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## Conflict analysis in Bakool and Bay, South-western Somalia

### Report on a two-week consultancy in the framework of the conflict resolution and reconciliation component of the Improvement of Farming Systems Project (IFSP), Bay and Bakool Region, March 3 to 17, 2004

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## Introduction

The consultancy was part of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology and GTZ International Services concerning the conflict resolution and reconciliation component of the Improvement of Farming Systems Project (IFSP), Bay and Bakool Region. I arrived at Huddur, capital of the Bakool Region and main base of the project, on March 3. The return flight to Nairobi was planned for March 17, but took place one day earlier. The reason is that on March 15, all international project staff at Huddur were asked by the local administration (The RRA<sup>1</sup> appointed DC<sup>2</sup>) to vacate Huddur, as militias had gathered there and more were to come, so that a fight seemed impending<sup>3</sup>. The Deputy Project Leader, Günter Wessel, and myself then went to Waajid, 90 km to the west, and took a flight to Nairobi from there on the following day, although tension at Huddur appeared to have decreased by then, as it was not certain that the flight from Huddur, which had originally been booked, would take place. Later all flights to and from Huddur in that period turned out to have been cancelled.

Within this period of 13 days, I accompanied project staff on missions to the villages of El Lehele and El Garas, to the regional peace conference at Waajid, and took part in a workshop with 20 participants from EL Lehele on conflict resolution, which was held in Huddur Primary School.

## Objectives

In the words of the Terms of Reference, the aim of the consultancy was "to refine relevant peace building strategies for the implementation process through analysing the interrelation between beneficiaries and project as well as to review the implementation process with regard to its impact on conflict reconciliation on both micro-level and to a certain extent meso-level for sustainable rural development."

According to my original plans, all this was meant to be done in a dialogue with the conflict analyst of the project and to be fine-tuned to her personal needs. It was also planned to carry out specific tasks (workshop planning, semi-structured interviews) together with her to provide her some on-the-job training in areas where she might feel insecure. Unfortunately the conflict analyst was found in a state of poor health and low spirits, no longer able to absorb the assistance extended to her. She returned to Nairobi on the third day after my arrival at Huddur and a couple of days later we received her resignation by e-mail.

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<sup>1</sup> Rahanweyn Resistance Army

<sup>2</sup> District Commissioner

<sup>3</sup> Of the three rivals for leadership within the RRA, two, namely 'Shatigaduud' (clan: Hirin) and Sheikh Adan Madoobe (Hadama) enjoy the support of Ethiopia. This shared alliance and the fact, that a ceasefire was signed by them on September 23, 2003, did not prevent some of the most vicious fighting to occur between their supporters subsequently (Magnus 1993:1). At the moment, however, there seems to be a level of understanding between the two. The third pretender to RRA leadership, Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade (Hadama, locally represented by Saransur, Hadama) cultivates links to the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Mogadishu. The pro-Ethiopia warlords wanted to meet with the Majerteen warlord 'Morgan', a figure who is instrumental to Ethiopian interests. While his rivals wanted to allow Morgan to come with his militia to Huddur in order to hold a meeting with him there, Habsade was strictly opposed to this. Saransur, his man on the ground, and his militia were in the end outnumbered and local elders persuaded him to remain in his compound to avoid bloodshed.

If peace in Bakool and Bay is achieved by agreeing to allow Morgan free movement in the area, this may in the end lead to him passing through the region and to move south to Kismayu, the coastal port from which he had been expelled in 1999. This might lead to renewed fighting about the control of Kismayu. The price for peace in Bay and Bakool might thus turn out to be war at Kismayu.

I therefore phrase my recommendations, although some of them are shaped by her experience, in a more general way, in the hope that they will be useful to who ever comes to replace her. The advertisement of this position (and three other positions at the MPI is attached at the end of this report.

### **The PICD process and conflict analysis: overlapping and complementary of methods**

The work of the conflict analyst is an essential component of the Improvement of Farming Systems Project (IFSP), Bay and Bakool Region. As the project takes place in an area without legitimate state authorities<sup>4</sup>, a constantly up-dated competent analysis of the local and regional social and political situation is essential to avoid disruption of development intervention in all technical fields and even for the security of the staff.

All parts of IFSP have a human factor, but the conflict analysis component (component 6) is the only one, which is exclusively concerned with the human environment of the project activities. It should be the eyes and the ears of the project. At an early stage it had therefore been suggested that, parallel to her other activities, the project analyst should learn the Somali language. It is therefore suggested that he or she treats language acquisition with a high priority. This can be done by lessons with bilingual Somali (project staff or hired from outside), and by spending as much time as possible with direct communication with Somali, gradually shifting away from the use of interpreters to speaking with them in Somali. Italian is also spoken by many local Somali of the older generation and can open another channel of direct communication.

The strength of the IFPS is its commitment to "implement activities strictly under the premises of Participatory Integrated Community Development (PICD)."<sup>5</sup> The PICD process, lengthy as it may be, leads to the stimulation of internal resources in terms of planning and ideas within the communities and –it is to be hoped- community ownership and community maintenance of any future material implementations of development measures. As resources are mapped, social structures depicted and problems, as they are perceived by the community, listed in the PICD process, the PICD process is also an important source of information for the conflict analyst. It is to be complemented by other methods.

In addition to the organised group discussions of the PICD process, a mix of methods is required for conflict analysis. As it can be expected that statements in public meetings, especially if these public meetings go back to an outside intervention like a development project, are harmonised to some degree or are subject to group pressure, censorship and self-censorship, individual conversations need to be held with people of all age and gender categories, and all clan and status groups.

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<sup>4</sup> The local governor is a nominee of one of the power brokers in the Digil and Mirifle region, Sheikh Adan Madobe, a pretender to the chair of the RRA (Rahanweyn Resistance Army). There is still intermittent factional fighting within the RRA. Huddur is relatively calm, because the hot spot of these controversies is Baydhaabe (Baidoa). But also Huddur will be affected by the outcome of these power struggles. There have never been elections and the local authorities therefore have to be regarded as a faction which finds itself in power due to a (temporary) superiority in combat.

<sup>5</sup> Muchoki, Jackson, Julius Muchemi and Günter K. Wessel: "Participatory Integrated Community Development Process", a paper presented at a workshop in Nairobi with other EC funded Somalia projects, no date.

The types of information to be collected from individuals or small groups, if necessary with the guarantee of anonymity, include

- the history of population movements in the area with a focus on recent changes in the composition of the population induced by the violence of the stateless period<sup>6</sup>,
- the life conditions, economic activities and political status of minority groups (i.e. all others but the clan of the present power holders).

This information is essential for a wide range of project activities. A level of knowledge on these matters is required for deciding on the composition of the committees, which prepare the Community Action Plans (CAP) and any form of agricultural improvement, which increases the value of land touches on the sensitive issues of land rights. Research on these matters by a mix of methods (group interviews, individual interviews, participating observation of everyday activities and economic activities accompanied by informal talks with subsequent note-taking) therefore needs to be carried out continuously and parallel to all other project activities so as to provide correctives and complements to these activities.

### **Recommendations on methods**

It is therefore suggested that open and explorative methods are used by the conflict analyst as soon as an area is accessible in terms of security, i.e. even before a formal PICD procedure is initiated. Such exploration may easily lead to the identification of groups which otherwise would not be represented or of problems which otherwise would not have been mentioned.

The method mix described in the preceding section is then to be applied parallel to the PICD process in a complementary fashion. The conflict analyst will participate in the PICD process to an extent, but will also have to reserve time for other forms of data collection.

### **Intended results**

The mix of methods recommended will have the following results:

- As conflict resolution and reconciliation is part of the PICD process, the communities will link conflict resolution to other aspects of development. In particular, they will recognise conflict resolution as an essential prerequisite for all other forms of development.
- As the conflict analyst is not limited to the PICD process as a source of knowledge, but will apply a whole range of methods of social science, especially open and semi-structured interviews, he or she will have an in-depth understanding of local conflicts and their wider ramifications.
- This in-depth understanding will enable him or her to assess in which localities and in which fields of activity the other members of the team will be safe, how their acceptance by the local communities can be enhanced and how their role can be made more plausible, especially by helping to define and to "sell" their contribution to peace and development.

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<sup>6</sup> The Hawiye and Darood with whom the local Rahanweyn have been engaged in fighting since 1991 have been expelled and territories restituted to earlier occupants. There are, however, people displaced from elsewhere residing in the area.

## **Material support for the activities of the conflict analyst**

Travelling in the area is costly, due to the necessity of motor transport and armed guards. As a large proportion of the time of the conflict analyst needs to be spent outside the compound (in fact far too much time has been spent inside the compound so far), transport needs, however, to be provided.

A part of the meetings, which require an informal character and a relaxed atmosphere, can, however, be held inside the project compound, if the conflict analyst is provided with the facilities for Somali type hospitality, which include:

- a hut or simple shade roof under which mats and cushions can be laid out
- food for invited elders, not more than one or two at the time, so that an element of confidentiality can be preserved
- tea. It may also be necessary to exempt this place from the general prohibition on chewing q (*miraa*) at in the GTZ compound.

As the project expands beyond Huddur and its immediate surroundings, clan affiliation, recent history, economic strategies and other relevant data need to be gathered for a large number of settlements and the task will have to be shared with local researchers and consultants. It is, however, essential that the conflict analyst, in addition to co-ordinating the activities of others, first gets and then remains involved in the collection of first-hand data for the following reasons:

- in order to identify questions which might be relevant for his/her co-workers to ask in other localities
- to cross-check the data collected by others
- to get a feeling for the sensitivities and biases involved. Which are the things which people tend to hide and disguise (the taboo subjects)? What are the investigator's effects (i.e. the influence of who is asking on how a question is answered) with regard to national/international staff and local researchers from different clan groups or political affiliation?

## **Recommendations on material support and labour requirements**

The conflict analyst needs to be mobile and talk a great deal to people outside the compound. Transport and security (car, driver, guards) would be the wrong place to save money. He or she needs to be provided with the means to provide basic Somali-type hospitality.

As more areas become accessible to project activities with an improving security situation and dozens of additional villages are included in IFSP, the activities of the conflict analyst need to be taken over by local staff and local and international consultants. The conflict analyst will then acquire co-ordinating and supervising functions. He or she, however, should remain involved in primary data collection with a part of his or her time for the reasons outlined in the preceding section.

## Sound recording equipment

It is essential that the conflict analyst be provided with a MD recorder or good cassette recorder for the selective (!) transcription of interviews. To have the exact wording in Somali of the conclusions of a peace negotiation, of an often cited proverb or of a historical tradition which legitimises a land claim can be very important, both for a correct analysis of the situation and for building the capacity of the conflict analyst in terms of language skills and general competence in local matters.

## Intended results

The material and personal outfit of the conflict analysis component must be designed with the following aims in mind:

- He or she is not tied down by repetitive and routine activities, like organising similar workshops in dozens of villages, but is enabled to be "eyes and ears" of the project.
- He or she is mobile, flexible in his or her schedule (freedom in space and time), and free in the choice of methods.

## Workshops on conflict resolution

During my two weeks with IFSP I had the opportunity to accompany project staff on a visit to El Lehele village to prepare a workshop on conflict resolution. I also spent several hours at that workshop on every day of the workshop but one, when it was held in Huddur primary school from March 10 to 14. The degree of openness, trust, and active community participation, which the PICD process had brought about, was impressive indeed. All of the twenty representatives the community had selected to participate on the basis of the subclan divisions had come. As the community themselves had set the agenda, the items discussed found everyone's interest and were hotly debated.

In the present situation, in which the peace conference in Nairobi has been dragging on for a year and a half and its outcome has become more uncertain than ever, peace efforts in Somalia cannot wait for the uncertain results of the peace process on the national level under the guidance and sponsorship of the international community but have to focus on the local and the regional level. Instead of waiting for a new government to be set up in Nairobi, an event which may occur or not, people have to organise their lives starting from the grass roots. What happened at this workshop, in fact, was that the community of El Lehele took over government functions.



Abdullahi Sahal, Günter Wessel and the DC with a participant of the El Lehele workshop.

They had put a re-examination of traditional law (*xeer*) on their agenda. They documented it on flip charts with the help of the facilitating staff members, Jerry Sheikh Hussein and Abdullahi Sahal, and they found fault with parts of it. So they engaged in a process of legislation. To cite just one example: Traditionally the owner of a fenced field had the right to kill a trespasser whom he found on his land and who had left the fence behind him open, not caring about possible damage by livestock that might then invade the field. It was now decided by majority vote that such a person should not be killed but fined a three year-old camel bull. Any damage, which was subsequently done by livestock to the crop would not have to be paid for by that person but by the owner of the livestock. The alternatives that all or half of this damage should be paid by the person, who left the fence open, were rejected. In the same spirit the law of adultery (*xeerka gogodhaafka*) was revised. The right of a husband to kill a lover caught with his wife was replaced by the right to demand compensation in the form of a camel bull of three years.

The method employed in these debates was a rather elaborate form of casuistic. People constructed imaginary cases and discussed the positions of the various characters involved in these fictive case histories. Many of the participants in the discussion seemed to be natural lawyers.

There are large enclosures of many square kilometres of former communal grazing, which rich people from among the Rahanweyn have fenced off for themselves. The participants of the workshop were hesitant to address that matter and said that it would have to be left to a future government. The objection was raised that the rich people in question were Hadama by clan, the governor of the region is Hadama as well, and so are the District Commissioner and everyone at the workshop. So what were people waiting for to solve this matter? The return of the Marrehan (Siad Barre) government? This comment evoked laughter.

Another major issue at the workshop was livestock marketing. This touches on security issues, which extend much beyond El Lehele to the regional and the national level. I shall therefore come back to this theme in the following section on "Geographical scale and levels of organisation".

### **Workshops on conflict resolution: recommendations**



A discussion at the El Lehele workshop

The experience with the workshop on El Lehele was extremely encouraging and it can only be recommended to continue along the same lines. As the agenda for such workshops (in accordance with the PICD principles) is set by the communities themselves, future workshops can not be planned to address the same themes, but it is very likely that security related themes like livestock marketing (*suuq-geynta xoolaha*) will come up also in the workshops on other villages since the problems encountered in this field are

ubiquitous to the entire region. This theme (with its wider national and international implications) deserves the special interest of the conflict analyst (component 6).



## **Intended results**

Local communities create institutions with government functions: they agree on rules (legislation), hold those who transgress these rules responsible (jurisdiction) and define and implement their own policies (executive). A future national government, if and when it comes into being, will have to accept these institutions as givens, and may very willingly accept them, because they are repositories of peace and development. An important proportion of the overall political power in Somalia will be located at the grassroots. Dictatorship and arbitrary rule will become very difficult to establish. Systems of extortion and intimidation, like that of the present warlords, will be difficult to maintain.

## **Geographical scale and levels of organisation**

The various levels of geographical inclusiveness (local, sub-national region, national, international) show multiple interconnections in the field of conflict analysis. The genesis of a violent conflict can be at one level and the conflict may then spread to another level. In the case of the regions Bay and Bakool it can be shown that conflicts receive much of their dynamics from the sub-national level (conflict of leadership within the Rahanweyn Resistance Army/the projected South-Western Somali regional state) but that this level is connected to other levels, namely:

- the international level (Libya or Ethiopia supporting one or the other faction<sup>7</sup>)
- the national level (regional forces struggling for recognition and for participation at the Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process<sup>8</sup>)
- the local level (the leadership struggle at the regional level causing clashes between localised clans<sup>9</sup>).

Apart from tracing these relationships of causation between different levels of conflict, also conflict resolution and healing the consequences of a conflict may require working from one level to the other.

It is to be hoped that in a not too distant future IFSP will have made substantial progress in helping to resolve local conflicts and in increasing the productivity in local farming systems. It is certainly on the right track to do so. Then it will become even more obvious than now that the economic outlets of the districts where improvements have been achieved are blocked by violent conflicts or insecurity in the aftermath of violent conflict or impaired by extortions by rival politico-military forces. The task ahead then will be to facilitate

- agreements on the free movement of goods, including livestock
- provision of security, possibly by combined forces representing different factions, to livestock treks and road transport
- establishment of conditions under which these security provisions can gradually be scaled down.

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. interview Sharif Yusuf Sharif Ahmad, Ashraaf, at Waajid, March 8, 2004, in the appendix

<sup>8</sup> Schlee 2003

<sup>9</sup> Cf. interview Sheikh Miris Mohammed Hussein Hadamo, Gaaljeel, at Waajid, March 8, 2004, and interview Marian Ruun Siraaji Ali, Eelay, at Waajid, March 8, 2004, in the appendix

The regional dimensions of those aspects of livestock trade, which need to be looked at from a conflict resolution perspective, extend beyond the boundaries of Somalia. Livestock used to be taken from Bakool via the Somali region of Ethiopia to Somaliland (Berbera), but the Ethiopians block that route now. Livestock exports through Somaliland have declined, because in Somaliland Ogadeen youths have been arrested and expelled<sup>10</sup>. In retaliation to this, people in the Somali region of Ethiopia have started to take animals destined for Somaliland.<sup>11</sup>

To resolve this matter, communication would have to be established with Ogadeen elders in the Ethiopian Somali region. The Somaliland Administration should be made aware that their exclusivist clan and residence policies harm Somaliland's export trade. Everyday concerns of local livestock producers and traders are thus immediately linked to regional and even international issues.

As the district relies heavily on grain imports and therefore needs to export livestock, this matter has some urgency. Facilitating export will have a positive effect on producer prices. At the moment buyers buy cheap and the price difference to the cities is big, the security risks in taking the stock anywhere being also high.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> In addition to clannish and exclusivist policies of the Somaliland government, taxation might be a reason why much of the livestock trade has recently shifted from Berbera to Bosaso. (Christoph Langenkamp, oral communication, March 18, 2004).

<sup>11</sup> Information by Abdullahi Sahal at El Lehele, March 6, 2004

<sup>12</sup> The connection between security and the flow of livestock to different markets is illustrated by Peter D. Little who focuses on the Kenyan markets which have grown in importance for Somali suppliers since the collapse of the Somali state and since the port of Kismayu and its hinterland are in the hands of rival militias. "Between 1988 and 1998 price differences in US dollar terms between Kenyan and Somali markets grew by about 20 percent, which implies a slight increase in risk and transaction costs on the Somalia side. With few options, Somali traders are largely restricted to selling animals in the trans-border markets, which partially explains why their animals' prices have not grown as fast as their Kenyan counterparts['] who have several marketing opportunities. In terms of transaction costs, added expenses include new fees (4-6 percent) for currency transactions", since Somali traders convert their money into dollars in informal monetary markets and then have it transferred by telecommunication to Somalia, to avoid travelling with lots of cash. On difficulties implying currency transactions and travelling with money cf. also the interview with Abdikarim Hajj Hassan in the appendix to this report. Peter D. Little continues about transaction costs, which also include "higher transport costs because of the need for additional security personnel to accompany transit animals. Security is a special problem between Mogadishu and Dinsoor and Baidoa and between these two towns and the Kenyan border." (Little 2003: 99)

In view of the problems of converting money into a currency which can be handled (the inflated Somali Shilling being rather bulky for larger transactions) and the difficulties to have access to a banking system especially in rural areas, old proposals about the introduction of a form of banking suitable to marginal livestock producing areas might be reconsidered as a possible development intervention. Pastoralists are forced to sell animals at a time when they need grain and when animal prices are low and pastures depleted, namely in the dry season. Banking facilities might put them into a position to sell animals earlier and to keep the proceeds in a safe place, reducing also the pressure on dry season pastures. (Schlee 1982, Kenya Range Management Handbook 1991)

The difficulties in handling the large amounts of Somali Shillings necessary even for modest transaction, by the way, have little to do with the stateless period. Most of the inflation of the SoSh has occurred in the 80s, the decade preceding state collapse, when its value decreased by 98%. As long as no fresh supply of banknotes came in the stateless period, the SoSh remained remarkably stable. Import of currency first by the warlord Hussein Aydiid, then by businessmen who supported the TNG, with the collusion of international money printing firms, however, devalued the SoSh by another 25% in 1999 to 20001 (Little 2003: 149f.)

It is therefore not surprising that the chairman at El Lehele insisted in putting livestock marketing on the agenda of the workshop on El Lehele, which has been held at Huddur from March 10 to 14, 2004. He explained that people take animals to the local markets and often do not find buyers. When they want to return, sometimes buyers then collect animals at throwaway prices and take them to no one knows where.

The organisation of mutual agreements of free passage for livestock treks and security escorts of mixed clan/militia composition might be a solution to this problem. The participants of the village workshop of El Lehele even spoke of *xeer* agreements by which the community takes the responsibility for the safety of the herds of traders. 'Responsibility' is meant to entail that stolen animals or animals taken by raiders are to be paid for or to be replaced by the community. The community would then to seek to recover their losses by tracing the raiders or thieves. When animals move out of an area, agreements with neighbouring communities should ensure that these neighbours then take over the responsibility, and so on, until the treks reach the final markets.



Camels at the well of El Lehele

### Scale and levels: recommendations

In the field of interconnections between various levels of conflict, it is therefore recommended that the conflict analyst of the project (component 6) makes sure that the following activities are covered:

- watching the media and following events at various levels (national, international) which influence politics and community relations in Bay and Bakool,
- keeping in touch with experts on political and security related issues in agencies and NGOs (UN security officers, UNDP, Somalia unit of the EC and others)
- semi-structured as well as open interviews with knowledgeable elders, clan leaders, local law (*xeer*) specialists for the documentation of recent history and current events and their perception in local perspectives
- observing meetings and discussions at all levels of social/political organisations, initially with the help of an interpreter, later by the use of own Somali language skills which need to be rapidly acquired
- facilitating contacts between peace promoters of different localities and regions to revive economic links and to open trade routes<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> The livestock export to Kenya, also from Bay and Bakool, already profits from such inter-clan cooperation. The Hagar District Council, dominated by Aulihan Ogadeen, and the Afmadow District Council (Mohammed Zubeyr Ogadeen) have cooperated in retrieving stolen trade goods, including livestock, and in providing safe passage to traders, in spite of their territorial conflict about pasture. (Little 2003: 156)

## **Intended results**

IFSP is enabled to situate its activities in wider contexts. It can assess influences on and constraints to its own activities emerging from regional, national and international configurations. It is also made able to assess how players on these higher levels of geographical inclusiveness perceive its own activities at the village and district level and might be influenced by them.

The IFSP facilitates regular forms of interaction (i.e. it facilitates institution building) beyond the local and the district level. This will lead to the following results:

Livestock marketing becomes safer, thereby the transaction costs (balancing risks, paying for security, paying for extortion) of the livestock trade sink, consumer prices and the profits of legitimate traders rise.

Livestock exports generate wealth, which can be used for imports. Food shortages resulting from a negative grain balance (especially of Bakool) may be redressed. The material standard of living will rise. Ways to measure this will be all conventional development indicators (nutrition, health, education ...). Sectoral measures stimulating development in all these fields will fall on more fertile ground if more wealth has been generated locally.

Peaceful interregional relations will generate wealth, which is not derived from criminal activities. Increasingly stronger political interests will be attached to the preservation and the increase of these forms of wealth. The balance of wealth and the balance of power will gradually shift away from criminals<sup>14</sup> and towards elements, which are conducive to the common good or at least do not harm it.

## **The Waajid peace conference**

The peace talks held in the ruins of the hospital at Waajid between all Digil and Mirifle clans, including the Ashraaf of the area, have been going on for three months there, after a similar period had been spent at Baidoa. Positive results include so far, that many road blocks in the area have disappeared and the general security situation improved. The elders and traditional leaders (*malaqs*) have gained ground in holding militia leaders at various levels responsible for any incidents and in bringing militias under clan control, although this aim is far from having been fully achieved.

In addition to being a peace conference, the gathering at Waajid has the character of being a mobile mediation unit. Delegations of elders have been sent from Waajid to wherever violence newly erupted. A description of these activities can be found in four of the seven interviews (nos. 2-5) documented in the appendix.

IFSP has supported these talks by donations of food and other materials. More such help, including 50 plastic chairs, has been promised after impatient requests by the temporary chairman of the conference. Also a workshop with 35 delegates is about to take place.

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<sup>14</sup> Examples for criminals who wield too much influence in Somalia at present are: extortionists, drug dealers, mercenaries of foreign powers, and environmental criminals (e.g. people who sell fishing rights which do not belong to them, sell the right to deposit poisonous waste, or commercially overexploit communal resources like wood).

## **The Waajid peace conference: recommendations**

The principles of intervention in such a setting have been clearly outlined by Magnus (2003) in her paper *Support of the Bay and Bakool Peace and Reconciliation Initiative. Proposed Interventions by GTZ IS* last November. External agencies are not called upon to take sides in political disputes, but they can greatly facilitate such peace initiatives with relatively modest means by relieving delegates from everyday worries like food and transport.

The measures proposed by Magnus to support this peace process include

1. Training workshops
2. Participation with an observer status
3. Sharing experiences with Somaliland
4. Study on local indigenous mechanisms of disarmament and reintegration
5. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of local physical infrastructure
6. Establishing and strengthening local and regional administrative and self-governing bodies

The justification and the necessity of these measures have been argued well in that paper and do not need to be elaborated here.

On the whole it can be said that while the Mbagathi process is still pending and its outcome more and more uncertain, such local and regional initiatives are the most rewarding targets for support. With a fraction of the expenses of a Nairobi type conference, much faster and more tangible results can be achieved here. It is also beneficial that the initiative for this conference comes from elders, women, and traditional authorities and that the 'warlords' will be involved at a later stage or simply be sidelined for a while and then be exposed to new givens. A Somali peace process needs to "involve" the warlords (to this extent the organisers of the Eldoret/Mbagathi conference were right), but involving them should mean to make them answerable, to expose them to scrutiny, to submit them to public pressure, to bring them under control, not to court them, to pamper them, to privilege them, to give them a veto right to everything including the power to block the whole peace process.

### **Intended Results**

The constituency of peace is empowered by processes like the one taking place at Waajid. The constituency of peace are those who are tired of arbitrary violence and are interested in generating circumstances in which a living can be made by peaceful economic activities. Correspondingly, the constituency of war is weakened. This constituency is made up of people who gain from violence: those who create insecurity to be able to sell "security", those who receive payments for continued fighting or profit from lawlessness by engaging in criminal activities.

People take over government functions. Democratic institutions growing from the grassroots to district and regional levels will provide checks and balances for a future national government, and as long as there is no such national government in existence, they will be able to provide a measure of peace and stability by concluding inter-regional treaties with each other.

## Appendix

On Friday, March 5, 2004 an interview was conducted with Sheikh Hussein of the Likse subclan of the Hadama. Sheikh Hussein is a former magistrate and provided valuable insights in the coexistence and interaction between secular law (*qanuun*), religious law (*shari'a*) and customary law (*xeer*) in the colonial period, under the period of the postcolonial governments and in the present period without a government.

The conflict analyst prepared the guideline for questions, carried out the interview largely on her own, and took the notes. She carried out all these tasks in an exemplary fashion. The transcript of the interview is in her possession.

Unfortunately she left the next morning for Nairobi for health reasons, after only 2 ½ days of sharing her experience with me, and resigned from her position a little later. Although interviews like the ones documented in this appendix were also meant to be on-the-job for the conflict analyst, I then had to carry them out without her. In spite of this, I hope it is useful to have done these interviews and to have documented them here, because they might help anyone working in the future on the conflict analysis component of the project to acquire a deeper understanding of the local and regional situation.

The following table lists the interviews in chronological order.

no.	name	clan	location	date
1	<b>Mohamed Ahmad Yare Dheere</b>	Gaalboore < Hadama	Huddur, in the house of Sahal	March 06, 2004
2	<b>Sharif Yusuf Sharif Ahmad</b>	Ashraaf	Waajid	March 8, 2004
3	<b>Sheikh Miris Mohammed Hussein Hadamo</b>	Gaaljeel < Hadama	Waajid	March 8, 2004
4	<b>Marian Ruun Siraaji Ali</b>	Eelay	Waajid	March 8, 2004
5	<b>Mohammed Hassan 'Usmaan "Anjeh"</b>	Kolmal < Boqol Hore	Waajid	March 8, 2004
6	<b>Hajia Awliyo Mohammed Yeerow</b>	Hadama	in her house in Huddur	March 11, 2004
7	<b>Ahmad Abdikarim Hajj Hassan</b>	Gaal Jeel < Hadama	In the house of relatives of him, next to the mosque, Huddur	March 12, 2004

## Mohamed Ahmad Yare Dheere

Clan: Gaalboore < Hadama

Former policeman, 63 years

Location: March 06, 2004 in the house of Sahal

Interviewer: Günther Schlee, Abdullahi Sahal, "Jery" Sheikh Hussein



### Biography:

I was born 10 km from El Barde, 80 km from here. When I was three months old, my father was killed by Ogadeen. They wanted to take the camels. My father and others pursued the raiders and that was when he was killed. I stayed with the animals until I was 22 years old. I was in the hand of my mother.

I then became a policeman. I was in Baidoa to sell smallstock and joined the queue of recruits. That was June 20, 1963. I was then taken from Baidoa to the police academy in Mogadishu for six months training. I learned some Italian. Then there was a national vote, the presidential election, and I was with the security forces at Barawa. After that I was transferred to the military police. After two years I was taken to two more months of training at the police academy and then I was transferred to the Huddur police station. That was in 1966.

At one point I was attached to a village called Salkudhooble. There the Ogadeen raided the camels of the Jeljela clan (Hawiye). We recaptured these camels and I was given the rank of corporal (*alif leh*).

I was in this area until 1970. On January 1, 1971, I was transferred to Mogadishu. There I stayed for four years in the central police station. During this period, I went to training at the police academy twice, for one and two months respectively. The training was for me to join the Criminal Investigation Department. When I completed the courses, I was told that I would be transferred to the CID. I anticipated difficulties there and wanted to resign from the service. My resignation was rejected. My rank was taken from me and I was imprisoned for three months. Then I was given the warning that I would be imprisoned for another 20 years, if he did not do as I was told. I then just asked to be transferred from Mogadishu, which was a place I did not understand. I was sent to Golweyn, Lower Shabelle, 50 km from Merka. On my request I was posted to one of the checkpoints on the road from Golweyn to Barawa.

In 1977 I was taken to the Ethio-Somalian war. I was sent to the northern front, which attacked Ethiopia from the Hargeisa side. We passed Dagahbuur, Sagag, Fiiq, Baabile. Shortly before completing my seventh month on this campaign, I was injured and admitted to Hargeisa General Hospital. From Hargeisa I was flown to Mogadishu. After I was discharged, I was brought here, as my family lived here. I was then told to go to another course and to become CID, wearing civilian clothes. I did not want that and wanted to quit. I said: "I have a medal from that war; you cannot send me to prison." I was then prohibited to take up another job and could not be promoted beyond corporal. So I remained a corporal until the destruction of the Somali government.

At the beginning of the civil war, we were attacked by troops of Ahmad 'Umar Jess [Mohamed Zubeir < Ogadeen]. They came from El Berde and captured Huddur and Baidoa to overthrow Mohamed Siad Barre. At Huddur, 3 military and 5 policemen were killed [including Mohamed Hassan, the commander of the police division, the father-in-law of "Jery"]

[Explanation from Jery and Sahal: There had been an alliance, concluded in Ethiopia, between Abdurrahman Tuur (Isaaq), Ahmad 'Umar Jess and Aydiid, to overthrow Barre. While these forces were marching on Mogadishu, the Manifesto group elected Ali Mahdi (Abgal) to be president. Jess was repelled from entering Mogadishu. That was the point when the conflict turned into an inter-clan war. It was now about throwing out the Darood.]

When Aydiid attacked Jess, Jess retreated towards this side. But people here attacked him as well. So he crossed into Ethiopia.

Now there was no government and a long drought. In 1992 there was hunger. People stole each other's food. In December 1992 the International Community came here in the shape of UNITAF. By that time it was said that a new government for the Rahanweyn community would be set up in Baidoa. It took four months to set up that government. Advocate Hassan Sheikh Ibrahim "Hassey" was installed. I was a member of a delegation of 100 from Bakool to attend that meeting. After two months Gen. Aydiid's troops occupied Baidoa, the seat of 37 international and UN agencies. No resistance was put up against Aydiid. They looted all agencies, computers and everything. When he was in possession of Baidoa for several months, Aydiid attacked Huddur with 31 "technicals", 600 soldiers, and four civilian trucks. On their way to Bakool, Aydiid's troops killed 13 persons. In Huddur they collected 101 guns and shot 11 persons. I was among those who escaped. The people of Huddur then asked themselves whether defence was possible or not. After 6 months it was decided to strike back.

I was in the bush for 2 ½ years, collecting volunteers from all villages around. We then attacked and 57 of us were killed. Aydiid's troops dragged captured soldiers through the streets, tied to the back of their cars, until they died. Houses were burnt. The Rahanweyn now united to overcome Aydiid [By then this name must refer to Hussein Aidiid, because his father had died of gunshot wounds in 1996]. On Oct. 29, 1988, we attacked Huddur and recaptured it. The next year, in June 1999, we recaptured Baidoa. My eldest son at that time was killed on his way from Baidoa to Huddur. The son next to him was injured. At that point I quit mobilising the people, and entered the fighting myself.

The RRA established its command at Baidoa. I went with 15 other elders to Mogadishu to meet Abdalla Dheerow (Isaaq), the spokesman of the TNG parliament. That was reported on the radio. On the way back we were intercepted at Leego, near Buur Hakaba, and then transferred to Huddur prison. The case was about why we had met with Abdalla Dheerow. We were in prison for 31 days. Ten days after our release, we went back to Mogadishu to meet Abdiqaasim, but again it was just Dheerow who received us. We reported to him what had happened to us. On the way back we were intercepted at the same spot. While we were retained, the troops who had arrested us started to quarrel. Some wanted to keep us in detention, others were defending us. One was killed and one injured. Then we were taken to Baidoa prison. After 36 days we were out again. ["Jery's" father was among those elders both times.] We were told not to go back to Mogadishu and not to contact anyone from the TNG. I was restricted to Huddur.



## Customary law (*xeer*)

There are 10 clans in the district of Huddur:

- Hadama
- Loway
- Leisan
- Jirom
- Harin
- Garwaale
- Ma'alimweene
- Reer Dumal
- Waanjel
- Ashraaf

Those 10 live here. There is a border between them. Hadama live to the north of the road El Berde – Wajid. All others live to the south of it. Apart from these Rahanweyn clans, the Hadama have other borders with other clans, namely three subclans of Aulihan < Ogadeen, each of whom have a *malaq*, which means that they can pay *diya* independently. Apart from these there are Gaadsan < Dir bordering them. So they have *xeer* with 13 neighbours. The *diya* between Aulihan and Hadama is not 100 camels [the normal rate for killing a man], but 44. The same applies to Dir. With other Rahanweyn it is just 27.

**Q.:** Normally one pays 100 for a man and 50 for a woman. What if the killed person is a woman and the rate for a man is 27?

**A.:** Then it is also 27 for a woman.

**Q.:** And how about the cases where the rate for a man is 44?

**A.:** Then it is 22 for a woman.

Within Hadama the *diya* is 32 for a man and 16 for a woman. It is higher than between Hadama and other Rahanweyn clans, to discourage internecine killings within Hadama.

In a recent case Aulihan had attacked Hadama and killed three men and a woman. The Hadama, in their response, killed three men. So the male killings were balanced and *diya* was discussed in the case of the woman. The Aulihan protested that they had not killed the woman, because the bullet was of a type, which could not come from one of their guns. The Hadama replied that the Aulihan had started the fighting. Without them there would not have been any shooting. In the end the *diya* was divided in halves.

The reason for the fight was that the RRA-appointed governor of Bakool went to El Berde to set up a local authority. But the Aulihan there refused. They said that the RRA was not secure in power and was in no position to tell them what to do. They also had a tribal name ("Rahanweyn") and can therefore not expect Aulihan to submit to them. If they want to represent all people in the region, they should first change their name.

## Recent alliances

These *xeer* agreements do not imply joint defence. When the Hawiye (Aydiid) were here, the Aulihan just looked on and did not interfere.

**Q.:** Who then helped you at that time?

**A.:** The Ethiopians saw this as a chance to attack Aydiid.

**Q.:** Who do you side with, the TNG or Ethiopia?

**A.:** I do not expect anything, neither from the TNG nor from Ethiopia. I am still patiently waiting for the peace process in Kenya, which has lasted a year and a half, to bring forth results. Unless disarmament is carried out by the International Community, there can be no central government.

**In response to Q.:** I would accept an army composed of AU forces. UNOSOM in their day could have achieved that mission, but they were not serious and people discovered their weaknesses.

## Hadama

Hadama are a combination of people. They are a federation. People stemming from all Somali clans are included. Gaalboore, my own subclan, is almost entirely composed of Ogadeen, namely Mohamed Zubeir, Abdalla, Aulihan, Bah Geri ... I myself am from Makahil (<Ogadeen). Enumerating his forefathers (*abtir*), it is the forefather in the fifth ascending generation who came from the Ogadeen.

Mohammed	himself	
Ahmad	father (F)	
Mohammed	father's father (FF)	
Adan	FFF	
Farah	FFFF	
'Ues	FFFFF	This is the one who joined Hadama.
Guma'adle	FFFFFF	
Makahil	FFFFFFF	

'Ues came with his wife and children and livestock from Shilaabo, Ethiopia. No-one knows the reason for this migration.

Waajid, March 08, 2004

In the morning, under a shade roof adjacent to the WFP compound, four delegates to the Waajid peace conference were interviewed individually. Here are the transcripts of the notes I took on that occasion:

Name: **Sharif Yusuf Sharif Ahmad**

clan: Ashraaf

location: Waajid

date: March 8, 2004

Interviewers: Günther Schlee, Abdullahi Sahal, Jery Sheikh Hussein, Günter Wessel

### **Biographical notes**

In Baidoa, Sheikh Hussein [the father of our co-worker Jery] and I were neighbours. I am here as a representative of the Ashraaf of Baidoa, the regional centre. I am a farmer.

During the regime of Mohammed Siad Barre I was working with the NSS, the National Security Service. I had four identity cards, one of which gave me access straight into the palace of the president. I was working there until 1990 [the collapse of the regime]. Since then I am a farmer and live at Baidoa.

When Aydiid occupied Baidoa, it was on a Sunday. On Monday he called me. He wanted to work through me with the elders. But after three days of discussion, I became afraid and went to my farm, 30 km from the town. Aydiid sent more messages to me, but I rejected his request. Aydiid remained in possession of Baidoa for four years. Then he<sup>15</sup> was removed.

The RRA chairman Shatigadud later called me to work with him, but I refused. I criticised the composition of the Executive Committee. [Jery explains that the RRA had been formed at a meeting under a tree at Jaffay in Bar Daale District on Oct. 29, 1995 and that many of those present there held positions in the movement. There are people who think that this has not been corrected sufficiently at later stages and that representation in the RRA is not based broadly enough.]

### **The Waajid Peace Conference**

At the beginning of the conference there were 15 Ashraaf. By now seven have gone back to their families. The Ashraaf started the conference four months before all others came. We read the Holy Qur'aan seven times and prayed for God's help in getting the other clans here. We sent out envoys to get the other clans to participate. Ali Bakhr kept the record of the delegates. The full



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<sup>15</sup> The person in question must have been Gen. Mohammed Farah Aydiid at the beginning of this period and his son and successor Hussein Aydiid at the end of this period. The General died of gunshot wounds in 1996.

size conference now has been together for six months, the first three of which were passed at Baidoa, the other three here.

**Q.:** Which results have you achieved so far?

**A.:**

1. A ceasefire.
2. The killings have stopped.
3. All illegal checkpoints have been removed.
4. With the exception of the gunmen [of the warlords], all other people [those who fought as clan militias] have returned home.
5. Elders of the two factions (Hirin (Sahtigudud)/Leisan (Habsade<sup>16</sup>) & Hadama (Sheikh Adan Madoobe)) have met for peace talks.

From here groups of delegates have travelled to solve newly emerging conflicts.

1. Clashes between Jiron and Maalinweyn were reported from Sarmandeer. We went there with a delegation of 6 Ashraaf and 8 Digil/Mirifle and solved the conflict. Two people had been killed.
2. News reached us about a conflict between Loway and Gelidle in Ufurro District. We went there with a delegation of 16, among them one Sharif. The rest were Digil and Mirifle. Two people had been killed.
3. There was a conflict between Helide and Eelay at Bur Hakaba. We left with seven persons, one Sharif and six others. Three persons had been killed.
4. Tunni and Yantaar had clashed at Bisig Ade. The delegation comprised two Ashraaf and nine others. In this case three persons had been killed.
5. At Sigle a conflict has broken out between Gelidle and Boqol Hore. The chairman and one other person went. Six people had been killed.

On November 27, 2003, the Digil and Mirifle concluded an agreement that compensation for killing shall be 100 camels. 50 Million SoSh will be paid as a fine. If the group of the culprit refuses to pay, he will be shot.

Special *xeer* agreements between neighbouring clans, which entail lower rates [cf. interview with Mohammed Ahmad Yare Dheere] will be superseded by the new law. But so far, the new *xeer* agreement has not yet been signed by the Hadama. We want them to sign it. We wait for the next case to come up to discuss the matter with them. They respect the Ashraaf. Because of the fear of our curse they will accept our position.

**Q.:** Apart from the fact that everyone wants to be the chairman, are there also political issues at stake between the RRA factions, e.g. whether to seek an alliance with the TNG or with Ethiopia?

**A.:** It is just that everyone wants to be the leader. The alliances with the TNG or with Ethiopia are just opportunistic. If one sides with the TNG, the other one will side with Ethiopia and vice versa. [At the moment Habsade sides with the TNG.]

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<sup>16</sup> Habsade has not met with the others for talks, but his Leisan clan has participated.

On the way to deal with the problem of leadership, the first step is that the delegates of this conference will be united. With the power of the community they will then be able to impose a solution.

**Q.:** May the solution not be that none of the pretenders (Shatigadud, Sheikh Adan, Habsade) will be the chairman?

**A.:** You are perfectly right, but please do not speak to anyone about this yet.

**Q.:** (Sahal): How did the split in the RRA come about?

**A.:** \$ 600,000 were offered by Libya to assist in the formation of a SW Somali state. 1500 militia were trained at a place called Manas<sup>17</sup>. Shatigadud alone signed that agreement. Sheikh Adan Madoobe and Habsade rejected it. [Arta elected President] Abdiqassim is behind all this. Shatigadud had first supported the TNG and had then withdrawn his support. This money had the effect it was meant to have: to divide the RRA. After declaring himself President of SW Somalia, Shatigadud withdrew the power of his two RRA vice chairmen to sign for payments.

**Q.:** Will there be a new attempt to form a SW Somali state? How are they going to integrate the non-Rahanweyn?

**A.:** After settling the matters between the Rahanweyn, if we want to set up a SW Somali state, other clans in the area will be included, so that Lower Jubba, Gedo and all that forms part of the new state. There is a proverb in Maymay:

*Masar, mar moradi oodi, morad kale oodas.* – 'The axe, after fencing one enclosure, can fence another one.'

The Ashraaf are like the Red Cross or the Red Crescent. They are accepted everywhere. Here they are needed for peace missions. When groups of delegates are sent out from the conference to settle a conflict somewhere, the Ashraaf are asked to come along.. But when matters are discussed at the conference, especially if contributions are to be shared, it happens too often that Digil and Mirifle sit aside from the Ashraaf. The Ashraaf want the conference to stay here, while some others want to move it to Baidoa.

Name: **Sheikh Miris Mohammed Hussein Hadamo**

clan: Gaaljeel

age: 62

location: Waajid

date: March 8, 2004

Interviewers: Günther Schlee, Abdullahi Sahal, Jery Sheikh Hussein, Günter Wessel

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<sup>17</sup> in Bay region.

At the beginning there was a short discussion about clan history. Sheikh Miris confirms that the Gaaljeel of Hadama stem from Gaaljecel Saransur. 'Isa Saransur is not identical with the 'Isa who live in Djibouti.

### **Biographical notes**

I was born at Moragaabe 10 km [in reality 31km] North of Huddur. I completed learning the Holy Qur'aan in the same place. Then I went on to study at the *madrasas* of Hamar (Mogadishu), Beled Weyne and Waajid. I work as a farmer, a livestock holder, a Qur'aan teacher and a religious practitioner. All my sons are Qur'aan teachers as well. I have always stayed in this area.

### **The Waajid Peace Conference**

I have been here for six months. The problems we have discussed include the conflict, which broke out at Baidoa. Nine women were killed in the period Oct. 11 to Oct. 21, 2003. That is when we interfered. On the way from Waajid to Baidoa, we have seen three wounded women, with the breasts, on arm or a leg shot off. We took them to Waajid hospital. They are still here. We then left for Baidoa again. There we met with four committees:

- one from Siddax Buurot
- one from Hamar (Xamar)
- one composed of Ashraaf from Baidoa
- one of the Digil and Mirifle of Baidoa.

Plus us from Bakool that was five delegations. These committees formed one conference. We selected Ali Barre as chairman. Mohamuud Muhammad Abdi became his deputy. We started to work. We divided up in four parts:

- Au Dinle area
- Goof Gaduud
- Hawaar (around Baidoa)
- Bur Hakaba.

We have succeeded in establishing a ceasefire. We organised a meeting in Baidoa. We called acting commanders of faction militias. They agreed with our activities. We called the two clans, which had killed the women, Harin and Leisan. Harin requested a meeting at Usle, inside Harin territory, and Leisan proposed Ashogaabo. We began with the Harin. We gave them one camel and one sheep. We stayed there one day and one night. Then we came to the Leisan and did likewise.

**In response to Q.:** These gifts were counted as *sabeen* [literally: young female sheep, a propitiation gift] not as *diya*.

We then had a meeting at Goof Gaduud, 30 km North of Baidoa. They signed a peace agreement. At this meeting both sides stated their claims. After that a committee was sent to them to verify the complaints. The committee decided that compensation had to be paid. After that another meeting was organised at Baidoa with the whole population. We sent other delegations from the peace making committee, including other clans. One went to Au Dinle, another one to Dey Nunay, Haabare and Gars Goof. They discussed ceasefire, stability and security. A third meeting in Baidoa was the start of the Waajid conference. It first had to be decided where to hold the conference. It had to be on neutral territory, not with the Harin and not with the Leisan. The options were Bur Hakaba, Waajid and Huddur. Waajid was chosen. The first issue was negotiation of the *diya*. The aim was to clear up all misunderstandings. We had to

interrupt these talks because there was renewed flaring up of violence in different areas, which required our attention [groups of delegates sent to the respective locations], namely:

- Ufurro
- Boola Fulai, where five people had been killed,
- Doodale
- Bur Helede, where there was a fight between Helede and Yantar,
- Sagle.

Even now, people have not yet reported back from Sagle. When the chairman comes back, we need to start again where we stopped.

**Q.:** Have you discussed the RRA leadership conflict?

**A.:** At the beginning the conflict was only between the three leaders and it was restricted to Baidoa. Then it spread to the entire area. Shatigadud was elected by the Executive Committee to be the president of SW Somalia. He wanted to remain RRA chairman at the same time. His deputies rejected this. Then the fighting started between Leisan and Harin. So the problem did not start in the wider community, it started just with the leaders.

**Q.:** What might be the solution?

**A.:** Now we will call the commanders of the militias and bring them to toe our line. Then we call the political leaders. If they refuse to come, the Digil and Mirifle will just overthrow them.

[He then employs the image of a mother making a baby "dance" by rhythmically tossing him up (*bubutis*)] "The baby thinks he is jumping. In reality his mother is just doing *bubutis*."

### **The venue**

It has been decided that the conference will not be moved from here to Baidoa. First the leaders have to come here. The re-location to Baidoa will only occur if and when the leaders have agreed to a plan. It will only be for implementation.

### **Specifically addressing Günter Wessel:**

We have never seen an agency which is as interested in peace and stability as the GTZ. They place the medicine on the right spot, where the wound is. I have got, however, one small question from my side. We were told there would be a workshop. It was postponed to March 22. There would be 45 participants, 7 women and 38 men. Can this number be increased?

Günter Wessel: This number is already the result of a compromise.

Name: **Marian Ruun Sirraaji Ali**



clan: Eelay

location: Waajid

date: March 8, 2004

Interviewers: Günther Schlee,  
Abdullahi Sahal, Jery Sheikh  
Hussein, Günter Wessel

I am here as a representative of the Women's Association of Bur Hakaba.

### **Biographical notes**

I have been born at Bur Hakaba, and that is where I completed Primary School. For secondary education I went to Baidoa. I then worked in the Commercial Bank from 1982 to 1990, the end of the regime.

Then I did business. I sold fuel (petrol). We were displaced from Baidoa to Bur Hakaba in 1992. My husband, who is also Eelay, became a supporter of Shatigadud. I remained neutral. None of our children go to school. [She appears to refer to publicly financed formal education.] The two eldest have completed computer training after private schooling and are now unemployed.

### **The current peace process**

Since the start of this conference we have enjoyed a peaceful environment at Baidoa. When we heard that eight women had been killed at Haween, we decided to collect money and to rent a vehicle to go to that place. Then we came back to Baidoa and passed on to Bur Hakaba. We, the peace-loving women, decided to organise elders to work on peace-building issues. In October 2003, they met at Baidoa. We organised to mobilise the community to accept a ceasefire. After that the giving of *subeen* (literally: young female sheep, a propitiating gift to initiate *diya* negotiations) was organised.

This conflict originated from the high command of the RRA and spread through the rural areas outside Baidoa. We decided to involve the villages. On November 10, 2003, it was agreed that 100 camels should be paid for anyone killed, and in case of revenge killings [i.e. when a man of the offending party is killed in revenge before *diya* is accepted] there is a fine of 50 Million SoSh [*diya* payments would balance each other in such cases and would therefore be waived.]

The committee now split up and members were sent to the villages to inform the population of the ceasefire. I was among those who went to Hawaare. On the way we saw dead bodies and put them into the shadow. When we reported this incident, the peace making committee decided "to put it into their pockets", i.e. to hide it to prevent a new escalation.

On a meeting in Baidoa we decided to go to Waajid, rather than Bur Hakaba or Huddur, because of water problems at Bur Hakaba and conflict at Huddur. When we came to Waajid, Hadama gave *subeen* to Harin. After this the delegates separated and some went to solve the Ufurro



conflict. Another group left for Fulai, between Qoriooley and Bur Hakaba. There was conflict between Eelay and Tunni. Three villages had been burned, and five people killed on one side, seven on the other. We solved all these conflicts and came back to Waajid.

The main issue now is to organise understanding between the fighting militias. All militias have been removed from the towns. The clan militias have to come under the peace making committee and to wear a badge. Now we are starting the most difficult part: We hope to succeed in involving the faction leaders. If they refuse, we will just abolish the militias. All men are either the father or the husband or the brother or the son of a woman. So the women will just remove them from the militias. Who will then do the fighting?

**Q.:** How about the plans to move the conference to Baidoa?

**A.:** The plan to move to Baidoa has been rejected. Here we are in one compound. In Baidoa we would be dispersed. There would be interference by warlords and there would be militias around.

Our association has made many contributions to the conference in terms of food and petrol and paying for drivers and guards. What the GTZ has contributed to the conference has been taken by a devil. We would like to receive your assistance separately from the men. Pass my greetings to Bilan [Hege Magnus], because she is a woman as well.

Name: **Mohammed Hassan 'Usmaan "Anjeh"**

clan: Kolmal < Boqol Hore

location: Waajid

date: March 8, 2004

Interviewers: Günther Schlee, Abdullahi Sahal, Jery Sheikh Hussein, Günter Wessel



I am here as a representative of the Dr Ayuub Organisation, a youth organisation, and the Universal School of Peace Making. [Further down he explains that he also represents his clan, the Boqol Hore.]

Dr Ayuub, after whom my organisation is named, was an educated man from the Digil/Mirifle. He worked for UNICEF, mother and child care. He was killed between Balad and Afgoye in an ambush in 1991. He did not leave an endowment. My organisation just took his name to honour him, just as the Baidoa football stadium. We are financed by contributions from the community.

### **Biographical notes**

I have been born in 1943 in Afgoye. I went to Intermediate School in Kisimayu and then joined the military. There I became a member of the Horseed ["Vanguard"] team for music and drama. I am a songwriter.

I resigned from the military in 1982. I worked in the Gulf countries as a driver and a carpenter. In 1986 I came back and started to do research on Digil and Mirifle history. I wrote poems about that and about the history of the whole of Somali.

[He shows the interviewers some texts. He has developed a Maymay alphabet.]

I have also written about the SYL [Somali Youth League, the main movement for independence] among the Digil and Mirifle and I have collected lists of organisers. [Shows these around.]

### **On the Waajid Peace conference**

I have been at this conference as one of the representatives of Boqol Hore. The elders have tried to solve the problems created by the youths. We have succeeded in establishing a ceasefire.

[He presents minutes copied from the first committee. A photocopy is made.]

**Q.:** Has everything been recorded since the beginning of the conference?

**A.:** Yes, but I myself have just kept notes for the youth organisation.

**Q.:** Are you actually a member of a youth organisation [in view of your age]?

**A.:** I am not a member but a supporter. They have invited me as an artist. Also here I have performed poems and songs in order to lift the spirits of the delegates. I used to have a group of musicians with me and also performed myself when I was in the military. Now this group is dispersed. I would have liked to contact them, but communication is too expensive.

**Q.:** Will the warlords be called to this conference?

**A.:** I think that if the warlords will ever be called to this conference, it will just be in order to tell them that their time is over.

I think the GTZ should help us in setting up a community radio to propagate the results of this conference. One could also put in cultural programmes. The costs of the equipment would be around \$ 3000.

Name: Hajia Awliyo Mohammed Yeerow

age: in her 60s

location: in her house in Huddur

date: March 11, 2004-03-11

Interviewers: Günther Schlee, Abdullahi Sahal



### Biography

I was born in the *badiya* (the open range, literally: the 'bedouin' country) around Huddur. I came to town in 1954. I was 15 then. I was married to a soldier of the unit Hisanley. It was under the Italians. I stayed with that man for five years, until we divorced.

I then became a member of the Digil and Mirifle Party. There were only two parties at that time, the SYL (Somali Youth League) and the Digil and Mirifle Party. From that time until now I have been in politics. I was elected chairperson of the women in that party.

There was an election in 1956 when a parliament was elected in preparation for independence. By 1960 we got independence. Adan Abdullahi 'Usmaan was elected president. 1967 Abdirashid

Ali Shirmarke was elected president and replaced Adan Abdullahi 'Usmaan democratically. In October 1969 Shirmarke was killed and Mohammed Siad Barre took over after five days. That was the October Revolution.

In the period of Shirmarke I was the district chairperson of the Huddur District of the Women's Group, the national association of women. We used to make awareness campaigns about women's rights and women's problems in raising families. One matter was the rights divorced women should have in their children. Husbands were in a position to send a wife away and to keep all their children. Another issue was women's right to education. Rights of inheritance of women were often ignored by male relatives. Girls got very little. Even if a man had only daughters, their *ilm adeer* (father's brother's sons, FBS) would take the bulk of the inheritance. I remember a case of a man who died, leaving only two daughters and no sons. Instead of his daughters, his brothers came in to inherit.

When Mohammed Siad Barre came to power, he made *Xeerka Qoyska* – the Family Law. He empowered women and gave them all rights. Women now had to agree to a divorce. Men did not automatically get all the children. That was a time of good opportunities for women. In the Siad Barre period I was elected to the municipal government council of Huddur. I belonged to that council for seven years. I was also there when UNOSOM came and set up a district council. I was an elected member of that council.

After that we were between death and life. We faced the worst problems women could face. Women were raped as a form of revenge. We do not have the power to defend ourselves. Women and children suffered most in the civil war. 90% of the devastation in Somalia was done to women, while the perpetrators were men.

I fled this area for four years. I went to Godey in Ethiopia, Khalaaf, Beledweyne, all sorts of places. I have no children, but I was taking care of the children of my dead brother, a very large family. Myself, I had twelve husbands but I never had a child. For the last twenty years I have not bothered about having a husband. So, from here we fled to Beledweyne. We were running away from the Habar Gidir (< Hawiye, of Aydiid), but Beledweyne was not good for us, because it was full of Hawiye as well. Then we passed Khalaaf in Ethiopia and went on to Godey. There we stayed for a while, but we had many problems, we just got a little here and there. I had some money with me, but we could not meet all our needs. After that we came back to El Berde.

We had a Nissan car. We rented that car out to the agencies at El Berde. I did some small trade with the rent I got for that car. The car had not been taken by the Hawiye because it had been rented out to Cosfo, an Italian organisation. We kept it in the bush near El Berde to hide it. When an organisation wanted to rent a car, we brought it out from the hiding place.

### **The liberation from Hawiye occupation and recent events**

**Q.:** How did the local people get rid of Aydiid again?

**A.:** We fought. The Hadama were fighting. There was one whole day of continuous fighting on which sixty Hadama were killed. The bad thing they showed us was dragging a man whose feet were tied to a car through the streets until he died. Twelve people were burned in a hut.

**Q.:** Who supported you in your fight?

**A.:** In Huddur there are nine clans. Not one of them supported the Hadama. The other clans were supporters of Aydiid. The Leisan of Baidoa helped us, but none of the clans from around here.

**Q.:** How about the Ethiopians?

**A.:** In Huddur I have never seen an Ethiopian. Maybe they assisted in taking back Baidoa, but none of them came here.

**Q.:** Were OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) involved in the fighting?

**A.:** The OLF were based in Huddur Highschool. There were 2,000 of them here. I was in El Berde at that time. But people told me that the Oromo were even worse than the Hawiye. They committed beatings, arson, rape, and looting in a merciless fashion.

**Q.:** How about Al-Itihad?

**A.:** There were some men with very long beards fighting on the side of Aydiid. Aydiid had a very close relationship to Al-Itihad.

**Q.:** Let us come to the present. Why do the Rahanweyn not organise themselves in a peaceful way?

**A.:** The guns are in the hand of irresponsible people. Unless disarmament will be achieved, there will be no peace. The Reer Badiya ('people of the open range') enter the town to take things. They say "the gun is the only thing I have got to make a living. What shall I eat without it?" You will never find a townsman carrying a gun openly. Maybe he has it under his bed. The fighters will say that they have nowhere to go back to. "I was brought to town and taught to live here by my gun." Mostly those who now work for the agencies, were among the worst. Now they even feel shy about carrying a gun.

Unless very strong government forces are put in place to disarm these people or a better way to live is offered to them, it will be hard to disarm them. If you can get two million per day by your gun, will you put it down? Even the leaders at Mbagathi [the peace conference in Kenya] are not in a position to control them. They just claim to be in charge and to be able to conclude a peace treaty. The militias were recruited with the promise of loot. Now the warlords cannot tell them that killing and looting is bad. Aydiid used to tell his militia: "Go over there, capture that area and take everything you find there." How can they now say that this is bad? Hawiye militias had been told that everything which was to be found in a town had been grabbed from their fathers and grandfathers. The Hawiye came to loot. The Rahanweyn just defended themselves in their own territories. The traces of war are everywhere. Five days ago someone around here was cleaning a well. In it, he found a gun and the skeleton of a man.

I am still the chairperson of the Women's Association. I have been that for thirty years now.

**Q.:** How does the Women's Association participate in politics?

**A.:** We are not in a political situation but in a war situation. Only strength (*xoog*- also the violent application of force, like in 'taking something by force') counts. We are just struggling for our lives. The women are the most hardworking in all ways, when it comes to peace-building and when it comes to business. A man cannot do business, because that would make him conspicuous and expose him to revenge killing. Women can start a business on a very small scale, like selling vegetables in a market, which men would not do. Men in such cases just stay with the children.

I went to three peace talks. The first one was in Baidoa. I took a car to go there. The car I had been hiring was taken by Harin militia. I also took part in the campaign to free the respected elders who had gone to Mogadishu to establish contacts with the TNG. We just stayed in the police station and said we would not go home.

I was among the first organisers of the Waajid conference. But then I went to the *hajj*. [Here the discussion digressed a bit to the over 240 victims of the stampede of pilgrims in this year's *hajj*, a news item which had gone around the world.] It had been my fourth time to Mekka. I have been there twice for *hajj* and twice for *umra*<sup>18</sup>.

**Q.:** What is the solution to the current problems among the Rahanweyn?

**A.:** As long as there is no government, there is nothing one can do. The conference at Waajid is just about reconciliation on a clan base, so that people will no longer look for people of other clans to kill them. It may bring an end to inter-clan fighting, but it will not lead to disarmament of the militias.

**Q. (Sahal):** Has Somaliland not shown the way? Or Puntland? That was on a clan basis, in the case of Puntland the Herti, in the Somaliland case mainly the Isaaq. Why does the same thing not work with the Rahanweyn?

**A.:** Somaliland is different from any other part of Somalia. They had a vision to return to their independence from the rest of Somalia. That is what they fought for: their independent government. And they achieved it. Puntland is different [= not really a success story]. There were rival presidents<sup>19</sup>.

In southern Somalia militias were organised not to set up a government but to overthrow one and then to skin everything they came across.

Rahanweyn easily agree with each other and are simple people. While we were living in peace, [Mohammed Hersi] "Morgan" and Hussein Aydiid came and introduced politics between us. Politics is a prostitute. You can make brothers fight by putting gossip in between them.

### **Note about an incident involving compensation payment**

The interview was interrupted at several points because of the following incident: Hajia Awlio raises a small orphan girl whom she sent to the Qur'aan school (*dugsi*). There she has hit another girl. The mother of that girl claims the wound was bleeding and demands compensation. The steps would be the following: 1. Hajia Awlio would be told *Sabeen soo hid!* – 'Tie the young female sheep here!' '*Sabeen*' in such a case would stand for about \$10. Then compensation would have to be paid for the wound, maybe another 50 \$, and the bill of the "doctor" would have to be covered. If three stitches have been made, this can bring the total up to 100 \$.

If the bruise is just swollen and not bleeding, Sahal explains, sometimes small incisions are made with a razor blade so that blood flows and "blood money" be asked for. To reject the payment of blood money invites violent retaliation. Also *xeer*, like other legal systems, seems to invite misuse.

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<sup>18</sup> *Umra* is the 'small pilgrimage', i.e. a pilgrimage outside the *hajj* season. Ramadan is a preferred month for this type of pilgrimage, because an *umra* in the month of fasting counts nearly as much as a *hajj*.

<sup>19</sup> In 2002 Jama Ali Jama was elected president of Puntland, but Abdullahi Yusuf successfully refused to cede office to him.

Name: **Ahmad Abdikarim Hajj Hassan**

clan: Gaal Jeel < Hadama

age: 79 years, born c. 1925

location: In the house of relatives of him, next to the mosque, Huddur

date: March 12, 2004-03-12

interviewers: Günther Schlee and Abdullahi Sahal



### **Biography**

I have been born at Orgaabo, 31 km north of Huddur. In 1936 I went to the Qur'aanic School (*dugsi*). I finished it in 1938. Then I became a camel herder for one year, and for one year I was farming.

**Q.:** Whose camels were you herding?

**A.:** They belonged to my father. Also the farm belonged to him. After that I went to Baidoa, where I learned more about the Qur'aan, including its meaning. I was there for four years. I came back and was given students to teach the Qur'aan to them. I moved with the people and taught the Qur'aan for three years. After that I got new students.

**Q.:** What did you get for teaching?

**A.:** For each child who completed the Qur'aan I got a female camel of three years. Then there was a request from Dolo. The Dir who live there wanted me to come to teach their children. They knew me from an earlier trade visit. So I moved to Dolo. After one year there was in drought in that area and I came back. Later I moved deep into Ethiopia, to El Karri. That place is inhabited by a mixture of Ogadeen and Gariire. I stayed there Khamis [the Thursday year of the seven-year cycle, 1957] and Juma' [the Friday year, 1958]. Then I came back to Huddur and started a livestock business. After one year, there was Somali independence [1960]. From that time on I took camels to Xamar (Mogadishu), Baidoa and Hargeisa. I built a house, just next to this mosque, and continued to live here.

### **Clan history**

[His subclan Gaal Jeel of Hadama derives from the Gaal Jecel, the majority of whom live in Hiran. He is aware of the genealogical tradition according to which Saransur had four sons (*afarta Saransur*), namely Masarre, 'Isa, Degodia, Gaal Jecel, who are the eponymous ancestors of clans.]

My sixth forefather was the one who joined the Hadama. [He enumerates his patrilineal ancestors.]

0	Mu'allim Ahmad	himself	
1	Abdikarim	his father (F)	
2	Hajj Hassan	his father's father (FF)	
3	'Isa	his father's father's father (FFF)	
4	Adam	his father's father's father's father (FFFF)	
5	Abdi	FFFFF	
6	Soom	FFFFFF	"This was the one who joined the Hadama. He came from Hiran. We do not know about the reasons for or the circumstances of this migration."
7	Hassan	FFFFFFF	
8	Keerow	...	
9	Hassan		
10	Abtiroon		
11	Mu'allim		
12	Barre		
13	Jaabir		
14	Duqundiid		the name implies stubbornness
15	Dorwa		
16	Gaal Jecel		the eponymous forefather of his subclan
17	Saransur		
18	Mantan		
19	Riyooole		
20	Garjente		
21	Gardeere		
22	Samaale		the eponymous ancestor of the Somali
23	Waarit		
24	Luhume		
25	Lod 'Umar		
26	Kooshin		
27	Reerdowa		
28	Nuh		'Noah' : the first Arabic name after a long row of Cushitic names
29	Mohammed		not identical with the Prophet
30	Aqiil		the patrilineal parallel cousin of the Prophet Muhammad (FBS)
31	Abu Taalib		an ancestor shared with the Prophet <sup>20</sup>
32	'Abdil Mudaalib		an ancestor shared with the Prophet
33	Haashim		an ancestor shared with the Prophet

There are still many Gaal Jecel living in Hiran. There are also some 'Isa Saransur and very few Degodia. The Masarre live in Ethiopia, north of Mandera. The shared patrilineal ancestor with the surrounding Hawiye is just Samaale. [I.e. in patrilineal terms there is no closer link than both deriving themselves from the eponymous ancestor of the Somali.<sup>21</sup>]

<sup>20</sup> Pious traditions about descent from the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet, are widespread among Somali and among African Muslims in general. Often such traditions are at variance with each other (Schlee 1989).

<sup>21</sup> In fact, not all Somali derive themselves from Samaale by exclusively male links. Many clans trace themselves to Arab (Qurayshitic) ancestry without going through Samaale.



**Q.:** Have you ever met Gaal Jecel and Masarre?

**A.:** Yes, I have met people from those clans in Dolo and in all the towns where I have been trading. Some of them were my trading partners. They took animals for me to far away markets and then sent me the money.

### **History of the region**

When the Italians came, I was not born. That was seven years before I was born. When I was a child, there was a fight between the Italians and the Ethiopians<sup>22</sup>. The Italians went all the way up to Addis Ababa and occupied all of Ethiopia. The Italians then held a big conference and told all tribes that they now were free to move in the entire Italian controlled part of Africa. Then the British came and threw the Italians out and ruled for a period of eight years. The rule of the British was harsh and people did not like it. Life was difficult. People even missed clothes and reverted to wearing goat skins. Freedom parties like the [Somali Youth] League and the Partito<sup>23</sup>. After a long struggle, the UN held a referendum about which country people wanted for a trusteeship of 10 years. People opted for Italy. So the Italians came back, to the annoyance of the British. The British moved out.

At that time [1950], boundary changes were made and Ethiopia got a lot of land. The boundary came very close to El Berde. In the trusteeship period there was a president called Abdullahi Isa. He was Hawiye by tribe. Also the first president after independence [1960] was Hawiye: Adan 'Abdille 'Usmaan. He was succeeded by Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke, a Majerteen. Shirmarke was overthrown [in 1969] by Mohammed Siad Barre. He ruled the country for 21 years.

### **Somali "Scientific Socialism"**

Under Mohammed Siad Barre, life was good for the first 10 years. Then tribalism came in. He gave all the food to the Marrehan, whom he had registered as refugees [after the war with Ethiopia, 1977]. With a slip of paper a Marrehan could get 200 bags of sugar from a sugar factory, to be paid later, after he has sold the sugar. Marrehan got all the business opportunities, and people felt bad about that. He created an agency called INSH [?], which had the licence to import all types of food. Very big warehouses came up. People had to queue there. They disliked that.

When you harvested from your farm, you could only keep two bags of grain. The rest had to be sold at a low price to ADC [?]. They put it in their store. When later you were in need of sorghum, you had to buy it back at a high price. It was forbidden to take your harvest to your house by a vehicle. You could only take what your wife could carry on her back. If one transported more, it was confiscated. There was price control. Everything, clothes, flour, sugar, was very expensive.

### **After Barre**

Then the opposition started to fight him. His enemies became more and more. After a long struggle and heavy fighting, he was overthrown. Then all his opponents started eating each other. His own clan, the Marrehan, took all the grain stores (*bakaroo*, mostly pits) of the farmers in Bay. Everyone looked for a gun to buy. Even the Rahanweyn clans started killing each other. They

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<sup>22</sup> In 1936 Italy invaded Ethiopia and kept it in its possession until 1941. Ras Tafari (Emperor Haile Selassie) became a symbol of African freedom in that period. The Italians were beaten in 1941 by a British based coalition of forces.

<sup>23</sup> 'Partito' is Italian for 'party'. What is meant here in the Digil and Mirifle Party, *Hizbiya Digil iyo Mirifle*.

destroyed all the wealth. Then they received assistance from the whole world, The English, the Germans, the Americans [UNOSOM].

All my possessions were lost. Towards the end of the reign of Mohammed Siad Barre, I took enough livestock for an entire shipload for export to Mogadishu. Then he was overthrown, and all the animals were taken by Hawiye. I was penniless and came back from Baidoa by foot. I had twenty he-goats left here. With God's help I started business again.

After UNOSOM, war started again Habar Gidir [Hawiye; Aydiid's forces] came here and people finished each other. Then the alarm reached Ethiopia. The Ethiopians removed them from Baidoa. Since then there has been stability in Huddur, but instability in Baidoa. But elders were sent there and have done a good job. Things are now calm. The elders are still at Waajid and are doing a good job. Apart from the drought, people are alright now.

### **Livestock management**

Livestock from here often moves to Ethiopia when there is a drought. Now there is such a drought; the last harvest has failed. Many animals, comprising camels, cattle and smallstock, are in Ethiopia now. There is no harassment by the authorities. In the Somali zone of Ethiopia one can move freely. Close to the boundary on the Ethiopian side there are Hadama. Beyond that there are Wafatte < Aulihan < Ogadeen. Also the Aulihan will come over here when there is little pasture in Ethiopia.

**Q.:** Was the situation the same when you were young?

**A.:** When I was young, there was a lot of rustling by Aulihan. Hadama did the same to the Aulihan. The raiding was at its worst in the period of Mohammed Siad Barre. People then preferred to take their animals south, towards Baidoa.

The period immediately before the onset of the rains is good for buying stock. Then prices are low. When the rain comes, animals are fattened and later sold. Under Mohammed Siad Barre trade was better than now. There was more security and there was a market.

**Q.:** How is the livestock trade done now?

**A.:** Few traders come here from elsewhere. Local traders buy livestock here. Camels are taken to Afgoye, cows and smallstock to Beledweyne or Mogadishu. The problem of traders is that there are no banks. You can get few dollars. You cannot keep your money in Somali Shillings, because that would mean to have bags and bags of money. The problem with there being no banks is that you have to keep much money with you and expose yourself to theft and robbery. The routes for livestock are more or less safe now. You can drive animals without a gun.

### **Prospects for the cooperation GTZ IS / Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology**

It has been decided that the position of a conflict analyst in the project will be advertised again at the expense of the MPI. As outlined in the original Memorandum of Understanding between GTZ IS and the MPI, the GTZ will pay for a two year phase of practical work of the conflict analyst in the project, and the MPI for a subsequent three year (2 + 0,5 + 0,5 are the usual contract periods) research grant. The costs of consultancy and supervision in the field by the author in the first phase will be covered by the GTZ in the first phase, by the MPI during the second phase (research grant). The costs of activities (research and supervision) by the present author at the institute in Halle/Saale will be covered by the MPI throughout (phase 1 + 2).

## Medium and long term gains from this cooperation

Depending on the earlier qualifications of the candidate, and under the condition of successful completion of phase one, the MPI will give the conflict analyst either a PhD grant or a postdoctoral grant to give him or her the opportunity to evaluate his/her practical experience under a perspective of social science (social anthropology). This grant will comprise a further year of field research which the strict focus on project activities during phase one has not allowed to collect. Much of this year may be spent in the project area, so that the analyst may also contribute ideas to the project in this second phase.

The scientific output will be a PhD thesis or another book in the case of a Post-Doc). This book will focus on the genesis, the course and the resolution of conflicts in Bay and Bakool, their connections to conflicts in the wider region, the interface between development intervention and local/regional peace processes, mediaperceptions of all this and the international political framework in which all this takes place. It will be a source of inspiration for anyone working for peace building in Somalia for years to come. In terms of human resource development, the research project will qualify the candidate for leading positions in the field of development cooperation and policy advice. Numerous others (field assistants, local interlocutors) will be exposed to a form of intellectual discourse and a way of work which may be beneficial to their future employment prospects and for the development of their communities.

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## Job Advertisement

# Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Halle (Saale)

Our Institute has the opportunity to offer

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The grants are to be awarded in the context of the following research program:

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Integration and conflict are central points of reference for the analysis of the interaction of ethnic groups and states. The construction, meaning and communication of identity offer an important field of research within this frame of reference. The analysis of descriptions of the self and the other in processes of peaceful and violent interaction and, in particular, the development of identities in confrontations with other groups, are at the centre of this research program. Description and analysis of conflict mechanisms also play an important role here. The regional foci of this research project are West Africa, Northeast Africa and Central Asia. Further background information concerning these projects can be found on our homepage: <http://www.eth.mpg.de>.

The BAT-O IIa Position is for three years (with the possibility of a two-year extension). BAT-O IIa Positions are open to scientists who have completed their doctorate within the last ten years.

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- **Junior Conflict and Reconciliation Specialist**

The conflict analyst will work with the Project on the Improvement of Farming Systems Project in the Bay and Bakool regions of Southern Somalia. The GTZ will fund the conflict analyst for 2 years of practical work on the project, and the MPI will fund a subsequent three year (2 + 0,5 + 0,5 are the usual contract periods) research grant.

Payment during the first phase will be in the range of Euro 1,500 (salary), plus 150 (health insurance) and 150 (housing allowance), per month. One flight home per year (up to EURO 1,200), will also be paid. The conflict analyst will spend most of his/her time in the field and concentrate on the micro and meso levels.

Depending on the qualifications of the candidate, and on successful completion of Phase One, the MPI will offer the conflict analyst a PhD grant or similar funding to give him or her the opportunity to evaluate his/her practical experience from the perspective of social science (social anthropology). This grant will comprise a further year of field research with a more open focus than that required by the project activities of Phase One. Much of this year may be spent in the project area, so that the analyst will also be able to contribute to the project in this second phase. The scientific output will be a PhD thesis or a similar major publication. This will focus on the genesis, the course and the resolution of conflicts in Bay and Bakool, their connections to conflicts in the wider region, the interface between development intervention and local/regional peace processes, media perceptions of these processes and the international political framework in which these take place.

Applications should include the standard documentations and a project resume. Final selection will be made following interviews in June-August 2004. Please send applications and the names of two referees (whom we may contact for confidential references) to the following address before **May 7<sup>th</sup> 2004**:

Max-Planck-Institute for Social Anthropology  
Personnel Administration, P. O. Box 11 03 51, 06017 Halle/Saale, Germany