relationship between the nation-state, social structures and individual ways of living and belonging. Looking beyond and within the borders of the nation-state at the same time may contribute to a better understanding of the social processes that shape the struc-
tures of contemporary societies. Such developments challenge our very concept of society.

References


Three Dyads Compared: Nuer/Anywaa (Ethiopia), Maasai/Kamba (Kenya), and Evenki/Buryat (Siberia)

Günther Schlee

There is a long tradition of comparing ethnic groups, also variously called ‘cultures’ or ‘societies’, in anthropology. This has been done in small settings with limited variation in the form of relatively controlled comparisons (Witchcraft in Four East African Societies) and world-wide using statistical methods based on the Human Relations Area Files. There are weaknesses in these approaches, as well as merits. I do not intend to discuss these works here. I simply mention them to illustrate the way in which the approach sketched in this rough and preliminary short essay differs from them. Here I am not going to take ethnic groups as the units of comparison, but the relationships between them. I am going to compare the relationship between Nuer and Anywaa with the relationship between the Maasai and the Kamba and with the relationship between the Buryat and Evenki. I am going to discuss three dyads. It goes without saying that the life-world of each of these groups goes beyond the dyad discussed. The Maasai have relevant others apart from the Kamba, the social environment of the Buryat does not consist of the Evenki only, and so on. Especially the state with its ethnic policies acts as a third element in all these dyads and transforms them into triangles, and if we include further elements, we get polygons or multidimensional clouds of factors. I am aware that the focus on a dyad is a simplification and that we need to bring more complexity back in at a later point if we are to model reality. My justification for focusing on dyads is that this focus shows us something, which we might not see otherwise, and that nobody should be asked to deal with more complexity than he can handle at a given moment.

The focus on dyads also suggests that the two groups interacting in each of them are given units. It must be kept in mind that the boundary between them might be drawn by a third party (e.g. the state) and that different actors hold different opinions with regard to where the boundary is. The possibility of re-affiliation also needs to be kept in mind. The Buryat/Evenki divide largely coincides, as we shall learn below, with the ecological divide between steppe and taiga. Can the ethnic divide be crossed by people who move into the other ecological zone?

The use of the term ‘ethnic’ as an adjective suggests that there is a quality of that name. Two ‘ethnic’ groups would be expected to differ according to some criteria of ‘ethnic’ distinction, while they would be the same at a higher level because both would qualify as ‘ethnic’.

Many mutually reactive ethno-nationalisms in the modern world indeed appear very similar to each other. They tend to be territorial, they tend to comprise linguistic or some other cultural elements, they inter-
act through well-defined diplomatic channels and at war they become even more similar to each other, because they engage in arms races for the same types of arms, imitate each other’s threatening conduct (parades, manoeuvres) and respond to each other’s tactics and strategies. One would have to look closely at the emblems on their uniforms to see the difference. These co-evolving ethno-nationalisms are quite clearly phenomena of the same kind.

**Anywaa and Nuer: different kinds of ethnicity**

In the case of Anywaa ethnicity reacting to Nuer ethnicity and vice versa, one cannot be so sure that ‘ethnicity’ stands for the same type of phenomenon in both cases. What makes an Anywaa more Anywaa differs so much from what makes a Nuer more Nuer that one hesitates to attach the same label ‘ethnicity’ to what is being intensified in either case. This emerges clearly from the doctoral thesis by Dereje Feyissa: *Ethnic Groups and Conflict: The case of the Anywaa-Nuer relations in the Gambela Region, Western Ethiopia*.¹

Quite plausibly, Dereje speaks of *two kinds* of ethnic groups, or *two kinds* of ethnicities, rather than just *two ethnic groups*. The following table summarises what can be adduced to show that the Anywaa are not just neighbours in a conflict who stress the minimal difference, but that the fundamental workings of ethnicity are rather different in both cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anywaa</th>
<th>Nuer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ancestry</td>
<td>diversity of origins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bilateral parentage</td>
<td>patriliny, adoptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific territory</td>
<td>mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rare bridewealth beads</td>
<td>cattle as bridewealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchical order</td>
<td>‘ordered anarchy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination, purity</td>
<td>assimilationism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>particularist</td>
<td>universalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnogenesis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in isolation</td>
<td>in a competitive setting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Anywaa emphasise the fact or belief that they are of exclusively Anywaa ancestry, while the Nuer admit that their sub-units, which take

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¹ The thesis was accepted by the Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg in July 2003. Supervisors: Richard Rottenburg and Günther Schlee. Dereje Feyissa has now taken up a new appointment at Osaka, Japan.
the form of patrilineal descent groups, are in fact of diverse origins. Descent in the patriline is perfectly sufficient for being a Nuer. It is not even a precondition, because where it is not present, it can be easily constituted by adoption. The Anywaa method of calculating descent also has a patrilineal bias, but it is distinct from that of the Nuer because of the absence of adoptions and the fact that attention is given to the patriline of the mother of a person as well in determining that person’s full status as an Anywaa. People with a non-Anywaa mother (and more so a non-Anywaa father) are not accepted as full Anywaa.

Anywaa identity is closely tied to a specific territory, where they till their fields, go hunting or have their fishing grounds. When forced to settle in a new place, they have to become one with the land by dissolving clumps of earth in the water they drink. The Nuer place a stronger emphasis on mobile pastoralism and territorial expansion. Whether one is from a lineage said to possess a given territory implies whether or not one is *diel* (member of the titular lineage, ‘noble’ in Evans-Pritchard’s sense), but is of little practical consequence.

Bridewealth, where it exists, is always interesting to look at in inter-ethnic relations. The Anywaa use a type of bead called *dimui* as bridewealth. No one knows where these beads originally came from, for how many centuries they have been around in Anywaa country, and where one can get a fresh supply. They can get lost but they cannot multiply. If one has a sister, one might get *dimui* for her and then be able to marry. The only people who can accumulate *dimui* are the chiefs who get them for their sisters and daughters but who are exempt from having to pay for their brides. They can build up a following by giving *dimui* to sisterless would-be bridegrooms. Nuer expansionism and openness, on the other hand, is reflected in their use of cattle as bridewealth. Cattle populations grow just like the populations of their keepers, partly in response to the number of their keepers and the care invested in them. And if, in spite of this, a young man does not have enough cattle to marry and cannot mobilise enough help from his relatives, he can still acquire cattle through raids or by becoming a labour migrant and earning money for the purchase of cattle. Cattle are a living, flexible, expandable resource. They can also be used by Nuer to marry Anywaa brides, because the Anywaa accept cattle from Nuer bridewealth and do not insist on *dimui* in these cases. It goes without saying that the issue of such unions are Nuer. For an Anywaa bride, one would have to spend significantly fewer animals than for a Nuer bride. Local marriages also provide Nuer with a foothold for expansion into Anywaa territories. The mention of chiefs and the social resources they can monopolise (like *dimui*), leads us to another dichotomy: the hierarchical order of Anywaa society versus the segmentary lineage system, in Evans-Pritchard’s terms the ‘ordered anarchy’ of the Nuer. Ideas of descent and practices of marriage enhance both the contrast between
the Anywaa tendency towards discrimination and purity on the one side and the expansive assimilationism of the Nuer on the other. Dereje summarises all this by attributing particularism to the Anywaa and a form of universalism to the Nuer. Combining scant evidence and plausible conjecture, he speculates that the Anywaa ethnogenesis must have taken place in relative isolation and that of the Nuer in a competitive setting where one had to mobilise numbers.

Primordialism and constructivism have been used as classifications of scholarly theories about ethnicity (‘etic’ theories, i.e. those from an analytical, non-participant perspective). Scholars tended to assume that the primordialists must be wrong if the constructivists are right and vice versa. Dereje has shown that this dichotomy can be applied to emic theory (i.e. the views of the actors under study) and that in that domain primordialism and constructivism co-exist and share reality. He calls the ethnicity of the Anywaa primordialist and that of the Nuer constructivist (p. xviii). The Nuer, he says, are aware that their system of patrilineal descent groups comprised in larger such units, ultimately giving them an identity as ‘Nuer’ at the highest level, is a construct, and they live happily with this construct without even missing a deeper truth. They might once have had ideas of purity or descent similar to those of the Anywaa, but have given these up under the pressure of resource competition which forced them to play the numbers game: “(…) the bigger the group, the more powerful it becomes, the higher the chances of winning in the competition over natural resources”. They have replaced the ideology of “purity” by that of the “melting pot”.

The two mutually opposed ethnicities – as has now become clear – do not produce a balance or a stable boundary. Social exchanges are asymmetrical and facilitate Nuer expansion at the expense of the Anywaa.

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2 Expansion versus self-restriction and conservative resource use has also been discussed by Schlee (1988a) in connection with the Somali and Rendille.
Dereje does not get bogged down in the usual sterile theoretical debates about whether the segmentary lineage system is just an anthropological model, or an actors’ model, or whether it reflects a social reality. He simply takes it as a descriptive category and tests its adequacy empirically. He does a micro-census and counts how many members of a given settlement cluster belong to the name-giving patrilineal unit and how many others are attached to it by affinal links which develop into cognatic ties in the next generation.

**Kamba and Maasai: uneasy coexistence**

We now turn to the second dyad, that of the Maasai and Kamba in Kenya. Our source is the doctoral thesis of Pius Mutie ‘In Spite of Difference’: making sense of the coexistence between the Kamba and the Maasai of Kenya.3

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3 This thesis was sponsored by the KAAD (Katholischer Akademischer Austauschdienst) and accepted by the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld in May 2003. Supervisors: Günther Schlee and Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka.
The Kamba and the Maasai belong to different language families. The former are Bantu speakers, the latter Eastern Nilotes. Their languages differ as much as any two languages on Earth can. Their modes of livelihood used to be clearly distinct; before modern education and economic diversification set in, the Kamba were exclusively farmers, while the Maasai (or more precisely: those Maasai who lived in the neighbourhood of the Kamba) despised farming and were proud of their exclusive reliance on cattle. Small stock may have had a significant economic role but was culturally downplayed.

In the two semi-arid districts in the south of Kenya where Mutie did his field research, Makueni and Kajiado, the Kamba and Maasai live side by side, the Kamba in Makueni, the Maasai in Kajiado. There are also Kamba farmers and traders who exploit opportunities in Kajiado, enjoying a precarious guest status among the Maasai.

Interethnic relationships have been examined in anthropological literature from a variety of different aspects. Leach (1954) stressed that cultural differences, especially in the visual field – frills and decorations – were used to communicate within a wider whole. Cultural differences between small-scale local societies were used by these to communicate with each other in a wider society, a society of societies or a metasociety so to speak. The current theory of ethnicity by Fredrik Barth and his followers also stresses interaction at the ethnic boundary. Boundaries are marked by cultural discontinuities and it is through these discontinuities, different standards of excellence and different values, that people reduce competition and enter into a peaceful or complementary relationship at the boundary. There is no reason to romanticise complementary relations as just or equal. Often they are not. But the complementary tends to reduce violence. Ethnic diversity can thus be seen as a factor of integration into a wider social system.

In popular theory, ethnic difference is seen as a potential source of conflict to such a degree that it is almost equated with conflict. Conflict analysts, or at least the anthropologists among them, mostly agree that ethnicity more often is something which emerges or is accentuated in the course of a conflict, rather than being its actual cause. But it is impossible to deny that the frontlines in a conflict can follow the lines of cultural discontinuities or that these lines are ethnicised, i.e. that ethnic distinctions develop along those lines of dissent. Conflict, of course, is not the opposite of integration. People communicate through their similarities and differences in hostile ways as well. Often they emulate their adversaries. War is also a social system within which it is possible to become integrated.

Rather than anchoring his analysis to this pair of concepts, integration and conflict, Mutie chooses a third term, coexistence. The concept has wide currency in politics, e.g. with reference to the Cold War. The Soviet doctrine of _Koexistenz_ is the only context cited by the Brockhaus
encyclopaedia. Less often it is found in the context of Israel/Palestine. It is used in an ecological context by biologists. The *International Encyclopaedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* goes directly from ‘Coeducation’ to ‘Cognition’ and has no entry on ‘Coexistence’. This history of the concept reveals that it is not a common term in the social sciences.

The utility of this rather unusual concept therefore needs to be examined. In the way Mutie uses the term, ‘coexistence’ implies difference but does not assume a particular form of relationship like hostility/cooperation/friendliness. It does, however, imply a certain social distance and at least partial separation (p.1). Within this wide conceptual framework, it can comprise a whole range of contradictory forms of interaction, like armed but ‘controlled’ conflict, political alliances, economic exchanges, shared identities (along some features, not along others) (p.2). Coexistence tends to be an uneasy relationship. It is close to violent conflict. In a fashion complementary to the analysis of the factors which lead to conflict (Wimmer 1997), Mutie wants to examine the mechanisms of keeping conflicts at low levels of violence and to highlight how “tensions and conflict situations are pre-empted, avoided and precluded in other settings, despite the contested borders, competition for power, heightened degree of ethnic difference and external instigation” (p.6).

‘Coexistence’ is thus characterised by ethnic distinction, social exchange, complementarity and interdependence, ethnic antagonisms and conflict below certain levels, shared territory and formative external factors, which shape the dyad under study (pp. 10, 287, 290). Many of these phenomena have also been studied by authors who take a different key concept as their starting point, like ‘integration’ or ‘articulation’. Another element in which Mutie is also interested, however, combines particularly well with ‘coexistence’ in an uneasy relationship. This is his insistence on compromises and concessions. Compromises and concessions do not really fit into those theories of ethnicity which stress the integrative workings of cultural differences, nor with those which stress their conflict potential. If the two parties make compromises and concessions, then that implies that the differences between them are neither the means of integration nor the cause of conflict. It implies that these differences have a disruptive potential, but that this potential is contained by minimizing differences or by wrapping them into some sort of package deal, by adding a sweet coating to something which is otherwise hard to swallow, or by gaining acceptance for something which the other side does not like by making concessions in some other field. This accent on compromises and concessions also motivates the “in spite of” in the title. Differences are potentially disruptive, but one can handle them, tame them, mollify them, make them acceptable, stabilise them. By these means one can coexist ‘in spite of’ differences.
Mutie explains that ‘coexistence’ is based on the maintenance of a distinction. Two things which merge into one no longer coexist, but exist as one. On the other hand, he states that “coexistence may also take the form of commonality or sameness” (p. 289). What is meant is that group distinctions are marked by difference in certain features, while other features may be similar or identical, and that resort to any one of these may be made according to a particular situation. Features which are shared by Kamba and Maasai are:

- the cultural and economic focus on cattle in all their ritual and social functions, including bride-wealth,
- their bilingualism which enables many of them to speak each other’s language
- female circumcision (also called FGM or female genital mutilation)
- Christianity
- their political affiliation (in 2002 both groups voted for the National Rainbow Coalition)
- both are counted among the ‘small tribes’ and use similar political discourses in their struggle with larger groups for a slice of the national cake
- their ecological vulnerability as inhabitants of semi-arid lands.

A similar list of similarities could be drawn up for Nuer and Anywaa to complement our table of differences, above. Both Nuer and Anywaa are ‘black’ and referred to as such by the ‘red’ highlanders, in addition to being abused as barya (slaves) by them, both speak Nilotic languages which are clearly distinct from the Afroasiatic (Semitic, Cushitic etc.) languages of the ‘Highlanders’, and both were politically marginalised by the imperial system. In the case of the Nuer and Anywaa, it seems to be the political environment of explicit ethnic politics which causes undercommunication of these commonalities and overcommunication of the differences.

Mutie perceives intermarriage as an integrating or binding force between the two Maasai and Kamba. By far the most frequent case is Maasai men marrying Kamba girls or women. Stemming from an agricultural background, these have the reputation of being hard working. The Kamba, however, are by no means the losers in this exchange. By becoming affinal relatives of the Maasai, they, or rather those among them who have these links, have a stronger moral right to any lands they till in the Maasai areas.

Mutie goes to explore emic theories at some length. The most elaborate one is that of ‘axes in a basket’, developed by one of Mutie’s interlocutors in a long conversation. The basket represents the shared territory, wider unit, the system, the commonality to which both the Kamba and the Maasai belong. The axes are the two groups. They might hit
each other and make noise as the basket is carried around. One may stop the noise by putting some insulation material between them: cloth, cotton or a lubricant. Intermarriage is among those materials that soften the contact. This is a quite elaborate emic theory, which recalls what Leach has written about associations of societies or Gluckman’s writings about cross-cutting ties.

Another emic theory is the one about ‘eating’, which resonates with recent sociological writings (Bayard, *La politique du ventre*) and ecological theories. “Stability is produced by ‘eating’ with ‘co-eaters’” (p.16). In Kenyan politics, ethnic coalitions change and groups succeed each other in gaining access to the resources of the state or to the state as a resource (also pp. 285, 300). This pattern is compared with an ecological theory by Pontin (1982, *Competition and coexistence of species*) about a ‘dominance ring’ in which different species manage to coexist by gaining access to a resource at different times, thus avoiding direct competition. Mutie does not elaborate whether this ‘dominance ring’ in Kenyan politics is the result of intentional compromises or historical contiguity.

**Buryat and Evenki: ethnic boundary meets ecological boundary**

The following paragraphs are based on a project proposal by István Sántha on *Buryat–Evenki Interethnic Relations in the Baikal Region*. The Buryats live in two different ecological zones (taiga and steppe) and the Evenki/Tungus exclusively in the taiga. Buryat livelihood largely depends on pastoralism, whereas for the Evenki/Tungus hunting plays a major role in everyday life as well as in the interpretations of their identity.

Buryats and Evenki/Tungus have been the target of various ethnic stereotypes by outsiders. Soviet social scientists have seen the Evenki as a prototype of ‘primitive society’, and the Buryats as representatives of a more advanced evolutionary stage. The Evenki/Tungus and the Buryat political elites have often acted as rivals in the process of ‘scrambling’ – seeking the favours of the Russian and Soviet state. However, in order to reduce the complexity of inter-ethnic relations in the present analysis, let us focus on the relationships between the Buryat and Evenki, and how they describe and negotiate these.

Sántha seeks to examine ethnic stereotypes (emic theories); in other words, how one ethnic group conceives of the other. His analysis comprises various spheres of activities and interaction: language; belief systems; various forms of land use and their connotations; the issue of

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4 István Sántha acknowledges his incorporation of comments by Joachim Otto Habeck and Brian Donahoe. On the grounds of this proposal, Sántha has been awarded a short term grant in 2003 with the aim of elaborating a fuller research plan. In addition, the author acknowledges the helpfulness of comments by Andrea Nicolas and Tilo Grätz when discussing ideas for this essay at the Department I Seminar at Großkühnau, July 2003.
cattle raiding and intermarriage. Some of these spheres are described in Sántha’s project description (under Siberian Studies Centre in the present report). What follows here deals specifically with cattle raiding and intermarriage, as well as the question of whether and how an Evenki/Tungus can become a Buryat, and vice versa.

While cattle raiding in this region may take place on a smaller scale than in East Africa, the way it occurs reveals a certain strategic advantage of the Evenki/Tungus, which translates into stereotypes about the Tungus and the land they inhabit. The steppe-inhabiting Buryats perceive the taiga as khatuu gazar, as a ‘hard place’ in terms of cattle-herding and the prosecution of cattle thieves. Retaliation is hard to achieve not only because of the natural environment, but also because of the social environment in the taiga, where taiga-based Buryats may act as allies of the Evenki/Tungus against the Steppe Buryats. Sántha illustrates this using the example of a group of Steppe Buryats who follow the tracks of a cattle thief through the snow. The footsteps lead them to a small village in the taiga where the trace of the criminal becomes obscured by the footsteps of the other inhabitants. The inquiries of the Steppe Buryat vendettists remain fruitless because both the local Taiga Buryats and the Evenki/Tungus cover up for the cattle thief. Their alliance is based on a legendary female ancestor who connects the local Buryats with the local Tungus, notwithstanding the fact that the two groups see each other as ethnically different. This example implies that sometimes interethnic solidarity is stronger than intra-ethnic kinship. It also introduces a third (or intermediate) element into the dyadic relationship between Buryats and Evenki/Tungus: namely, the Taiga Buryats. This intermediate element, however, does not weaken the general character of interethnic relations between Buryats and Evenki/Tungus, wherein the former see the latter as unreliable, irascible, unpredictable and as the genuine ‘Other’ in numerous ways. The following section on intermarriage and change of ethnic identity will add further clues about this perception of the genuine ‘Other’.

Is it possible for Evenki/Tungus to become Buryats, and if so, how? Here it is necessary to distinguish between how the Steppe Buryats assess this question, and how the Taiga Buryats approach it. From the Steppe Buryats’ point of view, Evenki/Tungus can never become Buryats, except in very specific circumstances. Buryats will unequivocally label all individuals of mixed descent as Evenki/Tungus (khamnagan in Buryat), regardless of whether his/her Evenki/Tungus ancestors are on the maternal or paternal side. An individual with any one such ancestor always has to assert his/her legitimacy and rights within the community he/she lives in, because the community never automatically accepts individuals with Evenki/Tungus ancestors as equals.

The position of women with regard to this question is less ambivalent than that of men. Whether a woman is ‘Buryat’ or ‘Evenki/Tungus’ is
not important for the Steppe Buryats; what is important is the fact that
women are generally ‘not ours’ (*kharin* = foreign), i.e. that they comply
with the requirement of exogamy and patrilocal residence in order to
qualify as marriage partners. Steppe Buryats perceive Evenki/Tungus as
foreign, and Evenki/Tungus women as doubly so.

Similar to Steppe Buryat men, Steppe Buryat women label other
women with at least one Evenki/Tungus ancestor as Evenki/Tungus
(*khamnagan*). Steppe Buryats often refer to the treacherous
Evenki/Tungus character and their ‘blood’ (*khamnagan shuhan*).

Regarding men with some Evenki/Tungus ancestry, the situation is
more complex: if a man of mixed descent has a Buryat ancestor in the
paternal line, he has the right to participate in communal sacrifices; he
is, however, often excluded from the community’s everyday activities.
The individual may occupy an important niche within the community
by filling a leading position in sacrifices and certain other ceremonies.
His status as an outsider can not, however, be overcome.

Exclusion is relevant not only at the level of exogamy (which in the
Buryat case extends to seven generations on the paternal line), but also
beyond it. Neither women (regardless of their ethnic background) nor
Tungus can be ‘legendary’ ancestors. Exclusion works on the imaginary
(spiritual) as well as on the everyday (experiential) level. In fact, Sán-
tha’s Steppe Buryat informants do not distinguish these two levels.

Steppe Buryats do not allow their children to come into close contact
with Evenki/Tungus youths, as they fear that their children might sexu-
ally engage with the Evenki/Tungus and thereby cause the Buryat fam-
ily to get entangled in a relation with the Evenki/Tungus.

Now we shall briefly examine the question of whether an
Evenki/Tungus can become a Buryat from the Taiga Buryat point of
view. While among the Buryats in general, any one Evenki/Tungus an-
cestor automatically means that an individual has Evenki/Tungus ethnic
features, in the eyes of the Taiga Buryats this criterion loses its impor-
tance beyond the seventh generation of forebears (since exogamy re-
quirements do not extend beyond the seventh generation). Interest-
ingly, there is an asymmetry not only with regard to intermarriage pat-
terns but also with regard to the recognition of ancestors within the
Taiga Buryat society. In the paternal line the threshold of clearly re-
membering and counting ones forebears is the seventh generation,
whereas in the maternal line, the threshold is perceived in a different
way. Tungus ancestors in the maternal line between the third and sev-
enth generation are considered to be powerful and potentially danger-
ous ancestors – and they render their power to the ego.

In short, for a Taiga Buryat it may even be expedient to have some
Evenki/Tungus forebears. It may help to emphasise a person’s positive
characteristics and to improve his/her status within the community.
Among the Taiga Buryats, Evenki/Tungus can achieve a prominent place among the community’s legendary ancestors.

In addition to intermarriage and descent, another phenomenon deserves to be mentioned: spatial distance. If the wife of a Buryat originates from far away, she is often labelled as Tungus. This again highlights the connection between the quality of being ‘foreign’ (the genuine ‘other’) and the concept of Evenki/Tungus ethnicity among the Buryats.

Complementary filiation (maternal ancestors in a patrilineal society) is thus a recurrent theme in Anywaa as well as Steppe Buryat ideology of purity of descent.

We now turn to a set of research questions and comparative points which can be applied to all three of the dyads compared.

**Forms of Resource Competition: struggle versus scramble**

Resource competition is a widespread explanation for ethnic conflict. Not all resource conflicts, however, are ethnicised and not all ethnic discontinuities are lines of conflict. Resource conflicts in Gambela often take more severe forms on the intra-ethnic level than between ethnic groups: “Competition over scarce resources in itself does not explain the development of mutually opposed ethnicities. In fact, competition over scarce resources has caused more deadly intra-[-] than inter-ethnic conflict” (Dereje p. xix) Further down Dereje specifies that competition over natural resources is the main cause cited for intra-ethnic conflicts, namely inter-clan fights among the Nuer, and has created sub-ethnic interest groups, some of which are strategically positioned to benefit from inter-ethnic peace (p. 211).

But also at the interethnic level a number of contested resources can be identified. This, however, does not imply that all Nuer are lined up against all Anywaa; on the contrary, there are internal cleavages within each of the groups, and in extended case studies it becomes clear that there is a buffer zone of groups with links to both sides. To speak of Nuer/Anywaa resource conflicts is therefore a simplification. Contested resources comprise riverine floodlands, which form a minimal proportion of the total surface but have an outstanding agricultural importance, and the distributive state as a resource. Especially since the introduction of a federal order in Ethiopia in 1991 which led to the foundation of the Gambela regional state, and since the ethnicisation of politics at all levels, the state itself – namely political office, state revenue and facilities managed by the state such as educational and health facilities – have become hotspots of conflict. Ethnic politics in Gambela are interwoven with the civil war in Southern Sudan and the diaspora in Western countries, especially the USA, which is the focus of the research currently carried out by Christiane Falge.
The Kenyan metaphor about eating, which Mutie not only describes but takes up for his own analytical purposes, could be explored further in the field of competitive use of natural resources. Do Kamba and Maasai scramble for resources (pasture, firewood, agricultural land) like two people eating from the same bowl, so that the one who eats faster is the winner, or do they struggle for resources (fight, litigation, arbitration) like people fighting about a bowl of food and the winner taking it? There seem to be even more forms of competition than these two. We can learn from Mutie that people sometimes hide the fact that they are eating or share what is not theirs.

The distinction between ‘scramble’ and ‘struggle’ is reminiscent of that between ‘sharing’ and ‘dividing’ resources in the usage of Dafinger and Pelican (2002:12-15). Shared resources, if scarce, may become the object of a scramble; while divided resources (the example given is the neatly divided farming and grazing areas in North-West Cameroon) may lead to a peaceful and regulated situation if the division is accepted by both sides, or to a violent struggle if it is contested. To the extent that the ethnic divide between Buryat and Evenki coincides with the ecological divide between steppe and taiga, one can expect a peaceful division. Competition will arise in cases where the ecological divide is crossed. It then may take the form of a scramble, which might lead to the depletion of a resource (overhunting, overgrazing), or a struggle (attempts at violent exclusion).

In the Anywaa/Nuer case we seem to encounter a combination of scramble and struggle. Nuer crowding out Anywaa from the use of a certain resource, using their pastures or fishing in their waters, is certainly a form of scramble. Violent struggle, however, is not absent. The Nuer raid the Anywaa for their cattle. This leads us to the next section of this short essay. Open Nuer violence is met by the Anywaa, so the Nuer say, by treason and clandestine murder against the Nuer in their midst.

**Raiding Pressure**

The literature to the Maasai attributes the belief that all the cattle in the world were created by God for them. In precolonial times, the Maasai largely restricted central Kenyan Bantu speakers to the forested highlands. To the extent that these Bantu speakers expanded into the plains and competed with the Maasai in the cattle economy, they did so by adopting Maasai military organisation (the age-sets) along with Maasai weapons and ornaments. In a rather unkind way, they are referred to as ‘Maasai-Affen’ in the older German literature. This expression reflects their propensity to imitate the Maasai in that early period. By and large, however, the Maasai were in control of the low lying open range, and they maintained this monopoly by raiding others who acquired cattle.
herds of a size which made the adoption of a wider ranging mobile graz-
ing system necessary and who thus came within the reach of the
Maasai warriors. The raiding pressure they exercised helped the Maasai
push their grazing areas to their ecological boundaries and to maintain
this advanced boundary against ethnic Others. Kikuyu and Kamba ex-
pansion into Maasai lands should be seen in the context of colonial
pacification and the policies of the postcolonial state, which in these
central and southern areas has managed to establish a semblance of a
power monopoly.

In the case of Nuer expansion against Anywaa we see raiding pressure
at work right now in the present period. Raiding people for their cattle
has the side-effect, intended or unintended, of making them vacate
particular areas. In these areas other resources, like agricultural lands,
can then be appropriated as well.

The Buryat steppe nomads are rich in cattle and the Evenki live in an
environment where cattle can easily be hidden – the taiga. The Evenki
have quite a tradition in raiding the Buryat, but as their forest habitat
does not offer open grazing areas to an extent that permits cattle keep-
ing on a larger scale, they practice ‘commercial raiding’: they sell the
cattle they have acquired as loot, unless they consume them. This form
of raiding does not lead to territorial expansion, because the two groups
remain in their respective habitats: the Buryat in the steppe and the
Evenki in the taiga.

When comparing Siberian and East African raiding, one has to keep
in mind that the contested resource (cattle) might have quite different
meanings within and between the two areas. Pastoralists, especially
East African ones, might ascribe more ritual and social functions to
cattle than hunters who are after the meat or the money. Also, while
killing human beings may be associated with rituals of status promotion
in Africa, it is not in Siberia.
Bridewealth, Intermarriage and Ethnic Boundary Shift

Bridewealth in livestock tends to be higher in societies richer in livestock. It is higher among the pastoral Nuer than among the agricultural Anywaa, it is higher among the pastoral Maasai than among the agricultural Kamba, and it is higher among the more pronouncedly pastoral Buryat than among the Evenki, who are predominantly hunters. In the case of interethnic marriages, this means that suitors from the first mentioned group of each dyad find brides from the second group ‘cheap’.

If we compare the dynamics of expansion, however, the fact that (ex-) pastoralists marry non-pastoralist women does not always have the same implications. Among the Maasai, those who have Kamba wives stay on Maasai territory and have to face their Kamba affines encroaching on their resources. The encroachment on land, which accompanies intermarriage, takes place in the opposite direction in the Nuer/Anywaa case. It is former Nuer pastoralists who marry Anywaa women and then settle in Anywaa lands and cultivate them. Intermarriage apparently has the potential to be a means of territorial expansion to both wife-givers and wife-takers, according to circumstances which remain to be elucidated. Another dimension of comparison would be the connection between intermarriage and violent conflict. There is ethnographic material from New Guinea to different parts of Africa, which suggests that this relationship can take a variety of forms. Often intermarriage is a de-escalating factor, but there are also cases where exogamy rules place potential marriage partners in the same categories as potential enemies, and others where intermarriage might even lead to conflict escalation, as affinal ties are the first to be cut by violent means when a war is started (Harrison 1991, Lang 1977).

The Buryat place a stronger emphasis on pastoralism and are richer in cattle than the Evenki, who are predominantly hunters. For Evenki it would be difficult to take a Buryat bride, because he would not be able to meet Buryat bridewealth expectations. The Buryat, on the other hand, regard marriage to Evenki women to be detrimental to their prestige. Therefore, intermarriage in both directions takes place on a very low scale. This may or not have always been the case. Sântha also wants

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5 Notwithstanding this, even in purely pastoral systems there is much variation in the forms of bridewealth, from open to fixed systems, with or without delayed payments. Much of the literature on this has been reviewed by Schlee 1988. The different forms of bridewealth were found to correlate with the kinds of relationships with affines and with the importance and the quality of stock friendships with unrelated people and with affinal relatives. The theme has more recently been taken up in the framework of the Workshop on Collective and Multiple Forms of Property in Land and Animals: cattle, camels, reindeer, organised with Michaela Pelican, Florian Stammer and Patty Gray (Siberia Group), August 2002. The results of that workshop will be published as a book edited by Anatoly Khazanov and Günther Schlee.
to look into interethnic marriages in different periods to find out more about differences in social prestige of the different ethnic groups over time and whether or not there were clear ethnic hierarchies.

**Wider Comparisons**

The comparison of such dyads could be expanded by the cases Bisa/Fulbe in Burkina Faso (Andreas Dafinger), different Fulbe ‘sub-ethnicities’ like Huya/Mbororo in Cameroon (Martine Guichard, Michaela Pelican), Arab/Masalit in Chad (Andrea Behrends) and Uzbek/Kazak in Kazakhstan (Tsypylma Darieva). As the on-going research produces results, this type of comparison will be pursued as far as it takes us, although we are aware that the world does not consist of dyads but of multiple interconnections, and that more complexity will have to be reincorporated at a later date.

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Deutschlandforschung:
Research on Contemporary Issues in Germany at the
MPI for Social Anthropology
John Eidson, Gordon Milligan and Tatjana Thelen

In *The Age of Extremes* (1996), his recent study of the twentieth century, the British historian Eric Hobsbawm describes the Cold War, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, as a golden age of political stability which provided a global framework for economic growth, technological progress, and social change of dramatic proportions. As we now know, growth, progress, and change often culminated in economic and demographic crises, which, in turn, contributed to profound political transformations, such as those beginning in Central Europe in 1989. Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the red letter dates have succeeded one another in quick succession: the reunification of Germany in 1990, the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the introduction of the Euro in most European Union (EU) member states in 2002, and recent decisions regarding the enlargement of the EU to include Central and Eastern European states. Taken together, these events signal a fundamental transformation in the political order of Europe, not least in Germany, the one country to have straddled the ‘Iron Curtain’. Many of the scientists at the MPI for Social Anthropology are taking advantage of the opportunities that the current transformations represent for those who conduct research not only *in* but also *on* Germany.

In both departments and in the Project Group on Legal Pluralism, members of the scientific staff are currently doing research on aspects of contemporary German society. In addition, there are other scientists at our institute who have made significant contributions to German area studies. In order to exchange ideas, coordinate efforts, and plan joint projects, all researchers with an interest in Germany joined together in May 2002 in the *Deutschlandforschungsgruppe*, or German Research Group. Since then, members have met several times in order to discuss ongoing research or hear presentations by guest speakers.

At the MPI for Social Anthropology, research pertaining to Germany is currently being conducted on a broad range of topics, all of which concern the local significance of economic and demographic developments within changing legal and political frameworks. There are three main themes: (1) agricultural production and rural life in the new federal states of eastern Germany; (2) changing systems of social security in eastern Germany and other parts of Europe; and (3) migrants in transnational fields, which transverse state borders and lead people of different nationalities to pass through, take up residence in, or become citizens of Germany.
Agricultural Production and Rural Life

Within the Property Group in Department II, which focuses generally on the transformation of agricultural production and rural life in the former Soviet Bloc, there are two projects set in the new federal states of eastern Germany. While both projects are concerned primarily with the privatisation of agricultural production, beginning in 1990, analysis of recent developments is viewed against the background of the socialist and pre-socialist eras.

Planners in the Soviet-occupied zone (1945-1949) and the German Democratic Republic or GDR (1949-1990) engineered the dissolution first of the large agricultural estates and then of family farms, replacing them with nationalised or collectivised agricultural conglomerates in which managers, technicians, and workers were supposed to assimilate to models provided by nationalised industries and the urban workforce. It is common to distinguish several phases in this larger transformation: land reform (1945-1949), ‘rural class struggle’, that is, state policies favouring beneficiaries of land reform and members of the early socialist cooperatives, while discriminating against owners of large and medium-sized farms (1950s), the collectivisation of agricultural production (1953-1960), the consolidation of collectivisation (1960s), and the industrialisation and specialisation of agricultural production (beginning in the late 1960s). Privatisation began with the collapse of the East German party state in 1990.

John Eidson and Gordon Milligan are currently exploring the implementation of these policies and the strategic responses of farmers in case studies located on opposite sides of the great divide of German agriculture. The territories that made up the GDR are traversed diagonally by the Elbe River, which marks the historical boundary between the large estates of the northeast and the smaller farms of the southwest. Eidson’s case study is set in Saxony, on the outskirts of the city of Leipzig. Though it is East German, this field site is thoroughly West Elbian, both geographically and in its typical characteristics. The second case study, carried out by Milligan, is set in western Pomerania near the Polish border, an area previously dominated by large estates but also including many family farms, which were, however, relatively large compared to their Saxon counterparts.

To ensure the comparability of their data, both Eidson and Milligan have based their case studies on landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften (LPG), that is, collective or socialist cooperative farms, which were much more numerous than state farms in the GDR. In each case, the unit of analysis is, however, the so-called Kooperationseinheit, or unit of cooperation. This term refers to cooperative farm complexes which were formed in the 1970s by merging several neighbouring LPG while separating them into interdependent enterprises for crop production.
and animal husbandry. Units of cooperation are the appropriate focus, because they represent the culmination of developments under socialism and served as the point of departure in processes of privatisation. In each case study, research is based on long-term stays in the field site, during which time the researchers have made surveys of current enterprises, conducted interviews with experts in agriculture and agricultural administration, gathered oral histories of rural life from farmers and former cooperative farm members, and viewed primary sources in private and state archives.

Comparison of the Saxon and Pomeranian case studies indicates that the same or similar policies after 1945 and again after 1990 often had variable effects in different regions. The post-war land reform had a much more dramatic effect in the north, where more land was confiscated and redistributed among landless refugees and rural labourers. Eventually, this resulted in greater demographic fluctuation in western Pomerania than in Saxony, because most recipients of land later stopped farming and had to be replaced through resettlement programmes whose recruits also mostly proved transient. In both case studies, it was the remaining members of middle peasant families who, in conjunction with socialist functionaries, played a crucial role in the development of the cooperative farms. The class of middle peasants was, however, represented more strongly in Saxony than it was in Pomerania.

With the passage of reform legislation and with reunification in 1990, a heterogeneous agrarian landscape emerged in eastern Germany – one which still contrasts strongly with that of western Germany. One of the most remarkable results is the dominance of the legal successors to the socialist cooperative farms, which, though relatively few in number, are much larger than private farms and cultivate well over half of all arable land. There are also many new or re-established private farms, which are, on the average, over twice the size of their western counterparts; but the re-emergence of the family farm has lagged behind expectations. Given the predominance of small and medium-sized farms on the eve of collectivevisation, especially after the post-war land reform, most landowners did not have enough land after restitution in 1990 to establish a farm that could survive under late twentieth century conditions. In addition, those who were capable of founding a new farm or re-establishing an old farm often did not do so, because they were too old and because their children had chosen other professions.

In the Pomeranian field site, the enterprises succeeding the former unit of cooperation include one large corporation with several thousand hectares and a handful of kin-based partnerships with a few hundred hectares each. All of these enterprises are run almost exclusively by a few former cooperative farm members, most of whom are from local farming families. The great majority of the former cooperative farmers
have gone into retirement or left the region. In the Saxon field site, where the process of privatisation was, on the whole, more controversial, the legal successors to the socialist cooperatives compete with small private farmers and with newcomers from West Germany and the Netherlands, who have often bought or who lease several hundred or several thousand hectares of land. Most types of farms can survive, given current levels of direct and indirect payments in the context of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Surely, however, coming reforms of agricultural policy, together with changing market conditions resulting from the expansion of the EU, will have a variable impact on the different types of enterprises, perhaps favouring limited partnerships and corporate farms with few shareholders and few employees.

Social Security

In the Project Group on Legal Pluralism, there are two projects on changing systems of social security, one set in the harbour city of Rostock and the other in a Lithuanian resort in which people of various nationalities, including Germans, are active. In addition, members of the scientific staff of the MPI for Social Anthropology are currently seeking funding for a team research project on kinship and social security in several European countries, including Germany.

From an anthropological perspective, ‘social security’ is best defined broadly as that dimension of social organisation dealing with the provision of security not considered to be an exclusive matter of individual responsibility (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2000). This formulation includes social security functions fulfilled not only by the state and its proxies but also by kin groups and by informal networks of various kinds. The broad anthropological conception of social security also encompasses the corresponding beliefs, values, and practices of the people whose security is at issue.

Tatjana Thelen’s project explores changes in the normative rules and functions of different bearers of social security in the former GDR. The special situation of East Germany offers an unique opportunity to study the influence of law on social organisation and practice. With the transfer of the West German model to East Germany, former strategies and life perspectives had to be changed profoundly, but people’s judgments of the new system are often still based on the way in which social security was organised before unification.

In contrast to the capitalist organisation of social security, the socialist welfare regime was centred on the right to work. During the socialist era in East Germany, an ever growing number of benefits were tied to the workplace. These included housing, medical care, childcare, shopping, and holiday facilities. Therefore, one important strategy for improving one’s living conditions was to enter an enterprise that had more
resources than others. Because of the importance of the workplace in providing social security, Thelen has chosen to carry out a case study in what used to be a large socialist enterprise in Rostock, namely the VEB Seehafen Rostock (Rostock Harbour). This enterprise, which was newly founded during the socialist era, was given special priority by the socialist state and could, therefore, provide its workforce with many resources, especially housing facilities. It was one of the few enterprises that could advertise in national newspapers and on television, and it also allowed its employees to earn foreign currency in the form of so-called ‘Valuta’ (papers with a value in DM, which enabled one to buy consumer goods in special shops). In interviews people have said that they first learned of the possibility of working in this enterprise through the media and that they chose to work there because of the possibility of earning money and getting a flat in one of the newly built apartment houses.

With unification, the shortage of housing, consumer goods and services ceased to be a problem, and instead the threat of unemployment became the major source of insecurity. In the case of this enterprise, and elsewhere as well, many members of the workforce were sent home. These experiences and the constant threat of ‘being the next’ had an influence on social relations in the workplace. In addition, the housing facilities that were associated with the enterprise were sold, and most people who had the financial means to do so left the Neubaugebiete (socialist apartment complexes), which were downgraded socially. With these changes, personal networks experienced a profound transformation as well.

By concentrating on one formerly large state enterprise, Thelen is in a position to trace these changes on different levels. The firm's archive allows insight into the era when the workplace provided for the whole range of social security needs in the former GDR. Also, it contains information about social security practices still existing, such as ‘care for the veterans’. Meetings and interviews with former workers give access to additional perspectives. Working habits and people's life histories show how these changes have affected individuals. By spending one month in each department of the firm, Thelen intends to explore the variable experiences of men and women, members of different age groups, and representatives of different levels of the organisational hierarchy. Additionally, she is doing research on two social projects and on one state agency providing help for unemployed young adults.

In a second project in the Project Group Legal Pluralism, Anja Peleikis is focusing on issues pertaining to cultural property and social security in a Lithuanian tourist centre with transnational ties to Russia, Latvia, and Germany.

A final project on social security is still in the planning stages. Max Planck scientists, led by Patrick Heady, are currently organizing a team
project, which is designed to describe and explain variations in the role of the family and kinship in providing social security in eight European countries, including Germany. The study is to be based on ethnographic methods and on interpretive and mathematical analyses of the resulting data. Ethnography and data analysis will also be supplemented with historical research intended to provide a plausible context for understanding contemporary variations and trends. This project, with the working title *Kinship and Social Security*, is intended as a contribution to policy debate and policy making within the EU, especially in light of the increasing diversity accompanying the process of enlargement.

**Migration**

Contemporary Germany has over 7.3 million foreign residents, who make up almost 9% of the population. In addition, many ethnic Germans have migrated to Germany from Poland or the Soviet Union and its successor states over the course of the last several decades. Among the scientists at the MPI for Social Anthropology, there is a rich tradition of research on migration to Germany and migrants in Germany. Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, who is currently working on the problem of agrarian transition in Azerbaijan, has conducted research among Turkish populations in the Federal Republic of Germany and in France, with special emphasis on ethnic associations and communities. Tsypylma Darieva, now studying the Uzbek minority in Kazakhstan, has written extensively on recent ethnic German and Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union to Berlin. These earlier projects provide a rich basis upon which others are now building: Günther Schlee in his research on Somali migrants in Germany, Nina Glick Schiller, Ayşe Çağlar, and Evangelos Karagiannis in their comparative study of migrants of various origins in Halle on the Saale and in Manchester, New Hampshire, and Boris Nieswand in his project on Ghanaians in Germany. In a separate essay in this report, these scientists reflect upon the participation of migrants in transnational social fields and on the ways in which they are incorporated into German society.

**References**


Interethnic Clan Relationships in Asia and Africa
Brian Donahoe and Günther Schlee

Identity games tend to be played with double affiliations. These offer a choice, either to stress one or the other situationally or to give up one in favour of the other. Double affiliations can come about either by making appeal to different criteria (e.g. linguistic versus political belonging, genealogical versus local affiliations) or by an older set of social distinctions existing concurrently with cross-cutting newer boundaries.

There is empirical evidence that in some parts of Africa the ethnic divisions tend to be older than the subunits of these ethnic groups, which appear to be recombinations of clans that seem to have existed prior to the processes which led to the emergence of the modern ethnic groups (Allen 1994, Turton 1994).

At this point we can do one of two things: we can either join the longstanding debate on primordialism versus situationalism and see whether we can add some wisdom to it by either stressing the stability of social units or their relatively transient nature, depending on the examples we select. This may not sound terribly attractive. Alternatively we may try to explain these variations. Once we accept the variations in the data (instead of stereotypically explaining all observations away by ascribing them to a researcher’s bias or one or the other ‘school’), it is not difficult to find the right type of question to ask about them.

Under which conditions are clan identities stable and ethnic identities fluid and under which conditions is it the other way round? Or more generally: What are the conditions of higher or lower time stability of collective identities? (Schlee 2000: 4f)

The Cushitic speaking pastoralists of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia comprise a number of large groups who are episodically hostile to one another, partly speak languages which are mutually unintelligible (Oromo, Rendille, dialects of Maymay Somali, dialects of Maxatiri Somali), and may or may not be Muslims. The level of difference found here makes it appear unproblematic to speak of distinct ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the same clans are found in these different ethnic groups to the extent that one can speak of a dense network of interethnic clan relationships.

Close examination of cultural features and historical data (Schlee 1989, 1999), derived from both oral and written sources, has revealed that these interethnic clan identities have come into being in three different ways:

1. The principle of patrilineal clan affiliation, by which a child becomes a member of the named descent group of his or her father, is
simple and has a high stability over time. Ethnicity appears to have a higher rate of change. Many clans therefore predate the present day ethnic groups. In the process of ethnogenesis of the present politico-military-cultural units, clans have split and their fragments have become parts of different emergent ethnic groups.

2. After the boundaries between the modern ethnic groups had started to come into being, individuals or groups have crossed them and affiliated themselves with another ethnic group. In the cases in which they had camels with distinct property marks, they did not give up their original clan affiliation.

3. In the course of the establishment of Boran Oromo hegemony (starting in the 16th century), non-Boran pastoralists were allotted, clan by clan, to certain Boran clans on whom they became politically and ritually dependent. These collective adoptions did not supersede the older clan relationships by descent or putative descent. People now had adoptive interethic clan relationships in addition to ‘real’ interethnic clan relationships.

Scholars of the indigenous Turkic populations of south-Siberia – the Tyva, Tozhu, Tofa, Soyot, Dukha, and Khakass – have given a great deal of attention to the phenomenon of interethnic clans (see inter alia Butanova 1994; Dolgikh 1960; Dolgikh and Levin 1951; Serdobov 1971; Vainshtein 1961, 1968, 1970, 1974). At first glance, these clans appear to have come about in the first of the three ways described above. Indeed much of the pre-Soviet and Soviet-era literature would support that thesis, and in some instances, it appears to be true. For example, the two Choodu clans – Ak-Choodu and Kara-Choodu – exist among the Tofa of Irkutsk Oblast’, the Tozhu of the Republic of Tyva, and the Dukha of Mongolia. The 1727 Kiakhta Treaty defining the borders between the Russian and Chinese Empires split the Choodu clans in such a way that some fell on the Russian side of the border and became incorporated into the people who are referred to today as Tofa, while the others fell on the Chinese side of the border and became part of the Tozhu people.

In fact, two of the five major clan names among the Tofa today – Ak (‘White’) Choodu and Choodu (formerly Kara (‘Black’) Choodu) – have direct counterparts among the contemporary Tozhu on the southern slopes of the Eastern Sayan Mountains, where the two most prominent family-clan names are Ak (shortened from Ak-Choodu), and Baraan,

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1 A commonly used variant of this ethnonym is Chogdu.

2 For two versions of a legend on the origins of the two Choodu clans among the Tofa, see Rassadin 1996:41 and Sherkhunaev 1975:220.
which derives from Kara-Choodu\(^3\). Boris Akovich Oybak-ool, local historian and story-teller in the Tozhu village of Kham-Syra, explained that the Tofa refer to the Tozhu as Choodu\(^4\), while the Tozhu still call all Tofa by the name Khaash (see also Dolgikh 1960, n. 152). Khaash (variants khash, kaash, kash) is another of the five extant Tofa clan names, and a component of yet another, Sary-Khaash\(^5\). These -khaash clans were all in the northwestern and central parts of the Tofa territory, shading toward the Kachin of Khakassia (who identify themselves as Khaash – see discussion of Khaash below). The two Choodu clans, Kara-Choodu and Ak-Choodu, were in the southeastern part of the Tofa territory, bordering Tozhu. In short, the Tozhu refer to all Tofa people in general using a widespread Tofa clan name (Khaash), and the Tofa refer to all Tozhu people in general using a different widespread Tofa clan name (Choodu), an indication that, in the past, the ethnic boundaries were perceived by local people differently than the official ethnic groupings that have been more recently constructed and reified via tax rolls, censuses, official state proclamations and, of course, ethnographers.

Starting in about 1930, the border between Mongolia and the USSR became increasingly strictly enforced until it was effectively closed in 1958 (Wheeler 2000), splitting the Choodu clans again, with those on the Soviet side still among the Tozhu people, and those on the Mongolian side going into the composition of Dukha (Tsaatan) people\(^6\). In these cases, geopolitics has split clans into different ethnic groups.

However, a more critical examination indicates that in most cases in southern Siberia it is more a phenomenon of interethnic clan ‘names’ than of actual interethnic clans in any practical sense, as exists among the Cushitic-language pastoralists of East Africa. But the very prevalence of interethnic clan names without apparent practical consequences raises important questions about the meaning of the term

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\(^3\) The fact that the Kara-Choodu among the Tozhu became today’s Baraan clan is not disputed. However, I have never received a satisfactory answer as to the etymology of the name ‘Baraan,’ or why and when Kara-Choodu became Baraan. Serdobov is the only source I have seen that makes explicit mention of this: “In present-day Tozhu [1971] there are 125 Ak-Choodu families and 73 Baraan-Choodu families (clearly Kara-Choodu)” (Serdobov 1971:158; all translations of Russian-language sources by Brian Donahue). Members of the Baraan clan explained to me that baraan means “black” in Mongolian, and that their name was simply the Mongolian translation of kara, which means “black” in Tyvan as well as in most Turkic languages. In fact, “black” in Mongolian is khara (cognate with Turkic kara). However, the word baraam is defined in Bawden’s Mongolian-English dictionary as “dark, dark-coloured” (Bawden 1997:43), and is often used in conjunction with the word khara as an intensifier (e.g., khara baraam kharankhi “pitch-black darkness”; “extremely dark”). It is possible that in this way Baraan came to stand in for Kara in this clan name.

\(^4\) Interview from 4 July 1998, Kham-Syra, Tozhu District, Tyva.

\(^5\) The five extant clan names are: Khaash, Sary-khaash (or Saryg-Khaash), Chogdu, Kara-Chogdu, and Cheptei (or Teptei).

\(^6\) There are good reasons to consider the Tozhu and the Dukha as a single ethnic group, but officially they are recognised as two separate ethnic groups.
‘clan’ among the south Siberians, and about the processes of assigning clan names and the state’s role in these processes.

In south Siberia, two different (but potentially related) processes have operated to produce the network of interethnic clan names. The first has to do with the relationship between ethnonym and toponym, and the second has to do with the extension of specific clan names to larger, more general groupings, in order to facilitate administrative control.

The ethnonym Soyot offers the best example of the first of these processes. Soyot is one of the most widespread of all clan names in southern Siberia, existing in one form or another among the Tyva, the Dukha, the Khakass, various Altaian groups, and formerly among the Tozhu. In addition, it is the ethnonym of a larger, officially recognised ethnic group living in the region of the Oka River in western Buryatia. The name is undoubtedly related to Sayan, which is the name for the entire mountain range system that traverses this region. The question then becomes: Was the ethnonym variously assigned because of the toponym, or was the mountain range named after the people? Is it possible that both of these occurred? In the first place, there may have been a group of people of indeterminate size who called themselves Soyot, or some variation thereof. On the basis of this, travellers or missionaries (or whoever it might have been who was in a position to label maps) named the mountain range after these people (Soyon is the plural of Soyot in Mongolian; Soyon and Sayan are variants of the same word). As the travellers carried on, they would have run into more indigenous peoples, living in the area of the mountains who seemed similar to these eponymous Soyot in language, lifestyle, and phenotype, and therefore labelled them all Soyot. Now what started as an ethnonym of one group in a relatively small area becomes widespread because it has become the toponym of a mountain range that covers a large territory encompassing several different ethnic groups.

The second of these processes requires more explication. Much of pre-Soviet and Soviet ethnography, influenced by the theories of Morgan and Engels, assumed that the lineage-based rod (clan) was the fundamental unit of social organisation among all peoples at the pervobytnoe obshchestvo (‘primitive society’) level of social development, as the Siberians were presumed to be (Pika 1999; Schweitzer 2000; Skalník 1981). However, it is important to recognise that the Siberian ‘clans’ discussed in most Russian and Soviet literature were administrative clans, and the degree to which they corresponded to true lineage-based clans has been rightly called into question (Butanaev 1994; Dolgikh and Levin 1951; Ssorin-Chaikov 2003). With the advancement of colonisers from Tsarist Russia there arose the need to administer the peoples of Siberia, predominantly for the purposes of collecting yasak (tax or duty, usually payable in the form of sable and squirrel pelts). The nomadic hunting and herding populations of southern Siberia were scattered in small,
flexible, and fluid groupings of people based on principles of shared territory, descent, and collaboration in economic activities. These groupings, which were called *aals* (and various cognates in the different languages), might best be described as 'bands'. But they were far too numerous and cumbersome for administrative purposes, so administrators lumped together clusters of *aals* and called them *rod* (pl. *rody* 'clans'), and then lumped clusters of clans together into larger groupings, which came to be called *plemya* (pl. *plemena* – ‘tribes’). Dolgikh and Levin discuss a few attempts by Soviet scholars to demonstrate “the necessity of distinguishing between the clan proper – i.e., based on blood relationships – and the administrative ‘clan,’ artificially created among the peoples of Siberia by Russian administrators”, but note that these efforts had little impact on the dominant paradigm in Soviet ethnography, which tended to assume a one-to-one correlation between administrative clan and clan proper (Dolghikh and Levin 1951:95). Butanaev, himself a native Khakass, observes that “from the 17th through the 19th centuries among the Khakass, apart from administrative clan divisions there were traditional forms of social-ethnic affiliation according to *seok*” (Butanaev 1994:3). *Seok* (also *söök*) means ‘bone’ among the Turkic-language populations of southern Siberia, and can loosely be translated as ‘clan’ or ‘lineage’.

To take the critique of the assumption of clan organisation one step further, there is good evidence suggesting that even the lineage-based clan proper was not the fundamental unit of social organisation among the indigenous Siberians:

>[T]he term ‘clan’ in Siberia obscured a different form of social organisation: the territorial *obshchina*, consisting of groups of relatives, by blood and by marriage, through various genealogical lines. ...The significance of the *obshchina* as a universal form of economic territorial organisation, and as a structural unit for survival, autonomy, and the reproduction of the ethnos is especially important for minority peoples seeking to preserve their cultural and economic distinctiveness.\(^7\)

The English term most closely approximating *obshchina* is ‘community,’ and such a community was most likely a cluster of bands. It has been suggested that one of the great shortcomings of Russian and Soviet ethnography was the failure to appreciate the difference between band and clan, and to assume a clan structure when in fact there was a band structure (Sárkány, personal communication 2003).

The Russian administrators’ method of assigning names to clans and tribes has not been explicitly documented, but the existence of inter-

\(^7\) Pika 1999:65; see also Skalník 1981 for a review of the development of the concept of ‘community’ in Soviet ethnography.
ethnic clan names suggests that these artificially constructed clans were given the name of the dominant lineage or seok within a certain aal, or simply the name of the group with whom the Russians had established the best relationship. There would likely have been advantages to being the favoured seok and giving your name to the larger clan. The Russian administrators may have given that seok the official imprimatur of the state, the responsibility for collecting yasak, and the means of enforcing the collection of yasak.

Pressure to collect as much yasak as possible would have created the incentive for the main seok to claim as many of the surrounding people within its clan as possible. This method was extended to the construction and naming of larger ethnic groups such as tribes (see Butanaev 1994, discussed below). In some cases these larger groups were then split by geopolitics into different administrative regions. The fragments remain as clan names within different emergent ethnic groups, following the first of the three ways interethnic clans can come into being as laid out at the beginning of this essay.

Thus the existence of overlapping clan names can be explained, at least in part, by the relational particularity of ethnonyms from a given point of reference, which the Russian administrators did not sufficiently appreciate or take into account in such a way that their divisions and names for those divisions accurately reflected the self-identification of each of the named groups. Butanaev’s (1994) discussion of the ethnonym Khaash illustrates the issue well. The contemporary Khakass ethnic group (for the most part currently residing in the Republic of Khakassia in south-central Siberia) is divided into four large subdivisions: the Kachins, the Sagais, the Koibals, and the Kyzyls. These subdivisions were constructed from smaller groupings by Russian colonialists for ease of administrative control (Butanaev 1994:3). The name Kachin is the Russified form of the self-designation Khaash, which in turn derives from the largest seok (clan) in the area, Khashkha, but under Russian administration this clan name expanded to encompass some 11 clans.

Through a comparative analysis of the ethnonyms among the peoples of South Siberia it becomes clear that the historic name khaash is characteristic of the ethnic formations of reindeer herding peoples of the Eastern Sayan. For example: khaash is one of the basic seoks (clans) among the Tofa; khaash is what the Tyva people call the Soyots of Buryatia; it is the Darkhat designation for the Tozhu; khara-khaash is the Tyva appellation for the Tofa. (Butanaev 1994:3-4)

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8 See Ssorin-Chaikov 2003:1-2 for an example of indigenous Siberians vying with one another for official appointment as the local community “prince” responsible for collecting the fur tribute.
Butanaev explains that the same process occurred with the construction of the other three major subdivisions among the Khakass.

To extend Butanaev’s analysis one step further, the ethnonym Khara-khaash is the basis for the name Karagas, which, until around 1930, was the general term for the Tofa (see above and Vainshtein 1961:21), an example of Russian administrators taking a seok name and applying it to a larger ethnic unit. In this manner the naming of clans and tribes by Russian administrators depended on where the administrators were standing at a given moment, and perhaps depended on whom the administrators had more contact and better relations. This relational particularity is not limited to the foreign administrators, however. The naming could well reflect the relational perspective of the indigenous groups with whom the Russian administrators had contact. For example, a person of the Khaash group could name fairly specifically the clans or tribes immediately to his north, south, east and west, but beyond that, his naming of peoples further out would become more general until all peoples in any given direction from his perspective would blur into one. Accordingly, a person of the Khaash group may say, “Yes, we are Khaash, and those people next to us are Sagai, and beyond that they are all Soyot.” But go to the territory beyond the Sagai, and the people there may say, “No, we are not Soyot. We are Choodu. And next to us are the Kara-Choodu. And beyond that they are all Soyot.” Like Khaash, the widespread south-Siberian ethnonyms Soyot, Choodu, and Irkit (all with their variations) support this idea of relational particularity – they are all used to refer to quite specific clans in some cases and to much larger, general groupings in others cases, depending on where one is standing and with whom one is speaking. This, we believe, is the principle reason behind interethnic clan names in southern Siberia.

Thus in many ways the clan as a practical unit of social organisation in Siberia appears to be a relatively recent construct of Russian imperialism, and the existence of interethnic clan names in southern Siberia should be treated more as a phenomenon of administrative convenience than one of organically emerging social structure. Clan affiliation in south Siberia is not as salient and does not have the same degree of practical or ritual significance as among the Cushitic pastoralists, and any comparison with clans in Africa must always bear this in mind.

Yet there is still a sense of clan affiliation that manifests itself in the elaborate analysis of family histories that people with a common family-clan name go through in search of a common ancestor or relative, which they usually find. There is, then, a belief that all clan members are somehow related, and a feeling of affinity with other clan members. This is becoming more pronounced among clan members living in different nation-states, and is particularly true of the interethnic clans among the Tozhu of the Tyva Republic and the Dukha of Mongolia (dis-
cussed above), who are appealing to clan affiliation to call for more freedom to cross borders and to engage in transboundary cooperation.

One can summarise that in this part of Siberia it depends on the particular case whether a shared clan name in different ethnically or regionally distinguished populations points to actual shared patrilineal descent or a classification by some other criteria, often just a recent colonial imposition. The latter case seems to be more frequent. Irrespective of the ‘historicity’ of shared descent, beliefs about shared descent tend to attach themselves to similar or identical names.

In Africa we find basically the same phenomena. We find cases of clans in different ethnic groups\(^9\) which claim to be related by patrilineal descent, which amounts to claiming that they are the same clan. In some such cases these claims are supported by evidence stemming from cultural comparisons, oral history or the isolated old written source. In other cases the ‘historicity’ of these claims can not be corroborated. In yet other cases, even from the local perspective it becomes clear that belonging to a unit of the same name is not based on shared descent but on individual or collective adoptions or on forceful incorporation of captives.

There are also regional differences. Neither clans nor ethnic groups are immutable, but they may differ in the speed of their change. Schlee has found good evidence that many clans in northern Kenya\(^10\) predate the present-day ethnic divisions, while Newbury has found equally good evidence that in Rwanda and Eastern Zaire the opposite is true. Here no clans seem to be older than the ethnic groups, which, according to their traditions of fission and migration from each other, might have a time depth of 200 years (Newbury 1980, cf. Schlee 1985:19-20).

Both ethnic groups and clans tend to have a descent ideology. They either claim actual community of descent or to have “become brothers”, i.e. they use the idiom of descent. In this sense both clans and ethnic groups are descent groups. Why in one cluster of peoples or in one region clans have the greater stability over time in comparison to ethnic groups and in another case ethnic divisions seem to be older than clans, remains a research problem. We seem to know very little about the conditions for the time stability of social identities; in other words, we have no general theory about the rate of change of social identities.

\(^9\) Structurally, a clan in one ethnic group might be something different from a clan in the neighbouring group, as far as exogamy rules, residence patterns or political forms are concerned (Schlee 1989: 8-29). To speak of an “interethnic clan relationship” therefore is shorthand for a relationship between a larger scale social unit claiming to be based on patrilineal descent with another such larger scale unit claiming the same patrilineal affiliation, although it may have quite different ritual, social and political forms and functions, and belong to another ethnic group.

\(^10\) Luling has found that the northern Kenyan pattern of larger units being made up of re-combinations of again and again the same smaller units expands well into southern Somalia (Luling 2002:79).
For a systematic comparison of different cases with such explanations in mind, whether a given interethnic clan relationship has a historical reality, and whether it actually has the time depth its members claim it to have, are important empirical questions. It is of little help, however, if different findings about the ‘historicity’ of clan relationships are invariably attributed to the period in which the authors who report them write or to other forms of authors’ bias, as Willis (1997:583) does. There are not just differences in our minds. There are differences in the world out there, and with the help of epistemological scepticism and methodological scrutiny we have to seek agreement on those differences. As long as we cannot agree on having different but empirically equally valid findings we have no chance of explaining those differences.

References


