THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AFAR REGION OF ETHIOPIA

A DYNAMIC PERIPHERY

[Maknun Gamaledin Ashami]
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ABOUT THE SERIES
This series of *Field Notes and Research Projects* does not aim to compete with high-impact, peer-reviewed books and journal articles, which are the main ambition of scholars seeking to publish their research. Rather, contributions to this series complement such publications. They serve a number of different purposes.

In recent decades, anthropological publications have often been purely discursive – that is, they have consisted only of words. Often, pictures, tables, and maps have not found their way into them. In this series, we want to devote more space to visual aspects of our data.

Data are often referred to in publications without being presented systematically. Here, we want to make the paths we take in proceeding from data to conclusions more transparent by devoting sufficient space to the documentation of data.

In addition to facilitating critical evaluation of our work by members of the scholarly community, stimulating comparative research within the institute and beyond, and providing citable references for books and articles in which only a limited amount of data can be presented, these volumes serve an important function in retaining connections to field sites and in maintaining the involvement of the people living there in the research process. Those who have helped us to collect data and provided us with information can be given these books and booklets as small tokens of our gratitude and as tangible evidence of their cooperation with us. When the results of our research are sown in the field, new discussions and fresh perspectives might sprout.

Especially in their electronic form, these volumes can also be used in the production of power points for teaching; and, as they are open-access and free of charge, they can serve an important public outreach function by arousing interest in our research among members of a wider audience.
PREFACE TO THE REPRINT
(MAKNUN GAMALEDIN ASHAMI)

This book has been lying on my desk for the past 32 years. I submitted it as my PhD thesis in November 1985. Professor I. M. Lewis, who was my external examiner, suggested I speak to James Curry about the possibility of publishing it. But then my life changed dramatically when my newly born daughter took a grip on my life. My daughter and making a living became top priorities. It was not until I came to the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (MPI) in Halle/Saale that I realized it was high time to make my thesis available for other scholars concerned with the predicaments of Afar pastoralists in the face of ‘development’ in the Awash Valley, Ethiopia. In 2014, I was invited by Professor Günther Schlee to come to the MPI to work with Jean Lydall on archiving the ethnographic estate of Glynn Flood, and to produce a volume for the series Field Notes and Research Projects of his department ‘Integration and Conflict’, which he hoped would allow scholars to follow Glynn’s scrutiny of ‘development’ in the Afar case, be useful for teaching fieldwork methodology, and provide invaluable data for the analysis of Afar nomadism.¹

I am grateful to Professor Günther Schlee who suggested that my dissertation could be reprinted without any changes as an historical document. Furthermore, Prof. Schlee suggested that a new preface be written explaining the reasons for reprinting the document at this time. I have added a new index related to names of places mentioned in the text.

The major shift from the Derg to the Ethiopian Peoples Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF) led to the establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia founded on nine ethnic-based states in 1994. The Afar National Regional State came into being. Certainly since then, this new development has improved the life of a small segment of the Afar population, but not the life of the semi-nomadic pastoralists who constitute the majority of people living in the Awash Valley. The change of the political situation was shaped by the federal government’s ‘Growth and Transformation Strategy’ which involved the promotion of large scale projects in the peripheries of the Ethiopian State without the consent of the local populations. In the Awash Valley a twin strategy was adopted allocating more than 70,000 ha of land to the development of sugar plantations, and the continuation of villagization programs that had been started under the Derg. As a result of

¹ Glynn Flood was a British anthropology student, who was killed by government forces in 1975 while he had been carrying out research in the Afar region of Ethiopia. His widow, Michèle, donated Glynn’s work journals, field notes, photos and other materials to the MPI to be archived and made accessible for research. Our work is now complete and has been published as volume XXI of Field Notes and Research Projects, under the title ‘In Pursuit of Afar Nomads: Glynn Flood Work Journal and Letters from the Field, 1973–1975’.
the sugar project thousands of pastoralists have been displaced and removed from their traditional grazing and watering areas close to the Awash River and its tributaries. As the government intends to implement a policy of forced sedentarization, it has not provided pastures in these new settlements. Other promises such as schools and clinics have neither materialized. One observer noted that the sugar development project is perceived negatively by the local Afar, who see it as an initiative that confiscates their land and leads to impoverishment of the local inhabitants, rather than as an agent of positive change (Firehiwot and Yonas 2015: 28). Now we have a newly formed Ethiopian government, with fresh promises to tackle corruption and inequality. However, there is no talk of moving away from the federal government’s ‘Growth and Transformation Strategy’. How will the Afar fare in this newly emerging power structure?

Many people at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology have helped me, and special thanks go to Viktoria Giehler-Zeng, Viola Stanisch, Anja Neuner, Anett Kirchhof, Manuela Pusch and Robert Dobslaw. I would also like to thank Jean Lydall for her encouragement and continual support.

Reference
The Political Economy of the Afar Region of Ethiopia:
A Dynamic Periphery

By

Maknun Gamaledin Ashami

A dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Wolfson College.

7 November 1985
To my wife, Sofia.
Declaration

I hereby declare that the length of this dissertation does not exceed the limits prescribed by the degree committee of the Social and Political Science Committee.

Maknum Gamaledin Ashami.
PREFACE:

Many people and institutions have assisted in various ways during the preparation of this research and to thank them all here, the list would be too long. However, my deepest thanks and gratitude are first due to my research supervisor, Dr. A.F. Robertson for many years of support, guidance and encouragement. His assistance far exceeded his official role. I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to Michele Flood for her great help from the initial stages of my research project and during the course of preparation of this dissertation. Thanks is also due to my brother H.G. Ashami for his selfless effort to support my education and whose encouragement and assistance was of immense importance during the course of this study. Special thanks is also due to AbdulRahman A. Idris for his support.

Several institutions have contributed to different stages of this research. I would like to express my gratitude to the World University Service which gave me an award to do postgraduate studies at Cambridge (1978-79; 1981-83). This support covered travelling expenses to Paris and Rome to consult documents and to undertake limited fieldwork in Djibouti (1981; 1982). Thanks are also due to the Government of the United Arab Emirates, Wolfson College, the Islamic Centre in London, the managers of Chadwick Award and the Noel Buxton Trust for postgraduate support scheme (administered by African Educational Trust) for providing me with financial and other support. I am also grateful to the following research centres and persons for access to materials: Mr. P. P. Bonnemaison, and the FAO documentation centre (Rome); the director and staff of the Istituto Italo-Africana (Rome); George Malecot and his staff at CHEAM (Paris); Tom Boyd and Neil Monroe of the Hunting Technical Services Ltd.; J.K. Dick chairman of the MCG and Mr. Peter O'Toole also from Mitchell Cotts Group (London); the International Disaster Institute (London) and the Department of Land Economy at Cambridge. It is also my privilege to thank the following persons for information and advice regarding Afar history and social structure: H.E. Sultan Alimirah, Elwan Yaye, Mohammed Gumhed, Sayiid Ismael, Musa danaba, Sayiid Abdullah Abdul Rahman, Alimirah Helem, and
other members of Sultan Alimirah's entourage. I have also benefited from discussions with E. Chedeville (Djibouti), Abdul Kadir Musa, Guedda Mohammed and Mohammed Abubeker and Assa Ismael (ALF). Among my Cambridge friends mention must be made of Dr. Francesca Bray, Dr. David Lehmann and Iona Lehmann, Dr. S. Smith who supported my application to pursue my research at Cambridge, Tegagne Teke, Ahmed Abdullah Ahmed, Ibtihal Rashad, Ivo and Jean Strecker, Kamal Mohammed Ibrahim, and Terhas Hagos whose friendship and encouragement kept my spirits high. Thanks is also due to Haile Larebo, for his support and help with the translation of Italian material, to Sathananda for typing part of the thesis and Carole Cheah for helping with maps.

I am particularly grateful to Mohammed H. Shehenieh for his selfless help in the production of the thesis through the University main computer framework.

Finally, I am greatly indebted to my wife, Sofia, whose continuous support, unfailing encouragement and dedication were of immense help to me.
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

Maknun Gamaledin Ashami
Wolfson College.
Cambridge
7 November 1985
ABBREVIATIONS

A.A = Addis Ababa
AAI = Annali dell'Africa Italiana (Rome).
AFC = Awa Farmers Cooperative.
ALF = Afar Liberation Front.
ANLM = Afar National Liberation Movement.
JAA = Journal of African Affairs
JAS = Journal of African Studies
ASMAI = Archivio Storico del Ministero dell'Africa Italiana.
ASR = African Studies Reveiw
AVA = Awash Valley Authority
AVDA = Awash Valley Development Agency
BIFAN = Bulletin de l'Institut Française d'Afrique Noire (Yaounde)
BRSGI = Bollettino del Reale Societa Geografica Italiana
BSAI = Bollettino della Societa Africa Italiana
BSBG = Bulletin de la Royale Societe Belge de Geographie
BSG = Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie (Paris).
BSGI = Bollettino della Societa Geografica Italiana.
BSOAS = Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
BSA = Bulletin Societe Anthropologie (Paris).
C.A.F = Centre Allaince Française (Djibouti)
CDC = Commonwealth Development Corporation (London)
CFNIS = Consolidated Food and Nutrition Information System (Addis Ababa).
C.D.F. = Centre de documentation Française (Paris).
C.F.S. = Cote Francaise des Somali (Now Djibouti).

Dj = Djibouti

EFD = Ethiopian Farm Development (Awash Valley)

ELF = Eritrean Liberation Front

ENI = Ethiopian Nutrition Institute

E.P.I.D. = Extension and Project Identification Department of the Ministry of Agriculture.

FAO = Food and Agricultural Organisation

FSLAV = Feasibility Study of the Lower Awash Valley

HSIU = Haile Selassie I University

HVA = Handels Vereniging Amsterdam

IAR = Institute of Agricultural Research (Melka Werer, Middle Awash).

IDR = Institute of Development Research (Addis Ababa)

IBRD = International Bank of Reconstruction and Development

IDI = International Disastor Institute (London)

IEG = Imperial Ethiopian Government

ILCA = International Livestock Center for Africa (Addis Ababa)

Jabha = Jabhat al Tahrir al afariya (i.e. Afar Liberation Front).

JES = Journal of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa)

JMAS = Journal of Modern African Studies

JRGS = Journal of Royal Geographical Society

LMB = Livestock and Meat Board (Addis Ababa)

MCG = Mitchell Cotts Group (Addis Ababa-London)

MLRA = Ministry of Land Reform and Administration
MMST = Minimum Mechanisation Settler Trial.
NERDP = North East Rangelands Development Project.
NLR = New Left Review
NRD = National Resources Development (Awash Valley)
PLCO = Planning Commission Office (Addis Ababa)
PMAC = Provisional Military Administrative Council
PMGSE = Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia
RAL = Rendicato del Reale Accademia dei Lincei (Rome)
RAIN = Royal Anthropological Institute News
RCC = Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (Addis Ababa).
REPEA = Revue d'Etudes Politiques et Economiques Africaines (Paris).
RKP = Routledge and Paul Kegan
ROAPE = Review of African Political Economy
RSO = Rivista degli Studi Orientali (Rome)
SFYDP = Second Five Year Development Plan
T.F.A.I. = Territroire Francaise des Afar et des Issa (Now Djibouti)
TFYDP = Third Five Year Development Plan
TPSC = Tendaho Plantations Shares Company
UNDP = United Nations Development Program
UNSF = United Nations Special Fund
VADA = Valleys Agricultural Development Authority
Water Commission = The State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, Victoria, Australia.
Summary of Dissertation.

The Political Economy of the Afar Region of Ethiopia: A Dynamic Periphery.

This study examines the responses of semi-nomadic Afar pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to the expansion of agricultural capitalism. It is based on data acquired from the Awash Valley region of Ethiopia. From the late 1950s onwards this valley was subject to the intrusion of capitalism in the form of foreign managed plantations, state-planned sedentarisation of nomads on irrigated agriculture, and spontaneous development by a powerful local Sultanate. The thesis is organised into seven Chapters. The introductory Chapter discusses Development Theories, and their relevance to the study of peripheral social formations. The line of analysis pursued here rejects some basic assumptions embodied in liberal and radical development theories which postulate that these societies are inert and passive, either subject to the forces of modernising industrialism or the whims of International Capital. Instead it is argued that the periphery is dynamic, in that it affects, and modifies the advancing capitalism, producing consequences not anticipated in the theories. The social and environmental setting in the Awash River Basin is introduced in Chapter Two. Chapter Three analyses the nature and policies of the Ethiopian State. Particular attention is given to State policy towards the Awa Sultanate. Chapter Four discusses the pattern of advancing capitalism in Ethiopia in general and the Awash Valley in particular. Special attention is given to the Awash Valley Authority and the institutional problems affecting its role in the valley. Chapter Five pursues the issue of local responses by examining spontaneous sedentarisation in the Awa Sultanate, where Afar used organisations transplanted from their traditional society as a vehicle for development, thereby making their own particular adaptation to the expanding capitalism. Chapter Six is divided into two parts. In part one, regional and local political processes are examined by analysing the political relationship between the Awa Sultanate and the Ethiopian political centre 1960-75. The second part discusses the changes brought about in the political economy of the Afar region by the Ethiopian
Revolution. These are manifested in the demise of the Awas Sultanate, the increasing state control of agricultural development, and the corresponding political instability expressed in the emergence of the Afar Liberation Front. The concluding chapter sums up the discussions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study is based on data acquired over some 12 years from the Awash Valley in the North-Eastern lowlands of Ethiopia. From the late 1950s onwards, this valley was subject to the intrusion of capitalism in the form of foreign managed plantations and state-planned sedentarisation of nomads on irrigated agriculture. Nevertheless, we shall argue that there is 'dynamism in the periphery', expressed in the way various social actors continually struggle among themselves, and against agents of the state and external capital, in order to control access to the means of production and to influence their development. These interactions take place at various levels and assume varied forms. The Awash Valley experience is an example of how the expansion of capitalism, emanating from western industrialised centres, is shaped by the political economy of the periphery.

The line of analysis pursued in this dissertation rejects some basic assumptions embodied in liberal and radical development theories which have had currency at different times over the last twenty-five years. Despite their ideological differences, there is a common element in these theories: they all presume that societies in the periphery of the world capitalist system are inert and passive, either subject to the forces of Modernising industrialism or to the whims of international capital emanating from metropolitan centres. Consequently the social structure of peripheral societies is seen either as the object of change [1] or as a

mere extension of the metropolitan centre. [2]

1.1 Theories of development and underdevelopment

If we examine liberal theories of 'Modernisation', we can observe that a common theme in the approach is the conceptualisation of development as a movement along a continuum of historical change. This continuum is described as a universal path of societal evolution, such as that already followed by modern western capitalist societies. Other societies were expected to follow the same route. This evolutionist and functionalist approach relied on ideal type polar opposites inspired by Parson's 'pattern variables'. [3] It was premised on the dichotomy of modernity and tradition. The former, with universalistic and achievement patterns, was represented by the experiences of those societies of Western Europe and North America which combine industrial economies with representative democracy. [4] In the words of G. Almond, 'the Model Modern...can only be derived from the most empirical, and formal analysis...of modern Western politics'. [5] Traditional societies were identified with particularistic and ascriptive patterns, characterised as an original state, defined as backward, stagnant and lacking attributes of developed modernity. [6] The process of modernization was achieved through diffusion at several levels: the social structure, culture and individual personality. [7] Modernisation theories envisaged problems or breakdowns in the process, but these were explained as 'shortfall from the norm' caused as a result of

'integration' not keeping abreast with 'differentiation'. [8]

The main difficulties with this approach are:
(1) Its use of ideal type polar opposites: are achievement and universalism so all-pervasive in modern societies, and ascription and particularism so entirely absent? Is particularism and the ascription of social status so generally characteristic of traditional societies, and are universalism and social achievement always absent? Can a whole range of societies with very different histories be put together in one category or the other?
(2) Modernisation theories postulate the existence of two different sectors, one modern and one traditional, and locate the obstacles to development within the latter: major political conflicts take place between these sectors. Such analysis ignores the fact that these "sectors" are interrelated, and that the traditional and the modern may be represented by one social group or, as we shall see in the case of Sultan Alimirah of Awa in the Awash Valley, in the activities of a single person.

The publication of Gunder Frank's work in 1967 constituted a major break with modernisation theories. [9] He explained underdevelopment not as an original state, but as a product of a historical process generated by the removal of surplus from the satellite to the metropolis, thereby creating economic development in the centre whilst at the same time underdeveloping the periphery. [10] The work of Frank brought a renewal of interest in Marxist theories and their application to the problems of developing societies. [11] I share with such scholars the fundamental assumption that all social formations at present form part of an

international economic system in which some units have the capacity to keep the rest 'dependent'. I also share their interest in Marxist theories of development, and their image of the problems of development penetrating outwards from the Western industrialised centres to non-capitalist or capitalising peripheries. Yet the views of Frank, and the many authors inspired by his work, seem to have much in common with Modernisation theories; as Skocpol states, they are 'plagued by the mirror image trap of attempting to create a new paradigm through direct polemical opposition to the old one while remaining in the same problematic'. [12] There are many variations of these theories, but for our purpose it is sufficient to rely on Colin Leys' summary of their main features:
(a) The social, economic and political conditions prevailing throughout the 'Third World' to-day are not due to the persistence of an 'original' (undeveloped or 'untouched') state of affairs, but are the result of the same world-wide historical process in which 'the first world' (developed market economies) became 'developed'; the development of the Third World involved a closely associated process of subordinate development or underdevelopment.
(b) The prime mover in this process was capital seeking profits, i.e., seeking opportunities to accumulate capital; specifically, capitalist merchants, capitalist bankers, capitalist insurers, etc. and finally capitalist manufacturers.
(c) Their activities involved accumulating capital where this could be done cheaply and investing it where the return to investment was highest. This gave rise to a process of surplus removal from some parts of the world to others, perpetuating and rigidifying in new ways the low level of productivity in the areas from which the surplus was taken; and also structuring these economies so as to subordinate them systematically to the structure of the economies where capital was being accumulated. This expressed itself in the external orientations of the subordinate economies.
(d) Secondary structural consequences of this served to reproduce the

process and constantly block local initiatives to pursue an autonomous development path.

(e) The correspondence, emergence and formation of social classes at the capitalist periphery with interests in common with the bourgeoisie of the metropoles made possible the development of colonial, neo-colonial and semi-feudal states representing successive types of such alliances.

(f) The term 'underdevelopment' refers to these self-perpetuating processes, self-reproducing structures, and to their results. The term 'dependency' is sometimes used to refer to exactly the same things, and sometimes used more specifically to refer to the non-autonomous nature of laws or tendencies governing change in the social formation of the periphery. In spite of disagreements between users of the two terms, their differences seem less important than their extensive points of general agreement. [13]

Let us consider briefly some of the shortcomings of this group of theories:

1. Unit of analysis: Unlike its predecessor, it made the focus of its analysis the international dimension of development. This is a step forward but it takes little account of the specific histories of the peripheral social formations, for according to underdevelopment theories these could be studied only from a world perspective. [14] In the words of Wallerstein, "leaving aside the now defunct minisystems, the only kind of social system is a world system, which we define quite simply as a unit


with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems". [15] The concepts of metropole, satellites, core, periphery, and semi-periphery have little precise meaning; likewise surplus extraction, appropriation and exploitation are not defined, nor are we told how they take place.

2. Economic determinism: Unlike its predecessor which "asserts the goal of modernity if correct prescriptions are followed, underdevelopment theories assert that whatever changes occur in the peripheral social formations, they will never achieve development within the capitalist system". [16] This is in part due to Frank's focus on the issue of growth, and on the incapacity of capitalism in the periphery to achieve it. In fact this line of analysis is an integral part of the way they construe the world economy and how it operates. According to this view, the world is under the tight control of a supposedly homogenous group of capitalists (or states). This assumption, however, ignores a whole epoch of struggle which was waged and won by peoples of the Third World and elsewhere. It is a deterministic approach which presumes fatalism and resignation. [17] The general feeling in the Third World is best summarised by a Third World scholar:

There could be no greater slur inflicted on our capabilities; we are nincompoops, we are unable to ensure a local supply of exploiters, the process of exploitation has to be initiated elsewhere...This itself is neo-colonialism of a sort. [18]

3. Social Classes and the State: The overemphasis on economic determinism causes theories of dependent underdevelopment to 'displace class relations from the centre of analysis of economic development' [19] because, according to this approach, everything, from social classes to the state, politics and ideology, is all derived from, and shaped by, economic

forces. [20] Its neglect of the state and social classes is mainly responsible for its analysis of the peripheral social formations as being 'passive' and 'inert'.

Some theories of underdevelopment interpret peripheral social formations in terms of interrelated modes of production. [21] A mode of production is defined by its component relations of production, i.e., the direct relations between the immediate producers of the surplus and its immediate appropriation. These theorists consider "involvement in market relations as irrelevant to the definition of a mode of production...thus whilst the mode of production approach acknowledges the existence of a capitalist world system knit together by market relations, it recognises a capitalist mode of production only where labour is 'free'". [22] It argues that capitalism perpetuates but simultaneously perverts the precapitalist social formations. Whereas the world system theories explain everything with reference to the system imperative, this group of theories emphasises that "the character and development of all social formations must be understood in terms of basic contradictions 'internal' to these formations". [23] This again has an analogy with Modernisation Theories for it too rests on the primacy of internal relations. [24] Thus, the mode of production theorists have narrowed the definition of the relations of production, thereby displacing from the centre of analysis "the much wider complex of relations of class, state, inter-state which define the dynamics of third world social formations". [25]

In general, the neo-Marxists identify some very important structural causes of the contradictions of capitalism, but their attempts to explain political and economic transformations in the periphery are constructed from the historical experience of the West and thus they are unable to grasp the realities of the Third World countries. Furthermore, those underdevelopment theories which rest on the Althusserian model view change and development in terms of the system's functional or reproductive requirements, and depict human beings in general and classes in particular as puppets of a complex system of structural determinism. [26]

1.2 Dependency and Peripheral Dynamism

In this thesis we shall argue that the periphery is dynamic, in that it affects and modifies the advance of capitalism, producing consequences not anticipated in the above theories of development and underdevelopment. To explain this, we will first consider the nature of capitalism and the way it has historically expanded. We will then characterise the capitalisation of the periphery as an internal and external process involving competing interest groups (including proto-classes). And in the main body of the thesis we shall explore this 'dynamism of the periphery' in one particular region of the world - the Awash Valley in the north-eastern lowlands of Ethiopia.

Historically, capitalism has not expanded evenly over time and space. S. Amin makes a useful attempt to show how capitalism continues to adjust its inherent contradictions between the capacity to produce and the capacity to consume, by extending its markets wider and deeper. [27] Unlike Frank, who tends to see the world capitalist system in a highly aggregated manner, stressing its continuity as a whole, Amin explains the different forms taken by the world capitalist system, and the different


functions performed by the periphery at different points in time. [28]

This diversity in the development of capitalism is also stressed with
regard to Latin America by Cardoso and Faletto. [29] The uneveness of
capitalist development is best summarised by Wallerstein:

Capitalism has thus overcome its periodic difficulties, the
bottlenecks of accumulation, in a cyclical pattern. Neither
the leading industries (in terms of profitability) nor the
leading countries (in terms of power and concentration of
accumulated capital and wealth) have remained the same over
time. Strong products and strong states seem to have passed
through patterns of growth and relative decline, each
succeeded by another and the world system has far from
exhausted the list of products or states that could play these
roles. [30]

Although Wallerstein would not agree, we believe that this very
process, interacting with nationalism among other factors, has produced
varying and competing capitalist centres. The inter-imperialist rivalry in
the 19th century was a manifestation of this competition. [31] In our time
these rivalries continue in different forms notably by competition
between the capitalist centres and the socialist states, which are
increasingly becoming involved in the capitalist market. This situation
elicits varying local responses to advancing capitalism, as national and
sub-national centres take advantage of the fact that the diffusion of
capital is not from a single source, but from several. These include the
State, other States, multilateral organisations, multi-national
corporations, etc.

Following James Petras, who rejects the 'internal relations' of the
modes of production analysis, and the 'external relations' of the world
system view, we will explicate the main features of peripheral societies
through the study of the manner in which external and internal class
structures cross one another, and of the various combinations of class

[29] Cardoso, H.Fand Faletto, 1973, Dependency and Underdevelopment in
Latin America. Berkeley; Cardoso, F., 1972, 'Dependency and Development
Dynamics of Global Crisis, pp.21-22.
alliance and interrelation. The State plays a crucial role in this process because directly and indirectly it fosters the process of accumulation which shapes class structures and class transformations. [32] According to Petras, capitalist development on the world scale has helped the emergence of linking strata, which are found in the system of externally oriented production or in the State apparatus. These strata orient production outwardly and exploit internally. The process of decolonisation gave them access to the instrumentality of the post-colonial State, and thus a choice of several development strategies based on different internal and external class alliances:

(i) There is the 'neo-colonial' strategy in which the national regime participates with the core bourgeoisie in exploiting the indigenous labour force.
(ii) The national regime may decide to follow a 'national developmentalism' strategy, based on exploitation of the indigenous labour force, and the limitation of shares going to imperial firms.
(iii) The regime may forge alliances with the indigenous labour force, nationalise foreign and even indigenous enterprises, redistribute income and generally undertake a 'national populist' strategy against core capital. [33]

Petras elaborates extensively on the interactions among these strategies and the role of the imperial state in shoring up some neo-colonial regimes and undermining others. [34]

Unlike dependency theorists, he succeeds in presenting some practical explanations, based on investigations of class structures and class relationships in peripheral social formations. However, he falls into the same trap as the world system theorists, when he insists on the pre-eminence of the imperial state: "the social and political nature of the state in the periphery is best understood through its relationship to the imperial state - whose role and activities in the formation of the

[33] Ibid., pp.206-07.
[34] Ibid., pp.210-11.
imperial network include shaping the state in the periphery". [35] This statement leaves very little scope for autonomy of the peripheral state vis-a-vis the imperial centres. In fact it sounds like Wallerstein's approach which implies that the state is subordinated to the forces generated by the world system. [36] We accept Petras' description of the role of the 'imperial state' in propping up and destabilising some regimes, but he does not explain why the imperial state succeeds with some and fails with others. Some of the phrases he uses, such as 'developmental regimes' in which the army plays an important role in organising society, and 'state building', which is another name for 'nation building', seem to have some affinity with 'political development' as perceived by the modernisation theorists. [37] Finally, he fails to attend fully to the nature of capitalist development and its expansion, particularly to the diversity of the centres from which capitalism emanates. As we shall argue here, it is this diversity which national and sub-national groups can exploit.

1.3 Peripheral Dynamism and the Awash Valley

We now proceed to identify the social actors who were involved in the development process in the Awash Valley of the north-eastern lowlands of Ethiopia. Prior to the intrusion of capitalism, the Awash Valley was the home of the semi-nomadic Kereyu (Oromo) and Afar (also known as Danakil) pastoralists. An exception to this pre-eminence of pastoralism was the existence of an ancient peasantry, which made use of irrigation agriculture, and the agro-pastoralists who co-existed with this peasantry, in the Afar Sultanate of Awsa (also written as Aussa).

In the Awash Valley, the external agents were represented by foreign-managed plantations; by multinational organisations seconded to

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[35] Ibid., p.211.
government agencies; private international consultants contracted by their own governments or by the Ethiopian government; international chemical companies; and international aerial spray companies, one of which was the Polish State Aircraft Company. Some of the big plantations, such as the Dutch HVA (Handels Vereniging Amsterdam) sugar estate and the British-managed Tendaho plantations S.C. (henceforth referred to as TPSC or Tendaho) formed joint ventures with the State, while other plantations were owned by resident private foreign interests.

The internal agents can be divided into two groups: the national and sub-national. The National comprised the State (provincial administrations and other development agencies); the Awash Valley Authority (henceforth referred to as AVA) which was responsible for the administration and management of the Valley's natural resources; and the nationals who were granted concessions by the AVA. The last are non-Afar Ethiopians from outside the Valley. There were also highland migrant labourers who had no access to land in the Valley, but most of whom had access to land in their areas of origin.

The sub-national groups are the indigenous inhabitants of the Valley, namely the semi-nomadic Oromo and Afar pastoralists among whom were found the main victims of capitalist penetration. The Afar comprise the larger group, and are our main concern here. They were represented by the Awsean polity, itself made up of several strata: the Afar capitalist farmers, increasingly represented by the Aysa Farmers Cooperative (henceforth referred to as AFC); the Makaatan (i.e. elders) of the middle Awash Valley; and the Afar settlers at the Dubti and Amibara development schemes.

To these may be added other interests from outside the Valley who exerted substantial influence on the actions of both the State and the emerging polity in Aysa, in connection with developments in the Awash. These are the Eritrean Liberation Front (henceforth referred to as ELF), many of whose supporters were involved as administrators and farmers, and which was active across the borders in southern Eritrea; and the Somali and Afar nationalists competing for hegemony in the then French Territory.
of Afar and Issa (now Djibouti). [38]

In explaining the 'dynamism of the periphery' in one particular region of the world, we need to take account of the following:

1. The structure and interest of the particular State in question.
2. The pattern of advancing capitalism in that State.
3. The nature of society and economy in the 'periphery' of that State.
4. The nature of involvement of all national and sub-national interests in the political economy of that periphery.

1.3.1 The Structure and Interests of the Ethiopian State

The modern State of Ethiopia was established at the turn of the century by indigenous forces interacting with external forces which were competing for areas of influence in the Horn of Africa. This process was spearheaded by the Northern Amhara/Tigrians, who are Christians. They brought vast areas of rich territory, inhabited by people of diverse culture, into the Ethiopian Empire. They extended and imposed their quasi-feudal political-economic system into the populous peasant areas, but they did not move into nomadic areas because they lacked the administrative and technical capacity to harness resources there. Thus the region under consideration here remained outside their control until 1944, although tribute was collected. [39] Ethiopia as a whole did not have a country-wide administration until after the end of Italian rule in 1941, when attempts were made to set up a centralised civil and military


bureaucracy. [40] This was associated with the introduction of agricultural reforms to consolidate the position of the newly-formed State bureaucracy. This class formed an alliance with the aristocracy as its junior partner. It also presided over the introduction of capitalism. [41] This took the form of large-scale commercialisation in the Awash Valley, and the introduction of the 'green revolution' in peasant agriculture. [42] Both involved large amounts of foreign investment, management and aid.

Let us now turn to the policy of the central government towards the Afar region, and particularly the Aawsa Sultanate. After 1941, the Ethiopian government began to view the Afar territory as politically important by virtue of its strategic location, controlling the entrance to the Red Sea, and economically important because of the agricultural resources of the Awash Valley. [43] In addition, because of the increasing instability in Eritrea after 1962 and the growing Somali nationalism in Djibouti after 1958, [44] the Ethiopian government had to co-opt Afar leaders, enlisting "their support for a proposal to create a Greater Danakali (Afar) as a semi-autonomous unit inside the Ethiopian realm". [45] The policy of the central government in this region was, on the one hand, to create an Afar officialdom on lines similar to those within Ethiopia by conferring titles on Afar notables, with associated stipends. On the other hand the Aawsa


Sultanate was given the privilege of acting as the bridge-head through which the centre was to exert its influence. Subsequently the AVA was to serve as a link to create an economic bond with the wider Ethiopian society, but this role had already been taken up by the emerging polity in Awasa, which successfully outmanoeuvered the AVA not only in the Valley but also in the corridors of power in the Ethiopian provincial capitals, and in Addis Ababa.

1.3.2 The Pattern of Advancing Capitalism in Ethiopia, and in the Awash Valley

John Markakis has summed up the form of capitalist intrusion in Ethiopia as follows:

The new mode of production embodied all the defects of peripheral capitalism, many of them in an exaggerated form. In order to compensate partially for the lack of conspicuous economic attraction, the regime enacted an investment code which was described as "one of Africa's most liberal". In addition, it gave land practically free, provided monopoly protection for industry, and prevented the organisation of labour in order to maintain low wages. It also invested heavily in the infrastructure required to sustain profitable investment, and in numerous joint ventures with foreign firms. Stimulated by the appearance of a domestic market - the State itself emerged as a major consumer - western capital was attracted into manufacturing for import substitution...By 1967, 75% of the private paid up capital in manufacturing was in foreign hands. [46]

However, Ethiopia witnessed much less foreign capital penetration than many African countries. [47] Such foreign capital as there was, was largely engaged in the Awash Valley, which offered potential for irrigated agriculture, road and rail transport to the areas of industrial concentration, and access to the ports of Assab and Djibouti.

In the Valley, agricultural development took the form of large scale plantations, which were highly mechanised, utilising land close to the

river banks which were used in the past by nomads as dry season grazing areas. There was a high concentration of output in a small number of enterprises controlling large tracts of land. For example, in 1974, only a decade and half after the intrusion of capitalism, eight private companies controlled 55% of the area under cultivation. Of this, more than half was controlled by foreign firms. [48] The Dutch-controlled sugar estate (HVA) and the British-managed Tendaho plantations controlled 22% and 17% respectively. The amount of land that had been developed reached 50,000 ha by 1972, [49] all in a small belt along the river bank. According to A.G. Goudie, "the wonji-shoa estate with total area of 5,606 ha reported in 1970/71 a net profit before tax of Eth$10,268,832 on fixed assets with a net book value of Eth$47,461,069." [50] Bondestam, writing in 1973, suggested that the total outflow of profits from the country had already surpassed the total investment. [51]

A look at any concession agreement entered into by the AVA, which was supposed to supervise and manage development projects, would reveal how AVA's hands were tied. Its agreements with foreign concessionaires lacked official governmental assurance in transactions relating to land and consequently uniformity and adequate provisions for enforcement. [52] S.D. Clark, a consultant who investigated the legal problems affecting AVA, summed up the situation:

The instability of the Authority, and its present impact outside the settlement areas do not stem so much from lack of formal power. There has, in fact, been little attempt to implement control procedures in the valley as a whole. Concessions have been granted from a position of weakness which was not justified by lack of formal power, and no attempt seems to have been made to enforce such controls over use and structure as are presently included in the agreements. [53]

[53] Ibid., p. 6. (Introduction)
Some concessionsaires, for example the Dutch-controlled HVA sugar estate, were protected by AVA's own charter, and thus were not liable for water and land fees, whilst concession agreements with non-Afar Ethiopian nationals contained clauses which gave the Authority considerable power, including the right to terminate agreements unilaterally. [54] As to the indigenous Afar and Kereyu Oromo, they were dispossessed of their traditional communal claim to land by the central government which had conferred legal control over their land on the AVA.

1.3.3 The Structure of Society and Economy in the Awash Valley

Historically, the Awash Valley is known as the main gateway for the caravan trade between the coast and highland Ethiopia. Aawsa formed an important station on this route, and Aawsa Sultans depended on revenues from trade, as did the Shoa rulers. [55] The Awash, as the home of the Afar pastoralists, and as the only oasis in this desert region, has always been regarded by Afar everywhere as the last resort to which they could fall back in times of acute crisis and drought. As the only area which grew food crops, the Awash Valley figured prominently in Afar mythology. In the Aawsa delta, a peasantry which made use of an elaborate network of irrigation existed long before the Muslim Imamate of Aawsa fell into the hands of the Moodayto pastoralists (a branch of Afar), in the middle of the 17th century. The Moodayto Sultans, who were assisted in their takeover of the delta by the Aweisan peasantry's revolt against the Muslim Imams, forged a close alliance with them at first, and did not interfere in their affairs which were managed by a complicated system of village and lineage heads. However, the Moodaytos' need to keep other Afar away from this permanent water course, and the decline of the Red Sea trade in the first decade of the 19th century, led to strains in their relations with the peasants. This period witnessed the beginning of sedentarisation among the Moodayto.

[54] Ibid., p.11. (document D)
[55] Most of the discussion here is based on travel accounts, and on M. Abir's excellent unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: see 1964, 'Trade and Politics in the Ethiopian Region 1830-1855, University of London; see also by the same author, 1966, 'Salt, Trade and Politics in Ethiopia', JES, IV, 2, pp.1-10.
The control of the peasantry was completed at the turn of the 20th century, when the caravan trade declined and the Awsa economy began to look inwards. This led to further sedentarisation of the Moodayto, and the appointment of Moodayto 'Malokti' (s. Malak) - bailiffs who managed land and water. This type of control was extended to the livestock sector of the economy. The period then witnessed the differentiation of a pastoral aristocracy, many of whose members owned land, from a client population, very many of whom were increasingly becoming dependent for their subsistence on livestock owned and managed by the Sultanate's own 'Malokti'. This re-structuring of society, and the Moodayto's historic fears of other Afar, led to the inclusion of non-Moodayto elements within the power structure, particularly as 'Malokti'. The extension of these officials to the pastoral sector, and the introduction of livestock taxes, reduced the power of the Makaaban.

The rise of the Empire of Ethiopia indirectly influenced the development of this new social formation. It began to take the form of a microcosm of the Ethiopian feudal system, although Awsa itself had escaped conquest and settlement by those who built the Ethiopian Empire. The 19th century trade, and Awsa's close links to Shoa in this regard, had brought into Awsa a small number of Abyssinian slaves, some of whom worked on special state land managed directly by 'Malokti', whilst a majority of them served as special bodyguards to the Sultan. [56] All these changes led to the emergence of a new class of Malokti who gradually began to replace the Makaaban as the most important proto-class. At this stage, the latter retained their control over the means of production which they exercised on behalf of the members of their own clans. The Malokti initially confined their activities as agricultural and livestock managers to areas inhabited by their clans. Nevertheless, the power of the Malokti, vis-à-vis

[56] There were two types of slaves. The 'Muwalad' were those who served on the Sultan's estate, and many of them were received as gifts from the Ethiopian emperors, whilst those who were retained as part of taxes on slave trade, formed members of the special bodyguard. P.Antonelli, the Italian Emissary who signed Treaties with Sultan Hanfare of Awsa in 1883 and 1888 mentioned that the army of the Sultan was made of and led by slaves: See his, 1883,"Il mio viaggio da Assab allo Scioa," BSGI,Vol.xx, PP 856-880. and his 1889, "Il primo viaggio di un Europeo attraverso L'Aussa. Diario del Conte P. Antonelli", BSGI, Vol. xxvi, pp.331-48; 526-49.
the Makaaban, was strengthened by the introduction of agricultural
capitalism. This was made possible by the multiplicity of responsibilities
conferred on the Malokti, and by the widening of their areas of management,
which now included those of several clans.

The Mitchell Cotts Group, (henceforth MCG) a British firm which managed
Tendaho plantations in the lower plains of the Awash, presided over the
creation of conditions for the emergence of rural capitalism through
massive technical and financial support for the Sultanate. The latter made
maximum use of its traditional organisation, based on the Malokti system,
to organise the production of cotton. Fear of land appropriation by the
State and by the concessionaires which it supported, and a growing demand
for cotton, led to a massive expansion of irrigated areas. The Malokti,
whose role was now expanded, acquired greater power through control of
land and its distribution. Many of them became capitalist farmers, while
retaining their position as Malokti. The new land tenure system looked
like a 'reversal of feudalism', whereby the clan (Kedho) ownership groups
leased land through the Malak to private investors, who became liable to
pay almost half of their gross profits to the clan. The Sultanate itself
acquired substantial land, and profits from taxation.

By 1967, conflict over land and water, and fear of appropriation of
land, turned the alliance with the Mitchell Cotts Group into antagonism
and competition. The availability to the Sultanate of financial credit
from private banking institutions finally broke the close-knit
relationship which had developed between the two. The Sultanate was able
to embark on a programme of consolidating land and limiting the access of
the concessionaires and the government by setting up farms around the
intrusive plantations.

1.3.4 The Nature of the Involvement of all National/Sub-national Interests
in the Political Economy of the Awash Valley

We have mentioned the interests of the Ethiopian State in securing
cash, commodities and Afar support for its policies in Eritrea and
Djibouti. This implied a contradiction because it had to grant the
concessionaires a free hand in the management of their plantations,
thereby alienating the Afar nomads and their leaders, whose support the State needed for its regional policy. Aware of these contradictions, the central government of Ethiopia opted for a low profile and gave the Aawsa Sultanate a free hand. [57] The State itself was represented in the Valley by several institutions: the provincial administrations of three regions, the Afar Makaaban and the Sultanate in their capacity as its intermediaries, and the AVA. The Aawsa Sultanate and the AVA competed for control of the means of production in the Valley. The former's claim over land was based on traditional occupation, whilst the latter's was derived from an imperial charter which established it as a manager of 'public land'. AVA, however, was not in a position to back this authority with political muscle. The concessionaires, whose interests the AVA represented, did not want a strong supervisor who would limit their activities and jeopardise their long-term interests. The State itself, which avoided the question of land anyway, did give the AVA some support, but not enough to bring complete control over the Aawsa Sultanate and the concessionaires. Thus the AVA spent much of its technical and managerial energy on two small-scale settlement schemes of its own, and in court battles with Afar Makaaban.

Its counterpart, the Aawsa Sultanate, stole the show from everyone else in the Valley. The expansion of cotton production diversified its links both inside Ethiopia and outside. At home, it used its position at the local and provincial levels, its Sultan being the province's own Balabat (official chief), to advance its interests and curtail those of AVA. The latter and its dependent concessionaires paid their taxes directly to the central treasury, while the Sultanate paid its livestock tax to the province. This arrangement, together with the Sultanate's role as arbitrator in Afar disputes in a region somewhat difficult to administer, favoured the Sultanate. For example, in 1972 a local court in Wollo ruled in favour of the Sultanate against the AVA and forced the latter to release water for a settlement scheme set up by the Sultanate. When AVA's manager refused to accept the court's ruling, he was arrested for having

refused to release water to a scheme which the government itself viewed as illegal. [58] Not everybody in the government, particularly the Prime Minister, was happy about these events in an area which was historically hostile to Christian Ethiopia. Some of the activities of the Sultanate, such as its drive for Islamisation, its growing connection with Muslims inside Ethiopia and in the Middle-East, were seen as dangerous by some elements within the bureaucracy. The Awseans kept their distance from the growing divisions within the Ethiopian State. Their activities were simply an expression of the ability of sub-national groups to exploit and manipulate diverse centres of power. The Sultanate's connection with Eritrea and Djibouti loomed substantially in the affairs in the Valley. In 1963, the Sultanate intervened directly on behalf of the Ethiopian State to defuse a strike by the Afar dockworkers at Assab. In 1970, it helped Afar elements when they decided to secede from the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front). But when it began to come under pressure from the central government in the early 1970s, it invited the ELF back into southern Eritrea. Its most significant achievement was, however, the expansion of its links with national and international business. Its contacts were at first limited to the Imperial Ethiopian Palace, but with cotton they expanded beyond Ethiopia's borders to London, Bonn, Rome, Paris and Washington. The Mitchell Cotts Group was mainly responsible for this in the beginning, but other international firms followed. By early 1972, Sultan Alimirah, and his 'Lloyds of Aysaita' as Cossins calls it, [59] began to compete with the Ethiopian bureaucracy for access and influence in international circles.

Within the Sultanate, the introduction of cotton and the emergence of new social groups brought strain in the political structure. The older traditional elites, who were replaced in the Sultanate's court by younger educated Afar, began to flirt with AVA. In 1971, there were disturbances between highland labourers and Afar at Aysaita, which split the ranks of the Afar leadership about the handling of the situation. Each section

tried to blame the other, exposing the strains within the system. The new
social forces, represented by Malokti and Afar capitalist farmers, were
winning the day, but the expansion of the irrigated area was beginning to
impinge upon the interests of the pastoral community. The conflict waged
against AVA seemed to have succeeded in uniting the two competing elites,
but only for a time.

1.4 Organisation of the Thesis and the Research

The thesis is organised in seven chapters, including the introduction
and conclusion. In Chapter Two, we introduce the social and environmental
setting in the Awash River Basin area. Historical and trade relations
among the different groups in the basin are discussed. Awsa is the focus of
our analysis. Chapter Three analyses the nature of the Ethiopian State and
its policies. Particular attention is given to State policy towards the
Awa Sultanate. Recurrent drought and problems associated with irrigation
development are discussed. Chapter Four examines the pattern of expanding
capitalism in Ethiopia in general and the Awash Valley in particular.
After introducing AVA and the institutional problems affecting its role in
the Valley, we discuss its land policy which favoured foreign private and
non-Afar Ethiopian concessionaires. Chapter Five pursues the issue of
local response by examining sedentarisation and development in the Awa
Sultanate. In the AVA's Amibara development scheme and in the Awa
Sultanate, Afar used organisations transplanted from their traditional
society as vehicles for development. In Awa, a stratified chieftaincy
with developed state functionaries received substantial financial and
technical assistance from the London based Mitchell Cotts Group but also
made its own particular adaptation to expanding capitalism. The emerging
patterns of land tenure took the form of a 'reversal' of the traditional
history of landownership. [60] Chapter Six considers regional and local
political processes before and after the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. We
look at the political relationship between the Awsean Sultanate and the
Ethiopian political centre from 1960 onwards, and then at the rise of
Almirhan, the Sultan of Awa, as an ideologue of Afar nationalism and

Islamic revivalism. We then discuss the changes brought about in the political economy of the Afar region by the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. This was manifest in the demise of the Aawsa Sultanate, the increasing State control of agricultural development, and the corresponding political instability expressed in the emergence of the Afar Liberation Front (henceforth to be referred to as ALF).

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to say something about myself, and my role as a participant-observer in Aawsa between 1972 and 1975. During this period I worked as Manager of Aawsa Import/Export Company, a subsidiary of the Aawsa Farmers Cooperative. My duties included liaison with financial institutions and other international firms, providing pesticides, aerial spray aircraft and marketing (raw) cotton. I also served on several government committees related to agriculture under the Military Government in 1974/75. [61] My involvement in a project which was in direct defiance of government policy gave me the additional advantage of a participatory role not only in agricultural activities, but in the politics of development. This makes my subjective evaluation all the more conspicuous.

When I began this research project, I was aware of the absence of a well-researched anthropological study of the Afar, which still remains a handicap. However, my extensive knowledge of and easy access to the files of H.E. Sultan Almirah, and the availability of abundant literature on development projects in the Awash Valley at the FAO documentation centre in Rome, [62] gave me the encouragement to pursue the research. This was enhanced, insofar as Afar social structure is considered, by free access to my father's manuscript - Al Mutakel ala - Akhbar Al Danakil, and Sayyid Ismael's Tarikh Al - Danakil, [63] and oral interviews with Afar elders.

[61] These were: Cotton Study Committee, under the chairmanship of Minister of Commerce and Industry, February 1974 to September 1974; Agriculture Committee under chairmanship of the Chairman of Social and Economic Affairs, PMAC.


[63] These are unpublished manuscripts written in Arabic.
from whom I was able to reconstruct some elements of social structure and history. In addition I was able to conduct extensive interviews with Sultan Alimirah, J.K. Dick, the London-based chairman of Mitchell Cotts Group, who also gave me some of his personal notes; Ato Dabebe Habte Yohannes, initiator and Managing Director of Addis Ababa Bank which financed the Amsa Farms between 1967 and 1975; Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Hayuti, Director-General of the Sultan's Agricultural Office (1965 - 1969); Mr. H.G. Ashami, Technical Advisor, AFC (1969 - 1975); and P.P. Bonnemain, FAO Project Director with the AVA. I spent several days in 1981 at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and the Land Resources Library at Surbiton, and International Disaster Institute (IDI) in London, consulting materials related to pastoralism and drought in the Afar region. The materials for Chapters four and five were acquired from FAO documentation centre in Rome, and from the Office of Hunting Technical Services Ltd., in London. My visit to Rome (January - March, 1981) to consult FAO and AVA materials was extended to cover historical records concerning Amsa's diplomatic history at the Istituto Italo-Africana, and the Italian Colonial Office. This was preceded by a short trip in January 1981 to Paris to consult the Bibliothèque Nationale and Centre de Haute Etudes sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Moderne (CHEAM) which proved to be valuable. I spent from April to July 1981 in Djibouti, making a short visit to Jeddah to interview Afar elders. I made another visit to Jeddah and Djibouti in the summer of 1982 to confirm the information which was collected on my earlier trip, to study elements of the recent political economy of the Afar region after the collapse of the Afar hegemony in the Awash Valley, and to see how the Afar had lost political power to the Issa-Somali in Djibouti. [64]

I cannot claim to have exhausted all the available materials concerning either the development projects in the Awash Valley or those related to Afar social structure and history. Because of the limitation of time and the scope of research, I am not able to deal extensively with historical

complexities here, but I intend to take these up elsewhere. However, I have
taken great care in assessing the reliability of the data, which were
checked and rechecked over long periods with those involved. It represents
many different voices, which I hope will do as much as anything to convey
the richness and diversity of this truly dynamic periphery of world
capitalism.
CHAPTER II
THE AWASH RIVER BASIN: THE PEOPLE AND THEIR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

2.1 Physical description of the Awash river basin

The Awash River Basin lies between latitudes 8 and 12 degrees north on the southern and eastern side of the central plateau of Ethiopia, extending between Addis Ababa in the west to the lowlands of the Aysaita delta in the east. It covers an area of 120,000 sq. km but the Awash River and its tributaries effectively drain an area of only 70,000 sq. km. The Awash river rises 70 km west of Addis Ababa and flows first east and then north. It is 1200 km long, and its course lies wholly within Ethiopia. It rises at an altitude of 3,000 meters above sea level and then flows in a general northerly direction before entering Lake Abbe at an altitude of 250m, (See Map No.1 for the Awash River Basin and its location). The average amount of annual rainfall for the basin as a whole is 710 mm. This rises to 1,000 mm in the upper basin, and falls to 215 mm in the lower plains. The average temperature at 1500 ft in the lower plains is estimated at 29.00 °C, and at 10,000 ft on the plateau at 13.5 °C. Thus in the Awash River Basin as elsewhere in Ethiopia altitude is one of the major factors determining climatic conditions.

Ethiopian tradition identifies four major natural zones according to altitude, climate and to some extent natural vegetation. These are: (a) The Bereha zone, a semi-arid region at altitudes below 1,500 which comprises 58% of the Awash catchment; (b) The Kola Zone, i.e. agricultural lands lying between 1,800m and 1,500m in altitude, comprising 22% of the Awash catchment; (c) The Woina Dega Zone, i.e. tropical and sub-tropical plateau at altitudes from 2,500m to 1,800m, comprising 13% of the area; and (d) the Dega Zone, i.e. tropical highlands at altitudes above 2,500m, with cool and
wet climate, comprising 7% of the Basin. [1] According to the UN survey conducted between 1961 and 1964, the valley is divided into three parts, and these are:

(i) The Upper Valley (The first 300km of the river's course)
(ii) The Middle Valley (a length of 650 kms)
(iii) The Lower Plains (the last 250 kms).

Each of these parts differs in climate and vegetation, altitude being a very important factor affecting both temperature and rainfall. [2]

2.2 Peoples of the Awash River Basin

The Awash River Basin is populated by diverse ethnic groups. The Oromo (or Galla) inhabit the area southeast of Addis Ababa, while the Guragi inhabit the area southwest of the city. Industrial development in Addis Ababa itself had attracted many members of these two groups. In the western highlands as far north as Debresina, Amhara forms the largest element, while further north Oromo or Galla dominate; still further north are the Wollo people. Most of these highlands are settled by peasancies, mainly Christian in the Amhara region, with two large Muslim Oromo groups settled in Wollo. The major industrial centres, such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, are located within this part of the basin. According to Mesfin Wolde Mariam writing in 1964, almost 35% of the total urban population of the country were located in this region. [3] In the lowlands of the basin live various pastoral people such as the Kereyu Oromo, the Afar and the Issa Somali. Unlike the highlands where population density is high, in the lowlands there is estimated to be less than five persons per sq. km. [4] The pastoralists of the Kereyu Oromo occupy a narrow belt stretching from the southern part of the upper valley all the way to the northern limits.

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Map 1: Showing the location of the Awash Basin
(M. Asham, 1985)

LEGEND

Awash river basin

Scale 1:8,000,000
of the lower valley. The Afar and Issa occupy the lower eastern portions of the valley. The Afar, the largest group to be affected by irrigation development, occupy the left and right banks of the Awash river. There are no official statistics concerning the Afar population in Ethiopia. Figures range anywhere from 600,000 to 3m depending on the source one uses. In the Awash Valley they number no more than 200,000. The Afar occupy a contiguous geographical area often referred to as the Afar Triangle. It lies in the Rift Valley and is bordered on the west by the eastern escarpment of the Abyssinian central plateau. The Red Sea forms the north eastern boundary of the Triangle. The Buri Peninsula defines the northern most border of the Afar Territory while the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line makes the southern most fringe, (See Map No.2 below for the Afar and their neighbours in the Horn of Africa).

These diverse groups of highland agriculturalists and lowland pastoralists have complementary economies, although at times there is conflict over resources. The Afar pastoralists utilize the areas close to the river banks during the dry season, and move their cattle to the escarpments during the rainy season, away from flooding and mosquitoes. Highland agriculturalists who own small plots of land, and who are unable to graze their livestock, are known to have developed a contractual system with some groups of Afar, who sell cattle to the highlanders, and then act as herdsmen for the new owners. The Afar use the milk, and share the offspring with the highland cultivators – the owners of the cows. This system satisfied both groups since the highlanders had a pressing need for


[6] The Afar are known by several names. The Arabs call them Danakil; (derived from the name of the Dankali clan who live in Beylul and who are known to have had trade relation with Arabia.); Amhara and Oromo call them Adal while Tigre call them Taltal. For more information on this and other aspects, see, Lewis, I. M., 1955, Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho, London: IAI, Conti Rossini, C., 1937, Etiopia e genti d’Etiopia, Florence; Franchetti, R., 1930. Nella Dancalia, Etiopica, Milano: Modadori; Johnston, C., 1884, Travels in southern Abyssinia through the Adal country to the kingdom of Shoa, London: J. Madden and Co.
oxen for ploughing. [7] Another form of cooperation was the reciprocal grazing arrangement whereby some Galla (Oromo) and Afar would allow each other to graze in their respective areas; alternatively, Afar would be allowed to graze their cattle during the rainy season on crop residues for which they paid an agreed amount, either in cash or in kind. [8] In addition, there were trade relations between these groups. During the nineteenth century Afar traders are known to have had special privileges in the markets of Aliu Amba and Ankobar, and trade was never interrupted by conflicts among these groups over routes or resources. Some of these famous markets still exist, while others have disappeared or been put out of reach of the Afar nomads. One finds a number of markets at the western edge of the Awash valley where the highlanders bring grain, vegetables, pulses and shammashas, [9] and lowlanders bring oxen, sheep, goats, honey, butter and aromatic woods and leaves. [10] The principal means of exchange is barter, but cash sales are on the increase.

In sum, the Awash valley exhibits various ecological zones in which differing ethnic groups with differing economies exist. The basin also embraces portions of four administrative regions: Arusi, Hararghe, Shoa and Wollo, the last two in particular being historical rivals. The region contains all or part of thirteen provinces (Awrajas), and many sub-districts (Wereda). [11] These differences in ethnic and administrative affiliation are important, and ought to be kept in mind throughout our discussions.

[9] Shammashas is a piece of cotton cloth used for protection from cold.
Map 2: Afar Land in the Horn of Africa (Afar and their Neighbours) (M. Ashami, 1985)
2.3 Historical sketch: The Afar and the Awa Sultanate

2.3.1 Afar legends of origin

The legend of Hadal-Manis, "he who is under a tree in the morning", is the most prestigious among Afar. It is related to an event which took place in the distant past, yet it is still very much alive. Its persistance and importance lies in two factors. It attributes a common ancestor to the ruling families of the north (Damoohoyta), of Awa and Radhu in the Middle Valley (Moadayto), of Tadjoura and Rahayto (Adali), and of many others. [12] It also attributes Arab ancestry to those who claim descent from Hadal-Mahis. This attribution, however, is not exclusive to these groups [13] because almost all Afar clans make such claims. [14] According to tradition, Hadal-Mahis was an Arab Sheikh and a companion of the Prophet. He appeared one morning in a tree which then shaded the well of Adaylu, [15] 30 kms north of Tadjoura. There he was found by a maidservant who, in some versions of the legend, was the daughter of Ali Ablis, [16] an Afar of Hadarmo clan, [17] later to become the ancestor of Able clan. It is often said, in addition, that the apparition was engineered by Ali Ablis, in order to spark off a rebellion among the people of the area, against

[12] E. Chedeville adds to these groups Ayrollaso, who constitute the elder branch of Adali, and Uuto, whose political power was eroded a long time ago. See Chedeville, E., 1966, op.cit. pp.178-179.

[13] The most detailed exposition using genealogical charts for almost all the Afar clans which claim an Arab ancestry is to be found in unpublished Ms, by Sheikh Gamaledin Ibrahim Khalil. AL Mutakil ala Akhbar al Danakil, n.d.

[14] According to some Afar elders, the Arab Sheikh was one of six Arab Ulama who arrived in Zeila after the rise of Islam. These included "Dulun", the ancestor of Dahimeela, an important independent Afar group of the north, and the ancestor of the Issa Somali. For Dahimeela, see Odorizzi, D., 1911, 'Zona delle Dancalia Italiana dell'ord', Monografia, No.50 Colonia Eritrea. Asmara, tipografia Firetto Betramto pp.228-236. For general information on the Issa Somali see Lewis, I. W., 1961, Notes on the social organisation of the Issa Somali, Rassegna di studi Etiopia, 17.

[15] This place is also referred to as Damoho, see Odorizzi, D., 1911, op.cit. p. 224


[17] For Hadarmo, see Odorizzi, D., 1911, op.cit. pp237-241
Dinkih-Yakani, the king of the Ankala [18] (northern Afar), who oppressed them. The Arab Sheikh was persuaded to descend from the tree after the king promised not to oppress his subjects. [19] He was also given the king's daughter for a wife but was eventually killed by the king. Out of this marriage 'Kutub le Omar', also known as Hadal-Mahis, was born. He destroyed the Ankala kingdom, and his descendants replaced them as the rulers of the Afar.

What does this legend signify? Was this the beginning of the Islamisation of the Afar, or is it simply a story which was retold over time to justify the conquest of the Awash valley, and elsewhere, by Islamised groups of Afar? The name attributed to the younger Hadal-Mahis, "Kutub le Omar", certainly indicates an association with Islam; Omar being a proper name, and "Kutub le" meaning "have books". Afar, like the Somalis, construct elaborate genealogies to demonstrate their origins in Arabia, nevertheless these genealogies hardly ever go beyond Hadal-Mahis. According to the Afar, the younger Hadal-Mahis had three sons. [20] The descendants of the latter form the ruling families: these are Adali, Damochoyta, and Moodayto. The last is composed of eight clan families known as Bahra-Kaada or eight beds, (see figure 1).

There is no doubt about the legend's prestige, but its overall importance as a source of legitimacy for the ruling families or as a unifying factor for the Afar in general is complicated by the division of

[18] For Ankala, see Odorizzi, D. 1911, op.cit pp248-49
[20] Some Afar speak also of a fourth son 'Gurale Issa' whom they claim is the ancestor of the Issa Somali.
Figure 1

HADAL-MAHIS

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ADALI
(Adali-debne)
Sultanates of
Rahayto, Gobad
and Tadjoura

MODAI LE IBRAHIM
(Moodayto)
sultanate of
Awsa and the
chiefdom of
Badhu

SAMBOLAKULI
(Damoo hoyta)
Sultanate of
Biru (or,
Giriffo)

Adohyanmara

Asahyanmara

Asahyanmara

Afkeek-maada
Arbtak-Asabakari
Kiuk-Hinkiba
Naserak-Aghini
Afar into two groups: [21] the Asahyanmara (those who say they are Reds) and the Adohyanmara (those who say they are whites). These have been identified respectively as "nobles" and "commoners." [22] The confusion arises because all the descendants of Hadal-Mahis (see figure 1) are also regarded by many foreign observers and many Afar as the "noble" elements in Afar society. The political reality in southern Afar does not conform with this view. For example, the Moodayto confederation of clans, who provide the Sultans of Awa'a, are regarded generally as Asahyanmara, while the Adali Sultans of Rahayto and Tadjoura are regarded as Adohyanmara. Both these groups are invariably reputed to descend from Hadal-Mahis.

2.3.2 The rise of Moodayto, and the Adohyanmara/Asahyanmara

The distinction between Asahyanmara (also spelled, Assaimara) and Adohyanmara (also spelled, Adoimara) is more important than the assertion of common descent from Hadal-Mahis for comprehending the pattern of power relations among Afar. The distinction, which cuts across the whole of Afar society, has been given various interpretations. Deschamps asserts that the division refers to geographical habitat [23] while Lewis asserts that the Asahyanmara are 'nobles' and the Adohyanmara 'commoners'. [24] However, Lewis recognises that "the distinction is hardly one of caste, and is not comparable to that between noble Somali, and outcaste Sab." [25] He further notes that much of the writing on the Afar "is invalidated through a failure to elucidate the nature of this distinction in particular tribal groups, and a very thorough study of Afar social organisations needs to be

[21] There are other historical and social divisions. For example the Afar divide themselves into Suget i.e 'those who were there,' and Yamaeta i.e 'those who came.' The former comprise the ancient groups and the latter comprise all the Asahyanmara and Adohyanmara. Among southern Afar we find a low caste group known as Bunta. This group work as black smiths in Awa'a and Tadjoura where they are known as Koor or Tunta, In Bedhu (Afar claim that Bunta came from Somalia) they are dependent cattle keepers. They are not free men but dependents of the clans they are attached to. There is no intermarriage between Bunta and other Afar clans.

[22] Lewis, I. M., 1955, op.cit. p.155; see also Chaillley, 1980, pp.15-17
made before the nature of Asaimara/Adoimara cleavage can be fully appreciated." [26] Afar social organisation is certainly complex, but since we are limited by space, we will only comment briefly on the distinction. It takes varying forms in different parts of the Afar country and does appear on the surface to connote stratification, but this, we would argue is, an ideological result of Afar conquest of the Awash. We have to note that the social basis of elders (or Makaaban) among pastoral Afar in general is derived not from their control of material resources, but rather from their control of what Giddens calls "authoritative resources". [27] By this we mean primarily the elders' exclusive control of juridical affairs, based on the Mada, the Afar customary law. [28] Among the Afar, interpretation of the Mada is the exclusive domain of the Asahyanmara (the Red) elders. In some regions where a stratified chieftaincy has developed, as is the case in the Sultanate of Aawsa, this monopoly is aided by their control of political and economic resources. Thus, we must take account of regional historical variations and differences in ecology when we try to account for the distinction.

The distinction is fairly recent. According to Chedeville and the Afar elders, it did not exist prior to the Afar expansion into the Awash valley. The Afar themselves are not explicit on the timing or motive for this expansion, but they assert that it was associated with wars involving Afar for the control of the Awash delta. Chedeville reckons that these took place continuously between the 12th and 15th centuries. [29] Afar themselves talk of continuous conquests spearheaded in the north by Danoohoyta, and south into the Awash valley by Debne, Weima, and Moodayto. It should be noted that all these groups are reputed to be descendants of

Hadal-Mahis. There is no information regarding the influence of Islam on these early Afar movements, although we know that Islam played a significant role as an ideological base for the Somali and Afar expansion into Christian Abyssinia during the Muslim conquest of Abyssinia from the 14th century onwards. [30]

We will not be concerned here with the chronology of the events concerning the expansion, but will look briefly at its outcome both in the south (Moodayto) and in the north (Damoohoyta), the latter, by most accounts being an offshoot of the former. [31]

In the south, all the eight clan-families of Moodayto or Bahra-Kaada, i.e. the eight beds as they are known among Afar (see figure 1), participated in the expansion. Afar talk of continual wars between Afar and the original inhabitants of the Valley over a long period of time. During this time, the Afkeek-Maad, one of the eight clan-families (see appendix A-1 for the genealogy of the Aydaioso ruling house of Aawsa) which constitute Moodayto proper, seem to have gained the upper hand. This was prior to the emergence of Awdahis as the uncontested leader of all of Moodayto in the 17th century. The Aydaioso lineage which was to provide the Sultans of Aawsa, are descendants of Awdahis. It is also one of the lineages constituting the Afkeek sara branch of Afkeek Maada (i.e. the latter represent the descendants of two brothers, Afkeek and Maad). Their original home is in Bodoyda, near Doobi, some 180 kms south of Assab.

We have little information on the original inhabitants of the Awash Valley at that time, although the Aawsa delta, the seat of the Muslim Imamate of Awaysa since 1577, had a substantial Afar population. The Awash Valley might also have been populated by Afar. Moodayto elders, however,
claim that their ancestors encountered resistance from Oromo in the area. They substantiate their argument by pointing to one particular group, Aderkaltu, whose ancestor is said to be a certain Ama le Issa, supposedly Oromo. This group was captured in war and now forms part of Moodayto. However, there are many Afar clans in the region which the elders do not account for and which are obviously indigenous to the valley. For reasons of simplicity we will refer to these non-Moodayto groups as Adohyanmara, and many of them in fact regard themselves so. However, today Afar outside Awsa regard the whole population of the Awsa Sultanate and its pastoral dependencies, such as the Afar clans of Badhu in the Middle Awash and the area around the Mille river (a tributary of the Awash), who are a mixture of the two, as Asahyanmara or simply Moodayto. The two designations have become synonymous. This process of acculturation followed from the policies adopted by the Moodayto in their conquest of the Awash. Having overrun the valley, the Moodayto, who were obviously few in number, decided to adopt the conquered Adohyanmara groups into their own ranks through the formation of marriage groupings between some of its component parts and factions of Adohyanmara. Once this was done, they then vested the political and territorial rights in the Moodayto part of these groupings. Consequently, the Hangadalla, the senior Makaaban who normally represented the group in the wider world, was drawn from the Moodayto faction. The Adohyanmara factions retained their own internal organisation.

The present population of the Sultanate of Awsa is composed of the following major groups:

1. Moodayto proper, mainly the Afkeek-Maada branch which inhabits the delta; they are chiefly agro-pastoralists. Other branches of Moodayto constitute the pastoral population.
2. Adayta, who are divided into four major groupings, and several sub-groups. They have extensions into Djibouti.
3. Adaliik Ayroita, who are divided into eight major groupings, and several sub-groups. They occupy the buffer zone between the Afar and the Issa Somali.
4. Aderkaltu, who are divided into four major groupings, and several sub-groups.

Groups 2, 3, and 4 are mixed Adohyanmara and Asahyanmara, the latter forming a small part of each. Each of these has its senior Makaaban or Hangadalla drawn from the Moodayto faction. To Afar outside the Sultanate of Awsa, all the four groupings are regarded as Afkeek-Maada or simply
Moodayto and Asahyanmara. Internally, they do distinguish among themselves.

To give a concrete example of the sort of acculturation which had taken place under Moodayto hegemony, let us consider the case of Aderkaltu. As mentioned above, this particular group was captured in war. The meaning of the word Aderkaltu is significant; Ader means "to accumulate" and kaltu means "to take away or withhold". This implies that Moodayto, for reasons unknown to us, decided against enslavement of the group. [32] Instead it decided to adopt them into its own ranks. Thus the new groupings formed as a result of Moodayto's process of absorption are known to take names according to the following format: Askakmalik-Moodayto; Lubakabak-Moodayto; Berhitok-Moodayto etc.

When assessing the relationship between the conqueror and the conquered within the context of the Sultanate of Awsa, it is important to take into account some factors which historically influenced the pattern of relationship between the two groupings and led to the emergence of a class structure, cutting across these cleavages of Asahyanmara and Adohyanmara. The ideology of the conquerer is enshrined in the Mada (the law), the interpretation of which requires a seal of approval by the Makaaban drawn from Asahyanmara.

The following are the factors that historically influenced the relationship between the two groupings within Awsa:
1) Kinship as a mediating ideology colours the potential conflict between the conquerer and the conquered, since all have become Moodayto or Afkeek-Maada. This is crucial in the lower plains of the Awash valley with its permanent water course and fertile pastures. Here, the Adohyanmara or the so-called "clients" have exclusive rights to water and pastures for which they pay no tribute, while the pastoral population of Awsa, who reputedly constitute Moodayto proper, are required to pay dues.
2) In the middle of the 17th century, Moodayto, under the leadership of

[32] For the meaning and derivation of the word kaltu, see G.A. Maknun and Hayward, R., 1981. Tolo Hanfade's song of accusation: an Afar text. BSOAS, University of London. Vol.xlv, part2, p.331
Sultan Kadafo, dislodged the Muslim Imams [33] who founded the Imamate in the delta in the aftermath of the Muslim/Christian conflict over Abyssinia, and established the Afar Sultanate of Awa. As a result of this, they inherited an administration based on state functionaries who managed agricultural estates and an irrigation network. In addition, they faced constant attacks by other Afar clans who wanted to share control of the fertile valley with Moodayto. The management of agriculture, and the need to defend the water and pastures, led to the creation of an elaborate system of resource management under officials known as Malokti (s. Malak), i.e. bailiffs, and a standing militia. Although recruitment of state functionaries favoured members of Afkeek-Maada, an increasing number of Adohyanmara were also appointed. This was even more the case in the militia, for without the support of the Adohyanmara the Moodayto would not have maintained their control of the fertile valley against attacks from other Afar groups. In the 1830s, Afkeek-Maada began their first phase of massive sedentarisation. This constant restructuring of society entailed a greater degree of social mobility and the emergence of a class-divided society.

The superiority of Asahyanmara then became manifest at the juridico-political level: the conquered groups became subject to the laws of the conquered. Mada, and its interpretation, are the exclusive domain of the Moodayto Asahyanmara Makaaban, for without their Fatiha, i.e. their seal of approval, no conflict can be considered as settled. The ideology of Asahyanmara can be summed up in the following Afar saying:

Adchyanmarih awkiiyii, kot habu wamak, kot haba wah enah gaha. [Adohyanmara man (boy) would pretend that he would not give up what he in actual fact would give up finally.]

Asahyanmarih Awkiiyii habu koh waya wam habu wa inah gaha. [Asahyanmara man (boy) would pretend that he would give up, what he in actual fact would not give up.]

This saying suggests that Afar associate the 'Red' Azaahyanmara with cleverness, ability to hide real motives, while the 'White' Adohyanmara is associated with openness, hasty and poor judgement, which is thought to be uncharacteristic of leaders.

We will now attend briefly to the outcome of the Damooohoyta expansion in northern Afar, for here this ideological mechanism, supportive of Azaahyanmara, is more visible in its ideological format. At present the Damooohoyta clan family extend from the Buri peninsula to Edd on the Red Sea coast, with subgroups under various names inhabiting Teeru, Biru, and the Rorum plain and the valley of Ala. [34] The expansion here was made to areas where, unlike the delta, there were no permanent water courses, fertile soils, nor any centralised political entity. To comprehend the power structures within the northern clan families, it is important to understand the origins of the Mada. Afar elders claim that sultan Borieli, an ancestor of the Ahowtto ruling lineage of Biru (also spelled as Bidu) was the first to bring together the various principal laws governing the Afar society. This has given the elders of Damooohoyta an ideological superiority expressed in their role as the guardians of the Mada and their right to chair the council of elders (i.e. Maro) who resolve conflicts. The Ahowtto ruling lineage have a distant suzerainty over all the Damooohoyta. According to Dante Odorizzi, the Italian governor of Massawa at the turn of the century, most Adohyanmara clan families with the exception of Dahimesla and Belsuzuwa were dependents of Damooohoyta prior to the colonisation of the Afar coast by the Italians. [35] Nevertheless all the Northern Afar clans who are subject to Borieli Mada refer to themselves collectively as Hamadi Sirata, i.e. the people of Hamadu (the founder of the Damooohoyta). Yet the various groups who compose this free union are not subject politically to Damooohoyta, unlike the case of the Sultanate of Amsa. In other words, this free association does not conflict with the independence of its various component parts. The Mada nevertheless ascribes a superior position to the Makaaban of the conquering group in so

[34] For distribution of tribal groups, see Lewis, I. M., 1955 op.cit; Pollera, A., 1935, La popolazione indigena dell'Eritrea, Bologna, pp.246-51; Franchetti, R., 1930. op. cit.
[35] Odorizzi explains attempts by his government to break this dependency. see, Odorizzi, D., 1911, op. cit.
far as conflict resolution is concerned.

Therefore, as a result of their conquest of the Awash valley, the Moodayto assumed the name Asahyanmara as did the Damaohoyta of the north. The outcome of this conquest varied from one region to another, but was justified by the conquerors' ideological insistence on superiority. The need to resolve conflicts peacefully in a society which continually fights over limited resources, has secured the continuity and acceptance of the Mada by the conquered.

2.3.3 Greater Afar: Political and Geographical Sketch

If we can speak of Afar as one social and political collectivity, what are its boundaries? The Afar inhabit a vast area and are parcelled out into numerous clans, some of which make up large political units based on a definite territory. These units are sometimes called Sultanates, such as Awsa, Tadjoura, Rahayto, Biru and Gobad. They differ in their degree of centralisation and in their economic activities, although pastoralism is dominant. [36] Yet despite the geographical distances, the various economic activities and the degree of political centralisation, we will argue that Afar social and political institutions have a similar structure and are held together by political contracts. Individuals are incorporated by membership of lineages and clans. We will use the term social or political contract, as Professor Lewis does for the Somali:

I do not claim that Somali political contract (heer) corresponds in all respects to any one of the many doctrines of the Social Contract of the political philosophers. But I do

[36] In the Red Sea coastal villages fishing is more important than pastoralism. See Assab Awraja, 1973, published by the Ehiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), and the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute (ENI) A.A. The extraction of salt is another activity that the Afar have practised for centuries. Although the Bahr Assal (Lake Assal) salt deposits were overtaken by commercial production in Djibouti and Assab, the Afar still extract salt in the great salt plains of the north, and today, the town of Berahale is an important salt market, see O'Mahoney, K., 1970, Salt Trail, Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. III, pp 147-153. For the history of trade in the north, see Munzinger, W., 1869, "Narrative of a journey through the Afar Country," Royal Geographical Society, Vol. 39. For Bahr Assal salt deposits near Tadjoura and its importance for Ethiopian/Afar relations in the 19th century, see Abir, M., 1966, 'Salt, Trade and Politics in Ethiopia,' J. of Ethiopian Studies, No. 2, pp. 1-10
hold that it includes essentially contractual elements having closest affinities with those political theories which saw the origins of political union in an egalitarian social contract. [37]

Following Professor Lewis, we will argue that clanship and contract are the fundamental principles in the constitution of Afar political units, as they are for the Somali. Lewis’ explanation of how political units are formed within the Somali context begins with the principle of kinship:

All northern Somali political units are based on kinship and are composed of men who trace descent through males to a common male ancestor from whom they take their corporate name. Political affiliation is thus determined by agnatic descent and political divisions correspond to differences in agnatic origin. [38]

He continues:

The second basic principle and one that is complementary to kinship is a form of social contract. All lineages which act corporately do so first because of their agnatic basis, and secondly through an explicit treaty defining the terms of their collective unity. In a formal sense, contract operates structurally as at once a unifying and dividing principle within the various spheres of extended agnation. Genealogies represent generally the widest range of possible political unity by dividing and uniting groups of kinsmen according to the ancestors from whom they stem. Contract galvanises the diffuse and manifold bonds of kinship at any point and through any ancestor, giving rise to opposed political units. [39]

He divides the Somali lineage system into five levels: the clan family, clans, sub-clans, primary lineage groups, and dia-paying group. [40] The last is the most stable political group. At this level "contractual political agreement is localised." [41] He does not restrict political

[38] Lewis, I. M., 1961, op.cit. p.1
[41] ibid, p.159.
relations to this level but suggests that "clanship alone does not explain political solidarity, nor does contract act by itself except in exceptional cases." [42] These agreements relate principally to collective defence and security and political cohesion in general. Contract is defined as "a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties. It binds people of the same treaty (heer) together in relation to internal delicts and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with other groups". [43] These contractual agreements which members freely enter into, or which they inherit from their ancestors, can be abrogated, modified or rescinded and new agreements made. [44] Professor Lewis' presentation of the principles of lineage segmentation among the Somali also applies to the Afar. However, the Afar lineage system is more highly segmented, [45] and their political units are more hierarchical and rigid. This does not invalidate Lewis' principle, and we can claim that political relations among Afar are articulated at the level of the dia-paying group in particular, through kinship and contract, and are thus expressed contractually in payment of blood wealth (diyat). Yet, when we speak of pan-Afar political relations, agnicl genealogy cannot be the only determinant. Here contract becomes paramount. Professor Lewis recognises such a situation:

Compared with other segmentary lineage systems the infrequency of full genealogical assimilation amongst the northern pastoralists seems consistent with the fact that agnation is not the sole idiom in which political relations are cast. For contract with or without the benefit of real or putative uterine connexion, can unite groups between whom no agnicl relationship subsists, and contractual alliances work within the framework of the lineage system to adjust the balance of power without normally disturbing existing genealogical relationships. Thus pride of agnicl origin can be maintained and political expediency satisfied without full genealogical identification. [46]

[42] ibid, p.161
[43] ibid, p.162
[44] ibid, pp.161-162
[45] For example Lewis counts 361 dia-paying groups for northern Somali, while among Afar, the Awa delta alone has 219 dia-paying groups among the Moadayto. This of course does not include Moadayto outside the delta. See, Lewis, I. M., 1961, p.10
[46] Ibid. p.192
Afar social and political institutions have a territorial, and also a clan basis; although dispersed, clans can be found to have extensions almost everywhere in the Afar world. Chedeville divides these into autonomous regiments or 'Great Chiefdoms', seven in the north, five of which are commanded by members of the Damoohoyta under the distant suzerainty of the Sultan of Biru, and two, those of the Dahiimmel and the Belusuwa (also written as Bellesuwa), independent Adohyanmara groups. Among the southern Afar, he counts about twelve great chiefdoms, of which Awse, occupying almost half of the entire territory, is considered paramount. [47] Its sultan was often able to bring pressure to bear upon his neighbours, and "although he takes no personal initiative with regard to their internal affairs, his position in effect brings it about that he is invited to play the role of arbitrator in all the important cases." [48] So, according to Chedeville, there are 20 chiefdoms of variable importance: 7 in the north, 12 or 13 in the south. About half of these fall under Asahyanmara chiefs, the other half being under Adohyanmara rule. [49] Nevertheless, this leaves out numerous clans both in the south and the north, notably the conglomeration known as Borik-Badi Muru which inhabit the coastal villages of the Red Sea, and which include the ancient groups of Dankali, Ankala and Adula.

All these Afar groups claim to be connected either through agnation, through uterine connections, or simply by alliances. It would be impossible to make a genealogical map for the whole of the Afar since some claim direct affiliation to chiefly Arabian lineages while others probably re-arranged their genealogies to express the victory of the descendants of Hadal-Mahis in the distant past. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible to speak of agnation as the principle structuring the Afar kinship system. Afar reckon descent through the male; clan founders are male, and their sons or grandsons serve as points of reference for

[48] Ibid
further divisions of the clan. [50] There are Afar terms for the various levels of segmentation, the first of which is Boda, meaning both a household and a lineage. The next level is the Gulubu, Samo, or daala [51] which all refer to a lineage of four generations depth comprising several Boda. The Kedho comprises several lineages and is the main political and jural unit. Members are united here in the payment of blood-wealth and have common political responsibilities. The Kedho has a generational depth of between seven and nine, and several Kedho make up an Affa which has a generational depth of at least thirteen. There is no term for more inclusive levels of segmentation. Unlike the Somali, at each of the levels mentioned above there is a leader drawn from a senior family or lineage — normally referred to as Abba; at the level of Kedho or the dia-paying group he is known as Kedho Abba. However, at the level of Affa, there is no leader among northern Afar, although there is a senior Makaaban drawn from the senior lineage whose power is recognised by the heads of lineages comprising the Affa. Among southern Afar the head of Affa is known as Hangadalla, likewise drawn from the senior lineage within the Affa. This probably reflects the centralising tendency attained by Moodayto’s supremacy over the southern Afar.

To illustrate, we will give examples from southern and northern Afar. The Moodayto branch of the southern Afar probably numbers 150,000 men, and is divided within the delta into 219 dia-paying groups. From the eponymous ancestor Maad, whose descendants are known as Maad Sara (i.e. Maad is a proper name, and Sara his descendants) derive three lineages: Maad Gangoita, Maad Andas, Maad Abakari. Of these, Abakari comprises the majority of the Maad Sara. In this chart we follow the genealogy of Gumeed Mohamed, a distinguished elder and confidante of the Sultan of Awa, whom


[51] The words are used in different geographical areas: daala is used in Badhu in the Middle Awash, Samo in the north, and Gulubu in the south.
he served as treasurer. [52] Abakari gave birth to Maad, who in turn had two sons Abakari, and Hannakis. Our informant is a direct descendant of the latter whose descendants comprise a dia-paying group. If a member of the Maad Sara is killed by an external group, all descendants of Hannakis act as a corporate group, but if a member of any lineage within Maad Sara commits murder against a member of our informants' direct sub-clan, which is Seiddo (marked X, in the Appendix A-2), then Seiddo acts as a corporate unit, and a dia-paying group. At each level of segmentation we have several Kedho headed by a Kedho Abba, but the head of Asnabtu, senior lineage of the Hannakis clan (marked 'S') is the Hangadalla of all of the descendants of Maad Sara.

We will take an example from the North to compare with the previous one. Here we are concerned with a branch of the Damooboyta who inhabit the Hailhal area around Edd: four lineages are descended from the eponymous ancestor Utam, Yusuf, Aliito, Gardia, Hulalta. Of these, Yusuf's descendants comprise the majority. Yusuf had two sons both named Elaama, the eldest branch of which comprises the family of the Sultan of Biru (Borielik - Asabakari). Our informant Musa Daanaba, formerly a teacher, and for many years the private secretary of the Sultan of Awsa, is a descendent of the younger Elaama (marked II in Appendix A-3) is a member of Hassan Affa clan. The latter is divided into five primary lineages, and of this the Filla Unda Ali is the dia-paying group. This is again divided into six lineages, of which Amerto is a senior lineage, and Ubarto is again a dia-paying group within Hassan Affa, of which our informant is a member. There is no overall leader for Hassan Affa, although there is a recognized senior Makabantu.

2.3.4 The Political Contract

There are two types of contract which all Afar clans enter into with each other. Contract here includes political alliance for collective defence and security, but also concerns a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties. The contracts are known as Mada and Dinto.

[52] G.C. Savard worked with this same informant in 1960. I compared my chart of genealogy with that of Savard, and found no discrepancies, an indication that Afar genealogies are stable.
Mada is based on the principle of compensation, and means 'law', which among
the Afar also implies both fithi, which could be translated 'resolve' in
English, and 'haki', which is derived from the Arabic word for
justice/right. Mada is thus a set of rules and obligations, rights and
justice which is not negotiable and is inherited from previous
generations. Elders and Makaaban preserve this knowledge, and pass it from
one generation to another. 'Dinto' is derived from Din', to sleep, or be at
peace. It refers to contracts between equals who inhabit a definite valley
or region, while 'Mada' applies to all the Afar people.

In the following discussion, we will focus on the Mada of Borieli. The
late sheikh Yassin Mahamooda Gumhed, Afar nationalist poet, historian and
administrator of Thio district in the Red Sea region made a pioneering
enquiry into 'Afar customary law'. [53] This body of laws contains 140
major articles dealing with a wide range of infringements of rights, and
the corresponding penalties and compensation. 'Biliu' or homicide,
according to Sheikh Yassin, is dealt with according to two sets of Mada:
Borieli Mada, which is a subject of his text, and another which he refers
to as Budduto Badirih Mada. Except for this passing remark, there is no
reference to the second one in his text, and my own investigation in
southern Afar failed to uncover it. [54] All elders I spoke to in southern
Afar accept the universality of 'Borieli Mada'. I found some minor
variations between north and south, concerning such matters as method of
compensation assessment, and conversion of this into cash. For example, in
the north all penalties are measured in baklo, young she-goat, while in the
south they are measured by saga, cow. They also differ in the way
conversions are made from either baklo or saga into cash. Yet, the main
principles of Mada, which the Afar call 'Allito', are the same; these
concern penalties for crimes committed by the hand (gaba), by the tongue
(af), and by (Sammo), genitalia. According to Sheikh Yassin:

The unified code was termed Borieli Mada deriving its name
from the tribe of Borieli which took the initiative.....with

[53] Sheikh Yassin Mahamooda. Afar Customary Law, translated by J. Reedo in
1973 (English text forms Appendix B).

[54] Some of my informants claim that Borieli is originally derived from
Budduto Badirih Mada which they claim to be the original source of
Afar law.

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the passage of time, the unified code came to enjoy such widespread acceptance among the Afar people that Borjeli Mada became synonymous with universality and certainty. [55]

The codification apparently took place at the Thio conference of elders in August 1962, which was held to discuss the future of Afar in Ethiopia and which was chaired by Sheikh Yassin himself. [56] Remarkably, this Mada is universally accepted regardless of geographical and economic variations among the different groups of Afar. Unlike the Somali contracts, it is not possible to opt out of Mada. It is possible for an individual to press for trial under Dinto, which as we have seen are agreements between equals (not only agnates) who inhabit a definite geographical area, and who may be subject to the same Chief, Sultan or Hangadalla. Since most of these are contracts between agnates, the penalties are normally less than in the Mada. We must stress that the Dinto contract is also rigorous and that most of the agreements are inherited from previous generations. Yet, Afar refer to Dinto as Ritei, signifying that it is 'negotiable', which Mada is not.

Most of Mada and Dinto is unwritten. The procedures of trial is explained fully in Appendix B. The men who interpret Mada and Dinto are Makaaban (elders), and Kedho Abba. Makaaban refers both to elders who assist Kedho Abba at all levels of the clan structure, and to the Kedho Abba, (pl. Abboti) the heads of kinship groups. Their knowledge of genealogy, history, custom, and their virtual monopoly over the interpretation of Mada had given them considerable power in Afar society. The definition of Makaaban in Afar is 'Lak ke harraymekla mara'; those who resolve matters between the 'leg' and the 'hand', i.e. between the individual and his patrilineal relatives (agnates), and between patrilineal and non-agnatic kin.

[56] Sayyid Ismael, himself a participant in this meeting, told me that Mada was extensively discussed.
2.4 Islam, the Imamate and the Moodayto in the Delta

Our concern here is to consider the impact of Islam among the Afar of the Aawsa Delta. Although historically Aawsa constituted one of the three important Islamic centres along with Harar and Zeila under the kingdom of Adal, Aawsa replaced the other two centres as a seat of Muslim power in Eastern Abyssinia in 1577 when the Muslim Imamate of Aawsa was founded by Imam Muhammad Jasa. He was a member of the family of Imam Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al Gazi, nicknamed Gran, the leader of the Muslim conquest of Abyssinia in the 16th century. The seat of the Muslim Imamate was moved from Harar which had become a constant target of Oromo raids, to Aawsa, in the hope that Aawsa which is surrounded by desert, would be more secure. However, Aawsa was not spared either from attacks by Oromo and other nomadic people including Afar and Somali, or from constant power struggles among various Muslim Amirs after their defeat by Christian Abyssinia. Tringham who refers to Aawsa's history under the Muslim Amirs as a miserable one, notes that Aawsa had 8 Imams in its first five years. This problem of succession continued to afflict the Afar sultans who replaced the Imams in the middle of the 17th century. There is very little information about the Muslim Imamate of Aawsa. The work of Enrico Cerulli, and a recent article by Ewald Wagner shed some light on the early history of the Aawsa Delta, particularly prior to the middle of the 17th century. However, we have no information on such matters as the extent of Afar participation in the struggle for power among the Muslim Amirs in Aawsa, although Afar, along with Somalis, constituted the bulk of the Muslim armies against Abyssinia:

Behind all these struggles between Ethiopia and the Muslims was a movement of expansion of the Afar (Dankali) and Somali. The movement appears to have been initiated by the Afar who

[57] Nearly all the Muslim Imams had their seats in Fursi, between Sahile and Gayrani Hinale, in the delta. Fursi is referred to in the records as Farfar. Some also had their seats in Handaga, and Amado (see map no.2). For Farfar see Cerulli, E., 1931, p.71
[59] Ibid, p.97
[60] Ibid.
[61] Tringham, J. S., 1976, cit.op, 97; Cerulli, E., 1931, cit.op.p.30 (44)
lived in the region of the Aussa, and the valley descending from Shoa. [63]

The movements of the Moodayto, and the other Islamised Afar mentioned earlier must have been part of this general upsurge, for these groups reached the valley much earlier than the middle of the 17th century when they established the first Afar sultanate in the Awash. In addition, the rebellion on the part of Moodayto, and other Afar, against the kings of Ankala, seems to coincide with the general instability in the Muslim dynasty of Walashma. [64] Writing about these new Muslim leaders, Tringham states:

The leaders of these Afar tribal movement were not the old hereditary sultans of Adal, but fanatical muslim amirs who began by carving out for themselves principalities within the sultanate of Adal itself in the regions between Harar and the sea, and relegated the Walashma dynasty to the position of nominal rulers. [65]

Thus the participation of Awsean Afar in the religious conflict in the 16th century is unquestionable, however the degree of their participation in the power struggle within the Muslim leadership, which had moved its seat to Awsa in the aftermath of the Muslim defeat, remains unknown. Neither of the two documents mentioned above makes reference to the ethnic origins of the Muslim Amirs. However, the names of some of the Imams such as Muhammad Jasa, the founder of the Imanate of Awa, and Omar Aldin Al Modayti, who ruled from 1600 to 1611, the longest period, [66] are Afar in origin. For example, Al Modayti can be translated as Imam Omer Aldin of Moodayto. This, however, remains only speculation, and more research is needed to reveal the ethnic origin of the Imams. One significant episode which sheds light on this matter is to be found in the Afar takeover of the Imamate. [67] According to oral tradition, this was an internal coup rather than an external invasion. Kadafo, the Moodayto leader is said to have engineered a coup with the assistance of the Awsean peasantry who

[63] Tringham, J. S., 1976, op. cit., p.79
[64] For Walashma see Tringham, J. S., 1976, op. cit.
[67] Most of the material for this early period of Awa's history was collected from Awsean elders. I also benefited from discussions with E. Chedeville, in May 1981 in Djibouti.
were dissatisfied with the Imam's handling of taxation. Tradition asserts that the coup was made by the guards who burned the Imams' Palace at Handaga with all its occupants. [68] Furthermore this tradition asserts that the Awsean peasantry were already subject to an annual tribute to Kadafo, known as "Eido Girib", prior to his dislodging the Imam, which suggests that the Moodayto had acquired substantial influence in the Awash Valley during this period. There is an old saying attributed to the mother of Imam Salman (the last of the Muslim Imams), which confirms this:

Awsi data Kadafoh yaha Eido girib ke waayti Guraydalii yaha gaba Mada sinil aka le.

The tribute that the Awseans give to Kadafo, the Black, and the water that River Awash pours into Guraydalu (i.e. diversion), will become a law with which you (Awseans) will have to abide.

The peasantry certainly became subject to oppressive taxation and direct control by the Moodayto sultans. The diversion of the river, at the turn of this century further strengthened the position of the sultans who could now hand over to the peasantry new lands with new conditions.

On assuming the position of the Imam, Kadafo chose the title of sultan which is an indication of a change from theocratic to civil rule. Nevertheless Islam retained substantial influence among the peasant community which observed strictly the Islamic law of property. The leading Ulama families of the delta such as Sekak Sharifa, Kabirto and Gaadida, acquired privileged positions in the Awsean courts. Moodayto sultans acquired wives from them. Krapf and Isenberg, writing in the middle of the 19th century, speak highly of the Awsean Ulamas' influence in the coastal petty sultanate of Tadjourah where their offices served to resolve religious and civil conflicts. [69] Their influence still persists in Aawsa and elsewhere in the Afar world today in the form of poetry in praise of

[68] According to some versions of Kadafo's rise to power, he is depicted as holding the position of a superior minister for peasant affairs. In all these versions he is presented as a cunning man.

the Prophet, a revered Afar tradition. An example of this is to be found in the work of Kabir Hamza, a leading 19th century Awsean scholar, whose poems written in Afar using Arabic script still evoke powerful sentiments among believers throughout the Afar world. Awsa did not produce great jurists, in the tradition of Dawe of north central Ethiopia for example, with which the Awsean Afar had always maintained a close trade and religious connections. Instead in Awsa there was a proliferation of poets and saints, who are known as Kulaya, who the Afar believe protect them well.

However, the association of Islam with the peasantry, whom the sultans were constantly attempting to bring under their direct control, brought strain into the relationship between the Ulama and the sultans. Yet, in the tradition of Sunni Islam, the Ulama had to follow their earthly Imams so long as there were no religious controversies. There are two instances in the history of the Afar sultanate when its leaders used the ideological force of Islam to bring about political change for their own ends. The first took place in the second and third decades of the 19th century when Sultan Hanfare I, who is regarded among Afar as the founder of the Awsean Sultanate, restored Moodoo to control over the valley, and of trade routes from Wieima and Debne. [70] He had taken control of the delta and of trade routes during the previous decade when Awsa was gripped in a succession struggle. [71] This also involved the removal of the Haralla, remnants of Imam Salman's descendants, who until then were allowed to retain nominal leadership of the peasant community. Sultan Hanfare I restructured Awsa's territorial boundaries and sphere of influence, which was now extended to Kombolcha near Dessie in the highlands and the salt deposits of Lake Assal in the coast, and also reorganised the economy. He presided over the first

[70] The alliance between Wieima and Debne was broken as a result of Wieima's defeat. The latter was pushed out of the delta into the middle Awash Valley where both groups still live. Debne soon lost its hegemony over the salt deposits of Lake Assal. They gained temporary prominence as a result of French interest in the region in the 19th century. The French recognised their Sultan of Gobad, but since they were subject to the rule of Awsa, the French had very little influence over them, and later exiled its sultan to Madagascar in 1931. See Thompson, V, and Adloff, R., 1968, op. cit. p.11; For Treaties between Afar and European Powers see Hertslet, E., 1949. The Map of Africa by Treaty, London. HMSO.

phase of sedentarisation by Moodayto, thereby bringing the peasantry under direct control of appointed Malokti who managed land and water. According to oral tradition, Sultan Hanfare I was assisted in this endeavour by Kabir Hamza, the Awsean Muslim scholar, who played the role of an ideologue for Hanfare’s expansionism. The second time that Islam came to the fore in the politics of Awsa was during the last quarter of the 19th century when Alimirah I, one of the sons of Sultan Mohamad Hanfare, acquired the support of the Ulama to prevent his cousin Mohamad Aydahis from deputising for the ageing sultan. Mohamad Aydahis had been accused of submitting to pressures from the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II. [72] In each of these instances, the ideological force of Islam was used to provide access to political power, indicating its powerful grip among its adherents in the delta. It is thus interesting to discover that in more recent years, Sultan Alimirah II (1944-1975) sought to restore Islam to the centre of Awsean politics.

2.5 Awsa Before 1960: An Outline.

We have to make a distinction between Awsa and Kalo (see Map no.4). Awsa refers to the Ayasaita delta, the area between Abrobadi Fagne, one mile south of Ayasaita, and Lake Gamari. More specifically it refers to the area historically cultivated by the Awsean peasantry, along the banks of the Awsa canal in the central delta. Kalo (protected area) refers to the geographical zone between Abrobadi Fagne and Dubti, including Ayasaita and Ditbahari, and is the home of pastoralists. Awsa is also used by outsiders to refer to the Afar Sultanate, but Kalo is the general name by which the whole delta is known. We will stick to the distinction made by the inhabitants of the Sultanate, although we will generally use Awsa to mean the Sultanate as a whole.

We shall now briefly analyse the social development of these two distinct economic sectors of the Sultanate; however, it is important to remember that until the turn of this century the sultans’ main income came neither from agriculture nor from pastoralism, but from trade

[72] For this period of Awsa’s history, see G.A. Makhun and Hayward, R., 1981. Mohamad Aydahis was later forced to leave Awsa to Samu in Shoa, where his descendants still live.
(particularly the slave trade), and from taxation imposed on the salt extracted from Lake Assal. There is recorded evidence of the importance of the salt trade in the 18th and 19th centuries, as a source of revenue for the sultans. [73] The sultans retained many of the slaves to work on their agricultural estates, and also to serve as members of the army. [74]

Changes in the pattern of Red Sea Trade dramatically affected internal developments in Awsa, as elsewhere on the Afar coast, and played a key role in the periodic restructuring of the Awsean economy. Twice in one hundred and fifty years, the Awsean Sultanate resorted to sedentarisation to cope with changes in the movement and volume of trade. In the first decade of the 19th century there was a 'slump in Red Sea trade', [75] and Awsans were forced to settle in large numbers, but with the increase of the Red Sea trade towards the end of the second decade, the Awsans again threw themselves actively into the control of trade routes and the taxing of trade goods. But at the turn of this century, with the decline in the slave trade and the establishment of colonial trading centres on the coast, finally resulting in the construction of the Djibouti Dire Dawe railway and the decline of the caravan trade, the Awsean sultans reoriented production and switched to the development of agriculture.


2.5.1 Agriculture

Irrigation agriculture has been practised in the delta for many hundreds of years. Kadafo, the founder of the Afar Sultanate, who came to power with the help of the peasants, did not interfere in their affairs. The kinship heads and traditional leaders of the delta were allowed to run their affairs unmolested, as long as they provided the Sultanate with tribute. Kadafo's grandson, Aydhis, attempted but failed to bring the peasants under his direct control. Sultan Hanfare I was the first Afar ruler to appoint officials from among the Moodayto to oversee production in the 1830s. He also granted land to Moodayto warriors as a reward for services rendered to the Sultanate.

Official agents of the state known as Malokti were at first appointed to manage water and land in the areas newly granted to the warriors; the tasks of the Malokti among the original cultivators were limited to the collection of taxes, and the village and kinship heads were allowed to manage their own affairs. The word Malak had its origins in the Islamic Imamate, where it referred to state functionaries in charge of the collection of taxes from cultivators, but it gradually began to encompass all state officials. Here it will be used in the context of agricultural and livestock management.

The appointment of Malokti underwent radical changes in the recent era of cotton production. Previously it had involved the sultan, the surrogate sultan, [76] local Malokti, clan Makaaban, and clan elders. They were normally assigned to areas inhabited by members of their own lineages. There were mechanisms for punishment and removal of a Malak, in which the elders played a prominent role. This system of resource management became intensified at the turn of the century when caravan trade declined. The Malak system of resource management was then extended to include the livestock sector.

The rise to power of Sultan Yayo in (1909-1927), a ruthless dictator intent on bringing the peasants under his complete control, assisted these

[76] Surrogate sultan refers to the leaders of the peasant community prior to Moodayto's rule.
new developments. Yayo, having spent several years in exile in Jima, [77] sought to transplant the Abyssinian feudal system to Awsa. The elders' memories are quite clear on this particular development, which brought about dramatic changes in the structure of production. The following types of land tenure system emerged in the delta soon after Yayo took over in 1909:

1) The old Awsa cultivated area; this covers an area of 3500 ha. Cultivation is done on both sides of the Awsa canal which runs for 25 km through the central delta. Here land is divided into rectangular plots held in freehold by lineages, and through them by individual extended families; at least 28 to 29 lineages inhabit the various villages along the Awsa canal. There are no written boundary records, but physical markers are sometimes noted. Land disputes were infrequent in the past, inheritance strictly followed Islamic law, and in the final analysis, the elders' opinion normally decided the outcome. Under Yayo, these peasants became subject to the administration of an overall bari Malak, who collected taxes and presided over land and water disputes. The peasants came to be collectively known as Gabar [78] which is derived from the Amharic term for peasants.

(2) The second type which emerged at this time was kodad land, which was set aside for the Sultanate. This was a direct borrowing from the Ethiopian model. [79] The Sultan appointed a Malak for the kodad, which was cultivated by gabar as corvee labour, free of charge. In some areas such as Alasa Boolo in the central delta, it was cultivated by slaves taken from slave merchants in lieu of taxes. The sultan's cattle men, diramo (partly militia men), also participated in the harvest. Their presence insured the smooth organisation of production. The Malak in charge of kodad land was given a piece of land to cultivate for his own use, but which was not heritable.

(3) The third type was also called kodad, and consisted of land given to

[77] Yayo and his brothers were exiled to Abyssinia by their cousin Mohamad Aydhis who deputised for their ageing father, Sultan Mohamad Hanfare, because they were opposed to him.
[78] For the definition of gabar, see Perham, M., 1947, op.cit. p.278.
[79] kodad is a corruption of the Ethiopian term Hudad (i.e. corvee labour and or Imperial estates). See Hiewt, A., 1975, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, London: ROAPE publication. p.28; p.32.
warriors for services to the sultan. Some of this land was cultivated by tenants. It was located in the north-central delta, and as most of the beneficiaries were Moodayo warriors, who combined herding with agriculture. Land thus granted became freehold over the years.

The Malokti supplied seed and oxen for kodad, as did the warriors to their tenants. The warriors were under the jurisdiction of Malokti who received tribute from them on behalf of the sultan. There is no information as to whether the Malak responsible for the kodad leased to warriors, kept part of the tribute for himself or not. It is however possible that he did so as payment for his services.

2.5.2 Method of tribute collection

At harvest time the produce of each separate plot was arranged in a form of a pyramid. Two methods were used to decide the amount to be given as tribute. There was the spear Method (Mahadu), where a spear was placed in the middle of the produce. The peasants or warrior peasants took what was above the shaft of the spear plus the necessary seed grain, the rest went as tribute to the sultan. This was of course in addition to the corvée labour expected of the peasants in the cultivation and harvesting of the sultan's own estates (kodad). The second method was known as Madaya or 'waist'. A person would stand next to the gathered produce, and the peasants (including the warrior peasants) took the amount of produce above the waist, plus seed; the amount below the waist went as tribute to the sultanate. Where warrior peasants' land was cultivated by tenants, state tribute was deducted before dividing the remainder of the produce equally between landlord and tenant.

Digging, cleaning and maintaining the irrigation canal was a cooperative effort organised by the elders and Malokti, and superintended by the militia.

This new organisation of production, which can be described as a microcosm of the Ethiopian system, was supplemented by yet another form of obligation to the emerging Awsean state, particularly to the sultan's
household [80] and the growing class of state functionaries. The additional contribution came from social groups collectively known as baaraffa. Baari means 'plenty', referring to farmland, and affa means 'branch'; baaraffa thus means 'a branch of plenty'. It comprised specific lineages such as Karboda, Askakmalik Moodayto, Dambellek-Hamadsara, and Waadiima, members of which were responsible for providing special services to the sultan's household. They supplied food, transporting it from the farms to the sultan's residence or to crop-storage depots. They were also responsible for transporting the belongings of the sultan and his household when they moved to their summer residences. These lineages were inhabitants of Kalo, and did not cultivate crops themselves, although some of them were given land for their services. Most of them retained a substantial interest in livestock, and therefore became subject to livestock tax when this was introduced by Sultan Yayo.

2.5.3 Livestock and management by Malokti.

In the Sultanate of Awsa livestock is owned by individual families as well as the state. There are no figures for the livestock population of Awsa as a whole, but Cossins estimated the number of livestock under the management of the Sultanate as between 20,000 and 25,000 head of cattle. [81] Camels, goats and especially sheep would probably amount to double that number. There is great inequality among livestock owners. Some clans like Dambela in Dubti, are known to have as many livestock as the Sultanate. But here we shall concentrate on the livestock belonging to the Sultanate. Livestock in both private and state ownership is subject to management by Malokti who are appointed in the same way as for agriculture.

Among the Afar there are several types of pastoral cooperation designed to relieve the problems arising from drought and other crises. Awsa and

[80] 'Household' (kada boda) in the Awsean usage includes anyone with close connection to the sultan, e.g. servants, soldiers, Ulama (religious men), slaves. Membership of kada boda cuts across clans and lineages, and ultimate loyalty is to the holder of the position of sultan. In the Awsean court, most members of the kada boda are non-Awsans and foreigners.

[81] This does not include camels, goats and sheep.
Agla are both relevant to our subsequent discussion. Aswa denotes the loaning of cattle to individuals or families by other individuals or families, on the understanding that the borrowers' only right is to the milk. Aswa cannot be reciprocated unless the cow is pregnant; no milking cow or a cow at birth can be exchanged. Aswa is a sacred trust because the loaned cattle are not subject to the law of the state. For example, if the borrower becomes subject to expropriation for one reason or another, the Aswa cattle are immediately returned to the original owner. Agla is a similar institution which normally takes place between lineages. Both Aswa and Agla constitute an important means for relieving crises befalling individuals and groups; they also represent a means by which powerful groups may exercise immense power over others. The right to deprive a person of the means of subsistence is not normally exercised. Nevertheless it is an important source of power to the owners of these vital resources, of which the Sultanate is a prime example.

Over the years the Awa Sultanate accumulated a large number of cattle, camels, goats and sheep through taxation on pastures [82] and possibly also through expropriation. The Awa are also known to be the largest owners of cattle in the Afar world. At the turn of the century, when Sultan Yayo first introduced the cattle tax (probably to pay tribute to Ethiopia), he extended the Malak system of cattle and pasture management, already operative in the delta since the 1830s, to Kalo, the home of Awa pastoralism. The main functions of the livestock and pasture (including timber) Malokti are the following: 1) To organise and coordinate all the controlled flooding and irrigation of pasture areas. 2) To control and limit the entry of outsiders and to coordinate access for resident herds. 3) To organise and coordinate the treatment of cattle diseases or to isolate infected animals.

There are three regional management units for livestock, plus a separate unit for timber. Of these, two are located within the delta, and one in Kalo. The degree of access varies. The delta is highly restricted, and within the delta the north-central area, the home of the Sultanate's

[82] Awa sees taxed non-resident owners (lineages) one cow per season. This was known as kalo saga.
own cattle, is virtually an excluded area. The situation is more relaxed in the Kalo area, probably reflecting its recent incorporation.

Each of these regional units is run by several cattle Malokti (or 'cattle fathers', la hi Abba) under a senior Malak who reports directly to the sultan through the deputy sultan. According to a study conducted by N.J. Cossins in 1973, there was one senior cattle Malak with 34 subsidiary Malokti, and one senior Malak for camels, goats and sheep (gaali Abba) with 19 subsidiary Malokti, excluding eight Malokti for timber. [83] In the past, Malokti for livestock were recruited from the lineages within the management area, but over the years this has changed; today cattle Malokti are not restricted to their own Kedho areas, nor do equal numbers of cattle fall under the responsibility of each man.

The increase in sedentarisation brought about dramatic changes in the class structure of the Äwsa Sultanate when the newly appointed Malokti began to replace the Makaaban as the most powerful state proto-class. Meanwhile similar changes were taking place in the livestock sector. As in the management of land and water, the Malokti shared decision-making with clan Makaaban and elders insofar as the allocation of grazing areas between various lineages was concerned. However there was one area in which they monopolised decision making. This concerned the allocation of the Sultanate's own cattle, camels, goats and sheep. The Malokti responsible for state cattle (diramo) and camels (gaala), gained monopoly over the allocation of these resources. In the process they acquired substantial influence over thousands of individuals and families who received livestock in the form of loans, and over other nomads who were recruited as cattle-keepers. Thus, almost one third of the population of the Sultanate were in fact cattle-keepers for the Sultanate, which appropriated their labour. The clan Makaaban, who traditionally managed both people and resources in Afar society, gradually lost both powers, first to the increasingly centralised Sultanate, and later to the Malokti. The latter became a dynamic class of state functionaries who increased their control of resources and acquired great power in the agricultural

and pastoral sectors.

We can now sum up social developments in the Afar Sultanate of Awaṣa over the last one hundred and fifty years. The need to find alternative sources of revenue once the slave and caravan trade declined, led to a restructuring of both its agricultural and pastoral sectors. A stratified society emerged in which the sultan and his household (kada boda drawn mainly from the Afkeek-Maada branch of Moodayto, and specifically the Aydahiso ruling family) formed the apex of political and economic power. Then came a new class of state functionaries known as Malokki, whose social position was boosted by the increased sedentarisation of the Moodayto, and by their virtual monopoly over the allocation of the Sultanate's own cattle to would-be cattle-keepers and to individual families. This new class relegated the clan Makaaban to a third rank in the social hierarchy, along with the landed warrior cultivators. These were followed by independent owner-cultivators, nomads, tenants, and cattle-keepers. The slaves who tilled the Sultanate's kodad formed the lowest stratum in the social hierarchy.

2.6 The land and its use in the Middle Valley (Badhu) and lower plains (Kalo).

Prior to the ecological changes brought about by planned irrigation development, the area utilized by the Afar seasonal migrations ranged roughly from the foothills of the highlands of Ethiopia in the west to the Red Sea in the east. These movements were contained to the south by the Issa Somali. This area comprises most of the Awash River basin. The general pattern of migration followed the availability of seasonal grazing and water supply during the dry period (December – June). In the rainy period and thereafter (July – October) Afar spread outwards to seasonal watering points and fresh grass growth. Thus in the crucial dry months the Awash River provided the main sustenance for the Afar herds. The pattern of access to grazing and water supply was fairly similar for Badhu (the Middle Valley) and Kalo (the lower plains), in that access was based on clan control of the grazing area, but control of wells was in the hands of lineages and individuals. The major difference in Kalo was the existence
of a political structure which organized access to water, farming land, and grazing through the centralised system of cattle and forest managers appointed by the Aawsa Sultanate. Within the lower plains the degree of control over grazing increased, and was most strict in the delta area where average rainfall was less adequate than in Badhu. However the Lower Awash Valley was regarded by Afar, including those from outside the Valley, as a refuge in times of drought. Permanent settlement in the delta area provided food crops which were also significant in times of emergency.

In Badhu, the semi-nomadic Afar normally move between dry season sites and wet season sites. These movements extend over 5 km to 30 km, and are undertaken once or twice a year. Most of the elderly people, children and women stay as long as possible in their main homestead, which are close to the river banks, although these are subject to flooding and mosquito infestation during the rainy season. The village sites are based on clan membership, although areas like Ambaba are more mixed because of irrigation development which attracts many clans. The wet season sites or villages, which are known as Ganta, normally include various clans who cooperate among themselves in watering their stock and possibly in protection against outside threats. Thus the Afar of the Middle Valley are not pure nomads, but are transhumant, moving between two permanent sites, each with a long established name. Nevertheless, patterns of occupancy are complex, due to the movement of part of the population to and from the two sites. [84] Under the traditional economies the ultimate constraint on production here, as in the lower plains, is the availability of grass, which fluctuates both with the amount of rainfall and the amount of flooding of the Awash River. These relationships are particularly important to our discussion since the recent ecological changes have had drastic effects.

In the lower plain or Kalo, Cossins identified three types of


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gaziers. [85]

1) The immigrant graziers who arrive at the onset of the dry season (mid-December) and leave at the time of the main rains (July). These are temporary users who come from areas as far south as Mille, and as far north as Assab. They utilise the area between Ditbahi and Galalu, south of the Awash River and along the full length of the Valley.

2) In the Kalo area, herds were in the past relatively immobile, and moved out only under pressure from flooding and mosquitoes. They utilized the area to the north of the Awash River between Aysaita and Dubti, including the island enclosed between the Boyale (Bayahle) tributary and the Awash River. This area has the most livestock and it now includes the area of the present Tendaho plantation at Dubti.

3) The delta area graziers are orientated towards settled agricultural life in which livestock ownership is combined with farming. They rarely move out except under pressure from flooding and mosquitoes. They have an elaborate system of pasture and land management, and the delta is a restricted area for outsiders including those from Kalo. Unlike the patterns of settlement in the Middle Awash Valley, in the lower plains we do not find a movement between two sites; instead the graziers occupy well-demarcated areas based on village residence. However, it is to be noted that when movements are made under pressure from flooding and mosquitoes, there are well defined routes to and from the Valley which normally pass through the area now held by Tendaho plantation at Dubti.

CHAPTER III
ORGANISING THE PERIPHERY: THE POLICIES OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE

3.1 The Gabar System: The Social Basis of the Ethiopian Polity

In this chapter, we will be concerned with the Ethiopian political centre, its objectives and goals, and the methods it employed to organise its periphery over a number of decades. Difficulties, failures and successes in these attempts will be examined in relation to the Afar region. [1]

After identifying the State's objectives and goals, we shall examine the effect of government policies on the political economy of the Afar in terms of their impact on the structure of authority among Afar, on changes in the Afar economy, and on the Lowland/Highland relationship.

[1] The study of political economy in Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon. Scholars interested in Ethiopia were until recently concerned with historical and cultural studies, and even these were confined to what is geographically referred to as 'Historic Abyssinia', i.e. the area comprising the north and north-central highland region of present-day Ethiopia. The peoples of the territories which were added to Ethiopia at the turn of this century and thereafter were ignored. Major works largely undertaken in this field include Perham, M., 1947, followed by Clapham in 1969; Since then there has been a growing literature on the subject among which can be mentioned Hess, Robert, 1970, The Modernisation of Autocracy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Schwab, Peter, 1972, Decision-Making in Ethiopia, Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; Markakis, John., 1974, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, Oxford:Clarendon Press. The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 stimulated broader political-economic research. The Nice Conference of 1977 was the real beginning: see Tubiana, Joseph, 1980, Modern Ethiopia: From the Accession of Menelik II to the present. Proceedings of the 5th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Nice, 19-22 December 1977, Balkema, A.A., Rotterdam. A growing interest by Ethiopians themselves is another new development. The works of Addis Hiwet, a major beginning: see, Addis Hiwet, 1975, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, (ROAPE publication), and his 1976, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Military Dictatorship.
The Sultanate of Awsa, the most important of the Afar political units, fell to the forces of Emperor Menelik II after the battle of Arado, near Tendaho in 1895, but the invading forces were immediately withdrawn. [2] There was, however, one period when Abyssinians were actively involved in Awsa's local politics. This was during the period known in Awsa's history as Nama Mislih dabaana, (the period of two dynasties), between 1900 and 1909, when rival contenders for the Awsean leadership split the Sultanate into two dynasties, and solicited the support of Shoa and Wollo. This direct contact also led to the borrowing of some elements of the Ethiopian feudal system. Apart from these brief encounters, there is no evidence for the Central Government's presence in either a military or administrative capacity until after the return of the Emperor from exile in 1941. [3]

For reasons of simplicity, we have divided the Afar region into northern and southern Afar. The latter is the focus of this study. There are unambiguous geographical and other boundaries dividing the two. Today the Afar form part of the five Ethiopian provinces of Wollo, Tigre, Shoa, Hararghe and Eritrea. However, historically the north's economic relations were with northern Ethiopia, particularly with what is now known as the Tigre Administrative Region, while the south's economic interaction was basically with the Ethiopian provinces of Wollo and Shoa. With the emergence of Shoans as the most powerful political group in the Centre, its close historical relationship with the Awsean Sultanate made the latter appear to be the leader and representative of all the Afar.

Recent developments in Eritrea, where an armed struggle for the independence of the territory began in the 1960s, and the emergence of Somali Nationalism to the south of the Afar, particularly in the ex-French colony of Djibouti, substantially increased the political significance of the Afar region within Ethiopia, since both Eritrea and Djibouti have Afar populations. The political stability of this region is vital to Ethiopia's


growing import-export trade, outlets of which fall within these politically explosive areas in Eritrea and Djibouti. [4] The critical position of the Awash Valley in Ethiopia's economy forms another important dimension of the Centre's policy in relation to the Afar region.

We will refer to the political system that emerged over many centuries in the north-central part of Ethiopia as the 'Ethiopian Political Model'. This system was extended in the last quarter of the 19th century into parts of the territories acquired by conquest and in particular to areas inhabited by large peasants. The system itself grew out of quasi-feudal agricultural communities in the north. Its application to areas inhabited by nomads and semi-nomads was limited, although the creation of the Empire imposed a common political context on all the various ethnic groups within its territory. [5]

It is important to give an outline of the relationship between political power and land in 'ancient Abyssinia' to assist us in understanding the type of the political and economic system which was extended to other parts of the country. 'Ancient Abyssinia' referred to the geographical area comprising the north and north-central highlands of present-day Ethiopia. This part of the country is inhabited by two major ethnic groups, Amhara and Tigrians, who belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and who have been economically and politically dominant since the establishment of the Empire-State in the last quarter of the 19th century. Margery Perham, writing in 1947, indicates clearly the relation between land tenure and political power, in her major work on the Government of Ethiopia:

Ethiopia shared with the rest of tropical Africa a primitive peasant agriculture; the difference was that there stood upon this basis a large hierarchical structure of government. This meant that the cultivator must, as the Ethiopians themselves expressed it, "carry upon his shoulders" all that very large proportion of the population which had withdrawn themselves from work on land. This included the Emperor; all his


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officials, central and provincial, great and small; the vast hierarchy of the Church and the large armies of soldiers. As a result of the undeveloped economy and communications of Ethiopia, the services of the agriculturalist had for the most part to be used directly by the contribution of part of the crops and cattle from his own land or by the use of his labour upon that of another. While slave labour was widely used for domestic purposes, especially in the houses of the rich, it was not in the north used very extensively in the fields, and the main support of Ethiopian State and Society was not the slave but the theoretically free cultivator, the gobar. The elaborate system of land tenure and of tribute with all their provincial variations represent only the different means by which his services and produce were utilised by the government, and by other classes. It was not the land, but the labour of the gobar on the land which provided the support for provincial as well as imperial administration. Hence the importance of the forms of tenure and tribute. [6]

Ethiopian feudalism [7] represented a hierarchical arrangement of three distinct social groups - the peasantry, the nobility and the clergy. [8] John Markakis notes the strength of vertical integration which linked the peasantry and the nobility on the basis of descent, locality and dependence, and further suggests that 'the strength of these ties and the stagnant nature of the traditional economy which obscured the economic relationship between these groups, reduced class antagonism to a minimum'. [9]


This system was extended to other areas which today form southern Ethiopia during the last quarter of the 19th century when the Emperor of Shoa extended his influence through conquest and annexation of Oromo, Somali, Afar, etc. territories. This process, which resulted in the incorporation and subjugation of diverse peoples and territories by the Shoans and their northern allies was described by Addis Hewit as 'military-feudal-colonialism'. [10] The colonial scramble for influence in the Horn of Africa at this time was exploited by the Shoan monarchy to acquire access to the then growing traffic in arms and ammunition which it used for conquest. Once it had been pacified, land which had now become the Emperor's by virtue of conquest, along with the people on it, was allocated to northerners who had participated in the campaigns. They were also given responsibility for the administration of the areas allocated to them and garrison towns known as ketemas served as centres of control. [11] The people of the annexed territories were different from their new masters in terms of culture, language and religion. However, some of the indigenous groups were converted to Christianity and strategic marriages were made with leading families. Traditional leaders were co-opted into the system by appointing some of them as balabbats [12] (intermediaries) to mediate between the Central Government and their peoples. In return for these services they were given Ethiopian titles and land grants.

The expansion of the Ethiopian feudal system into the newly acquired territories was directed to areas where there was a large peasantry to be exploited. The quasi-feudal structure acquired from the north took a rather different shape in the south, for unlike the northern peasantry, who retained ownership of land, the southern peasants became tenants on their own land. [13]

The nomadic areas in the south and south–east escaped this process of internal colonialism since the environment was not suitable for


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cultivation and Ethiopia lacked the technical capability to exploit it. Administrative control in the areas had to wait until after the return of the Emperor in 1941, when the Ethiopian State began to create a viable administrative and military capacity to attempt to control the movements of nomads, and to tax them. [14]

We must point out that the extension of the Ethiopian political model was associated with methods other than conquest, although the latter was predominant. In areas where there was conquest and Amhara rule was forcefully imposed, much of the surplus was consumed locally by the new governors and their retainers. [15] In areas beyond the direct control of Menelik's forces, an annual tribute was imposed. The Centre received direct annual tribute from kurat giber agre, i.e. 'the land of constant tribute'. This designation referred to areas which were not being ruled or administered and were without military settlements, in other words, regions under traditional rulers. They included the Sultanate of Awsa, Jima and Wallaga. These regions were also known as 'weket areas', i.e. areas which paid their tribute in gold fixed at 1,000 weket of gold. [16] Wallaga and Awsa were not incorporated into the Empire until 1918 [17] and 1943 respectively.

H.K. Asmarom has identified four objectives of the Ethiopian political system under both Menelik II and Haile Selassie: [18]

(1) Perpetuation of the Solomonic dynasty.
(2) Maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Empire as expanded and consolidated by Menelik II, and of the additional regions incorporated in the Empire during the reign of Haile Selassie.
(3) Maintenance of internal law and order and defence of the territorial integrity of the Empire from external aggression, with the

[17] Ibid., p.119.
use of modern armed forces.

(4) Extraction of the necessary material and manpower resources to sustain the monarchy, the armed forces and the members of the expanding patrimonial bureaucracy.

These objectives began to be pursued by the founder of the modern State of Ethiopia, Menelik II, who attempted to achieve a highly centralised State. To do this, he established an imperial army supplemented by provincial governors, and enforced a monopoly over the supply of arms. To feed this army, he systematized the collection of revenues by the imperial treasury. [19] However, the regional governors still maintained the power to raise armies and finance. [20] Menelik II set up a Council of Ministers in 1909, and began to centralise state power and personal control over the appointment of officials to higher positions, but no viable central administration existed until Haile Selassie returned from exile after the end of Italian occupation of Ethiopia.

After 1941 a number of reforms were attempted particularly concerning the increase of central authority to raise agricultural taxes. This was frustrated by the land-owning classes and provincial barons who were intent on retaining their power to extract surplus from the peasants. [21] The struggle between the various segments of the ruling classes, the landed aristocracy and the emerging civil-military bureaucracy, was responsible for the continued inability of the State to impose taxes. The Emperor's policy of granting land to members of the aristocracy and the civil-military bureaucracy further aggravated the situation. Agricultural reforms were repeated in essence in all five year development plans (1957-62; 1962-68; 1968-73). Nevertheless, no major attempts were made to implement changes in the structure of this anarchaic quasi-feudal

[19] Ibid., p.119.


[21] Taxes on agriculture were small compared to the importance of the sector in the national economy. For example, direct taxes from agriculture accounted for 23% of the tax revenue in 1950-51, and increased to 27% in 1974.- Gilkes, P., 1974, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernisation in Ethiopia, London: F. Julian Friedmann Publication Ltd., p.164.
The inability to change the structure of peasant agriculture, and thereby increase the domestic share of development expenditure, led the government to look for alternative sources of income to maintain the expanding civil and military bureaucracy and to finance government projects in foreign capital and foreign technical assistance. [23] Most commercialisation of agriculture was to take place in areas outside those where subsistence agriculture existed and where the landowning class had a vested interest. These were the areas officially labelled as 'State domain', but which were in fact inhabited by nomads and semi-nomadic pastoralists whose customary rights over land were not recognised by the State. Most of this was in the Awash Valley. It must be pointed out that Ethiopia followed the path normally pursued by countries in the third world, developing roads and communication serving mainly the small industrial sector, which was based on agricultural products and supplied the growing urban population with textiles and sugar. [24]

Various laws governing foreign investments were made from as early as 1950. In 1963, a more liberal investment code called for the participation of external capital, and allowed extensive concessions in the form of remittance of profits. Soon foreign capital was taking advantage of these provisions. [25] Ethiopia was quoted by the New York Times in 1961 as

[22] In 1967, the government introduced a proposal to reform the tax system, and introduce agricultural income tax. This was resisted by the local aristocracy. For more information, see: Schwab, Peter, 1972, op.cit. pp.89-156.


having the most liberal foreign investment code in Africa. [26] A statement issued by the Ethiopian Minister of Finance in 1950 summarises the country's attitude:

The Imperial Ethiopian Government has decided upon a general working policy for the encouragement of foreign capital investments in Ethiopia of enterprises deemed to be beneficial to the country. For the achievement of this policy, the government is prepared to grant special facilities to new enterprises starting with foreign capital... New enterprises will be free from profit tax for five years from the date production is started... The necessary machinery... will be free of customs duty. [27]

According to Patrick Gilkes, between 1950 and 1967 an amount equivalent to Eth$262.8 m. was invested by foreign capital in Ethiopia and declared profits amounted to Eth$216.1 m. in this period. [28] Bondestam and Duri show the same trend for foreign enterprises working in the Awash Valley region. [29] However, the industrial sector remained small in terms of both production and employment, [30] as shown in Table 2.1 which highlights the main economic indicators of the country between 1961 and 1970. Agricultural surplus still constituted just over half of the total GDP. 92.2% of the population lived in communities of less than 2,500 people and 95% of the population was engaged in the subsistence economy. [31]

Thus, it was no wonder that the government strove to achieve growth in agriculture. The country's third five year plan (1968-73) emphasised two policies: one dealt with the commercialisation of agriculture in areas

[27] Quoted from Gilkes, Patrick, 1974, op.cit. p.149
[28] Ibid., p.149.
[30] Ibid.
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Domestic Product</strong></td>
<td>% change</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In 1961 prices)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing output</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural output</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of goods and NFS</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export of goods and NFS</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic price level</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross National Savings</strong></td>
<td>% GDP</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Gap</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Factor Payments</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Investment</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt Service</td>
<td>% Export</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td><strong>Central Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Revenue</td>
<td>% GDP</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Surplus</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on social services</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
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<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing output</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy consumption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fertiliser consumption</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social indicators</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban population growth</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>School enrollment:</td>
<td>% of school age</td>
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<td>Primary and secondary population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per hospital bed</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,400</td>
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Source: IBRD, 1973, Agricultural Sector Survey, I, Statistical Table Annex, Table 1.

such as the Awash Valley, which had been identified for development in the
early 1950s. [32] The second policy dealt with bringing subsistence agriculture into the market economy through the provision of inputs and facilitation of marketing procedures. This was to be done through the Minimum Package Programmes. [33] As in the commercialisation of agriculture, foreign organisations like the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and US Aid, were to play an important role in for example the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) and Wallamo Agricultural Development Unit (WADU). Commercial agriculture was to be run and managed by private foreign capital in joint ventures with Ethiopian para-statal Agencies. Examples of these are the HVA (Handles Vereniging Amsterdam) sugar plantation and the Tendaho Plantation Shares Co., both in the Awash Valley. This commercialisation of agriculture was to be the basis of an import substitution policy, in addition to providing employment. According to Lars Bondestam, who studied the role of foreign investment in the Awash Valley, the main objectives laid down by the import substitution policy were not fulfilled, even though development was managed through a special agency, the AVA. [34]

Another element of Haile Selassie's government's policy was integration. This has been interpreted as the development of structures of domination rather than participation, which would have helped to weld these diverse groups into a new nation. John Markakis and H.K. Asmarom argue that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Amharic language were the twin instruments used to carry this out. [35] Markakis has taken a sceptical view of these moves:

The Ethiopian regime has not been stimulated into any noticeable effort by the task of national integration. Its accomplishment is viewed simply as a natural derivative of Centralisation and Modernisation, and such a complacent attitude stems from the conviction that the two processes

will advance integration automatically through the forceful promotion of the Amharic language and the gradual spread of Orthodox Christianity. No specific policy designed to promote integration has been formulated by the Government, nor have any of its actions ever been formally identified with that cause. On the contrary, it apprehensively avoids recognition of ethnic divisions, and through stringent censorship prevents any public mention of the subject. Nevertheless, cultural integration is energetically promoted in various ways, with the Amharic language serving as the main catalyst in this process - in fact, no other Ethiopian language is allowed to be taught or printed. [36]

According to H.K. Asmarom, the State recognised the ethnic and religious diversity of the country, [37] but the nature of the State itself would not allow debate on this and most other matters. Haile Selassie's famous phrase that 'religion is personal, the State is for all' [38] sums up the extent of the recognition of diversity.

3.2 Resistance and Collaboration: The Aawsa Sultanate, 1943-1975

Ethiopia's policy in the Afar region reflects the State's objective of centralisation-cum-modernisation. In political terms, this process took place through a sort of indirect rule, whereby traditional leaders, in the Afar case the Makabab, were used as intermediaries between the State and the people. [39] However, the creation of an economic bond between the Afar periphery and the rest of the Empire is much more recent. This was made possible by the availability of advanced technology to harness resources and bring the Afar into the mainstream of the Ethiopian economy. Two approaches were made: through the settlement of semi-nomadic Afar on irrigated agricultural land and the encouragement of sedentarisation in

the Lower Awash Valley.

Until the return of Haile Selassie to Ethiopia with the help of Britain in 1941, this region was not penetrated by the Ethiopian government, partly due to the inability of the central government to provide the necessary administration, and partly because of the close historical relations between Shoa and the southern Afar. The Shoans and particularly Emperor Menelik II developed a close commercial relationship with Aydahis Mohamed who was deputising for his ageing uncle Sultan Mohamed Hanfare in the 1880s. Opposition to Aydahis Mohamed's policy was led by Alimirah I, one of the sons of the ageing Sultan. While most of his brothers were exiled to Abyssinia by Aydahis Mohamed, Alimirah I fled to Yemen and with weapons acquired from there returned in 1888 to defeat his cousin. He was supported in this venture by Sultan Ahab Yassin of Biru. It was then that Awasa formed the 1888 treaty with the Italians but unlike the 1883 treaty, this one was not communicated to the emperor of Ethiopia. Some historians claim that this triggered the Ethiopian expedition of 1895. [40]

Only in the period known in Awasa's history as Nama Mislih dabana, when rival dynasties were established in Awasa between 1900 and 1909, was there a more extrovert attitude: rival contenders to the throne of Awasa solicited the support of the governors (or kings) of Shoa and Wollo. However, there is no evidence of an Ethiopian presence in either Awasa or the rest of the Afar; [41] three European explorers went to the area during the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the impression they give attests to the autonomous nature of the Afar region. Mr. L.M. Nesbitt, who crossed the Afar desert from south to north in 1934 and visited the Sultan of Awasa, but whose wish to visit the northern Afar Sultanate of Biru was not fulfilled, explained the Afar relationship to the Ethiopian State:

Although the Danakil country belongs to Abyssinia the agents of the Government are unable to penetrate into its deserts, except at the fringes. The brave and ferocious Danakils are in

[41] For the period of the two dynasties, see Maknum, G. A., and Hayward, D., 1981, op. cit.
continual state of contention with the Government forces for the possession of the borderlands lying between their territories and the Plateau. In any given sector, sometimes the Government and sometimes the Danakils hold the upper hand. Beyond the borderlands, no Government forces even dares to pass. [42]

Of the relationship between Awaśa and Ethiopia, he further noted that 'the sole tie existing between the two states is the artful, or foolish, Council Chamber convention by which the Awaśa falls within the boundary of the Ethiopian Empire. So it is marked on maps, things the existence of which the Aussans are sublimely ignorant'. [43] Another British explorer, Mr. W. Thesiger, who travelled along the Awash river and visited Awaśa shortly after Nesbitt, remarked: 'the country has never been effectively conquered by the Abyssinians, who are highlanders, unsuited by nature to operation in those hot and feverish lowlands'. [44] Finally, Baron Franchetti who, on the eve of the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia, led the Italian expedition to the Afar Sultanates of Awaśa and Biru (also written as Bīdu) to win them over to the Italian side, [45] raised the question not only of Ethiopia's sovereignty but also of Italian authority over a territory in which the Afar gave loyalty to their traditional leaders only. [46] L.M. Nesbitt observes that 'had we presented a paper from Addis Ababa authorising us in confident terms to travel in the Awaśa, it is more likely that the Aussan Ruler would have taken offence at it, and denied us further passage through his dominion'. [47] Baron Franchetti, who did present such a letter to the Sultan of Biru through an intermediary, was not only denied passage through the Sultanate, which partly fell within the Italian administration of Eritrea, but was even refused an audience with the Sultan. [48]

In the inter-war years, the level of raids and counter-raids escalated as highland Ethiopia became engulfed in political instability after the

[43] Ibid., p.217.
death of Menelik II in 1913. The Sultanate of Awas was raided by Abyssinians three times between 1909 and 1924, and more than four times between 1924 and the beginning of the Italian occupation. [49] The major thrust of these raids was against the northern Afar Sultanate of Biru which was under constant harassment by the Italians prior to and after the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935. [50] Baron Franchetti indicated that the main reason was famine in highland Ethiopia, but the intensity of conflict suggests the absence of administrative control on the part of the Ethiopian State. [51]

However, this situation was dramatically changed at the end of the Allied campaign in East Africa, and the withdrawal of the Italians from Eritrea. An Abyssinian expedition reached Awas in 1944, captured the Sultan and brought him back to Addis Ababa where he died in captivity. [52] This second expedition against Awas in nearly 50 years was made on the pretext of the securing of trade routes, but it served both as Haile Selassie's vengeance for Awas's friendly relations with the Italian occupation authorities, and as a means of extending the authority of the central government.

After the removal of Sultan Mohamed Yayo in 1944, and his replacement by a kinsman, the central government's efforts to extend its authority by appointing an Ethiopian governor to administer Awas directly was met by fierce resistance from the newly appointed Sultan. According to the

[49] Interview with Awaese elders.
[50] The Sultanate of Biru was drastically affected by the construction of the Assab-Addis road. Its attitude to Italian colonialism and its continued history of resistance gave it a special position among young Afar. Its Sultan, Yassin Haysama, is considered today as a liberator, whose killing by the Italian authorities in the 1930s was followed by the arrest of many leaders of coastal Afar. For relations between Biru and the Italians, see, ASMAI, 1930, Affari politica, Busta 4, Fasc.3.
[51] From my interviews with Afar elders, it is evident that they put the blame on established State machinery, while Franchetti claims the situation was created in order to prevent his expedition, although he mentions the existence of famine.
[52] See: from Mr. F.L. Cook to Mackereth, 25.4.1944 (J.1664/22/1); from Consul Vaughan-Russell (Jebouti) to H.M.'s Charge d'Affairs, British Legation, Addis Ababa, (No.21/366/5/3c), 25.4, 1944, in FO 371 File No.41479.
elders, the success of the Ethiopian expedition was made possible by the never-ending power struggle within the Aydahiso ruling house. A section of this solicited the support of the central government, which was more than eager to get a foothold in the area. This section of the Aydahiso ruling house had the support of Hamadi Yayo, a wazir of the ex-Sultan, a celebrated warrior who is a household name throughout the Afar territory and who had fallen out of favour with Sultan Mohamed during the last days of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Hamadi Yayo, who is said to have told Sultan Mohamed that he would not live like a 'fox in a territory where he previously lived like a lion', joined the victorious Ethiopian Patriot forces on the eve of the Italian defeat. Hamadi Yayo had previously accompanied Sultan Mohamed on a trip to Italy, and his actions reveal the readiness of a shrewd local Politician to switch sides. Yayo knew and was aware of the Italian defeat, and quickly developed strong relations with the Ethiopian administration. He masterminded the coup within the Aydahiso ruling house and brought members of the elite Imperial Body Guard to remove the Sultan of Awa in 1944. Yayo was married to the sister of Sultan Alimirah who replaced Sultan Mohamed in 1944 and he became the central figure in Awa’s relations with the central government between 1944 and 1971. As a protege of Emperor Haile Selassie, and as a celebrated warrior in his own right, Yayo held a central role in Awa’s politics, particularly in the formative years of Sultan Alimirah’s reign, since the latter was too young and was indebted to Yayo for assisting him to come to power. Yayo himself could not aspire to the position of Sultan since he was not a member of the Aydahiso ruling family.

However, as head of the Sultan’s militia, and as his emissary to the Afar in general as well as to the central government, Yayo in reality held immense power. Although Yayo, as great Makaabantu (elder) and as a celebrated warrior, commanded great respect beyond the borders of the Sultanate of Awa, his power in Awa itself was derived from his position as Wazir and head of the Sultanate’s militia, rather than popular support. This is important to remember when we discuss Awa’s rise as a political and economic power in the mid-1960s after the introduction of cotton; this period brought strains to Awa’s relations with the central government, and Addis Ababa attempted to use its old allies to bring about changes in
Awsa, by encouraging Yayo and others to forge alliances with the Awas Valley Authority. [53]

To return to the 1940s, the honeymoon between Sultan Alimirah and his Ethiopian supporters who assisted him to succeed to the position of Sultan in 1944, did not last long, for between 1944 and 1954 the Ethiopian authorities attempted to rule Awsa directly through the appointment of an Ethiopian governor. [54] This led to a little-known revolt by the Sultan in 1949 when he decided to exile himself to Boha, a small village near the border of the French colony of Djibouti (see map no.2). The Ethiopian governor ran the administration of Awsa district from the Sultan's official seat, Aysaita, but the support of the traditional leadership was not forthcoming; elders looked for leadership and guidance to Boha rather than to Aysaita.

According to the Awsan elders the decision to move to Boha was made after the Sultan was informed by his Wazir Hamadi Yayo, who was on a visit to the Ethiopian capital, of a document which was being circulated there which implicated both the Sultan and his Wazir in a plot to separate Awsa from Ethiopia. The document outlined an agreement between the Sultan and his Wazir on the one hand and the French authorities across the border on the other. [55] Whoever was responsible for writing the document knew well the sensitivities of the Ethiopian authorities regarding such matters, for it was precisely the making of treaties by Awsa with Italy in 1888 which was the immediate cause for Menelik II's expedition in 1895 against the

[53] The Sultan was later that year promoted to the rank of Bitwooded, which means 'the Beloved' and is normally reserved to those very close to the Imperial Royal House. But it is short of Ras, which is the highest rank and is normally reserved for princes. Alimirah seems to have been trying to get it for some time, according to those close to him.

[54] Interview with Musa Danaba, Sultan Alimirah's private secretary from 1950 to 1962. Interview in Djibouti 1981; and in Jeddah in 1982.

[55] In a letter to the British Legation in Addis Ababa, J.R. Vaughan-Russell mentions that the French had occupied Afambo, a strategically located mountain path between Awsa and Djibouti after the War and that they justified their occupation by the claims that their possession of Afambo enabled them to prevent warring Danakil and Issa from bringing bloodshed and ruin within the borders of French Somaliland'.- FAO 371 (File No.41479), 25.4.1944.
Sultan of Awaṣa. [56] The immediate reaction of the Sultan was the physical elimination of those he thought were responsible for the conspiracy. These included three of his immediate staff who also happened to have very close relationships with the Ethiopian administration at Bati, Awaṣa’s district capital. Nobody seems now to recall why particular individuals should have defied a powerful local power to whom they were indebted for their positions; it is however possible that they were prompted by Ethiopia’s new governor at Aysaita. It was this incident which precipitated the decision by the Sultan, who was already unhappy with the Ethiopian local administration, to take up self-exile to Boha.

If the removal and capture of Sultan Mohamed in 1944 seemed to mark the end of Awaṣa’s cherished independence, Boha opened a new chapter. It was here that the Awaṣeans renewed their contact with the Islamic world. An open letter was drafted by a Yemeni lawyer named Mohamed Said Subhi, based in Djibouti. It was later published under the title of ‘Awaṣa Message’ or ‘Risalat Awaṣa’ in Al Muslimoon, the official organ of the Muslim Brotherhood, in March 1954. [57] In Boha, the Sultan also renewed his contact with the Afar from Eritrea. His militia was given training by members of the British-trained Eritrean Police Force who had left Eritrea for fear that it would fall under Ethiopian authority. [58] Also the self-exiled Sultan renewed his contacts with Muslims from Dawe and Wollo province who were themselves under pressure from the Ethiopian Authorities at that time. Dawe’s historical relations with Awaṣa, both commercial and Islamic, were well established; Muslim ulama from Dawe were

[57] See Subhi, Mohamed Said, 1955, ‘Risalat Awaṣa’, Al Muslimoon, March 1954 (Arabic text). This is composed of two sections. One forms the appeal to the International Community, and other an introduction to Awaṣa and its leader Sultan Alimrah. There is an interesting part in the latter section concerning the methods by which the Sultan is appointed.
[58] Several former members of the Eritrean Police Force, mainly from the Saho ethnic group, went to Awaṣa in 1949/50. Some of them trained the Sultan’s militia and later became influential in his security. One of them was still active during the 1975 revolt. A number of important Afar politicians from Eritrea, particularly those who advocated independence, developed close relations with the Awaṣeans as early as 1950 at Boha. Among them was Sayiid Ibrahim, noted for his Eritrean nationalist tendencies: For relations with Dawe, see Al Ethiopie, Abu Ahmed, 1964, Al Islam al jarif fil Habasha.
brought to Awsa to teach the sons and daughters of the members of the Aydahisso ruling house, and the Sultan himself received his Islamic education by a Daweyan scholar.

Boha gave new life to Awsa's elites who had nearly lost their grip on local power by the mid-1940s. Those with Ethiopian loyalties were all but eliminated. Resistance to central authority helped to build bridges with similar groups in Dawe and Eritrea which were to the advantage of the Awsan leaders. By 1954, the central government, which had brought Eritrea into its fold and which was to sign a new Djibouti border agreement with France, [59] probably needed more than at any other time to avoid any conflict with the Awsans.

The following agreement was made by the central government with the Awsan leaders: [60]

a) The Ethiopian governor was removed from Aysaita, and Ethiopian governors henceforth were to administer the Awsa district from their remote base at Bati in the highlands.

b) Contacts were restored at the highest level: the Sultan who had complained about restriction of access to the Emperor, was given such access; this later frustrated contacts at both provincial and district levels, because the Sultan was now to be responsible to the Emperor only.

c) The Sultan was promoted to the position of 'Chief Balabbat'. This ushered in an era of indirect rule because all other Afar leaders, particularly in the south, were to be subject to this new over-lord.

[59] For a critical view of the agreement, see Chederville, E., 1954, (30 Janvier). La rectification de frontière entre L'Ethiopie et la Côte Française des Somalis. Le Monde. Paris. The agreement was about handing over to Ethiopia, the Afambo, a strategic mountain path that the French had re-occupied after 1941. Boha is located near Afambo. For more information, and for French view of why they re-occupied Afambo, see FO 371/41479, op. cit.

[60] This information was received from Musa Danaba, private secretary of the Sultan of Awsa who drafted all correspondence between the Sultan and the Ethiopian administration.
d) Hamadi Yayo, the Sultan's Wazir, was appointed as the new district governor, to be based at Kysaita with less than a dozen police and just one administrative secretary.

This arrangement served the interests of both the central government and the Awseans, and a new bridge-head began to be built. The supremacy of Awa's traditional elites over the rest of Afar was now sanctioned by the central government. The creation of an Afar officialdom by central appointment was to have damaging effects on the structure of authority among the semi-nomadic Afar in general, although one could argue that the centralisation of authority at Awa meant that Afar grievances could be heard directly at the highest level of authority in the country. However, Awa's historical expansionist tendencies served the interests only of the Awseans themselves, as will be clear when we discuss their agricultural policies; they were to prosper at the time when the rest of the Afar were facing severe drought in 1972/73. [61]

The introduction of Balabbsats caused political havoc because some Afar Kidho Abba (lineage heads), with aspiration to power, began to use the government to assist their personal and their lineages' rise in status by petitioning either the Sultan of Awa or district/provincial government to become officials. [62] The government had little knowledge of the structure of authority among Afar and at times this meant the appointment of minor Makaabab (elders) to the position of Balabbat while senior Makaaban were made Chickashum, another Ethiopian rank normally given in highland Ethiopia to a village head. [63]

3.3 Drought and Irrigation

The studies undertaken by FAO since 1950s on behalf of the Imperial Government of Ethiopia reveal that the production of commercial crops based on irrigation had a top place in development priorities. The planners envisaged that the growth in this sector of the national economy would pull the 'archaic' subsistence agricultural sector up into the market economy thereby bringing about a change in the life style of ordinary peasants. This has mainly taken place in the Awash Valley. In 1962 the Government established the Awash Valley Authority to supervise development in the Valley. The Government vested land ownership in the AVA, ignoring the traditional claims of the nomadic people. Under the management of AVA, development in the Valley took the form of large scale mechanised commercial enterprises mostly managed by foreign agro-business in joint ventures with the state. The Government's main concern at this stage was to acquire cash and commodities for its expanding military and civilian bureaucracy. [64] Irrigation development in the Awash Valley certainly did increase the country's production of cotton and sugar, and was able to absorb large numbers of migrant labourers. However, irrigation, the construction of dams and the Government's drive for centralisation, interacting with drought, produced deplorable effects on the nomads of the Awash.

Recent studies indicate an explicit correlation between development policies, and drought and famine. [65] Within the context of Ethiopia, many


writers associated the Great Famine of 1972/73 with the feudal land tenure of Highland Ethiopia. [66] Others also linked the Afar plight with the encroachment of pastures by irrigation schemes and the reduced river flooding caused by the construction of the Koka Dams. [67] The full extent of the relationship between Government policy and the Great Famine cannot be pursued here in any detail; however, we shall argue that there is an explicit connection between Government's irrigation development policy in the Awash Valley and drought and famine in that region. This is not to claim that drought is solely the creation of development policy; however it is evident from from oral traditions, as well as from recent studies, that this region was hit by drought in 1958, 1964, 1966 and 1967, and that drought is a historically recurrent phenomenon in this part of the world. [68] Yet there are strong indications today that, 'drought and famine do not always reflect cause-effect relationships and that the two may co-exist independently and often become linked only through politico-economic conditions'. [69] Consequently drought could be related even if indirectly to Government policies.


Among the Afar livestock production depended on the availability of grass, and water. This in turn depended on river flooding, and on rain. One of the major climatic characteristics of this region is the correlation between low mean annual rainfall, altitude, and river flooding. Rainfall is highly seasonal, confined to the 'small rains' (February - March), and the 'big rains' (July - August), which results in marked fluctuations in river discharge. Precipitation decreases and temperature increases with lower elevations. This is reflected in the vegetation zones which range from degraded montane Savanna and Forest on the High Plateau (2,500 - 3,000 meters), to woodland and Tree Savanna (1,200 - 2,500 meters), and to predominantly tropical dry grass Savanna and semi-desert interspaced with volcanic formations, basalt flows, and sand in the lowland. [70] There are a number of rivers draining the area from the highlands to the west, all of which are subject to flash floods during the rainy season. All the tributaries of the Awash in the lowlands, except Arba Dima, Kessem Kabena, Borchenna, and Mille usually dry up after the rainy season. However, in the dry river beds water is stored in the sand for several months after the rain, providing well water. There are, however, few water points with salty water good for camels and goats. [71]

As has been mentioned above these physiogeographical and ecological constraints are met by the existence of a well-balanced system of land use, based on migration and transhumance, and reciprocal arrangements with the highland cultivators which include both grazing rights on crop residues, stock loans and trading, especially in food. The last aspect is vital, because pastoralists in this region tend to meet almost half of their calorie requirements through agricultural products, and any disruption of this has immediate effects on their survival. To these adaptations, we may add the internal adjustment mechanisms by pastoral societies when confronting drought. Among the Afar, a number of cooperative associations exist [72] to which Afar turn in times of crisis.

[70] Ibid, p.22.
such as the Fiema, Youth Associations; [73] Agla agreement between two or more clans to exchange livestock and [74] Asuma, the loaning of livestock to individuals and/or households.

It is important to note that pastoralists need access to several types of flooded grazing. When land is totally under water, it cannot be grazed and when it has dried the grass is rapidly burnt off by the sun. Each pastoral group needs access to both land which drains quickly after flooding, and to land which drains slowly, if it is to survive a dry season, which can last from mid-September to mid-June. [75] The river banks, which constitute this critical grazing area, were absorbed by irrigation development. The seasonal flooding was affected by changes in the regime of the river resulting from regulation of the flow of water at the Koka Dams. Since 1960, three dams have been built on the Awash; Abu Samuel, Koka 1 and Koka 2; the purpose of Koka 1, the largest of the three, is to provide hydroelectric power for Addis Ababa. Impounding the river and fairly steady release of water from the two Koka Dams sharply reduced the seasonal floods downstream. It is estimated that:

The proportion of total annual Awash water discharged during the large rains (July - September) at Wonji fell from 84% prior to the dams to 35% after their completion in 1960. The new river flow pattern completely eliminated floods from the Upper Valley and significantly reduced them in the Middle Valley, though in the plains the Awash retains a more pronounced seasonal flow pattern, owing to the still unregulated tributaries. [76]

Under pressure from AVA and the farmers, the amounts of water released by the reservoir were modified after 1972 to supply the farmers with more water during March and October, [77] permitting cultivation of an additional 25,000 ha. This considerable change in the regime of the river

[74] Agla means sharing arrangement between clans (specific clans) and includes other social obligations which tie them together.
[77] Ibid.
affected the flooding pattern to which the pastoralists were used. Commenting on this, H.E.Voelkner states:

Before the intrusion of irrigated farming into the project area, the Afar way of life seemed to have been well balanced with forage resources of the area provided by the rainfall and flooding of the river and necessitating only minimal amount of migration. This balance supported an even greater amount of livestock and population but any upset in this balance would naturally have the immediate effect (within 1 to 2 years) of reducing both. The effect of the latest drought (1972/73) may not have been as devastating had the river been allowed to flood as in its unregulated past and had the normally flooded area been available as grazing area to the Afar population.(sic) [78]

Thus the best grazing areas, which happened to be close to the river banks, were taken up by irrigation agriculture. By 1972, there were some 50,000 ha. under irrigated agriculture, displacing some 20,000 pastoralists. [79] The irrigated land area was small in comparison to the size of the basin or the flat grazing areas of the Awash, but this crucial belt was estimated by A.G.Goudie in 1972 to constitute '16% of the total size of the flat grazing originally available'. He continues 'the position is more marked in the lower plains where 23% of the river flats are now used for irrigated cropping'. [80] Outside this belt, the Great Plains could not support a great number of people and livestock both in the dry and wet seasons. The removal of this strategic grazing zone also meant the blocking of migration routes and livestock watering points of Arsi at Nura Era, and the Afar in the Melka-Sedi and Awsa areas. [81]

Several secondary developments have sprung from this introduction of commercial crops, which have important bearing on the general pattern of plant degradation. The large numbers of highland labourers led to clearing of riparian forests and trees for use in the construction of labour camps, and for fuel. This significantly reduced the forage resources. Even Awsa,

which had a highly restricted system of protection under Sultan Almirah, was not saved from this development. [82] In addition, woodcutting and charcoal production by farmers along the Addis Ababa-Assab, and Bati-Assab road for use in the capital city and other large villages in the Awash River Basin resulted in large scale destruction of acacia woodlands and deciduous bush vegetation in the wet-season grazing areas. [83]

The introduction of irrigated development disrupted both the traditional economy of the pastoralists and their pattern of life. The important dry season gatherings that brought a large number of people together and fostered social activities such as marriages had been disrupted. At the same time, 'new groups lacking amity have been thrust together, and conflict is high; whilst groups which before had many ritual links have sometimes been separated'. [84] The cooperation between groups, which is linked to residential and genealogical patterns is essential, particularly in the wet season when the clans move away from their residential areas; but this is disrupted by forced out-migration. Such cooperation is essential for pastoral production since certain groups assist each other in the search for better pastures, in the drilling of wells, and in watering stock. The decline of this cooperation has brought conflict between them, and between them and the highlander graziers who began to limit the reciprocal stock arrangements which existed between them and the Afar. [85]

It was the intrusion of commercial agriculture and the disruption of pastoral processes which caused the over-grazing, seen by some as a basic cause of plant degradation in pastoral areas, and not the activities of the nomads themselves. Together with the failure of the 'small' rains, this led inevitably to the devastating drought and famine of 1972/73. The disaster was compounded by the reduced river flooding over the preceding four years. The Afar were the first to be hit, and were among the refugees seeking help in Addis Ababa in December 1972. They figured most

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prominently in the lowlands, lining the north-south highway through Wollo in early 1973, stopping cars and buses asking for food. [86]

This situation was exacerbated by the Government's wider policy of centralisation which included replacement of traditional markets by new ones in order to control and to tax nomads. An understanding of this aspect of Central Government's policy is crucial for comprehending changes in the structure and development of the Afar economic system. The Afar, as semi-nomadic pastoralists, produced few commodities other than milk products such as butter and, increasingly, livestock, hides and skin. They traditionally depended on the highlands for food, and they also sold heifers to the agriculturalists. In addition, historically, highland Abyssinia depended on salt from Afar, and this trade is continued on a much smaller scale in northern Afar. [87] In the past, merchants from the coast brought foreign goods to markets in the highlands to be exchanged for slaves, ivory and other goods. Thus, the Afar controlled major trade routes which they relinquished only after the construction of the Djibouti-Addis railway and Assab-Addis highway. Hostilities between the trading communities, however, never disrupted exchange. [88] Political stability in the highlands after 1941 brought peace to the area, and Afar and other Ethiopians frequently exchanged goods at traditional markets. However, after 1941 the introduction of the process of centralisation brought some strains to the Afar. The emerging administration began to re-draw boundaries, so that the semi-nomadic Afar found themselves split into newly created districts. Consequently they were directed to new rather


than traditional markets. In some cases markets closer to the lowland were closed for good, when hostilities between Afar and highlanders became acute. [89]

In the Afar region, the necessity of economic cooperation with the highlands had a direct impact on the economy. The Afar needed to pasture their livestock in the highlands at certain times of the year. They also needed to use highland markets to sell and purchase certain goods. The peace and stability created after 1941 enabled these needs to be met, but these favourable conditions were being eroded by government policies and exacerbated by the serious drought which affected the areas concerned in 1965/66. [90]

In the highlands, political and administrative change caused strains on land. Peasants were increasingly finding themselves with less land to farm and thus they began slowly to bring under cultivation more of the land hitherto used by Afar pastoralists for grazing. This led to hostilities and, at times, to the closure of highland markets to the Afar. [91] The hostilities were exacerbated by irrigation development in the Awash Valley, where areas close to the river banks were taken over by agriculturalists, so that the semi-nomadic Afar began to search for pasture nearer the foothills of the Ethiopian plateau.

A major problem was that for political and administrative reasons there were no markets close to the lowlands, and the Afar had to travel long distances to get to them. [92] The hostilities which became associated with conflict over limited resources made 'access to the highlands essentially closed; getting to market and selling and buying has become a problem of major proportions to the Afar'. [93] Thus, when they were hit by

[92] Afar in some cases had to travel some eight days to Bati, and their camels could not keep this up. See Cossins, N.J., 1972, op.cit. p.104.
[93] Ibid.
the drought, they had to sell their stock for food, particularly maize, at a time when livestock market prices were falling fast. This worsening of the exchange rate, which was 'very substantial', [94] disrupted the pastoralists' normal method of meeting his food requirements. A.K. Sen states that

The characteristics of exchange relations between the pastoral and the agricultural economies thus contributed to the starvation of herdsmen by making price movements reinforce — rather than counteract — the decline in the livestock quantity. The pastoralist, hit by the drought, was decimated by the market mechanism. [95]

One can only estimate the number of Afar who starved to death in 1972/73 famine; L. Bondestam suggests some 30% of the Afar perished (see the Table 2.2 for the north-east rangelands).

Table 2.2
Estimates of Afar livestock and human loss based on three round aerial survey of 29,100 Kms² in North-East Rangeland

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>September 1972</th>
<th>January 1973</th>
<th>May 1973</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human families</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(of 5 people)</td>
<td>22,600</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livestock</strong></td>
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Source: LMB (Livestock and Meat Board, Ethiopian Government), 1974, Annex 1, para 1.05; see also Halland, Johan, 1972, p.14. For estimates of livestock losses in the north-east rangeland areas of Wollo, Tigre, northern Shoa and Harargte, see EPID (Extension and Project Identification Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Ethiopian Government), publication, no.16, January 1974, p.39.
CHAPTER IV

IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT AND THE AWASH VALLEY AUTHORITY

4.1 Irrigation and the Establishment of the Awash Valley Authority

The establishment of the Awash Valley Authority was preceded by a number of major irrigation and water-control projects in the valley. Prior to 1950 only the upper reaches of the valley around Addis Ababa produced cash crops for the nearby market, and there were just two organisations further downstream. These were Montanari (at Melka Awara) located to the north-west of the Awash station on the Kebena River (a tributary of the Awash), and the Metahara plantation on the Awash River west of the Awash station. These organisations made use of irrigation to produce bananas, citrus fruits, papaya, grapes, vegetables, cotton, rice, sugar and oil seeds. [1] These were followed by concessions of 5000 ha. to HVA, a Dutch firm, at Wonji to produce sugar in 1954. In 1959, another concession was granted to the Mitchell Cotts Group, a British firm, to grow cotton on 18,000 ha. along the Awash River at Tendaho. This became operational in 1961. These were soon followed by new projects in the middle and upper valley, such as those of Abadir (5,000 ha.), Nura Era (5,400 ha.), Haile Selassie Welfare Trust (1,500 ha.), and at Tibilla (200 ha.) [2] In addition to these, the irrigation network of the Awsa Sultanate had been in existence for more than four centuries, (See Map No.3 for Irrigation developments in the Awash Valley). [3] According to a report undertaken by SOGREAH on behalf of FAO in 1965, the AYA was set up to put an end to the

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Includes foreign loans and technical assistance budget allocation for the Mash Valley Authority.
'piecemeal' approaches to development. [4] In the following discussion we will examine the role of the AVA and evaluate whether or not the Authority was able to achieve the goals for which it was established.

The AVA was created on 23rd of January, 1962, by Imperial Charter. [5] According to the Charter, AVA was given exclusive jurisdiction "to administer and develop the natural resources of the Valley". The Authority's jurisdiction covered the whole of the River Basin area. The Authority, however, limited its activities to the lowland region inhabited by semi-nomadic pastoralists, and never ventured into the highlands. [6] The reason for this was that AVA was assigned to develop areas the State considered to be public land and in the highlands the Rist system of individual tenure prevailed. AVA was not obliged to recognise the rights of existing users of land and water, "unless a written agreement had already been entered into between users and government". There were no such agreements between Afar nomads and the Ethiopian State.

The basic functions [7] of the Authority were:
1) To conduct surveys of the River Basin's resources.
2) To establish plans and programmes for the use and development of the resources of the Valley.
3) To coordinate activities of all government ministries and public authorities in the use and development of these resources.
4) To authorise third parties to contract, acquire, manage and administer and maintain physical structures.
5) To administer all land and water rights.
6) To assign water for all irrigation and other purposes, and to fix and collect fees for the use of such water and other facilities.
7) To promote, organise and authorise establishment of cooperative and agricultural and industrial enterprises.
8) To do all such things as may be necessary to assure the best use and

development of the resources of the Awash Valley.

Thus, the Charter granted the Authority extensive powers, extending far beyond the mere control of agricultural and hydraulic activities. [8] In the context of an underdeveloped country like Ethiopia, this was a tremendous task for one authority or department within a government. The Ethiopian government had only established modern central government machinery after the Second World War, and had neither the managerial nor technical capabilities to supervise modern irrigation development carried out by foreign firms nor the political will to back up the Authority in the face of international capital or local pressures. The government itself had very little authority in the Awash Valley, indeed the AVA itself and the concessionaires came to symbolise government presence there.

AVA, like the rest of Ethiopia's expanding bureaucracy, fell prey to competing interests within and outside the State. Asmarom, in his excellent study of the Ethiopian bureaucracy, describes this as one of the main bottlenecks in development planning. [9] Organisations with similar functions were created, resulting in duplication of activities and widespread conflict of interests within officialdom. [10] The proliferation of agricultural agencies prevented the Ministry of Agriculture from developing 'a well integrated general plan for agricultural development within the framework of five year plan', [11] and made coordinated effort among the various government departments involved in a particular area virtually impossible. For example,

The Awash Valley Authority, the Ethiopian Light and Power Authority (ELPA), the Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs, the Department of the Municipalities of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Mines were all responsible for different aspects of water resources development. [12]

[10] Ibid., pp.84-185.
[12] Ibid., p.185.
The AVA's own Master Plan of 1974 highlighted this difficulty:

There has been little relationship between AVA promoted development and those stimulated by the National Plan. On the one hand, the AVA Charter implies vesting of considerable power in the Authority in matters within its jurisdiction whilst on the other hand, the actions of ministries responsible for sectoral and general development have in practice restricted the AVA's power to plan and control development. [13]

More so than most formal organisations, the AVA was 'moulded by forces tangential to their rationally ordered structures and stated goals'. [14] One such tangential force was the Afar Sultanate of Awsa. This Sultanate had the support of the local administration and some government departments in the centre. It challenged the stated objectives and goals of AVA, notwithstanding the powers conferred on it by its Charter.

A look at the composition of the AVA's high-powered Board of Commissioners which acted as a policy making body gives the impression that the Authority had the necessary governmental backing. In fact this was not so: Hailu W.Emmanuel has rightly suggested that the Authority's 'organisational and administrative and institutional problems are associated with the composition of the Board and the limited power and sanctions of the executive body'. [15] Originally the Board of Commissioners was composed of 7 members, including the General Manager of AVA. The Commission was made up of the representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Interior, Public Works and Communication. The Prime Minister (at that time the Emperor himself) was allowed to appoint two additional members. The Commission was headed by a Vice-Minister of Agriculture. [16] Later the membership of the Board was


enlarged to include representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Education and Fine Arts, Industry and Tourism and the Interior, as well as representatives of the Planning Commission and the Water Resources Authority. [17] This new list left out some of the most important developmental departments with interest in the Valley, such as the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs which had direct responsibility for the Gewani Community Development Centre in the Middle Awash and the Cooperative Society of the Ambara settlement scheme. A whole range of other public authorities and provincial administrations in Shoa, Hararghe and Wollo, as well as the Awa Sultanate and Afar Balabbata were left out. Apart from the Board of Commissioners, it had an executive headed by a General Manager with the rank of Vice-Minister, responsible to the Board. The Authority had its headquarters in Addis Ababa where only the foreign managed plantations had offices. This put the organisation out of reach of the indigenous population whose representatives had to make expensive trips to Addis Ababa whenever they wanted to air their views. Until early 1970, AVA kept a skeleton office in the middle and lower Valley which were fully engaged in the management of the two settlement schemes. In 1970, a report prepared by the FAO for the Government of Ethiopia suggested that the Authority's headquarters be moved to a suitable location in the Middle Valley once the Assab-Addis Ababa highway was completed. [18] This was completed in 1973, but the AVA headquarters was still not moved to the Middle Valley.

As to the internal organisation of AVA, the few available materials suggest that with all the assistance given by FAO and other international organisations, AVA lacked proper organisation to carry out its defined

functions. [19] The Authority blamed the Central Government for not giving it the necessary autonomy in organisational and financial matters. [20]

Right from the very beginning, AVA's policies were influenced by government directives. [21] In the initial stage of the development of the Valley, the State was concerned with the acquisition of cash and commodities to support its expanding bureaucracy; the semi-nomadic people did not constitute a part of its programme and the Charter was very vague on the development of human resources. Indeed, Ethiopia as a whole did not have a land settlement policy when AVA was created. John MacArthur, who advised the Government on land settlement in 1972, argued that the settlement schemes, including those of AVA, "were underlaid by no single philosophy or conception of a settlement project that has any national acceptance". [22] A Land Settlement Department was created as part of the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration for the first time in 1972. [23] When AVA was created in 1962, Land Settlement was not in fact undertaken by AVA, but by the expatriate Mitchell Cotts Group as part of the Tendaho plantation, and modelled on the Sudan Gezira Scheme.

The two settlement schemes at Dubti and Amibara were established during the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1967-1972), which recognised AVA's role in the regional development process. The Plan saw the Authority's role as:

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[23] Ibid., p.40.
To guide, administer and control the utilisation of the natural resources under its jurisdiction, and to take the various economic, technical and social measures for the development of the River Basin'. [24]

Apart from this short paragraph, the plan document did not give any specific indications on the directions to be followed in the coming years. Table 4.1 indicates the extent of government support to AVA. [25] Between 1962 and 1972/73 AVA's greatest achievement was in conducting surveys and feasibility studies. [26] These, along with the Afar challenge in the Lower Plains, changed dramatically the AVA's developmental thinking about the need to curb the expansion of large scale commercialisation. A further factor was the devastating drought in 1972/73 in which 30% of the Afar population is said to have perished and in which 80% of their livestock were lost. [27] Up to 1974, there was no Master Plan for the Valley, and AVA's activities were mainly ad hoc decisions.

Thus far, we have been discussing AVA in its Ethiopian context, but since it was associated with the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) from its inception, it is time to clarify its international relation. The United Nations, through its Development Programme (UNDP), undertook a major survey of the potential resources of the Valley long before the

[26] FAO-UNDP, Terminal Report, 1978, op. cit., p.4; Major feasibility studies undertaken were those of the Middle and Lower Plains. Consultants involved were Italcconsult and Sir William Halcrow and Partners in the Middle Valley, and Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners in association with Hunting Technical Services Ltd. in the Lower Plains.
[27] Bondestam, L., 1973, op.cit. p.8; AVA began to rethink after a Review Meeting attended by FAO officials in 1969. They decided to design and implement 'projects to accord a just share of participation by the semi-nomadic people of the area'.- FAO-UNDP, Terminal Report, 1978, p.4. Another Report for 1974 also mentions the Tripartite Review meeting which was held in Addis Ababa in June 1972 in which officials of the Government, AVA and FAO agreed that AVA should recognise that 'nomads who are in the area, as Ethiopian citizens, must share the benefit of the Valley's development'.- FAO-UNDP, Interim Report, No.2, 1975, Appendix IV, p.72. The First Regional Development Plan by AVA which was finalised in July 1973 also suggested that 'private concessionaires cannot be given priority over the local people...This is and will be a major policy that is to be adhered to in the course of development'.- AVA, Master Plan, 1974, Main Volume Chapter V, p.53.
Map 3:
Awash River Basin Irrigation Development
(M. Ashami, 1985)
establishment of AVA. [28] This was completed in 1964, and, upon request of the Ethiopian Government, FAO was designated an Executing Agency on behalf of the United Nations Special Fund in June 1965. [29] This arrangement resulted in the setting up of joint management between AVA and FAO whereby AVA's General Manager became Co-Project Manager with a UNDP (FAO) Resident Manager. [30] This association was supposed to strengthen AVA. In 1969, the FAO selected the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission of Victoria, Australia, (henceforth Water Commission) to act as twinning organisation to AVA. [31] The Water Commission recruited personnel, and 'provided the necessary back-stopping services for the project'. [32] This association was criticised by John Harbeson because the Water Commission had practically no experience in the area of the tranformation of nomadic pastoralists into sedentary agriculturalists. [33]

This close cooperation between AVA and its international counterparts tended to give the impression that they comprised a single organisation. In fact it is rather difficult to differentiate between the views and attitudes of one party and another. The available literature does not assist us in this matter because most of the studies on AVA and its projects were commissioned by FAO and its subcontractors. No Ethiopian individual or institution was commissioned to undertake a study of the Valley, with the exception of one or two internal papers produced in cooperation with international experts. [34] However, this does not mean that we are unable to draw a line between their views. The international experts played very important roles in the way development took place in the Valley. Their presence was evident through their constant visits to

[30] For a list of FAO Counter Staff, see ibid, Appendix 1, p.153.
[34] An example of this was the study undertaken by Kassahun A. and F.Juhasz: see Kassahun, A. and F.Juhasz, 1970, Report on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Nomadic Pastoralists in the Awash Valley Basin, IEG, AVA, Addis Ababa.
the project areas, and AVA headquarters in Addis Ababa became a center for international development experts, and seemed a world apart from other government departments, housed nearby. These experts exercised a substantial influence on the Authority's policy regarding both the settlement schemes and the concessions. Although critical of the Authority's inability to control concessionaires, [35] these consultants nevertheless encouraged the process of agrarian capitalism in the Valley.

FAO officials were involved in the settlement schemes and extension services from the initiation of the project. Indeed the extension service in the lower plains was virtually run by FAO personnel. They were also associated with the implementation of the Dubti and Amibara settlement schemes if not operationally, at least at the advisory level. Close association with the day to day operation of the projects made this group of people more sympathetic to the semi-nomadic Afar, while the attitudes of the Ethiopian officials towards the Afar were more paternalistic. The following statement from a consultant's report in 1974 sums up the Ethiopian attitude:

Whether as field supervisors, cooperative staff or other managerial personnel, the non-Afar bosses often exhibit an attitude that shows quite clearly disdain and superiority. Very seldom do they care to learn even a few words of Afar to communicate. On the contrary, the Afar are generally expected to understand Amharic and when they don't they are considered to be ignorant and more often of having a very low intelligence. [36]

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[35] The following studies on legal matters shed some light on their views:
   d) Clark, S.D., 1972, op. cit.

The Authority's international wing, represented by FAO and other consultants, was not happy about the AVA's management approach in the Settlement Schemes. The Ethiopian Government viewed the AVA as its political preserve in the Valley, and therefore had no policy to transfer authority from the AVA to the people of the Valley. The FAO consultants' views were different:

Every settlement started by a government or private agency must, from the very beginning plan to phase itself out by making the settlement self-sufficient in operation and management. Presently no indications or components are considered for the phasing out of the AVA from the Amibara settlement farm. [37]

AVA and its counterparts also did not agree on land tenure arrangements between AVA and the settlers. As early as 1969, a report commissioned by FAO indicated the need for formal tenural arrangement between the settlers and the AVA, and set out guidelines. [38] No action was taken by AVA. Another report in 1970 recommended a freeze on existing settlement at Amibara. [39] It also suggested that tenurial arrangements in the Awash Valley did not require new legislation, but could be accommodated within existing laws:

The Law of Ethiopia allows for various forms of land tenure to be adopted. It is recommended that alternative solutions provided by existing legislation should be studied and a decision reached concerning the form of land tenure to be adopted in present and future settlement schemes. Only proper titles affording adequate security of tenure and constituting acceptable security for the extension of credit should be granted and this preferably after the settler has completed a satisfactory probationary period. [40]

Again AVA did not act. To be fair to AVA, the question of tenurial arrangements was far beyond the power of the Authority. Ethiopia under Haile Selassie was not particularly keen in settling this basic issue, and was more interested in securing the Valley as an important source of wealth through large-scale commercial development.

[37] Ibid., p.57
[40] Ibid., p.5.
However there was yet another area which was related to the question of land tenure, and which brought to the surface a major difference between the domestic and expatriate factions of AVA. This concerned the way development ought to be pursued in the Valley, and AVA's role in this process, and was initiated with the publication of the Feasibility Study of the lower plains made in late 1973. This was commissioned by FAO on behalf of the Ethiopian Government, and undertaken by Sir Alexander Gibb in association with Hunting Technical Service [41] (henceforth referred to as FSLAV). It was paid for by the Overseas Development Administration of the British Government, was commenced in April 1972, and a final draft was submitted to the IEG and AVA in November 1973. The study assessed the physical and human resources of the Lower Awash. It also included a section on the political structure of Awas and, most important, an appraisal of the development projects undertaken by the leadership of the Sultanate of Awa, [42] The most devastating part of the FSLAV report as far as the role of the AVA in the Valley was concerned, was the sociological study written by Cossins. This was incorporated in the final recommendation under the title of 'Organisation and Management'. [43] Cossins had previously conducted a study of the Afar clans of the NE Rangeland for the Ethiopian livestock and Meat Board in 1972. [44] He was known to be sympathetic to the Afar, and an outspoken critic of the development in the Valley, and was recommended for the study by P.P. Bonnemaison, FAO, Co-Manager at AVA. [45] Cossins report in its original

form [46] blamed both the AVA and the Tendaho for having deprived the herdsmen of their prime grazing area, and it also singled out Mitchell Cotts as 'the root cause' of the Afar suspicions of any outside initiative. Mitchell Cotts threatened to sue the author of the study for what it called 'unsubstantiated allegations'. [47] Whilst the study praised the organisational skill of the Afar farmers in the Lower Awash, the Awaseen landed aristocracy did not escape Cossin's criticism, although the Sultanate fared better than AVA and TPSC.

Sir Alexander Gibb and partners, realising that AVA would not accept Cossin's view in its original presentation, decided to present it in an abridged form. They also forwarded a copy of Cossin's report to AVA. [48] The abridged form appeared as part of the feasibility study under the title of Afar People, Land Tenure and Institutions. [49] This was not, however, made available to researchers until 1975.

Unlike earlier reports or feasibility studies, the contents of which normally appear in FAO's periodical report to the Imperial Government of Ethiopia, neither the Interim Report of 1974 nor the subsequent Interim Report, [50] carried the recommendations of the FSLAV. This departure from procedure indicates the AVA's dissatisfaction with the FSLAV, which in


[47] Private communications from Tom Boyd, Economist at Hunting Technical Service Ltd (November, 1982). He felt that some of Cossin's allegation was not substantiated, a matter, which according to him, led to the cutting of the report; N.J.Cossins told me that Mitchell Cotts threatened him with damages if the original report was to be published as an integral part of the FSLAV; private communication, London, December, 1982. This was confirmed by Tom Boyd.


fact recommended that AVA limit its activities in the Lower Awash Valley to the role of water management only. The differences of opinion were underscored by FSLAV's assertion that

Time has shown, however, that long term balanced and productive development of the Lower Valley is unlikely to be achieved unless adequate thought and attention is given to the indigenous population and to their integration within the development plan. It is believed that the present situation cannot be ignored and that the charter of AVA requires amendment to meet present conditions. [51]

The study went on to suggest that:

In view of the relationship which exists between the AVA and the Afar, it seems imperative that, for the time being land and human resources development in the Lower Awash Valley should be undertaken by a new body in which Government, the AVA and the Afar participate, leaving the AVA to deal with water resources. [52]

To this effect, the feasibility study called for the establishment of a new development organisation in which the Afar farmers and the Aawsa Sultanate were to participate along with local government and the AVA. The management of the new organisation was to be staffed by expatriates who were to prepare the indigenous people to assume responsibility within a fifteen-year period. [53]

There was no difference between the two wings of AVA as far as the need to turn the river banks into capitalist estates was concerned. The international experts called for the institution of private ownership, the need to maintain credit for private development, and the need to consider the concept of joint venture, as part of their recommendation to the Ethiopian Government in 1970. [54]

[52] Ibid., p.1.
[53] Ibid.
The first survey of the Valley recommended that a "Master Plan should be prepared and implemented effectively, so as to bring forth rational development based on physical and economic feasibilities as well as socio-political considerations". [55] This last point was important, because the absence of a sense of political awareness on the part of the Government concerning the Valley's people was to cost the Authority dearly. The report also suggested the improvement of grazing land together with irrigated agriculture, the digging of wells, distribution of watering points and spreading flood water from intermittent watering points. But at the same time, it called for priority to be given to large scale commercial development in the Middle Valley, and the promotion of family size farms in the Lower Valley. The latter was to meet the demands of the Lower Plains Afar.

4.2 AVA and the Allocation of Land Resources

It is generally wrong to believe that nomads are independent people who swarm about large areas without identifying themselves to specific parcels of land and for this reason they cannot claim any rights whatsoever over grazing areas. It has been proved in numerous studies that the nomads in their wanderings follow a specific pattern, and the fact that they often return to same area gives them certain customary rights which should be properly recognised.

O.A. Sabry, 1970, p.7

The Ethiopian government had not devised any definition of what it referred to as government land. [56] Nevertheless, according to the Government all lands utilised by semi-nomadic pastoralists were by definition 'state domain', a claim based on Menelik's conquest, which may or may not have included the Afar country. The revised constitution of 1955


nationalised all pastoral lands in the Empire: according to Article 130 (d),

All property held and possessed in the name of any person, natural or juridical, including all land in escheat and all abandoned properties, whether real or personal, as well as all products of the sub-soil, all forests and all grazing lands, water courses, lakes and territorial waters are State Domain. [57]

Legal opinion in Ethiopia differed on the interpretation of this article in relation to the expropriation of land without compensation. Some legal experts argued that the appropriation of land by the government was based on the fact that the nomads did not pay tax on land. [58] Most experts agreed that government policy concurs with the statement with relation to ownership, but not regarding rights of nomads to use land for grazing cattle. According to H.E. Voelkner, there are two interpretations of this article: one, that it nationalised all grazing land, the other that it nationalised only unoccupied grazing land. [59] This confusion regarding the definition of government land was never made clear under Haile Selassie's government, although the need for its clarification was echoed by the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration and other public bodies, including the AVA. [60] This, however, did not prevent the government or the Emperor from actively disposing of such lands by imperial grant or for that narrowly defined 'public interest' which was the case in the Awash Valley. Thus AVA interpreted Article 7 of its charter to mean that it was manager of all grazing land, basing its interpretation on the state's right to all such land. [61] However, Article 7 of AVA's charter itself adds


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further confusion:

AVA shall ascertain land ownership in the Awash Valley and all state owned land shall be transferred to the AVA by the Ministries and Public Authorities presently holding title thereto. [62]

No Ministry or Public Authority in fact ever turned over title to AVA. [63] Nevertheless, AVA interpreted this article to mean that it was under direction from government to manage land, and to determine ownership within the Awash Valley. It was on this basis that AVA formulated its land policies.

These were two, both based on its interpretation of its charter. The first concerned the granting of concessions to private enterprises and the second concerned its role as a settlement agency. The charter made no mention of AVA's responsibility to devise ways of attempting to settle the Afar on irrigated land. This was more a response to the alienation of grazing land to concessionaires and the perceived need to compensate the Afar by settling some of them on irrigated plots. The government's position as far as compensation was concerned was argued as follows:

The ownership of grazing land has been constitutionally nationalised; rights to graze livestock on such land however, were not subject to nationalisation, and as a result continue to exist; the grazing rights cannot be expropriated without compensation according to Civil Code. Such compensation could be pecuniary but could consist of replacement of equal value. [64]

However, this was not offset by AVA's overriding commitment to the concessionaires with which it had entered into unfavourable concession agreements. [65]

The following statement from AVA's own document illustrates this:

AVA's legal adviser is of the opinion that it is a moot point

[65] Clark, S.D., 1972, document D.
whether or not these grazing rights do in fact continue to exist. However, the question is largely academic since, if the nomads think that they still have grazing rights and feel that sufficient alternative compensation has not been made, then invasion of valuable crops by nomadic cattle may occur. This becomes an official problem because some commercial farmers have been granted by AVA peaceful use and enjoyment of the leased land and protection against claims by third parties regarding ownership or rights thereon. [66]

Compensation in principle was unacceptable to the Afar, both nomads and settlers. [67] The Authority's policy of granting concessions to private enterprises which excluded the Afar did not assist AVA's attempts to win some Afar to its side. The AVA's Master Plan document of 1974 illustrates the magnitude of land alienation:

Of the Government land of the upper, middle valley and the lower plains, some 12,000 ha. have been sold or granted to private enterprises by government. A further 42,260 ha. have been leased to concessions (private domain) and 5,640 ha. have been developed with public funds (state domain). [68]

The exclusion of Afar was exacerbated by the hostile attitude towards the nomads by the newly established farming entities, many of which made elaborate networks of fences, some electric, around their plantations. [69] However, it was the economic tensions arising from the land issue which shaped the Afar opinions towards the Authority. The crude economic incentive offered to limited numbers of Afar settlers on the Amibara settlement scheme was not enough. It is, however, incorrect to assume that there was a unified reaction of all Afar towards the Authority: attitudes ranged from outright hostility and rejection of AVA and its activities as in the lower plains, to a policy of accommodation as in the Middle Valley. [70] Here the Authority attempted to engage the


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elders, albeit nominally, in the affairs of the scheme, depending on them for the selection of settlers, and setting up 'Field Committees' organised by the settlers. The role of the clan elders in the establishment and running of these Committees was not lost to AVA; the elders' constant demand to be given the right to grant concessions themselves directly challenged AVA's role as manager of land in the Valley. The Authority's refusal to provide them with credit facilities, and large concessions [71] of the kind available to non-Afar, increased hostility towards the AVA. Yet the Middle Valley Afar were willing to accommodate the Authority if the latter were to give them equal treatment with other interests in the Valley. These elders understood very well the political pressures and the strength of the state, and their economic deterioration caused by the continued drought. They were thus prepared to support the settlement schemes, but remained hostile to AVA's land policy.

Opinion in the lower plains was altogether different:

In the lower plains one does not come across a single Balabbat who does not have serious reservations about the usefulness of AVA for the Afars. Their most serious complaint concerns the claims that AVA is reluctant to give concessions to the Afar, but is ready to adopt a strictly legalistic posture in its attempt to accomplish its task within the context of its charter and engage in court battles with any Afar who claims the land of his ancestors' as his. Apart from the fact that the 'state domain' concept is repugnant to the Afars, they claim that, in this area, they have cultivated the land for seven generations and that it is discriminatory for the Government to withhold RIST' rights from them while granting such rights to cultivators who develop 'virgin' lands in other parts of Ethiopia. [72]

A report commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1974 admits that "these attitudes were prevalent not only in the lower plains where the Sultan's influence was considerable, but also in the Middle Valley where AVA has had great impact". [73] The report also indicates that in

the Middle Valley, Afar "particularly resent the apparent resistance of AVA to attempts by Afar Balabbats to develop their own concessions, while at the same time granting large concessions to non-Afar Ethiopians and foreign investors". [74]

The Afar view was expressed quite clearly by Sultan Alimirah of Awa, to the panel of consultants who evaluated AVA settlement schemes in 1974:

> We are loyal to our government, and we have paid Giber [75] for generations. We fought for the land as we fought for the country because the land is ours, just as the country is ours. No man with a piece of paper [76] from Addis Ababa is going to take that right away from us. We live along the frontier of the French occupied territory. Our people on the other side of the border look towards us for advice and leadership. [77]

This statement is an indication of the political awareness of the Afar leadership, something that the AVA's management seemed to overlook.

But what were the bases of the Afar claims to land? Previously we made a distinction between the pattern of land use among Afar in the lower plains and the Middle Valley. In the former, sedentarisation had been practised for generations along with an elaborate system of cattle management by the functionaries of the Sultanate. Ownership of land was based on the Kedo (clan) which had ownership rights over specific plots, and by extension every member of the Kedo had the right to cultivate a plot, which could be inherited. In the pastoral areas of the Sultanate, there was also a recognised system of Kedo control of pasture and watering points. [78]

This, however, was not the case in the Middle Valley where access to, rather than ownership of pastures was what mattered. The Afar legal system (Mada,) [79] had no provisions for rights in land. However, in Afar custom

[74] Ibid., p.2; Asmarom Legesse et al, 1974, op. cit., p.37-38.
[76] The paper here is reference to AVA's charter.
'negotiated agreements' among groups does give us a clue as to the status of land tenure among the Afar. According to dinto every clan family has control over recognised pasture (Desso) or watering rights along the river. All individuals who trace their origin patrilinially to the clan's founding father are entitled to live in, and utilise clan pastures including the right to lease it (Iso). [81] In the Middle Valley there are well defined watering places (Faghe) for each clan along the river. The migratory process takes place between a core area where the old and the weak are permanently stationed and a periphery to which others move, by established routes, in the wet season. [82]

Afar claims to land are based on their permanent access to the river banks, and some of these clans have been in their present areas of habitation for more than seven generations. [83] The introduction of mechanised agriculture meant the demarcation of particular plots of land. This was an entirely different approach to the system of utilisation of resources by the traditional users who had not been restricted either in their movements or choice of places of utilisation of resources. The granting of legal title to new users of land which allowed its holders to prevent trespass on their property, complicated the situation:

The Afar have become quite militant about this. They are quite expressive about the fact that this land is theirs. That they fought for it as Ethiopians and that they held it and utilised it for many generations. Again and again they have expressed that they will fight to keep their land and that before anyone can take it away from them, they first will have to be buried right here. [84]

The Afar were unable to comprehend AVA's rejection of the traditional rights conferred upon clan leaders as spokesman in matters related to resources. AVA's refusal to discuss the matter was incomprehensible in a

[80] 'Dinto' refers to both 'peace' and 'negotiated agreements between groups'.
[81] Traditionally Clans normally lease land in return for tribute or rent. This is known as Iso.
society where only negotiations and prolonged discussion can lead to agreement. It was this which triggered Afar militancy, not simply the threat to resources or the loss of livestock. These matters were crucial, but they were exacerbated by the Authority's reluctance to recognise traditional authority and role of the clan. The Afar recognised the relationship between drought, and the loss of grazing lands and watering points to the concessionaires, and "the more they recognise this relationship the more incensed and bitter they became". [85]

The Afar leaders of the Middle Valley challenged AYA directly. With political and financial backing from the Sultan of Awsa, and the loan of 17 tractors and 2 bulldozers, [86] they set up their own commercial farms, and allocated concessions to others. This was fiercely opposed by the AYA in the law courts but the Afar were able to exploit the loopholes in Ethiopian law, particularly those related to government land. In 1973, an Afar elder won a legal case against AYA, and the court upheld his right as spokesman of his clan to dispose of land. [87] This encouraged other elders to grant concessions, and by 1974 in Gewani alone, concessions were made to six Arabs from Yemen. [88]

4.3 AYA and the Private Concessionaires

The initial development in the Awash Valley was characterised by large scale commercial enterprises mostly managed by foreign agro-business in

[85] Ibid., p.41.
[87] AYA, Master Plan, 1974 op. cit., Chapter IV - p.3.
[88] Ibid.
joint ventures with the state. [89] This development was made within the context of state policy. This policy was set out in the second five year plan (1962-1967), the publication of which coincided with the setting up of AVA:

Although significant development of the peasant sector has been foreseen, it will not be possible to realise the production targets in peasant agriculture exclusively. Important production targets will have to be realised on the big modern commercial farms. This sector will have to produce large quantities of raw material for the domestic industry such as cotton and other fibres, vegetables, fatten cattle for the meat packing and canning industry, etc., as well as to increase production and improve the quality of products intended for export. The commercial farms will have to produce better quality seeds and breeding cattle for the development of peasant agriculture. They will have to ensure the rational use of investment funds for the cultivation of wasteland in developing new regions, such as the Awash Valley, and the Wabi Shabell Valley, etc. [90]

In the Awash Valley, concession agriculture was to fulfil the following objectives: [91]

1. To substitute imports and increase exports in order to improve the balance of payments.
2. To increase state revenues through taxes, water fees and land rent.
3. To increase employment opportunities and thus purchasing power.
4. To make possible a decrease in the retail prices of some of the most important daily products like sugar, cotton and clothes, thus increasing consumption and improving the standard of living.

This policy encouraged both national Ethiopian and foreign private investors to invest in commercial agriculture in the Valley. The quick

[89] A 1958 FAO report to the Government of Ethiopia recommended the importance of following this path of development: 'Since there are relatively few claims to land rights, and the lack of rainfall make cultivation conditional on considerable investment in irrigation works, there can be little popular resistance to make the Valley available to capable concessionaires who may grow a variety of commercial crops like sugar cane, cotton, etc.' Diebold, P.B., 1958, p.12.


return to investment encouraged credit institutions to channel funds to these enterprises, and Afar farmers in the Lower Valley were reacting to the opportunities offered for production of cotton. [92] As indicated by Table 4.2 below, the rate of commercial development was staggering.

Out of the total area under cultivation in 1972 estimated at 50,000 ha., almost 45,800 ha. was under private development. The units ranged in size from 10,000 ha. under TPSC to 500 ha. for concessions to Ethiopian Nationals and to 2 and 5 ha. farms in settlement areas and for the maize growers of the lower plains. More than half the area was controlled by foreign managed plantations in 1972. Of the area under cultivation, Wonji Sugar Estate, under Dutch Management, and TPSC, under British management, controlled 17% and 22% respectively in 1970. [93] In 1974, 8 private share companies controlled 55% of the total cultivated area [94] in the Valley.

The highest concentrations of irrigation development were in the Upper and Lower Plains. In the Upper Valley, there were four major irrigation projects covering more than 11,000 ha. out of a total of 26,000 irrigable area. Of the cultivated area, two-thirds were taken up by the HVA Wonji Sugar Estate. [95] In the Lower Plains, almost half of the cultivated area was taken up by Tendabo. [96] In the Middle Valley there were several foreign held concessions including MAESCO, an Italian-managed banana plantation and a number of concessions held by Ethiopian nationals as part of AVA's National Concessions Policy. In all, by 1974 there were 27 concessions under AVA supervision. Allocation, according to AVA's own Master Plan document was based on the management and financial abilities

[92] According to AVA Master Plan, 1974, the Agro-Industrial Development Bank advanced Eth$7,646,065 during 1963-64 (Eth. C.) in short, medium and long term credit to the farmers of the Awash Valley. See IEG, AVA, Master Plan, 1974 (Main Volume, 1974) Chapter 5-9; for the Afar farmers of the lower plains, see, Gibb and Hunting, FSLAV, 1973, Part 1, Annex 4, pp.120-31. The latter was advanced by commercial banks only.


[94] AVA, Master Plan, (Main Volume, July 1974), Chapter V-5.3.

[95] Emmanuel, Hailu W., 1975, op.cit. p.11. The total irrigable area was upgraded as a result of feasibility studies, see AVA, Master Plan, (Main Volume) Chapter IV, p.2 (Upgraded to 31,900 in Upper Valley, 54,000 ha. in Middle Valley and 66,000 ha. in Lower Plain).

Table 4.2
Areas of Major Private Enterprises Plantations of the Valley (1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plantation Location</th>
<th>Year started</th>
<th>Crops grown</th>
<th>Area (ha.) irrigated (1972)</th>
<th>Ownership and management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Valley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVA Wonji</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nura Era</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Major farms in</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td></td>
<td>No. Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibella</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oranges</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Valley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abadir</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>Israeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abadir (NRD)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fruit</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVA Metahara</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maesco</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alegata</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambash</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>No. Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awra Melka</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>No. Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kessem Kebena</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>No. Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Valley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendaho</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.V.Barga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Crown Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWSA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sultanate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>of Awsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: No. Info denotes that there is no information.
of applicants, [97] but included no concessions to the Afar people. Agro-
business was lucrative in the Valley. The cost of labour was high in
comparison with other areas but not when compared with salaries, wages,
management fees and commissions paid to foreigners or to earnings from the
produce. Agricultural implements and fuel were purchased duty free, and
the foreign enterprises enjoyed a liberal policy of repatriation of
profits. [98] The Ethiopian concessionaires likewise made huge
profits [99] as did the two foreign enterprises for which information is
available, HVA Wonji and TPSC. According to A.G. Goudie, Wonji Sugar Estate,
with a total of 5,606 ha. reported in 1970/71 a net profit before tax of
$10,268,832 on fixed assets with a net book value of $47,461,069. This
company, "was reluctant to provide cost of production data on the grounds
that it would provide an unfair advantage to potential international
competitors" [100] and thus the declared profits may be deflated.
Likewise, Tendaho, after initial losses, trebled its production by 1973 and
made huge profits. Bondestam, who made a study of these two firms makes the
following blunt assessment: [101]

(1) The total outflow of profits from the country has already
surpassed the foreign investments, and probably accumulated
to a sum even exceeding the total investment;
(2) The total export of capital (profits, import of machinery,
equipment, insecticides, fuel, etc., payment for services,
interests, and the foreigners' personal savings abroad) is
almost as large as the total import of capital (foreign
investments, exports, and saving due to import substitution).
(3) The transition from imported to domestically produced
Sugar and Cotton has meant a rise in the prices of these
products, and has therefore not benefited the consumers.
(4) The introduction of cash crop agriculture was made
possible by chasing the indigenous people off their land and
thereby undermining their living conditions.

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[98] Bondestam, L., 1974, op. cit. p.432. For production costs, see Boyd, Tom,
1973, The Economics of Crop Production in the Awash Valley, Informal
[99] See Bondestam, L., 1971, Agricultural Development in the Awash Valley,
a paper prepared for the Ethiopian Institute of Nutrition. Addis
Ababa.
Despite the outflow of capital, the emergence of a privileged class, and the negative effects on the indigenous social and economic structures, capitalism in the Awash Valley fulfilled the government's target in cotton production and reduced cotton imports and provided employment for over 75,000 migrant and Afar labourers. By 1974, there were 29,000 ha. of land producing 61,400 tons of seed cotton, and 10,000 ha. producing 1,296,000 tons of sugar. [102] This supported a number of industries in Addis Ababa, Diredawa and Kombolcha which employed no less than 7,070 permanent workers in the Awash Valley alone [103] and an estimated 17,530 overall. [104]

This development, it must be pointed out, took place in small sections of the Valley, mainly along the river banks - the dry season grazing areas of the Afar. Highly mechanised farm units with all the modern facilities grew up as islands in the sea of pastoralists. Very few nomads became workers on the cotton plantation in the Middle Valley; most of the workforce was brought from the highlands. However, the Awasa Afar, unlike their kin in the Middle Awash Valley, were drawn into these developments as workers and as farmers, with the delta and its surrounding areas faring best in this respect. The distance here between the concessions and the Afar was close geographically but in other respects very distant. They represented separate worlds: the concessions, which in most cases had wire fences built around them, were enclaves surrounded by highland labour settlements. There were few Afar settlements or hamlets near the concessions. The situation was almost the opposite in the Lower Plains, and particularly in the Dubti-Aysaita area, where a large number of Afar have become involved in commercial farming. Here although Tendaho had attempted to set up its own world, the emergence of farms belonging to the Afar all around it gives a different picture to that in the Middle Valley. Here one could feel all the exultation of work and of entrepreneurship. The Afar connection with their resident concessionaire was not one of distance but of very close cooperation. It is true that Tendaho did not recruit many

[104] Ibid., Annex IV-8, 1974 op.cit. pp.1-4; see also IV-59-61 for agro-industries in general.
Afar in its work force, yet some were recruited as plantation guards and sales agents. Most important, the new Afar farms themselves imitated Tendaho plantation [105] without, of course, the wire fences, the swimming pool and the tennis court. These farms attracted large numbers of Afar as farm hands, guards, workers and managers. [106] One report by the Awsa Farmers' Cooperative estimated the number of Afar farmers at 3,500 in 1972. [107]

Yet the expansion of capitalism in the Awash Valley, as far as the semi-nomadic Afar were concerned, took away much and offered little. Even in the case of Awsa, as will be noted later, the price of integration was high, for it meant the undermining of the local economy.

The dependence of the concessions on migrant labour from highland Ethiopia was a mixed blessing. Without it, much of this development would not have taken place. Apart from the problems arising from the lack of medical and educational services, [108] the presence of 75,000 highland labourers, different in culture, language and religion from the indigenous population, created political and economic tensions. The Afar saw the labourers as competitors, and the fact that the AVA officials were drawn from the highlands was used by the Afar leaders as a political weapon to remind their people of the constant danger of AVA's intentions. This was one interpretation of the Aysaita disturbance of 1971, in which 17 people died [109] and hundreds of highland tenants were expelled by the Afar Sultanate. [110]

Let us examine the extent to which AVA was able to perform its role as the manager of state land. To do this, we will study the concession

[110] Emmanuel, Hailu W., 1975 op.cit. p.16
agreements into which the Authority had entered, especially that with Tendaho.

According to S.D.Clark, legal consultant to AVA, there were five groups of water users in the Valley: [111]

(1) Concessions to which AVA is not a party: This included the Wonji Sugar Estate which made a concession agreement with the Finance Ministry in 1961. The latter remained the body responsible for supervision and the subsequent passage of AVA charter did not affect this and other pre-existing concessions. However, H.V.A. Metahara, a subsidiary of Wonji estate, formed agreements with the Ministry of Agriculture in 1965, after the constitution of AVA, supervision was duly passed to the AVA.

(2) Concessions to use both land and water: This included Tendaho, which signed a concession agreement in 1969, almost 8 years after the AVA was constituted, and the Ethiopian National Companies of Alegata, Ambash, and Ethiopian Farm Development. The last of these was given a temporary lease.

(3) Concessions to use water: There are six of these private landowners who are supplied with water by AVA. Three of them have formal agreements while the other three paid yearly water fees.

(4) Those who use water without concessions: These represent four groups of farms: the Abadir, the Melka Werer Agricultural Research Station of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Crown Prince’s farm at Barga in the lower plains, and finally Montanari, an Italian who refused to sign an agreement with AVA in relation to land in Nura Era.

(5) The AVA and other development schemes: These include the pilot settlement schemes of Dubbi and Amibara, and the Afar farmers of the Sultanate of Awsa.

This meant that out of 45,800 ha. under cultivation by 1972, only 20,000 ha. were covered by concession agreements. [112] Even where agreement existed there has been divergence in the type of agreements that the AVA enters into.

According to AVA's own Master Plan document of 1974, only four concessionaires paid their land and water dues, amounting to Eth$331,000, in 1972/73. The document also mentioned that there was an outstanding sum of Eth$541,390 which was due from private farmers for the period from 1964 to 1973. [113] There was no systematic method of measuring the amount of water taken, and instead a flat rate was imposed for both water and land. [114] AVA did not pursue legal action against those who refused to pay dues, although such a course of action was suggested to the Authority by its own legal consultant in 1972. Instead the AVA advocated the establishment of a National Water Resource Commission, with broad powers to control, use and manage water in the whole of Ethiopia. The Commission would in turn confer power on the Authority by designating the Awash Valley as a Water District. [115] The Authority must have realised how complex its legal problems had become some time late in 1967, because from that date it hired a number of legal consultants through FAO. [116] Nevertheless, its concession agreements with Tendaho, signed in 1969, includes contradictory and sometimes confusing clauses. The Authority felt that the Charter, which was published as a General Notice, was inadequate because it did not have the legal power of an Imperial Proclamation. According to the AVA's legal consultant, "insofar as the charter purports


[113] AVA, Master Plan, 1974 (Main Volume) Chapter IV - 68.

[114] Ibid., IV - 68. The Dubti settlers each paid Eth$125, a total of Eth$12,000 in 1973/74 which is $25 per ha. while concessionaires paid a flat rate of Eth$15 per ha. See Clark, S.D., 1972, Document E, p.2.


[116] See the following:
(a) Pagucki, 1968 op. cit.
(b) Caponera, Dante, 1969, op. cit.
to confer power on the Authority to levy charges on the use of land and water, it is argued that it is *ultra vires* the executive. The contention is that such matters relating to the imposition of duties and the liberty of the subject must be sanctioned by Parliament and must be therefore embodied in the Proclamation." [117] Legal opinion differed in this matter. Dante Caponera who drafted the first water law for Ethiopia in 1955, and whose services were sought by AVA in 1969, suggested that since "administrative laws has not yet developed into a sophisticated and cut system" in Ethiopia it made no difference whether it be Proclamation or a General Notice. [118]

Was AVA's problem in getting the concessions and other water users in the Valley to accept its directives simply a legal problem or were there other issues involved? According to S.D.Clark, AVA's own legal consultant, "there is enough provision within the Charter to enforce it particularly those concerning revenue specially where there is already concession agreement. Thus AVA's failure to do so can not be justified on legal grounds." [119] The Authority's inability to impose water and land charges as required by its Charter ought to be seen within the context of its relations with powerful interest groups such as the concessionaires, various government departments, the Sultanate of Awa, the IBRD, the UNSF and FAO. [120] The Authority did not even have its own land management department until October 1973. [121]

The contents of the concession agreements, especially with foreign managed plantations, suggest that they were made by AVA from a position of weakness. AVA's own consultant admits that:

The instability of the Authority and its present impact outside the settlement areas do not seem to stem so much from the lack of formal power. There has in fact been little attempt to implement control procedures in the Valley as a whole. Concessions have been granted from a position of


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weakness which was not justified by lack of formal power, and no attempt seems to have been made to enforce such controls over use and structure as are presently included in the agreements. [122]

Consequently, agreements are imprecise, and lack uniformity and adequate enforcement. [123] This is nowhere more evident than in the concession agreement that AVA entered into with Tendaho in 1969. This document is a clear example of how foreign investors can tie up their business partners, in this case the Ministry of Finance and later AVA. It fails to protect the proper interest of the Authority as guardian of national resources and reveals how AVA lacked concrete powers of supervision, control and intervention.

Some articles are too vague for AVA to police sensibly; for example, Article 8 requires that Tendaho take 'all reasonable measures to combat pollution' and by Article 12, the company undertakes to 'take responsible steps by way of fencing or as may be otherwise suitable to prevent damage'. [124] Article 4 stipulates that water and land charges must be paid by a specific date, and Article 5(a) prohibits the installation of works which have not previously been discussed with the Authority. [125] However, in neither case is there any provision as to what will happen in the event that Tendaho refuses to abide by the terms of the concession. Article 6 provides that a five year 'water-use Plan' be submitted to AVA. This also includes hydraulic works for the period. However, there is no power in AVA to review or reject these plans. Instead they are submitted for 'joint consultation' only.

According to AVA's consultant, such plans were never submitted, no licenses have been issued, no fees imposed or collected, and no regulation passed. [126] This lack of enforcement was evident in most agreements

[123] Ibid., pp.8-11.
[125] Clark, S. D., 1972, (Document D), pp.9-11
signed with concessionaires. Moreover, agreements treated each of the concessionaire differently; for example, Wonji Sugar Estate was protected by AVA's own Charter, and thus was not liable to pay water and land fees. The agreement with Tendaho does not contain provision concerning cancellation or termination of the agreement by default whilst an agreement with a certain Solomon Getachew, an Ethiopian national, does so.

We can sum up the situation this way: the largest plantations were set up prior to AVA, were protected by AVA's Charter, and others did not acquire their leases from AVA. This created divergences in the use of water and land, robbing the Authority of the necessary power to control development. AVA saw this as grounded in its inadequate legal status, but the various interest groups in the Valley, notably foreign plantations, deliberately made it impossible for AVA to exercise its role. This was exacerbated by the unclear divisions between AVA and other government agencies in the development of the Valley.

The beneficiaries of this situation were the concessionaires, particularly the private foreign companies; at the same time, AVA was embroiled in endless battles with the Afar, and directed its technical and managerial energies to the development of two small pilot settlement schemes. The private foreign concessionaires were left to run their affairs without interference from the AVA. The concession agreements indicate the extent to which the Authority was made subservient to the interests of private foreign capital. AVA was the product of the encouragement of private foreign investment by the Ethiopian state since the War. Not only did it provide a symbolic presence for the state in remote rural areas, it was also a medium through which the wider capitalist world gained a foothold in the Valley.
4.4 AVA and the Settlement Schemes

It is not possible to isolate the launching of the settlement schemes by the AVA in the mid-1960s from the economic policy of the Ethiopian state, which was geared towards bringing the peasant sector into the market economy. [127] Nevertheless, it was the continuing loss of grazing land to commercial agriculture which led the government to formulate and implement a way of compensating the nomads for the land lost to the concessionaires. [128]

The settlement schemes, which were launched as capitalist projects first in Dubti in 1966, in the lower plains, and later in 1967 at Ambara in the Middle Awash were preceded by an extension and contracting service which began operations in 1964 in Aysaita with the aid of UNDP and FAO. The project was discontinued in 1972. [129] In the discussions below, we will be mainly concerned with Ambara, because of the abundance of data and because the scheme brought a direct confrontation between the state and nomads. Unlike Dubti, which remained very passive, [130] Ambara settlers were not only able to use the opportunities offered to them, but also organised themselves by revitalising traditional institutions transplanted from pastoral society.

According to a report by a group of consultants from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1974 who evaluated AVA's settlement schemes in the Valley, the following constituted the basic settlement policy:

1) To keep the cost of settlement as low as possible both to spread

[127] A number of agricultural projects aimed at the peasant sector were launched during the same period. These included Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), and Wollamo Agricultural Development Unit (WADU). These were financed by SIDA, and USAID respectively. For more information see Stahl, M., 1974; Tecle, T., 1973.

[128] The extent of irrigated farms was alarming already. In 1966, some 24,150 ha. were cultivated, and in 1968, another 8,300 ha. was excised from traditional users, and a further 8,000 ha. was set aside for the Awash National Park. See Goudie, A.G., 1972, op.cit p.13.

[129] This will be discussed in Chapter 5 within the context of the Afar response.

benefits widely among the Afar themselves and to avoid pre-empting resources from settlement or any other development activity elsewhere in Ethiopia.

2) To aim at standards compatible with the guidelines concerning the level and type of investment and the income targets per family. These considerations were particularly important since if settlement were to be viewed as a continuing operation it was vital that high expectations should not be created among the settlers and also that account be taken of the low anticipated return to capital and land. [131]

The Authority succeeded in maintaining a level of production costs comparable to those of other farms in the Valley, but the high income given to the very limited number of people who were engaged in its settlement schemes, particularly at Amibara, roused great expectations among the Afar of the area. This is evident from the number of applicants who wanted to participate in the scheme; [132] the high demand was particularly due to the continuous drought from 1966 onwards, in which the Afar lost a great number of livestock, [133] but was also stimulated by the fact that the income earned from the settlement schemes was not a reward for work done, but money given for symbolic participation. This was at least the view held by many Afar, which AVA did little to gainsay.

During the initial years (i.e. between 1967 and 1971), the settlement schemes were financial disasters, subsidised by the government. [134] The funding for the settlement schemes at Dubti and Amibara was channelled from the Central Treasury to AVA which prepared a development budget covering its entire programme which was then received by the Planning Commission Office (PCO). The final allocation in respect of each


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development item was recommended by a sub-committee of the PCO for incorporation in the national budget [135] (see AVA's budget Table 4.1). The UNDP also contributed to the funding of development projects, including the settlement schemes. [136] The total contribution made by the central treasury during the period of 1965/66 and 1972/73 towards the cost of the settlement schemes of Dubti and Amibara amounted to Eth$2,115,156 (Table 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amibara</th>
<th>Dubti</th>
<th>Alledeghi</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>137,605</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>137,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>56,758</td>
<td></td>
<td>306,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>165,339</td>
<td>24,789</td>
<td></td>
<td>190,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>313,001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>313,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>113,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>413,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>149,960</td>
<td>48,750</td>
<td>70,454</td>
<td>269,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>108,200</td>
<td>68,200</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>216,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>84,600</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>268,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,371,100</td>
<td>508,662</td>
<td>235,454</td>
<td>2,115,156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In the original data figure 508,602 (column 3, row 9) was 489,813. This was probably a calculation mistake.

This was considered insufficient by the AVA, especially in view of the incomes the government received from the irrigation developments in the

[136] There is a difficulty in estimating the exact figures for UN contribution towards the cost of settlement schemes because no separate accounts exist. Nevertheless, the UN agencies contributed in the funding projects including settlement schemes. For UN contributions, see, FAO-UNDP, Interim Report, 1970, pp.6-7.
The Settlement Scheme in Dubti in the lower plains was set up as the first pilot project in 1966 with 20 settlers on 5 ha. plots. The number of settlers was reduced to 19 and the area to 95 ha. The scheme was located very close to Mitchell Cotts' Tendaho plantation which provided it with irrigation from the company's gravity canal. [138] This location was known to be one of the main flood paths of the Awash river and three times in 8 years protective dykes have been breached and the farm flooded. [139] In 1969 permanent houses of some kind were built for the settlers but by 1972 these were uninhabitable due to negligence. [140] The settlers continue to live in their traditional 'Ari' or huts. The appearance of Afar-owned farms in areas close to the settlement scheme made it look deserted with little life except for the cotton plantation, scattered machines, and the occasional appearance of land cruisers carrying AVA officials. An additional 80 ha. were opened in 1971 as a training farm, yet the panel of consultants from the Ministry of Agriculture who visited the scheme in 1974 found no trainees on the farm. [141] There was no Cooperative Society and, unlike Ambara, attendance for farm work was very poor. [142] According to R.J. Hogg (1972) cotton production increased from 8.6q of seed cotton per ha. in 1966–67 to 12.5q per ha. in 1970/71. Net incomes averaged Eth$183 per settler in 1966/67, rising to Eth$910 per settler in 1970/71. [143] This was immensely increased after the boom in the price of cotton in 1973/74. H.G. Asham states that the investment pattern favoured

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[141] Ibid., p.7.


[143] Ibid., p.146. Cited in Hogg, R.J., 1972, op.cit.
the AVA management and others in the area, who accounted for much of the expenditure on the scheme. He suggests that payments and advances to the settlers represented only 21% of the total spending on the scheme, while 19% was paid as salaries, wages, and as expenses to oil dealers, garage owners, and other non-Afar. [144] As in Amibara, the settlers were selected from among the clans of the area, with some addition of former salt workers from Assab, but the land tenure problem was greater here because of the increase in the number of Afar farmers who had no obligation to AVA, but who either farmed their own land or were granted leases by Kedho (clan) ownership groups, and because of the existence of the powerful Sultanate at Avisa.

The Amibara Settlement Scheme was situated in the upper Middle Valley, Mieso Woreda (sub-district), Asbe Tefri Awraja (district) in Hararghe administrative region. It is located on the Addis Ababa – Assab highway, 280 km, north-east of Addis Ababa, and some 60 km north of the Awash Station on Addis Ababa – Djibouti railway line. At this point a feeder road branches off to N.W, passes the village of Melka Werer after 3 km, and reaches the centre of Amibara settlement scheme at 16 kms from the main road. It is on the right side of the river bank. Average rainfall is 450 mm. [145]

Proposals for the Amibara settlement scheme can be traced to the first survey of the Valley's resources which pointed to the great potential for irrigation development. Thus the Melka Sedi Amibara area, of which Amibara forms a part, was selected by AVA as a development area in 1967, and was in turn part of a larger development project in which 20,000 ha. were to be developed by gravity irrigation by mid 1972. It was to be divided into large and medium sized concessions and a settlement scheme. The latter was to be allocated 2,000 ha. for an eventual settlement of 800 nomadic

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families, [146] and was to be funded by IBRD and other international agencies. In the long run, only the AVA scheme at Amibara was implemented, in addition to a number of private concessions for Ethiopian nationals and foreign agro-businesses. [147]

Amibara, like Dubti, had no modern housing for settlers, [148] but the settlers' life was centred either around the nearby village of Melka Werer [149] or the nomadic encampments near the scheme. The Authority's inability to provide social services, an effective cooperative society, or some basis for local leadership, defeated the objective to establish the Afar nomads as cotton growers. While the AVA handled land preparation, irrigation works, and a whole range of on and off-farm operations ranging from planting to marketing, [150] its contacts with the Afar were confined to the Field Committee or Fiema, a traditional multi-purpose organisation transplanted from the nomadic society. [151] At Amibara it became responsible for judicial functions and also served as a link between the settlers and their kin groups.

The settlement scheme was managed direct from AVA's headquarters in Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, the Authority kept a large number of staff at Amibara. [152] The farm itself was divided into two units, the settlement


[147] In 1972, AVA granted concessions to the Italian firm 'MAESCO' at Melka Sedi (4,600 ha. net) for banana production - Ibid., p.26. For information on the World Bank projects at Amibara, see Swales, G.H., 1974, op.cit.


scheme proper and the Instruction Farm. The development of each of these units is shown in Table 4.4. The Instruction Farm is a place where the settlers receive their training. Normally this is supposed to take one year on the job, but in fact it takes almost two years. In the first year, the land is cleared with the prospective settlers as wage labourers. In the second year each worker receives a specific plot on which he is trained as a prospective settler, and in the third year he receives a family plot. During this period the prospective settler is responsible to a foreman and a supervisor. [153] In 1973, AVA kept two senior staff members to run the Instruction Farm of 500 ha, and to carry out the necessary training of 100 prospective settlers. None of these supervisors spoke Afar. This shortcoming in a vital process of settling semi-nomadic people on irrigated farms is an indication of the Authority's failure:

Apart from the inadequacy of the number of supervisors, aggravated by the fact that generally they do not speak the language of the Afars, no systematic approach to training has been worked out and this activity continues to be performed in an ad hoc and haphazard fashion. Moreover, the trainees are no more than daily labourers that have no opportunity of acquiring a realistic understanding of the concept of settlement or the implication of farming life. [154]

As shown in Table 4.4 the size of the Instruction Farm remained larger than the settlement scheme between 1967 and 1973. According to AVA's interim report of 1970, the Instruction Farm was set up to 'Introduce the Afar to the technique of irrigated crop production and the general requirements of more sedentary way of life associated with settlement'. [155] In this the Authority seems to have had little success. As to the settlement scheme proper, its size and the number of settlers has increased since 1971 (see Table 4.4). Here each settler is assigned 2.5 ha, but this is not a plot of land to which the settler has full tenurial rights. Such an arrangement has not been worked out by the AVA, although when the scheme began, the settlers were allowed land on a probationary lease of 3 years to be followed by a tenure agreement which would provide

Table 4.4
AVA Settlement Schemes: Development Data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amibara</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>NT</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>TF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>432.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>167.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>432.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>167.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>489.5</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>167.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>487.5</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>322.5</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>515.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>535.0</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>265.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>785.0</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From: IEG, AVA, Master Plan 1974, (Main Volume, Table IV-15).
Note: TF = Training Farm; NT = Number of Trainees; SS = Settlement Scheme proper; NS = Number of Settlers.

Security to the tenant. [156] Subsequently no such agreement was made, although a sociological study undertaken on behalf of AVA in 1969 recommended it, and even suggested the lines along which it could be laid down. [157] Instead, work is done collectively, while earnings are calculated on the basis of 2.5 ha for each individual settler.

However, in Amibara, farm work, i.e. the production of cotton, is mostly done by machines and highland labour, and the Afar contribute only about 30% of labour. [158] According to Asmarom Legesse in 1972/73 settlers picked no more than 6 q/ha which is 16% of the mean yield, and the majority (95%) picked less than 4 q/ha (12% of the mean yield). [159] This low

[159] Ibid., p.15.
output on the part of the settlers is explained by AVA as being due to nutritional deficiency or because the nomads are not accustomed to physical labour. This excuse is older than AVA and is inadequate. van Santen, who evaluated the Ambaba scheme in 1978, contested these findings, and based his own on the work done by the Afar on a new scheme established in 1975/76, known as the Minimum Mechanisation Settler Trial (MMST). The MMST was initiated at Ambaba in 1975 in order to move away from a capital intensive mechanised farming system and to introduce animal drawn implements which require a much higher degree of actual participation of settlers. [160] The main objective was

To drive workable farming systems to enable the Afar pastoralists of the Middle Awash Valley to become self reliant farmers and self-sustaining for food and animal resources on an irrigated settlement scheme with a minimum paternalistic infrastructure (sic). [161]

The project involved 30 settler families with 2.4 ha. per farm unit or 72 ha. total. This is divided into 0.8 ha. food crop, 0.8 cash crop and 0.8 ha. pasture and work is done collectively. In this project "labour attendance of the Afar settlers participating was 72% of the total required" [162] and the author admits that here too there was a shortage of manpower: "in spite of a sincere involvement of the Afar settlers in the trial, an additional average of 71 days of hired labour was required per 1.6 ha." [163] There was insufficient labour input by the settlers because the settlers were able to provide only 1.5 workers per family instead of the 5 workers planned, and because most of the settlers' household members were still involved in other work related to their livestock, and many were residing far from their plot. [164]

[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid.
The problem has to do with the training a prospective settler received, and the insecurity of tenure. A report written for AVA gives further reasons for the low output of the settlers: [165]

1. The absence of proper extension services in Amibara;
2. The principle of trying to achieve the highest possible returns on the capital inputs;
3. The concept held by some that the Afar pastoralists are basically not suitable for agricultural work and should therefore not be much involved in the work.

Points 2 and 3 dominated AVA's developmental thinking from the start and this is why there was always a need to bring in highland labour. John Harbeson explains:

The Ethiopian government was unwilling to accept delays or shortfalls in cotton production on the schemes and introduced highland agriculturalists to prevent such eventuality. [166]

The highland labourers were themselves unhappy about their situation at Amibara. They provided, by most accounts, almost 70% of labour, yet they were paid only Eth$1.50 per day, at a time when the settlers' income rose from Eth$431 in 1967/68 to almost Eth$3,000 per annum in 1975 in Amibara, and Eth$4,000 per annum at Dubti (see Table 4.5).

This raises a number of questions regarding the essence of the whole project, about the Authority's intention towards the people it was supposed to serve, and whether the settlers were supposed to be landowners, peasants, or wage earners. It is not clear why the AVA kept on paying huge sums of money to the settlers for work not carried out by themselves. Was it attempting to impose the Ethiopian type of feudal system on a nomadic society by creating a new landholding class, as suggested by J. Harbeson? [167] But as Harbeson himself noted, the Authority's tenurial policy and its paternalistic managerial approach could not in fact promote

Table 4.5
Amibara: Cotton Revenues and Settlers' Income 1966-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>No. of ha.</th>
<th>Average yield/ha</th>
<th>Total yield in tons</th>
<th>Average cotton price in per ton 1000 Eth</th>
<th>No. of settlers</th>
<th>Average net income settlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66-67</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67-68</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68-69</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-70</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-71</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-72</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72-73</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>3,510</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-74</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74-75</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3,006</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per year</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Eth $ = 0.49 US $


the development of such a class. van Lier, who made the first comprehensive study of Amibara project in 1969, does not consider the Afar on the settlement scheme as settlers:

The Afar working on pilot-project cannot be considered as settlers in the full sense of the concept, since they had no tenurial rights and received a wage for their labour to which was added later on a share in the revenue from the harvest. The fact that they were given special responsibility for a piece of land made them, however, different from mere wage-labourers as prospective settlers going through an initial period of training. [168]

Was this then a means of bribing the Afar into accepting the AVA and its role in the Valley? Regardless of AVA's good intentions, its inability to set out a pragmatic income target compatible with the national level

produced two undesirable effects. It increased the hostility between the settlers, and the work force who came from the highlands, and whose ethnic origin was the same as most AVA officials. It also created, as did the surrounding concessions which grew cotton using sophisticated technology, a false expectation on the part of the potential settlers in the region. [169] In addition the Authority's inability to devise means to assist the settlers on how to spend their newly found wealth created a vacuum which the settlers and the elders themselves attempted to bridge. A.F. Robertson remarked in 1975 that

In this vacuum they will find their own organisations and solutions to their changed life circumstances, solutions which will be most displeasing to the AVA. They will acquire political aptitudes which outstrip the Authority's very limited capacity to manipulate them, and they will be blamed for making trouble and for squandering the economic opportunities which have been put their way. To that extent the Afar are being harshly and unfairly treated. [170]

Had the February Revolution not taken place in 1974, and brought the demise of AVA in 1977, [171] these predictions would almost certainly have come true. There were already signs of militancy among the settlers. Their participation in Ethiopia's Muslim Community's largest demonstration in Addis Ababa in 1974, [172] and most significantly their participation during the same period in Addis Ababa in a demonstration along with the other staff of AVA which demanded the removal of the Authority's General Manager, are indications of their degree of political awareness.

However, they were taking things into their own hands long before 1974, as their participation in the various 'political' organisations on the scheme testifies. There were three such organisations: the Cooperative Society, the Fieha or the Field Committee, and the headmen, the Balaabbats or Makaaban.

The Cooperative Society was set up by the AVA in order to strengthen community ties with the settlement. It was registered with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs in 1972. The Society was essentially a credit organisation in which the settlers contribute an annual lump sum in advance sufficient to provide a monthly allowance to cover household supplies and food. [173] Individual settlers who contributed to this trust fund received a regular monthly income of Eth$50 during the crop season. [174] A community development officer was attached to the Society, and detailed records of purchases were kept. Both the settlers and others on the scheme received their surplus of food and other items from the Cooperative. It was basically a consumer society. The cooperative leaders who were elected from among the settlers were, in the words of the Report by Consultants, a "rather timidly passive group that lacks experience and vision". [175] The Report went on to suggest that 'there is little hope that it will develop sufficiently to meet these challenges'. [176] The reason for this was that the settlers, after nearly 8 years on the scheme, still maintained strong ties with their kinsmen outside the scheme. Moreover, neither they nor their headmen wanted to take over the AVA production process because occasional slashing or weeding were enough to get them the large incomes they received.

The emergence of the Fiea, or Field Committee, on the scheme was the work of the Makaaban, who selected the settlers on AVA's behalf. It was to be their link with the AVA. The latter, according to most accounts, had very little knowledge of the organisation and how it worked, and 'there has been little awareness among AVA officials that the Field Committee is in fact a transplant from traditional Afar society'. [177]

[176] Ibid., p.10.
[177] Ibid., p.10.
The Fiema in traditional Afar society is a youth organisation. It includes men of the same age, but most importantly, individuals of equal status who have the same rights and obligations. Fiema members are recruited from various lineages and thus it comprises a pan-Afar organisation. Its functions, however, differ from one Afar region to another. Whilst membership is restricted to those with property - land and cattle - in Avisa, [179] in other areas any individual could join the Fiema. Once a person becomes a member of the Fiema he is among equals, yet the Fiema reflects the power structure within a particular group because the Fiemat abba (the Fiema leader) is normally nominated by the chief of a given territory from a dominant lineage, and the deputy from a minor lineage. The Fiema can reject the Chief’s nominee, but they have no right to choose one themselves. Once accepted, the Fiemat abba is appointed for life. Within the Afar the Fiema functions as a mutual aid group, and in the frontier areas they act as defence units. In most cases, they work through the leader of a given territory or perform functions assigned to them by the council of elders. Thus Fiema cannot normally act independently of the political leaders of a given territory.

In Ambara, the Fiema became an integral part of the settler organisation. It assumed the new role of the judiciary and became responsible for discipline and for ejecting those who were not wanted by the RVA and the Makaaban (the elders). Since the settlers were selected by the Makaaban from the various lineages inhabiting the area, they in fact represented a supra-tribal organisation very like the Fiema in the traditional pastoral society. The difference was that the process of selection was open to all individuals. The Fiema, or the Field Committee as it became to be known in Ambara, also represented the power structure in the Ambara area because its leader (Fiemat abba) was selected from the

[178] Although Fiema is normally associated with men, there are women youth organisations on similar lines also known as Fiema, in the city-state of Tadjoura, and other Red Sea villages. For women’s Fiema, see 'Fiema', 1982. Nigaada (Quarterly Journal of Afar Students in Western Europe, Afar text).

[179] In Avisa, the individual is considered irresponsible if he does not own property. For this, and Fiema in general, see Ahmed Dini Ahmed, 1967, pp.31-36; Abdalla Mohamed Kamal, 1967, pp.36-40.
Fedinite, the largest clan in the area. [180]

On the settlement, the Fiema periodically expelled settlers who neglected their farms. They were replaced by other, more promising members of their lineage. This was done through the Makaaban, which helped the AVA to avoid contact with troublesome settlers, but allowed the Makaaban to create patronage for themselves.

In the past Makaaban represented their respective clans on intra-clan councils as mediators, and to outsiders such as neighbouring non-Afar ethnic groups. However, the extension of government machinery into the area and the introduction of cotton widened their contacts and increased their powers immensely. When the AVA established development projects, there was no government administrative offices in the region through which the Authority could work. Thus, the AVA depended on the Makaaban to select the prospective candidates [181] for the settlement project. In Amibara the Makaaban had an additional advantage which did not exist in the pastoral society. Here they became engaged in the actual selection of the Fiema membership by their involvement in the selection of settlers in the first place. The power to remove members from the Fiema gave them another advantage because the replacement of one settler by another brought favours. According to H.E.Voelkner, the Makaaban expelled trouble makers in return for favours: 'accounts of this kind have been voiced by Aba Haba clan in Bolohamo and Amibara'. [182] The process of selection of settlers by Makaaban was 'impartial' to the extent that it was based on the equality of clans and lineage divisions. Each clan was given a quota which was reallocated to all lineages within the clan. These quotas were proportionate to the size of the group. Nevertheless, "some lineages which are small in number are represented in equal proportion with those with large numbers. However, the lineages of Makaaban or Balabbats are not being over represented". [183] This process reflects the way heads of kinship

[180] This man gave up his position as head of a clan to become a settler, see, van Santen, 1978, op. cit., p.25.

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groups jealously guard their independence and status of their lineages rather than the impartiality of the Makaaban, as claimed by the AVA Consultants report. [184]

Yet, the Authority tended to play down the role of these Makaaban on the scheme. Its literature does not say much about them except that they assisted in the selection of settlers, and that they gave occasional advice to the Authority. [185] This was not because the Authority was not aware of their role but because the relationship between itself and the Makaaban was strained throughout much of the period under discussion. The Makaaban saw 'the Authority as being instrumental in blocking their highest aspiration', [186] namely, preventing them from exercising their traditional right to dispose of land. Nevertheless, the Authority did not want to look as if it was alienating these people, who wield considerable power in their own society.

4.5 Building Up Stock in Amibara

The most interesting question regarding the Amibara scheme is what happened to the large sums of money which accrued to the settlers from cotton revenue. This money was not wasted, nor was it simply spent on consumer goods; it was used to restock cattle for settlers and their kin, i.e. to re-invest in the pastoral economy.

Most observers of the scheme agree that there was no marked change in the consumption habits of settlers despite large incomes. Yet these observers were unable to account for the large amount of unreported expenditure. John Harbeson, who studied the scheme in 1974, reported that there was very little change in the settler's possession pattern, the quality of their dwellings, their dress and social activities despite the fact that many of the settlers had been associated with the scheme for

[184] For the distribution of settlers by lineages, see Asmarom Legesse et al, 1974 op. cit., p.11.
[185] Ibid., p.11; AVA, Master Plan, 1974 Annex IV.
[186] Ibid., p.11.

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nearly 8 years. [187] His investigation indicated the existence of large sums of unreported expenditure. He explained this by saying that previous studies on the Afar suggest that they do not report personal spending, or social obligations which bind them to their kin. However, he noted that much of the unreported expenditure may have been used to relieve destitute relatives or for entertainment in the towns. [188] This last point was frequently made by AVA officials.

However, there is ample evidence to suggest that money created in the capitalist sector were re-invested in the non-capitalist sector. This is an interesting development particularly when one takes into consideration the degree of increased exposure of these people to urban life, and to higher standard of living. One would expect the settlers to spend a great deal of their income on durable consumer goods such as radios, bicycles, etc. Instead the settlers, who did purchase some goods, spent large sums to accumulate livestock for themselves, and for their relatives with whom they kept some of the stock. In the words of van Santen, 'the only visible way in which the settlers appear so far to have made investment is in increasing their herds'. [189] Studies of the Amibara and MMST schemes in 1974 and 1976 by J. Harbeson, van Santen and J. Colaris, [190] help to explain how the settlers transferred capital from one sector to another.

In 1974 John Harbeson reported the monthly settler expenditure as amounting to Eth$306, out of which Eth$40 were reported as being spent on purchase of livestock. During the same year settlers received Eth$3,960 as net income from cotton sales. In 1976, van Santen reported a monthly expenditure of only Eth$81, of which only Eth$6 was reported as being spent on livestock purchase. The settler income in 1976 amounted to Eth$2,300. Weapons were reported by Harbeson in 1974 as being a major item purchased, at the rate of Eth$144 per month. This was not included in the questionnaire in the survey conducted by van Santen in 1976. With the exception of expenditures on this last item, there seems to be little

[190] Colaris, J., 1977 op.cit. 145
difference between the data taken in 1974 and 1975. [191]

However, to get a clear picture, let us have a close look at the financial position of the Amibara settlers as reported by van Santen for the crop season of 1975/76. The net return for cotton per settler amounted to nearly Eth$2,900. After deduction of the subsistence advance of Eth$600 (Eth$50 per month), each settler received a net share of Eth$2,300 from cotton. [192] The average living expenses amounted to Eth$890 per family for the year 1975/76 while livestock purchases reported amounted to Eth$74 for the same period. However, there seems to be some discrepancies because almost Eth$2,000 (or 68% of all expenses) which amounted to Eth$165 per month per settler is not accounted for. The survey admits in a footnote:

Unfortunately, this is unaccounted expenditure and was not noticed during the field work and consequently no further investigation was made at that time. [193]

However, the survey again refers to previous studies which suggest that Afar do not report expenditure. Having indicated its inability to give a 'fully satisfactory explanation' [194] for this unaccounted expenditure, the survey does, however, suggest an interesting explanation:

Reliable Afar informants gave the opinion that this amount of livestock purchases may be considerably under reported. They point to the obligation of the Amibara settlers to assist their relatives of the same lineage, in particular with helping them to restock their herd, which were badly affected by the 1973/74 drought. In the view of these informants each settler may have spent in 1975/76 up to Birr 1,500 for livestock purchases, mainly to give it to relatives. [195]

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[192] Ibid., p.39.
[193] Ibid., in footnote on p.39.
[194] Ibid., p.40.
He further suggested that 'the balance of the unreported expenditure for an amount of Birr 500 per settler was mainly utilised for other assistance to relatives'. [196]

Table 4.6 compares the livestock of settlers before and after joining the Amibara scheme in 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation before joining Amibara</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Camels</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlers reporting livestock by type</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>7,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average no. per settler</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation in 1974</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Camels</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlers reporting livestock by type</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of animals within Amibara</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of animals outside Amibara</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of animals owned</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average no.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on van Santen, 1978, p.32.
FAO Access 41118.

It is based on the reports of the settlers as well as counts taken by the members of the survey team. It indicates that before joining Amibara, settlers owned an average of 245 head of livestock, consisting of 77 cattle, 63 sheep, 43 goats and 62 camels. In 1976 when the last survey of

[196] Ibid., p.40.
livestock was made, the settlers owned an average of 48 animals consisting of 13 cattle, 10 sheep, 13 goats and 7 camels; 53% of the settlers reported that the majority of their herd was grazing in the vicinity of their huts, while 38% reported that their livestock was grazing far from their home, i.e. at a distance of about half a day's walk from Amibara. [197] This indicates that the settlers who came to Amibara with no livestock were able to build almost 26% of the number of animals they owned before joining Amibara. [198]

This was also supported by the findings of J. Colaris. In a study of a group of 26 pastoralists, participating in the Minimum Mechanisation of Afar Settlement Experiment, a livestock census was held two times. In January 1976, an average of 32 head of livestock per participant was found. In December 1976, the participants owned already an average of 43 head, an increase of 34% in about 11 months only. These settlers are very similar to the Amibara settlers, but they did not receive the same large revenues from cotton. During 1976, they received a monthly allowance of Eth$50 for their participation in the MMST. Despite this, they were able to purchase livestock to a value of about Eth$600 to build up their herds again. [199] Table No.4.7 shows information on size and composition of herd owned by 26 trainee settlers before the drought, at the time they joined the project and one year after they joined the project; [200] 26 settlers and their families owned 6,068 animals before the drought.

This comprised 234 animals per family consisting of 36% of cattle, 26% of goats, 20% of sheep and 18% of camels. At the time they joined the project, the cattle population dropped to 344 which is an average of 32 animals per family - a loss of 86% of the herd. When another census of livestock population was made in December 1976, it showed a universal increase of 33%, mainly in cattle, over the one year period which in terms of number of livestock is 1,119 animals or 43 animals per family. This pattern of restocking serves to confirm the argument set out previously that settlers remain very much tied to their pastoral society, despite the fact that

[198] Ibid., p.32.
[199] Ibid., p.33.
### Table 4.7

Livestock Population in MMSI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Camels</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>NO. of animals</th>
<th>NO. of families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em><em>NAPC</em> Before the drought</em>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>6,068</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave. per family</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAPC in January 1976</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave. per family</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Loss</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAPC in December 1976</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave. per family</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Increase</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NAPC No. of Animals Per Category


(FAO Access No.36932 MF).

their incomes accrued to them from a sector which was completely alien.
CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT IN THE AFAR SULTANATE OF AWSA

5.1 Tendaho Plantations

Our concern here is to analyse how Tendaho Plantations Shares Company gave elites within Amsa the opportunity to take up cotton farming using sophisticated technology. Under the patronage of Tendaho's British management, a whole generation of Afar turned themselves into efficient capitalist farmers. This was made possible by the provision of technical and material assistance by Tendaho, and by the readiness of the powerful local sultanate to take up this new challenge. Once established, the Aweise entrepreneurs began to organise themselves using structures transplanted from their traditional society in order to limit the capacity of their mentor, Tendaho, from expanding into new areas. Tensions between these elites and Tendaho were aggravated by competition over control of access to land and water. Furthermore, this was complicated by Tendaho's relationship with AVA, which the Afar felt was committed to depriving them of access to their land and water.

We will begin the story of Tendaho by quoting from private notes of J. K. Dick, the chairman of Mitchell Cotts Group (MCG), who initiated the project after reading a report on the potential of the Awash Valley, written by an expatriate firm of surveyors, Bolton, Hennessy and Partners:

I read this over one week-end and decided that here was a golden opportunity. ..... In conformity with my thinking, I saw the Ethiopian Ambassador in London immediately, and asked him how his government would view us starting a pilot scheme at the bottom of the Awash Valley, just downstream from Tendaho, probably for the growing of cotton. I explained that if we obtained government support, we were quite prepared to meet all the developmental costs of proving the economic viability or otherwise of the project ourselves, and that thereafter, we would welcome participation in the operating company to be formed from either the government or Ethiopian citizens, or,
for that matter, both. He asked for a memorandum of one page and said that he would put it on the Emperor, Haile Selassie's, desk the following morning. This was done and in principle I was assured of all necessary support for a preliminary survey, followed by subsequent negotiations on the next step. [1]

Equipped with a quarter of a million pounds from his Board, and a further financial promise from 'a dozen or so City institutions', [2] Dick went to Ethiopia in 1959 to choose the site and conclude the deal. During his first trip to the Valley, he was accompanied by, among others, Mr. Arthur Gaitskell, the former General- manager of the Gezira (cotton) scheme in Sudan. He also mentions that his "interpreter", evidently making his first visit to the lower Awash was no less a figure than Lij Haile Mariam [3] who was then the minister responsible for the development of the Awash, and the first General Manager of AVA. Dick describes his first encounter with the Aweyan leadership:

Subsequent T.V. pictures of the men on the moon would give a close idea of the sort of landscape we were confronted with. Our Landrover driver had erected our table, and four chairs and Arthur Gaitskell and I, plus Almirah, and Yayo, duly sat down. The purpose of this absolutely vital meeting was to establish whether or not we would be welcome in the Danakil Territory, whether people would work for us, whether an influx of casual labour at the height of the cotton-picking season would be acceptable, and whether or not we ought to model ourselves on the Gezira scheme or pay wages in cash. This last point was crucial.... We got a very good reception from Almirah who explained that in his view this could be an excellent development for his people, that they should be paid in cash and that he would support us in any way he could. [4]

The idea to develop 100,000 ha of cotton on the same lines as the Gezira scheme was seriously considered, but was resisted by the sultan and given up by 1962. [5] Instead Tendaho emerged as a joint venture, with the Mitchell Cotts Group holding 51%, the Ethiopian Government 38% and the

remaining shares divided between Ethiopians including Afar. [6]

The project was to encourage private growers who were to be linked to it through credit and marketing arrangements involving the Awash Valley Authority. An agreement was signed on 12 November 1960. Operations began at Dubti, which was to become its Headquarters. The Agreement between MCG and Ethiopia was revised further in a letter dated 2 November 1962. [7] Its control of Tendaho, the largest cotton producer in the Valley, and its close association with the cotton growers of the Afar Sultanate of Awsa, assured MCG of substantial influence in the Valley. Initially, Tendaho was to take the form of three plantation units of 6,000 ha, one each in Dubti and in Aysaita delta, and a third to be decided at a later date. However no expansion was made at the Aysaita delta, and instead two plantations were set up, one at Dubti, the Company's H.Q., which lies 590 kms by road from Addis Ababa to the North-East, and another at Ditbahari, to the S.E. of Dubti. According to Dick, the scheme was initiated by himself and his company, and the agreement over the site was decided upon by the Sultan and his hierarchy of officials. In a letter to Lord Buxton of Alsa, he writes:

"The simple truth is that the Ethiopian Government preferred to know nothing at all about the Afar people; and not one single solitary member of the then Government had ever been there until I took them. They were wholly and totally ignorant about what went on down in that remote part of their country and the thought of developing it would never have crossed their minds for an instant". [6]

He adds: "The development was done, I blush to say by me". [9] Dick describes how the site was chosen:

"I personally agreed with Alimirah. He himself in turn called a conference of tribal council who in turn spoke to their respective followers ...... we thus had a decision on which piece of ground to use settled by a remarkably active piece of local democracy and it is a matter of record that from that day until we left some 16 years later, we never had one

[9] Ibid, p.3
argument of any sort about land, and the maximum of disagreement was when one isolated herdsman drove half a dozen cattle in the cotton maybe a week earlier than we would have wished." [10]

Some of Dick's accounts confirms with our view that the Awsean aristocracy found in MCG a new and a very powerful partner. One can argue that for much of the period under discussion, the Awseans looked for support and guidance to MCG rather than to the government in Addis Ababa.

This decision concerning a "piece of ground to use" as a nucleus for a plantation, which Dick describes as being settled by "a remarkable piece of local democracy" and which was obviously approved by the Awsean leaders, did however create immense suffering for a large number of ordinary Afar pastoralists, both resident and migrant herders, who used the Tendaho area as a dry season grazing area. Cossins suggests that at first, from 1961 to 1968, there was adequate rain, and the effects were marginal, but in subsequent drought years "the Ex-Tendaho herds possibly were straw that broke the back of already over loaded areas". [11] Cossin's Report was commissioned by the Ethiopian Livestock and Meat Board at the peak of the Great Drought of 1972 which affected the Afar drastically. His views, which blame Tendaho as the "root cause of almost all the complex intense suspicions the Afar have regarding any outside involvement in their affairs", [12] are shared particularly by those affected by recent developments in the area. [13]

The ease with which Tendaho's deal was approved by the Awsean leadership must be explained in the light of the local situation. Tendaho was not important to the Afkeek-Maada, the political power base of the Awa Sultanate which retained exclusive control of the delta, but it was to two politically less important groups. These were the non-Afkeek-Maada resident pastoralists, and the migrant herders who inhabited the surrounding desert. The latter group had in the past normally paid tribute to the Sultanate of Awa to graze and water at Tendaho.

As a result of Tendaho's establishment, several new types of settlement sprang up in the midst of a sandy desert. These included a small modern colony, surrounded by a shanty town which in itself was an offshoot of the small colony. The shanty town was surrounded by several make-shift labour-settlements which were in turn encircled by a number of semi-nomadic hamlets or homesteads. The small modern colony comprised the H.Q. of Tendaho. It consisted of ultra-modern pre-fabricated housing units surrounded on all sides by planted trees. It included air-conditioned villas for the expatriate and the highly paid Ethiopian staff [14] as well as tennis court, a swimming pool, a cinema and a guest house. Within this compound, there were two clubs, one for senior and another for junior members. Each of these groups had their separate cinema houses. Membership depended on the scale of the income earned. These groups were all housed in this compound which was separated from the shanty town nearby by a wire fence. [15]

The shanty town dwellers of Dubti were mainly highland labourers, and a few Afar and northern highland shopkeepers and merchants who made quick profits by selling merchandise to labourers at high prices during the picking season. The town had no formal market, and no real overall social organization or town leaders. [16]

5.1.1 Revitalisation of the Awsean Traditional Elites

The Tendaho management was well qualified to forge an alliance with the local Awsean officials. Most were people with wide experience in areas similar to the Sultanate of Aawsa. Some of them were well versed in Arabic, and had first hand experience in the customs and life-style of semi-nomadic and Muslim societies of the Middle East and East Africa. The Company's first general manager, Mr. Congdom, served in Kenya, Aden and Eritrea, and spoke Arabic. This was in sharp contrast to the officials of the AVA, none of whom spoke Arabic or Afar. The Company's first material

[15] The Concession Agreement allowed a fence to be made: see Concession Agreement, Article 12 of the Concession Agreement in Mulholland J. S., 1970, op.cit.

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assistance to Awsa came in the form of the construction of the 'Awsa Canal' in 1963. Since the 1930's the Awash river had shifted course leaving the northern part of the delta without water. It formed a wide bend at the foot of the basalt hills before discharging into lake Gamari. This area was abandoned when the Awash shifted its bed. In 1963 Tendaho undertook the expensive task of building a canal to allow irrigation of the area. [17] This project made large tracts of land available for the cultivation of cotton. Local Afar were encouraged to go into cotton farming with credit and equipment made available to them.

Chairman Dick of MCG suggested that the Ethiopian Government was totally uninterested in the development of the region. [18] It is true that the 'Letter of Agreement' between MCG and the Ethiopian Government was drafted by MCG. Yet, the agreements signed between MCG and the Ethiopian Government, in 1962 reveal that although the latter may not have initiated the project, it nevertheless supported the scheme, in which it was a partner. [19] In these agreements it was envisaged that Tendaho was to be the focal point of cotton growing in the Awash. It even envisaged a three tier co-operation comprising T.P.S.C. (Tendaho), the AVA, and the local "Outgrowers". It did not however, identify who the local participants would be. The following sections bear witness to the type of arrangements envisaged: [20]

Article 5:

"The Agreement shall support through the medium of the AVA, the plans of T.P.S.C. to produce raw cotton at the minimum rate of 24,000 tons per annum by 1967. In particular, such assistance will be necessary to support the cultivation of cotton by Outgrowers to a minimum quantity of 9,000 tons per annum".


[18] DieY, J. k., op.cit;


[20] Ibid op.cit.
Article 6:

"Bearing in mind that the achievement of the minimum targets of Outgrower production in each area is essential to the profitable operation of T.P.S.C., the Government agrees to assist in the drawing up of an Agreement by 31 March, 1963, between AVA and T.P.S.C. whereby AVA on their Part:

a) Make available suitable areas of land for outside growing of cotton and similarly make available sufficient water.

b) Finance approved capital works required by way of canals etc. on the basis that such investments will be profitable to them.

c) Finance outgrowers by way of revolving crop loans.

d) Ensure the control of cotton growing standards by issuing suitable regulations, which would be drawn up in consultation with the Company (T.P.S.C.) and the appropriate Ministries of the Government.

e) Make available to the Company and the outgrowers the data and findings of the Awash Valley Survey.

f) Direct and assist the Community to provide the necessary access roads, villages and such public services as may be required.

The MCG agreed that Tendaho will provide the following services on a repayment basis:

a) The necessary services to design, survey and construct any works in the areas of "Outgrowing ".

b) Agricultural Services where necessary.

c) Seed, Insecticide and Fertilisers.
d) Ginning, Selling and distributing the lint cotton to the Textile Industry. [21]

The Agreement further goes on to speak about the establishment of Community Development Co-operatives which "will be run by appointed representatives of the outgrowers, T.P.S.C. and AVA will assist in administration. The Community Development Co-operatives will be legally constituted and through them A.V.A./ T.P.S.C. will conduct all transactions and agreements towards the achievement of the minimum levels of outside cotton production, in return for which they will receive an agreed share of revenue". [22] Thus, although the Ethiopian Government may not have wanted to involve itself directly, they were nevertheless party to the development scheme, and Tendaho's initial assistance to the Afar ought to be seen in this context. However, events developed in the Afar Sultanate of Aawsa which neither the Government or MCG had foreseen when they were entertaining the idea of developing the region. This was to make it difficult for them to implement their plans in their entirety. The capitalist offensive initiated by them began to release new social forces whose power had stemmed from the region's fiercely independent agro-pastoralists.

5.1.2 Co-operation and Friction

Tendaho had basically three interests in the area: plantation security, acquisition of raw cotton, and expansion into new lands in Dubti and Ditbahari.

When Tendaho was founded in 1961, the nearest police station was in Aysaita, some 30 km to the South. This was a small force of less than 10. The Ethiopian Government itself used the Sultan's office except in emergency. This meant that Tendaho, like the Government, had to depend on the local Sultanate to provide it with plantation security, especially protection from tresspass by nomadic cattle. It received assistance from the Sultan, in the form of 50 Afar guards. In 1965, Tendaho appointed a

[22] Ibid, Article 9 of the Letter of Agreement, p.4.
"Danakil Affairs Officer" whose duties included supervising the guards and liaising with the Sultanate. The appointees were recommended by the Sultan from among his own entourage or ruling family.

Tendaho had two major conflicting interests: to influence the local Sultanate to encourage its own people in the area to develop an interest in the production of cotton as a cash crop, and to get the Sultanate's approval to allow it to expand into new areas. However, the interest in receiving raw cotton regularly from the Afar farmers contradicted the desire to expand into new lands. Tendaho thus had to seek a compromise, and was obliged to curry favour with the Awsean elite. MCG arranged for the Sultan and his entourage to visit the Gezira scheme in the Sudan in 1965. [23] A similar trip was arranged to Kenya in 1969, including visits to livestock and range development schemes. For the Awseans, the association with MCG meant greater prestige, both at home and abroad, and other multi-national companies seeking to consolidate an interest in the area were soon to follow suit. Bayer Co. of West-Germany, and Montecatini of Turin, Italy, invited the Sultan in 1972 to visit their respective industries. [24] At home, the material assistance from Tendaho helped create a strong economic base for the Sultan and the Awsean leaders, because the production of cotton meant increasing revenues. They were aware that Tendaho's willingness to support them far succeeded any potential material assistance from Government sources. The extent of this support is evident from Table 5.1 which gives the figures for cotton sales to Tendaho between 1961/62 to 1974/75.

In exchange for this support, the leaders of Awsa allowed Tendaho to proceed with expansion at its Dubti plantation. Table 5.2 below shows the high annual rate of expansion. [25] both at Dubti and the Ditbahari plantation to the S.E. of Dubti.

[23] This was a particularly important visit for Awsean leaders because they were able to call on such important political personalities in the Sudan such as Sadig Al Mahdi (then Prime minister) and members of Al Murghani family. Personal communication from Sultan Almirah, May 1982, Jeddah.

[24] This was also followed by the U.S., State Department which arranged for the Sultan to visit the U.S.A. on a 45 day visit during 1972.

## Table 5.1

Cotton Sold by Awaś Farms to Tendaho 1961-62, 1974-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop Year</th>
<th>Qty in Quintals</th>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Value (Esh)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>8,790</td>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>439,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>19,452</td>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>849,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>21,756</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>1,025,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>15,640</td>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>832,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>31,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>30,549</td>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>1,539,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>30,220</td>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1,513,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>234,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>22,612</td>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>1,136,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>32,334</td>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>1,718,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>13,230</td>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>890,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>27,457</td>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>1,886,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>6,162</td>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>537,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>3,980</td>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>278,602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data was acquired from the MCG in London on 11th August, 1980, with the kind permission of Mr. Peter O'Toole.

*Esh equal to US $ 0.49

## Table 5.2.

TPSC Plantation area in Hectares, 1963-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area in Hectars Dubti</th>
<th>Area in Hectars Ditbahari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>2680</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>2040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>2296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from Mulholland, J. S., 1970 Appendix (X)
Such rapid expansion into new lands complicated the relationship between Tendaho and the Awsean leaders. [26] Tendaho required that cotton delivered to its ginnery should be of good clean quality. This meant that Tendaho bought cotton according to certain graded standards [27] and this in turn meant different prices for different grades of cotton. The AFC had a hard task selling the idea of different prices to its members. For many farmers, this was incomprehensible at first, and although they got used to it, it continued to cause tension. It is to be noted that while initially the Afar developed the area around Aysaita delta, Tendaho began cultivation first at Dubti and later at Ditbahari, a distance of some 30 km. This gap was to be closed in less than a decade, the new irrigated Afar farms were being created at such a very rapid rate. This increased financial demands on Tendaho. They, in turn, were facing a financial crisis in the mid-60's [28] and therefore could not provide the Awseans with the material assistance required to sustain extensive land development.

Tendaho's financial weakness exposed the Company's vulnerability in the eyes of the Awsean leaders. Tendaho's own expansion had begun to dislodge the semi-nomadic Afar pastoralists from their traditional grazing and watering places and the AFC and its backers in the sultan's court were eager to seize upon this to advance their own interests in expansion. However, the leaders of these semi-nomadic pastoralists began to play a political role of their own, seeking to widen the system of controlled access to water and grazing in the Dubti and Ditbahari area. To do this they put pressure on the sultanate to take some action.

It is important to understand the local political organisation of these nomadic groups. There were a large number of Afar clans in this area, some resident, and others who were migrant herders. Here we will be concerned with only two of these clans who were directly affected by irrigation, and whose leaders spearheaded the pressure on the sultanate. These were the

[27] The company prided itself as being the only firm in the country with an expert cotton classifier, Mulholland, J. S., 1970, op.cit. p.40.

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numerically large Dambeela clan who resided in Bayahale near Dubti, and Arbta, some of whom were residents of Dubti, but the majority of whom were migrant herdsmen. The Dambeela clan are the traditional wife suppliers to the ruling Moodayto [29] and in addition a large number of Malokti are recruited from this clan. [30] Dambeela is also known as the largest owner of cattle in the valley. For its part, the Arbta clan forms an important segment of the ruling Moodayto conglomeration of clan-families and is genealogically related to the ruling lineage. In addition the clan has extensions in Eritrea and the middle Awash valley. Members of Arbta were heavily represented in the sultanate's court and among the emerging Afar Capitalist farmers.

The sultanate was thus put under pressure which it could not simply brush aside. Any delay in acting would have jeopardised its position as a champion of the Afar cause. This was particularly so as far as Arbta was concerned. Support for this group was essential because the sultanate was already facing rebellion among Arbta's senior Makaaban in the Mille area [31] who were pursuing an independent line from that of sultan Alimirah in so far as leasing tribal land was concerned. This was further exacerbated by the fact that unlike the agro-pastoralists of the delta who were allowed to lease their land in exchange for a share in profits, the semi-nomads of this area did not have such an arrangement with Tendaho. For the sultanate to be seen as following two different agricultural policies, one for the delta, and another for Kalo was politically unacceptable.

Relationships between Tendaho and the Afar came to a head over the blocking of Ferite channel and the bunding of Bayahale (also written as Boyale) breakaway channels in the Dubti area. These were crucial issues which triggered concerted action by the Afar community to undertake extensive land development by themselves at Dubti and Ditbahari, to arrest the

[29] The Sultan's mother belonged to this clan, and he himself had acquired two wives from them.
[30] Included among these was Malak Hake, the Senior Malak who was a large farmer himself.
[31] For example Wallisa, the most senior Makaabantu of Arbta was known as defying Alimirah's orders by leasing tribal land to town merchants
expansion by Tendaño, (Map no. 4 below shows the impact of cultivation on grazing land and migration routes in Tendaño area). The issue was how to apportion water between the interests of the traditional users, who required flooding of areas to use for themselves and their cattle, and to avoid the risk of flooding the plantations and settlement scheme. Three parties were involved: Tendaño; the Afar pastoralists represented by the sultanate, and the Awash Valley Authority. The latter became involved through Tendaño's concession agreement but AVA also ran a settlement scheme close to the river, at Dubti. The breakaway channels (see map no. 4) were located very close to Dubti plantation as well as to the AVA's settlement scheme at Dubti. Both schemes suffered damage as a result of flooding caused by the channels. Furthermore Tendaño feared that changes in the river course, particularly as a result of Bayehale defluents, could direct water away from its Ditbahari plantation, possibly leading to water shortage in the delta. [32] The danger of these breakaway channels, and the need to control them was first voiced in an FAO Report of 1965. [33] This was followed by several other reports, all of which recommended their control; only one, by N. Vidak in 1968, suggested that there was also a need to provide irrigation to the grazers. [34] According to Cossins, Tendaño first felt the danger to its Dubti plantation by the defluents in 1964. [35] During that year floods destroyed some parts of its plantation, [36] and from then on, the Company felt threatened by these breakaway channels.

The parties concerned did not publish any material related to the dispute, and whatever agreements they concluded remain inaccessible, particularly those made between Tendaño and the AVA. Nevertheless, the

[32] Cossins believes that there was little danger as far as the area downstream was concerned. see Cossins 1973 op.cit p.153.
Map 4:
Former Grazing land and Tendaho Plantation
(M. Ashami, 1985)
Afar claim that a three-tier agreement was made between the parties concerned in order to control the flooding, and also to irrigate the area for the use of the grazers. According to H.C. Ashami, Technical Manager of the Awa Farms, an agreement was made among "the Afar leaders, Tendaho and AVA on the closing of the canals on condition that the Company and the AVA open a new man-made canal to preserve the grazing benefits". [37] He claims that the Company and the AVA failed to keep their promises. [38] H.C. Ashami puts the number of hectares involved as 20,000, capable of supporting 60,000 head of cattle during the dry season, while Hunter who studied the River control problems in 1968 put the number of livestock during his stay at 25,000 head. According to N.J. Cossins "Afar elders estimated that Ditbahari area alone provided the grazing survival margin for at least 20,000 - 25,000 immigrant cattle as well as shootots" [39]

The problem under discussion began in 1968 when Tendaho decided to bund the Ferite and put a weir across the Bayahale (Boyale weir in map no.4), in order to stop flooding into the eastern end of its Dubti plantation: [40] This was not its first attempt to stop the defluents from inundating the plantation; several earlier attempts had failed because the flood washed them away. The measures eliminated the flooding of the Bayahale area, which was of great importance to the grazers. Afar pastoralists in Bayahale reacted bitterly towards Tendaho. Some years later Cossins, explained:

"Without living in the area for a time, it is difficult to realise how deep and bitter are the feelings these three issues have engendered on all sides and how over the period of years they have been the root cause of the now entrenched potentially explosive Afar anti-mood". [41]

However, these closures were preceded by meetings between the three parties. Since none of the minutes of the meetings are officially

[41] Ibid, p.151
published, it is difficult to say what was agreed. None of the parties concerned denies discussing the issues at their various meetings. When Cossins, approached Mitchell Cotts in 1972, the latter denied that there had been any promises to the Afar. [42] There was actually an agreement made in 1967 between AVA and Tendaho to control the two channels, [43] and a contract was signed with an Italian engineer to build a dam. The work of this contractor was slowed down by Afar obstruction. [44] It was probably this delay which prompted Tendaho to decide unilaterally to bund the Ferite breakaway canal in 1968. A. Zanen, an FAO Consultant writing in 1969, confirms that work on the dam was in progress, but he adds that it would not be completed because "Tendaho appears to have an agreement with the local people to ensure the supply of water needed for the grazing through the drainage system of the Dubti plantations". [45]

Cossins was asking questions at a very difficult time, i.e. in the middle of the Great Drought of 1972/73, and no one would blames Tendaho for not answering them. Furthermore, Tendaho did not want to make public its direct dealings with the local Sultanate on issues of water and land, because this would jeopardise its relation with AVA. Afar leaders confirm the existence of these agreements, and Cossins, explains:

There is recorded evidence that T.P.S.C. management, when the operational future of their plantations seemed jeopardized by the Ferite and the Bayahale breakaway channels, were prepared to concede unilateral assistance to the Afar in return for being allowed to control these two. However, at the present time the T.P.S.C. management deny flatly that they have ever had or even entertained any plans or agreement of assistance to the Afar". [46]

Cossins then refers to various reports by Tendaho staff. Whatever the merits of the agreements, it is clear that Tendaho was caught between its

[42] Ibid, p.152
[43] Ibid, p.152
[45] Zanen, A., 1969, p.3; Cossins, mentions that the Italian contractor was certainly harrassed by Afar and took two sessions to complete the job from 1967-1969, p.154; Mulholland, J. S., 1970 op.cit. pp.44-45.
obligation to a nationally chartered Agency, AVA, with which it had entered into an agreement but which had very little influence in the area, and its need to create a working relationship with the local people with which it had to live.

These frictions over water, were used by the Afar political leaders to advance their own plans for the development of the area. In 1971 they established their own settlement scheme of 1,000 ha for 400 nomad families on the Ferite area. [47] Earlier in 1970 they had encouraged the Afar clans in the area to cultivate their land in Bayahale so as to arrest expansion by either Tendaho or AVA. These actions, were prompted on the one hand by delays on the part of AVA and Tendaho to set up a system for irrigating the area for the benefit of the grazers, [48] and on the other hand to compensate the Arbta clans for land lost to Tendaho. [49]

The problem of Bayahale at Dubti over the breakaway channels also affected Ditbahari. Tendaho felt that the breakaway of Bayahale was causing shortage of water to its Ditbahari plantations. The local pastoralists resisted the intrusion into their lands from the beginning. Had it not been for the political leadership which acceded to Tendaho's request, Ditbahari plantation would not have been established. Nevertheless, the Aweyan political leaders and the emerging powerful Afar capitalist farmers found an excuse in the water dispute in Dubti, to encourage local people to cultivate the land themselves. Their views, are best summarized by Cossins, who quotes the elders:

"We allowed them to come here", they say, "because Amoyta [50] said be patient they will help develop your land, but nothing happened". Now they add "If the company tries to get more land, we will fight. If the Amoyta says don't fight no one will hear him for there is no patience any more". [51]

[47] Emmanuel, H. W., 1975 op.cit. p.18
[50] Amoyta, meaning 'head' refers to the Sultan.
By the end of 1972/73, Tendaho’s Ditbahari plantation had been sandwiched by Afar farmers.

To sum up, the introduction of cotton as a cash crop by the MCG in the Tendaho area revitalised the traditional elements in the Afar Sultanate of Aawsa who were encouraged by the Company to turn the desert into cotton farms, and also to modernise their old farming methods. This brought forth within a decade a very powerful group of Afar farmers, under the leadership of the Sultan of Aawsa. This group, having found that land can be a great source of wealth, began to defy both the Government and the MCG. They used the issue of the access of semi-nomadic pastoralists to water and grazing as a way of hitting back at the Government and MCG. Since their power was derived from the local clans who maintained control of land, and with whom this ascending group were ready to share the benefits derived from cotton wealth, they put up strong resistance to intrusion by the State and foreign capital, to the extent of arresting land development by the outsiders. MCG, one of the parties which had to confront this local resistance, was put in a difficult position by the Government because it had entered into an agreement with the parastatal agency, AVA, which had little power in the area. As an initiator of the Development project, it had created a substantial influence among Aawsa’s political leaders. Yet, having initiated cotton production, it had little influence over the forces generated by these very processes. It did not have the financial power, at least in the mid-60’s to meet the increasing demands of the Afar farmers. The latter were adamant in rejecting any dialogue with the AVA unless it recognised their ownership of land. This put the MCG in a difficult position, because it had to work with the local leaders to ensure the smooth production of cotton, but at the same time it had to defer to AVA.
5.2 The Awa'a Sultanate: Development Policies

The entry of the Afar Sultanate of Awa'sa into the race for land was influenced by several factors, notably the State policy of import substitution which implied the expansion of the production of sugar and cotton, and the need on the part of an expanding bureaucracy for cash. This was augmented on the local level by fears that agricultural expansion by outsiders would lead to expropriation and loss of land. Bondestam observes:

There was evident risk of expropriation of the Sultan's land and thereby a threat against the status of the semi-independence of the Sultanate and against the position of the Sultan himself. He would have few, if any, possibilities to defend his land if livestock breeding had remained the main activity, and it was therefore more effective to fight TPSC with 'the same weapon,' which meant a fast growth of cash crop production. [52]

It is partially correct to say that inaction on the part of the Afar Sultanate would have led to extensive expropriation of nomadic land by Tendaho and AVA-supported commercial projects as there had been, for example, in the middle valley. Between 1961 and 1965 there was practically no activity on the part of the AVA in Awa'sa except occasional appearances of foreign experts working with SOGREAH a French firm which was undertaking a general survey of the Valley on behalf of the FAO and the government. These activities were occasionally hindered by the dismantling of boundary markers by the nomads. [53]

In 1964, the SOGREAH report was published, and its findings became the main basis on which subsequent policies were made. During the same year, an agricultural extension programme was launched in Aysaita by AVA under the supervision of FAO experts, to provide credit and contracting services to the farmers of the area. This was followed in 1965 by the establishment of the Dubti settlement scheme under AVA management. [54] These projects were

all blessed by Sultan Alimirah of Awsa, who personally decided on the location of the Dubti settlement scheme, and the selection of the would-be settlers.

By 1967, there was already a growing community of Afar capitalist farmers, anxious to protect their new-found cotton wealth. They decided to cut their extensive dependence on Tendaho, and seek alternative finance from the (private) Addis Ababa Bank. The Afar leaders of Awa were involved, and ethnic sentiments were used to politicise the question of nomadic land. This was constantly raised in discussions and meetings between the Afar leaders and Tendaho on the one hand, and AWA on the other. The Afar leaders now argued that the interests of these nomads would be better served by their sedentarisation and their involvement in farming, either directly or as lessors. H.G.Ashami sums up the Afar attitudes:

The above reactions, perceptions, decisions, policies and strategies and objectives of the Afar were not undertaken in a certain identifiable pattern nor in identified discrete intervals. Some of the decisions and reactions were instantaneous in nature. Most of the decisions, policies and strategies were made by the authoritative paternalistic and traditional leadership in whom power is vested. Plans were not necessarily carried out in a highly coordinated fashion. Many of the decisions, policies and strategies have met with full consensus, enthusiasm, and participation of the Afar masses, while in other cases, these people were not fully aware of nor played any substantial role in the execution or remained indifferent and alienated by some (sic). [55]

This statement by a man who was at the centre of the decision making process is over-simplified. The Sultan's position was, of course, central, but the decisions were "more often than not those of the cadre of elders, advisors, agricultural technicians, managers, accountants that have been drawn in and encompassed by the Sultanate umbrella." [56]

Thus, there emerged a general agricultural strategy at this period in Awa comprising the following basic objectives: [57]

1. An expansion of irrigated land, not only to limit the growth of existing foreign and government projects, but also to cater for the interests of the emerging farmers.

2. A policy of gradual replacement of existing highland tenants by Afar.

3. A long-term policy of self-reliance involving provision of agricultural inputs and aerial spray services, and acquisition of cotton processing plant. [58]

The execution of these objectives was to be the function of the Sultan's office which after 1967 was expanded to include agricultural and other specialists. The agricultural office soon began to call itself the Amsa Farmers Cooperative (Association).

5.2.1 The Amsa Farmers Cooperative

The Amsa Farmers Cooperative was unique in a number of ways. It was never registered as a cooperative society with any government department. There were two main reasons for this: the absence of any formal association with the Awash Valley Authority which was entrusted to manage 'state domain' land; and the rejection of the idea of 'state domain' by the Afar leaders of Amsa, who claimed customary rights to the land. [59] Yet the question of legality never prevented the AFC from pursuing its activities. It was recognised by the country's leading financial institutions, the various multi-national firms which provided it with agricultural implements and insecticides, the aerial spray companies and practically all the textile ginning companies, as "being reliable and credit worthy". [60] The AFC, unlike most modern organisations, had no

[58] In 1973, the author participated in a study for the acquisition of cotton processing plant. Among the countries approached were UK and Poland. The latter's commercial office in Addis Ababa went to the extent of submitting a long term loan scheme involving training of Afar technicians, plus a plant in exchange for an agreement to provide lint cotton. Some UK merchant banks, which financed the purchase of spray-aircraft in 1973, also showed interest in financing a plant, through an arrangement with the British Cotton Growers Association in Liverpool.


'constitution' or 'membership' [61] in the formal sense. According to AFC's own publication, it "was initiated and managed by the office of H.I. Bit. Alimrah Hanfare", [62] the Sultan of Awasa, as "an informal association of Awasa Farmers". [63] It had its own staff who were composed of "two agricultural experts, a business manager, an engineer and a surveyor". [64] N.J. Cossins also mentions that AFC called on various outside specialists, consultants and experts for advice on technical matters. [65] While management was in the hands of outsiders, it was reckoned that "those farmers receiving services through the Sultan's office can be taken to be its members". [66]

The absence of official recognition by the government, or of a set of formal rules, made little impact on its role as a vehicle for rural development; AFC was still able to do what most of its rival organisations such as the AVA failed to do. It identified "itself with Awasa Afar aspiration by sponsoring both formally organised and self-initiated settlement schemes at Dubti and Ditbahari respectively", [67] in addition to providing a complex range of farm supplies. The AFC's main function was not to engage in cultivation by itself but to create the necessary conditions for the production of cotton and maize. The actual production process was done by individual farmers and Malokti. The AFC was not involved in the allocation of land. This right was retained by the Sultanate and by the Kedho ownership groups (the lineages), although AFC's advice was sought in this and other matters.

In fact, AFC was basically engaged in providing the following services: [68]

[63] Ibid., p.9.
[64] Ibid., p.9.
[67] Ibid., p.38.
(1) Treated cotton seed, obtained on credit from Tendaho and distributed amongst the farmers.

(2) Short-term credit, obtained from two banks and channelled through the office to the farmers.

(3) Cotton insecticides, obtained on credit and distributed to farmers.

(4) Pest control services, involving entomologists, surveys, and organisation of spray planes, arranged on credit basis.

(5) Maintenance and digging of the main canal, organised by the office and paid for by a cess on seed cotton.

(6) The direct financing and operation of the Sultan's settlement scheme at Dubti.

(7) Organisation of the collection of seed cotton at weighing stations in Aysaita and Dubti.

(8) The sale of cotton.

(9) Contracting services for use by small farmers who could not afford to buy their own implements.

(10) Provision of agricultural implements on credit from retailers.

(11) The fixing of rental payments for individual farmers to Kedho ownership groups in liaison with the Sultan.

(12) The building and maintenance of several air strips used by the aerial spray companies.

The AFC had its head-quarters in Aysaita and a branch office in Dubti, which handled the Dubti and Ditbahari areas. In 1972, it established an agency in Addis Ababa under the name of Awsa Import/Export Company which was registered as a private limited company. This agency acted as an official representative to the banks, cotton ginneries, textile companies and agro-chemical companies, and also conducted marketing research for cotton. It received an annual service fee of Esh$45,000. [69] AFC also set up an agency in Assab to clear goods from the port and to arrange the transportation of chemicals. This was handled by an individual Afar from Assab who already owned a custom clearance agency.

[69] The author served as Manager of this company between 1973 and 1975.
Two important developments affected the role and expansion of AFC in the agricultural development of Awsa at this period: the entry of Addis Ababa Bank as the major financial backer to Awsa's agricultural development; and the decline of the political power of Awsa's traditional elites and their replacement by educated Afar. The entry of Addis Ababa Bank led to a major restructuring of AFC's organisation. Hitherto, the package deal with Tendaho provided them with everything from credit to product marketing, but now this had to be taken over directly by AFC. No less important, the rapid rate of development of commercial agriculture brought a sharp conflict between traditional elements who in the past dominated the political scene, and the newly emerging commercial interests. The latter had the backing of the Sultan himself, whose political ambitions were then beginning to extend far beyond the borders of Awsa. In 1969-71, a number of Afar students who had received education in Cairo and other Middle Eastern countries arrived in Awsa. Prior to this, the Sultan had already surrounded himself with young Afar who had received some education in government schools in Addis Ababa. The new group included the Sultan's own son Hanfare Alimirah, a very ambitious young man who was to play a crucial role in Awsa's politics from the late 1960s onwards.

Hanfare's first task was to restructure the AFC not only by bringing in the newly-educated elements, but also by severing the AFC from the Sultanate's other political organs, particularly the office of political affairs which dealt with government. Hanfare himself later took over this office.

AFC dealt differently with two categories of farmers, the large and the small. Applications for credit supply was made direct to AFC by the large farmers, while the small farmers made their applications through their area Malokti who prepared an estimate of their credit needs. The application then went to a Committee composed of AFC's senior staff and the Sultan. [70] This was a very tortuous process, particularly for members of

[70] This section is based on information derived from Gibb and Hunting, 1973, FSLAV, Part 1, 'Agriculture', Annex 4, and on personal experience of the author.
AFC staff who had to sort out a yearly growing number of applicants. The Sultanate's declared policy of expansion of irrigated land meant a constant increase in the number of farmers and the acreage developed each year. This outstripped the administrative resources of the AFC which also had to negotiate with the financial institutions for more credit. In addition, the Sultan at times would decide to include in the list of creditors people who in the eyes of AFC's senior staff would be unable to make full repayments of loans. The Sultan's role as a guarantor gave him veto power, which was exercised quite often, although the AFC had developed a number of ways to get around to such problems. Once the list was approved by AFC each application had to be endorsed by the Sultan before it was sent to the banks. The latter normally approved the list of creditors submitted by the AFC. Credit was then advanced on a short-term basis, and was guaranteed by the Sultan and his heirs. All large farmers and Malokti pledged their crops to the financial institutions "until all loans, interests, and all other charges are fully liquidated". [71] The credit was advanced in the form of 'loans' and 'letters of credit'. The crop would not be sold without the authority of the Banks, and all machinery purchased through the bank loans was put up as collateral. [72]

It is difficult to assess the number of farmers who received credit through AFC. In 1973, Bondestam puts the figure at 2,500, [73] while AFC's own publication mentions the figure of 3,500 in 1972. [74] FSLAV report puts the number of primary creditors at the Sultan's office at 98 in 1972/73 season. [75] The number of creditors, like everything else in Amsa at this time, fluctuated from year to year, but it was generally always on the increase. The list of creditors at the Sultan's office would not tell us much about the actual number of farmers in the area. With the exception of the large cotton growers who put individual applications for credit, the Malokti represented numerous farmers to whom they disbursed funds. According to Cossin's report, there was:

[71] Emmanuel, Hailu W., 1975, p.16.
Sub-listed under "the primary credit file" of the Malak creditors a host of lesser farmers who cultivated within the Malak management area but who are too small to a separate credit list. To these the Malokti disburse credit in proportionate amount as well as arranging and coordinating all other services. Thus the total number of Afar farmers for whom the Sultan's office arranges credit backing and other services number in several thousands. [76]

Prior to 1967, Tendaho and the Aysaita merchants were the only source of credit. With the entry of the commercial banks, Tendaho's role declined, while the Aysaita merchants continued to provide credit for small-holders and for highland tenants. They were mainly shopkeepers of Arab and highland origin, and included some Afar. They were an important source of credit prior to 1961, but the availability of funds from institutional sources decreased their role in money-lending. The majority of farmers who used this source of credit were those under AVA contracting services. [77]

Aerial spray service companies, and retailers of agricultural implements, also supplied credit. The former were paid at harvest for their services which were monitored by AFC staff and the area Malaks. The first company to be involved was the Desert Locust Control Organisation of East Africa (DLCO). Their excellent and rather cheap service was terminated in late 1972 at the request of AVA which objected to the 'commercial' dealings of an international organisation. [78] After that period, a number of companies were involved, such as the Addis Ababa based American company Axum Air Services, the Ethio-Pest Control Co, which used Polish aircrafts, and the National Air Service, an Ethiopian private company. [79]

Other institutional sources of credit included the Addis Ababa Bank which opened a branch office in Aysaita in 1968, and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia which began to advance credit in 1972. AVA also provided credit

[77] For AVA, see AVA, Master Plan, 1974, Chapter IV-35.
[79] In 1974 the AFC itself trained an Afar as a pilot in America and it also purchased two Cessena aircrafts to supplement the services provided by the above mentioned companies.
to a small number of farmers for labour costs. [80] Among these, the Addis Ababa Bank was the largest source of credit both in terms of the number of farmers and the amount of cash and letters of credit involved. The nationally-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia did not have a branch office in Aysaïta, and its creditors had to travel more than 250 kms. to Kombolcha in the highlands, but the private Addis Ababa Bank had better facilities for supervision of creditors by the physical presence of its personnel in the farming region. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia provided credit to the largest cotton growers in Awaṣa while the creditors from Addis Ababa Bank ranged from those with less than 50 ha. to those with as much as 250 ha. During 1972/73, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia gave short-term credit amounting to Eth$3.7 million to a mere 23 farmers who controlled some 6,400 ha. of cotton. [81] Almost one half went to a single farmer. [82] During the same period, Addis Ababa Bank advanced credit in cash and letters amounting to Eth$6.5 million for farmers who controlled some 13,000 ha. of cotton under cultivation. [83] Both banks granted loans for 12 month periods at an interest rate of 9.5\% for the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, and 13.5\% for Addis Ababa Bank. Methods of disbursement were the same. Of the main cotton buyers, the Awash Cotton Processing Company (Awacot) operated through the Addis Ababa Bank, and Yerer Kessen Private Ltd. Co. dealt with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. The extent of some of the loans granted to Awaṣa farmers through the AFC by the Addis Ababa Bank since the 1968/69 season is summarised in Table 5.3.

These figures should be compared with the credit and contracting services provided by the Awash Valley Authority in the same area and covering roughly the same period (Table 5.4).

While there was an increase in credit provided by the AFC the value of AVA's contracting services as well as the cash credit shows a sharp decline after 1970-71. In 1972, R.J. Hogg attributed AVA's problems to the difficulty of effective extension among "illiterate people", especially under the sometimes strained social and political situation in the lower

[82] Emmanuel, Hailu W., 1975, p.16.
[83] Ibid., p.16.
### Table 5.3

Addis Ababa Bank: Short Term Credit Advanced to Awsa Farmers Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop season</th>
<th>Cash loans* Eths,000</th>
<th>Guaranteed loans** Eths,000</th>
<th>Total Eths,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>6,500(t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cash loans are utilised to pay labour cost and for purchase of fuel.
**Guaranteed loans are utilised for payment of machinery, pumps and purchase of insecticides, and aerial spray services, etc.
(t) Figure Eths 6,506 (column 4, row 5) was obtained from Emmanuel's data while figure Eths 3,130 is based on the difference between that figure and Gibb & Hunting (Column 2, row 5). However it must be pointed out that the figure of Eths 3,130 is too high for Guaranteed loans and therefore it is possible that it includes unpaid bills or and additional cash loans to cover labour expenses.


Awash'. [84] According to the FSLAV report:

The reason for the recent marked decline in the contract work and in the equipment available, appear to be poor management, inadequate technically skilled staff at Aysaita and inadequate interest and technical and financial assistance from Addis Ababa. [85]

Prior to 1971, AFC farmers received crop loans in a lump sum at the beginning of every season. The AFC determined the amount of money needed.

[85] Ibid., p.29.
Table 5.4

Value of Contracting Services of the AVA at Aysaita
(1966/67 to 1972/73)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ploughing</th>
<th>Spraying</th>
<th>Insecticide</th>
<th>Pumping</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Carting</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66-67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67-68</td>
<td>7,963</td>
<td>3,585</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>13,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68-69</td>
<td>14,287</td>
<td>3,507</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>5,570</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>27,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69-70</td>
<td>24,708</td>
<td>12,602</td>
<td>9,362</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>5,732</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>54,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-71</td>
<td>19,044</td>
<td>9,415</td>
<td>5,923</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>5,737</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-72</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72-73</td>
<td>10,815</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>7,460</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: there was some calculation mistakes in column 8 of the original data which is corrected. For example figure 13,604 (column 8, row 2) appeared as 13,605; figure 54,828 (column 8, row 5) appeared as 55,102; figure 44,927 (column 8, row 2) appeared as 48,542.

to cultivate each hectare of cotton (about Eth$675). [86] The farmers were free to use the money any way they wanted, without supervision. However, payments for aerial spray services, machinery and insecticides were deducted from cotton revenues at harvest. Individual farmers were allowed to acquire insecticides and machinery direct from retailers in Addis Ababa and AFC would then issue letters of guarantee to the retailers. Farmers who were unable to purchase these inputs were sponsored by AFC. The new management that took over AFC in 1971 found these methods unacceptable. Instead they introduced a new system of channelling credit to farmers which allowed the management to assume greater control of the farming policy. The decision to acquire agricultural inputs direct from retailers passed from individual farmers to AFC. Most significantly, the Sultanate itself, which in the past used loans acquired for farming purposes to build political patronage, was to lose some of its prerogatives. Having

[86] For comparative costs in other parts of the Awash Valley, see: Boyd, Tom., 1973, op. cit.
taken on the task of preparing the total requirements of insecticides, machinery, and aerial spray services for the farming community as a whole, the management of AFC appointed Special Agents based in Addis Ababa to handle negotiations and enter into contracts with both the International and National firms. It also made arrangements with its bankers to deduct a certain amount of money from the loans of each individual farmer, and retain it in a special account. The money was to be used to issue letters of credit to agricultural chemical companies and to pay for the cost of aerial spray services.

The big farmers, particularly the non-Afar, objected to this type of centralisation but the AFC succeeded in defusing their hostility by pointing out the advantage of cutting out the middlemen in Addis Ababa. It claimed that only a centralised body like itself could negotiate better deals with international agro-chemical firms, and sellers of agricultural implements. It also emphasised that such arrangements could ensure that inputs were available when they were needed.

Another area in which drastic reforms were made concerned the flow of cash loans. The AFC management introduced a system which tied the flow of cash to stages in production. Payments to farmers were to be made in three stages for ploughing, weeding, and picking, rather than in a lump sum as before. The banks would not release funds unless instructed by AFC which determined the amount of money to be released after assessing the actual area under cultivation at each stage, thereby preventing the use of cash for purposes other than farming.

The AFC's measures were influenced by two factors: the need to maintain creditworthiness, and its obsession with accelerated rate of land development. From its inception the AFC ensured that there were few defaults in the repayment of loans. In the past the Sultan covered the defaults from his private purse but the new management found this method unacceptable and felt that concrete measures were necessary. Creditworthiness was vital to these farmers as they were not eligible for development finance from government, and were not allowed, like other commercial farmers, to purchase tax-free gasoline, which immensely
increased their production costs. However, both the Sultanate and the AFC's financial backers were apprehensive at first about these measures. For the Sultan, the need to create influence and political patronage was vital but since it was the cotton wealth which sustained his influence he supported the measures. The Addis Ababa Bank, which was seen by many as risking its future by its association with AFC because it did not have any collateral [87] felt that the stages system could affect its interest on loans negatively.

The changes brought about by the emergence of AFC did lead to massive land development, and to an increase in the number of Afar turning to agriculture. The development of cotton and maize production in Avisa was impressive. According to L. Bondestam, 'from 1968 to 1971 the cultivated area increased from 5,000 to 15,000 ha. and the number of tractors from 15 to 100. Cotton which is grown on 30% of the area was in 1970/71 produced at a value of Eth$7 m.' [88] There was a further increase in land development after 1971. By 1975 almost 22,000 ha. were developed, and the value of output exceeded Eth$26 million. Cotton production for 1973/74 stood at 311,000 quintals, out of 1,710,000 for the country as a whole. Tendaho and AFC together accounted for almost half of Ethiopia's cotton production. Map No.5 below shows the extent of irrigation development in the Lower Plains of the Awash. [89]

Despite the dislocation of the nomadic lifestyle, the AFC's own publication in 1972 prided itself as having 'initiated inducement to nomads to improve their living'. [90] This meant sedentarisation; the AFC had rejected livestock management as a way of improving the material well-being of the population, although this could have been combined with

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[87] Personal communication from Ato Debebe Habte Yohannes, Managing Director, Addis Ababa Bank.
[90] AFC, 1972, Avisa Farms, p.11.
Map 5:
Areas of Cultivation in the Lower Plains (Awa)
(M. Asham, 1985)

LEGEND
- Tandaho
- AVA settlement
- Sultan settlement
- RFC farms
agriculture, as was the case with most Awsa Afar already.

AFC's publication also stated that its activities assisted the emergence of new towns and villages and provided employment for thousands of both Afar and highlanders, and that it had contributed to social services such as education. It went further to suggest that on a national level it had contributed in 1970/71 to saving hard currency estimated at Eth$9 m., in addition to Eth$1.5m 'being the approximate value of seeds obtained from the same amount of cotton exported to foreign countries.' [91]

We can now sum up the role of AFC in Awsa's commercial development. AFC emerged as a result of rapid land development and the growth of cash cropping. As an expression of local interest, it demonstrated the organisational capacity of the supposedly stagnant periphery. This impressive achievement was not only made without government assistance, but in an atmosphere of official opposition. This was evident in the government's refusal to provide Awsa farmers with medium and long term development finance, tax-free gasoline, or information on research and development, all of which were available to other Ethiopian nationals and foreign private enterprises in the Valley. AFC was the product of the Sultanate of Awsa: it reflected the interests of the Awsans, particularly the emerging commercial elites. The expansion of AFC's activities, and its entry into new and sophisticated areas of agro-business led to its developing more bureaucratic controls and a degree of alienation from smaller and medium-sized farmers. The AFC's organisation and paternalistic structure made it liable to many of the institutional problems experienced by the AVA. But however successful it may have appeared, AFC failed to involve the nomads and farmers in decision making processes.

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[91] Ibid., p.11.
5.3 The Rise of the Malokti

Before we embark on the discussion of the role of Malokti in the development of Awasa's commercial agriculture, we have to mention that the literature on the subject is full of confusion. This is not surprising, in view of the rapidity with which land was developed. Moreover, the political conflict between AVA and the Awasa Sultanate affected the nature of the available data, or the absence of it. For example, the AVA attempted in 1973 to suppress a study on the political structure of Awasa, which was undertaken by a British consultant firm on its behalf, because the study came out in favour of the way the Afar had been handling development in the lower plains. [92] There were also instances in which all the agricultural development operations in the lower plains were portrayed as being the initiative of a single individual, the Sultan of Awasa. This was a kind of extension of the way foreign and Ethiopian scholars alike represented the Emperor Haile Selassie as a prime mover in the country's political and economic progress.

One gets such a view, for example, from reading a paper submitted to the Land Tenure Centre at Madison, Wisconsin, in December 1973 by an official of the Ethiopian Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, Hailu W. Emmanuel. [93] This shows how politics affected research; the author was an important official of the Ministry, responsible for making land tenure surveys, and was also a member of a ministerial sub-committee investigating land use and land rights in the Awash Valley in 1973. [94] His views represent the general trend of official thinking, certainly in the ministry responsible for land policy.

Two arguments dominate the section of his paper on the lower plains of the Awash. One concerns the role of the Sultan, who, Emmanuel claims, controlled large amounts of land, the ownership of which has not yet

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[94] Ibid., p.1.
received legal recognition. [95] The other, of central importance to us, concerns the roles of Malokti and Ketho ownership groups. The significance of these he brushes aside, saying that 'almost all the large farms, and many of the small farms particularly those growing cotton, are sultan generated rather than self-generated'. [96] Emmanuel, who is an expert on land tenure, is highly unlikely to have missed such an important feature of African land tenure systems as the role of traditional leaders who, by virtue of their position in society, are entitled to decide on the distribution of land on behalf of the community.

An example of the discrepancy between Emmanuel's data based on AVA's, and that of FSLAV which was derived from Primary Credit Files at AFC's office in Aysaita, is indicated in the following diagram concerning the distribution of landholding by large farmers of different ethnic groups (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5

Number of Large Farmers* by Ethnic Group 1970-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>H.W. Emmanuel based on AVA 1970/71</th>
<th>FSLAV 1971-72</th>
<th>FSLAV proportion of area occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Afar or Malokti</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-Afar large farmers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlanders</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FSLAV report defines large farmers as those who cultivated more than 50 Ha.


[96] Ibid., p.19.
It must be noted that the Sultan of Awa'a was criticised by AVA for his Arab connections, and for preferring lowland Muslims to highlanders. [97] It is then probable that the AVA's data were originally meant to highlight this political argument. Notwithstanding the Sultan's pro-Muslim stand, evidence collected by FSLAV suggest that "in terms of farm size, the highlanders compare favourably with those of Arab origin". [98]

As regards landholding patterns, Emmanuel's information is again difficult to interpret. While he plays down the role of Kedho ownership groups and Malokti, he admits that "cotton cultivation in the delta is organised under the supervision of the "Malak" who allocates land and water to the cultivators, distributes inputs (fertiliser, credit) and supervises the harvesting and marketing of crops". [99] Yet when the data are assembled in a diagram on holdings, the Malak category disappears, and instead the whole farming community becomes the Sultan's tenants. He summarises landholding as follows: the Sultan (4,085 ha. or 22.2%); the Sultan's tenants (10,720 ha. or 55.5%); Sultan's relatives, deputies and friends (1,150 ha. or 6.0%); small farmers' operations (allocated by H.E. the Sultan)(2,550 ha. or 13.2%) and Barga Farm (800 ha. or 4.1%). [100] These figures contradict earlier data gathered by Bondestam in 1971: [101] Sultan (2,000 ha.); large farmers (6,550 ha.); small landowners (5,689 ha.). The FSLAV report gives figures similar to those of Bondestam and also mentions the importance of the Sultan, the Kedho ownership groups and the Malokti:

It is almost certain the Sultan and his family directly owns several thousand hectares of central and northern delta land, and possibly that other Afar elders of the inner circle also own certain portions of land. The ownership of the land farmed by non-Afar farmers is often hazy and it seems that some of the land at least may be part owned by the Sultan and part Kedho owned. [102]

[98] Ibid.
[99] Emmanuel, H. W., 1975, p.16.
[100] Ibid., p.20; the Barga estate belonged to the Crown Prince and was managed by MCG.
The above statement must be qualified. The absence of written agreements between the various parties, and the Sultanate's extreme secrecy regarding almost everything related to revenue, contributed to the confusion described above. It is our opinion that the Sultan had complete control of the Sahile farm which was estimated at 2,000 ha. and this is in line with Bondestam's figure. The Sultan's sons also controlled another 2,000 ha. As far as the large non-Afar farmers were concerned they were, like other large farmers, tenants of the Kedho ownership group, but unlike the latter who were not subject to any obligation to the Sultanate, the non-Afar large farmers paid 15% of their gross profits to the Sultanate's office as part of their contribution to Awqaf (Islamic tax) and school tax. These dues were in addition to any obligation they might have as land users to Kedho ownership groups. As to the role of the Malak, unlike Emmanuel, the FSLAV report stresses his importance. It defines him as "generally a relatively important and wealthy Awsa Afar, and a large farmer in his own right" [103] and pointing out that "all large farmers, non-Afar and Afar alike are at least nominally managed by an area Malak and not even the Sultan's farms are above the system". [104] The significance of the Kedho ownership is likewise emphasised:

The basic land tenure system although perhaps only a development stage, is a fascinating reversal of the traditional history of land ownership patterns. In the Awsa system all the land is divided into Kedho ownership blocks, and by extension the block belongs equally to each Kedho member. An individual entrepreneur who has large farming ambitions apparently negotiates with the relevant Kedho leaders through the area Malak, to farm the Kedho area or to include it as part of a farm. The large farmer undertakes to pay up to 40 per cent of his profits to the Kedho "ownership groups" in return for the use of the land. [105]

In the following discussion, we shall explain the procedure for the selection of Malokti, their role in production, and how profits were distributed.

[104] Ibid., p.23.
[105] Ibid., p.16; SEE Also: AVA, Master Plan, 1974, Chapter IV; Cossins, N.J., 1973, op. cit. p.59.
Prior to commercial farming, the process of selecting the Malak involved a range of people, including the Sultan, a deputy Sultan, the Senior Malak, [106] the Kedho ownership group, the peasant land owners and the Makaaban (elders). The Malak was normally selected from among the Kedho ownership group whose land be managed. His power to allocate land and water was supervised jointly by the Senior Malak and Kedho elders.

In the case of the modern agricultural Malak, the management unit under his supervision includes land belonging to several Kedho ownership groups. In the delta, for example, there were some 219 Kedho ownership groups managed by about 58 Malokti, so that in general there were at least 4 ownership groups within a management unit. [107] In addition, most of the farmers particularly the large cotton farmers, were users of land but not owners, as in the past. There was also the Sultan's agricultural office, which we have referred to previously as the Awas Farmers Cooperative (AFC) which regulated the organisation of cotton and maize production through its control of credit and marketing. Thus, the number of social actors to be consulted in the selection of a Malak was greater than before. Each area Malak was directly responsible to the Sultan, either via the AFC office or, in the case of the non-agricultural Malak, via the Sultan's deputy. A candidate could be proposed either by the Kedho ownership group or by the Sultan, but the latter could exercise a veto. In the era of cotton, as in the past, a prospective candidate had also to satisfy certain criteria before his selection was finally approved: [108] a) he should be skilled in land and water management; b) if he did not have the required experience, he should understudy another operating Malak for a year or so; c) he should be young, as the job called for energy and hard work. The position could be inherited if the candidate had understudied his father. Because the area elders still retained the power to propose a candidate, and the right to veto one, the selection procedures were not changed substantially. The process of removal of a Malak from his position was:

---

[106] The Senior Malak or Baari Malak was limited in the era of cotton to the maize growing area where he exercised his traditional role of presiding over land and water disputes.


however, affected by the wider range of interested parties and by the
eclipse of the role of the Senior Malak, who in the past was responsible
for the punishment of a Malak who mismanaged his unit. [109] The
multiplicity of interest groups and the enlargement of the management unit
to include several Kedhos, as well as emergence of users of land, instead
of owners, and the proliferation of AFC's various agents in the field, made
it unlikely that a decision to remove a Malak could ever be agreed upon.
The near-democratic process of selection was not matched by a similar
procedure for either removal or punishment of a Malak who mismanaged his
unit. In addition, most of the new Malokti themselves became large farmers,
so that not only did they now control the allocation of land and
distribution of water, they also became wealthy as cotton farmers. The one
important group which continued to exert some influence (albeit small) on
the performance of the Malak, besides the AFC, were the area elders. The
latter's views carried weight with the Sultan who needed their support for
the peaceful production of cotton.

Who were the Malokti and how did they work? The AFC's own publication
refers to them as 'group leaders' who determine farm requirements and
supervise the activities of farmers. [110] Cossins calls them 'self-
generated' entrepreneurs, while Hailu W.Emmanuel, who sees them as 'Sultan-
generated', says that they are "land holders agents, but can also be
engaged in cultivating their own land". [111]

The difficulty in defining the Malak arises from the multiplicity of
his roles, and of the social actors to whom he was responsible. The Malak
acted as an agent of the land ownership group but also as a state
functionary. The latter status was important prior to commercialisation
because the Malak then presided over land and water disputes, managed the

[109] In the past, the Senior Malak could call a meeting of the Kedho
ownership groups and cultivators. After taking a vote, he would then
petition the Sultan to relieve the Malak of his position. Alternatively, the Senior Malak could impose a penalty on the Malak
if his performance was not good, by slaughtering 3 of his oxen which
were then consumed by the aggrieved farmers. See Gibb and Hunting,
[111] Emmanuel, Hailu W., 1975, in a footnote on p.16.
Sultanate's own agricultural estates (Kodad) and collected tribute from the peasantry on the Sultan's behalf. For his services to the State, the Malak was rewarded with a piece of land. In the era of cotton, some of these services were taken over by AFC but he continued to perform administrative and policing functions, in the area which he managed. He was no longer paid in cash or kind by the Sultanate, although he owed his appointment and his power to the Sultanate. This is why the AFC publication refers to the Malak as 'Group leader' and 'Supervisor'. He was rewarded for his services by the Kedho ownership group for whom he acted as an agent.

The management of farms growing either cotton or Maize was handled by the farmers themselves. The task of the Malak was to allocate land to private individuals and to members of the Kedho ownership groups. Any individual who wanted a farm had to apply direct to the Malak, or to the Sultanate which referred him to the Malak. The Malak in turn negotiated with the individual on behalf of the Kedho ownership group. The Malak also had the power to distribute land to members of the Kedho ownership group. In this, he was assisted by the Kedho elders.

The Malak controlled the distribution of water to all farmers in his management unit. Here his responsibility was even greater than in allocating land, because water had to be distributed fairly and at the optimum period. He was also normally responsible for the distributory canals adjacent to the main canals. Control over decisions concerning the allocation of land and water gave the Malak great power. Both commercial farmers and land ownership groups depended on him for management of basic resources and a good return on investment.

In arranging credit and coordinating the agricultural inputs, the Malak's role was less important than that of the Awasa Farmers Cooperative which provided such services, through the Malak, to the farmers. Although they were under the control of the Malak insofar as land allocation and water distribution were concerned, some of the larger farmers had direct access to AFC in matters related to credit and finance. For the majority of farmers, however, the Malak was the sole source of credit since AFC
channelled credit through him. For them, he also acted as coordinator for acquiring insecticides and providing spraying services.

In addition, the Malak, in association with AFC, arranged the transportation of produce from the management unit to sites especially designed for weighing cotton in Aysaita and Dutti. He also assisted the farmers in acquiring the necessary labour. At first, most of the labour came from the highlands, but over the years substantial numbers of Afar began to work on the farms as wage labourers. The Malak ensured that there was no labour unrest and that there was no damage done by cattle. In situations of social unrest, he was normally supported by the Sultan's militia.

If the Malak was not a primary creditor, [112] he would, as the agent of the land holding group, receive at the end of each year their share of profits from individual land users, and would distribute the profits to members of the Kedho ownership group through their Kedho Abba (lineage heads). If the Malak was a primary creditor, at the end of the harvest he would receive from the Bank, after deductions of the loan and interest, the share of his management unit, which he in turn would give over to the Kedho Abba for distribution to members of the Kedho.

There were three distinct forms of land holding under the management of Malokti, in each of which profits were distributed somewhat differently:

a) The Malak Farmer: If he was a large farmer, that is, with over 5 ha. or oxen ploughing capability, the Malak would retain 70% of his profit and, like anyone else, pays 30% of the profit to the Kedho ownership groups. If the Malak was a small farmer, he was generally given the free use of up to 5 ha and permitted to retain the entire crop.

b) Large Farmers: The majority of these were private entrepreneurs comprising Afar, Arabs and highlanders who did not have their own land but rented it from Kedho ownership groups. The land was actually allocated not

[112] The primary creditors are those whose names are listed in the AFC file and although all Malokti are by definition primary creditors, large number of Malokti were not in the list. Nevertheless, they functioned as sub-primary creditors.
by the Malak under whose management they farmed but by the AFC office. If
the individual land user was an Afar, he paid only 30% of his profits as
rent to the Kedho ownership group. If he was non-Afar, he would pay between
30% and 40% of his profit to the Kedho ownership group, out of which the
area Malak, as negotiator and agent, could receive a small fee. [113] Large
farmers, whether they were Maloki or not, were theoretically obliged to
pay 15% of their profits to the AFC office as their contribution to Awgaf
(Zakat religious tax) and education tax which was in fact compensation for
services provided by AFC. These dues were in addition to any obligations
they might have as land users to Kedho ownership groups.

c) Smallholders: These were totally independent farmers. With the
introduction of cotton, these farmers ceased to be subject to obligations
to the Sultanate. Cossins, however, suggests that they were liable to a
cess on cotton. [114] There were two types of small holders: the maize
growers whose average farm size was between 1.8 ha. to 2 ha., and who
depended totally on family labour were not subject to any levies
whatsoever. The cotton growers whose average farm size was 2.5 ha., [115]
and who supplemented family labour with wage labour, were sub-divided into
two categories - land owners, and land users. The cotton growers who were
owners were subject to a cess on cotton, i.e., they paid ETH$1 per quintal
as part of their contribution to Awgaf and school tax. The cotton growers
who were not owners were subject to obligations to the customary owners of
the land. In such a case, tenants paid varying amounts in cash or in kind
to the owners of land through the area Malak. These ranged from 30% - 40%
of their gross profits if they were Afar, and up to 50% if they were
not. [116]
5.4 Development and Social Structure in Aawsa

We described in chapter two the process of sedentarisation some one hundred and fifty years ago which brought political and economic changes. Much of the power of the Makaaban and Kedho Abba was taken up by the centralising Sultanate. Thereafter they had to share the decisions of resource allocation with the Malokti. Within the enclave of Aysaita, or the Awsa delta, this process reached its peak prior to the introduction of cotton, while in the periphery (Kalo and beyond) of this delta, where pastoralism was the dominant form of economy, the Malokti exercised less authority and the Sultanate had to depend on the Makaaban and Kedho Abba for the administration of justice. Here the allocation and distribution of resources, namely grazing land remained under the control of the elders and heads of clans.

A process of 'state formation', with an elementary form of bureaucracy comprising "Malokti," had emerged prior to the introduction of cotton. The social hierarchy at this time stood as follows:

1) The Kada Boda, (Royal House Hold) which comprised a whole range of individuals and social groups including the Sultan's immediate household; members of the ruling Aydahis lineages; the Wazir (senior Minister or deputy), the sultans Administrative officials; the bodyguards and servants; and the "Awakala", the militia.

2) The Malokti - including managers of livestock (cattle, camels and sheep), timber, water and land. To this we may add warrior class of landowners who were given land in lieu of services rendered to the Sultan.

3) The Makaaban and Kedoh Abba (elders and heads of clans).

4) The Peasants and agro-pastoralists of the Awsa delta.

5) The Semi-nomadic pastoralists of Kalo (the periphery).
The first three groups can be described as "The Awsean Aristocracy". They were mainly drawn from the Afkeek - Maada clan family. Some had land, while others did not. Two factors, have to be remembered here: That there existed socially distinct groups within each of these, and that clan membership determined the position of an individual rather than his membership of a social category (say, Malokti). Beneath the "aristocracy" whose political power was derived from its control over the resources of the valley, was a differentiated peasantry, and pastoralists. With the transition to agrarian capitalism, these divisions were sharpened and modified; the Makasaban and Kedoh Abba lost power to the Malokti and the Sultan's immediate family. The Kada Boda (royal household) was also affected because of the emergence of a new office which handled agricultural as well as the Sultanate's external affairs. [117] The old offices of Fiemat Abba, and Mirah, [118] which in the past dealt with war became redundant, and there was no place for the "Wazir", the Senior Minister and the Sultan's deputy. The Awsa Farmers Cooperative took over most of their duties. Moreover, members of Sultan Ali Mirah's own immediate family assumed prominent positions, which allowed them to control large tracts of land.

We will illustrate these new distinctions by looking at farm sizes and the degree of mechanisation. Farm sizes ranged from 1.8 ha for maize growers, and 2.8 ha for small cotton growers, to 2000 ha Sahile Estate. [119]

Bondestam states: "There are no holdings between 10 and 50 hectares in size. Whereas the small farmers had an average of 2.2 hectares per family, each big farmer held almost almost 400 hectares, and although they constituted less than one percent of the total, they had 60 per cent of the developed land". [120] This statement is an indication of the divisions

[117] The members of staff of this modern organisation were not given the status of Malak.
[118] "Mirah" is the leader of war, and only certain family within the ruling lineage could hold the title (see genealogy of the Aydahiso lineage, appendix A-1).
[119] Sahile Estate was owned by the Sultan himself.
[120] Bondestam, L., 1974, p.437
being created by the introduction of the cash crop. A farm survey undertaken by Tom Boyd from Hunting Technical Services Ltd indicates average sizes for small farms of 1.8 ha for maize, and 2.8 ha for cotton, and simply refers to those holding above 40 ha as 'large farmers'. [121]

Clarification of the situation can be made by looking at maize and cotton separately. Table 5.6 summarizes the extent of Agricultural development in the delta and Kalo. This is particularly significant when we discuss regional inequalities.

Maize Farms: Originally the cultivation of maize was concentrated in the delta, particularly on either side of Awa canal. It is the main crop of small A’ar Farmers. [122] The expansion of cotton cultivation greatly increased the demand for food. This led to expansion of the cultivation of maize beyond its original area, and out into Kalo (the periphery of the delta). Most of the new maize farms were small and situated outside the delta (see table 5.6) but large farmers also cultivated maize, paying their traditional owners rent in kind.

Out of the total area of 17,173, hectares under cultivation in 1972-1973, some 6150 ha were under maize (Table 5.6).
Of this 4868 ha were held by small farmers in the delta and beyond, while only 1282 ha were held by large farmers. As a strictly family enterprise, maize farming was labour intensive. There was very little improvement in cultivation methods: no fertiliser was used, and most farms had one pair of oxen which provided draft power. Equipment consisted of a locally made plough, a yoke, ropes, and planter, an axe and hoe. [123] Harvesting and shelling was done by hand and yields were in the range of 8 to 10 q/ha. [124] Average farm size was 1.8 ha. The normal price for maize at the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Farms</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Other Crops</th>
<th>Uncultivated</th>
<th>Total Farmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>6,825</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2,625</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>8,775</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3,375</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small farms in delta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small farms outside delta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>2,386</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>5,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4,541</td>
<td>18,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>10,835</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>5,527</td>
<td>22,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Uncultivated areas include follows, bare ground, water course, trucks and villages etc.

Aysaita Market was Eth$ 15 per quintal in 1972/73. [125] Thus average family income from maize was slightly less than E$200 per annum. This was normally supplemented by livestock products and by-products, for most of these peasants kept some livestock on the farm or entrusted them to their relatives.

Cotton Farms: We shall distinguish large farms, i.e. those above 40 ha, from the small family farms, the average size of which was 2.8 ha. The large farms [126] accounted for 10,835 ha in 1972/73 (see table 5.6). A major feature of these was their extensive use of machinery. A survey conducted

[125] Cossins, N. J., 1973, op. cit., see also Gibb and Hunting, 1973, FSLAV part 1, Main Report, p.54 (Table 3.9).
[126] Cotton constituted 86% of produce, and maize 14%; Gibb and Hunting, 1973, part 1 annex 4, op cit. p.32
in 1972 by FSLAV found some 110 tractors and 10 bulldozers. It also indicated that over the years, the Awasa farmers had purchased some 175 tractors from agricultural machinery agents. [127] Some of this machinery was also hired to small farmers. The following Table 5.7 sums up the situation in the Lower Plains as far as machinery and other implements are concerned.

### Table 5.7

Machinery 1973 - Estimates For the Lower Plains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Tractors</th>
<th>Implements</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tendaho</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Awasa Farms)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVA Settlement</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEG AVA Master Plan, 1974 (Main Volume) Chapter IV - p. 37

It shows that there was more tractors on the Awasa farms than Tendaho. The average large farm had 3 to 4 furrow disc ploughs and as many as 4 raw cotton planters and disc harrows. [128] These farms also used aerial sprays, but no fertilisers were used. Some of the irrigation was done by pumping. Yields were initially very low but increased significantly over the years. Moczarski, an FAO rural extension officer, estimated yields at 7 to 10 q/ha in 1969. R.J. Hogg, another FAO expert familiar with the area, estimated cotton production at 161,000 q. from 9,000 ha in 1970-1971 which suggests an average yield of about 10.6q/ha. [129] The FSLAV large farm survey in 1971/72 estimated average yield at 17q./ha, in a range from 10q./ha to 30q./ha. [130]

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[127] According to this survey, the makes of tractors were roughly: 60% Fiat, 15% Massey Ferguson, 15% Sane Italian and 10% Beyelarus (Russian). These are 70.h.p. with 4-wheel drive. See Gibb and Hunting, 1973, FSLAV, part 1, annex 4, p.99.


[130] Ibid, p.23; also Gibb and Hunting, 1973, FSLAV, Part 1, Main Report, op. cit, p. 52
Small cotton farms: these accounted for 2000 ha, with average farm sizes of 2.8 ha per family, and were mainly outside the delta (See Table 5.6). They were labour intensive but used hired labour for weeding and harvesting operations. Cultivation was mainly done by hand hoe or ox drawn local plough, and an estimated 15% of land was also cultivated by machines, normally hired from Aawsa Farmers Cooperative, AVA, or private contractors (i.e. the large farmers). [131] Most of them used agricultural chemicals, but no fertilisers. Use was made of knapsack sprayers. The small farm survey conducted by FSLAV estimated average yields at 9.2q/ha. [132] or almost half that of the large farmers. Average yearly income of this category was estimated at £$360 per ha net revenue from cotton [133] after deduction of "rents" which are normally due to the Kedho ownership groups (Table 5.8 is a bold summary of Revenues and costs of the Aawsa Farms in 1972-73 season).

Cotton developments also accentuated the difference between Aawsa and the people of the surrounding areas. We have previously divided the Sultanate into two geographical zones: the Aawsa delta, and Kalo. The latter is the home of semi-nomadic pastoralists who formed marriage relationships with the politically dominant group, Afkeek-Msada. Beyond these are the pastoralists of the surrounding desert, who use the water and pastures of the oasis. The central area of the delta is used exclusively by the Awsian peasantry. The south-central area is shared by the semi-nomadic Afar pastoralists. The delta as a whole is a reserve area, which means that no outsider herd is allowed in. This has involved a highly organised system of livestock, timber and pasture management under the control of the Malokti. In 1972/73, there were three regional management units, and a separate unit for timber management. Of these, one administered the north-central area while the other managed the south-central. The third administered Kalo. Each of these regional management units were run by several "cattle fathers" under a Senior Malak who reported to the Sultan through the deputy Sultan in charge of timber and livestock management. There were 34 subsidiary units in the delta, and 21
Table 5.8

Gross and Net Value of present production and Economic Prices* (1972-1973) in 1000 Eth $

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Large Farms</th>
<th>Small Farms</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>6216.1</td>
<td>615.9</td>
<td>6832.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1463.1</td>
<td>636.9</td>
<td>783.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6362.4</td>
<td>1252.8</td>
<td>7615.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Cost **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1523.6</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>1635.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>165.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1590.4</td>
<td>210.1</td>
<td>1800.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Cost ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>902.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>941.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>--(1)</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>929.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>968.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Value of Present Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>3789.6</td>
<td>465.6</td>
<td>4255.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>538.3</td>
<td>591.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3842.3</td>
<td>1003.9</td>
<td>4846.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This data is based on the following: Large Farms: Cotton: 7000 ha planted; 120,000 q; average yield of 17 q/ha; price Eth$ 51.5q. Maize: 1000 ha planted; 9,500q (9.5q/ha); price Eth$ 15.4q. Small Farms: Cotton: 1,300 ha planted; 11,960 q (9.2q/ha); price Eth$ 51.5q; Maize: 4700 ha planted; 41,360 q (8.8q/ha); price Eth$ 15.4q.

** Includes material, machinery, oxen, spraying and pumping.

*** This is based on a shadow wage rate equal to 50% of a daily wage of Eth$ 1.50 (for hired labour). Zero rate is for family labour. Harvest labour was costed per quantity picked. The cost included here equals 50% of the calculated market price.

(1) All family labour assumed.

Source: Gibb and Hunting 1973, FSLAV, Annex 7; see also of the same Study (FSLAV), Main Report, p.54;

management units for livestock in Kalo. In addition, there were 19 camel and sheep management units in Kalo. In the delta there was no access to outsiders. The North-central area was more exclusive than the South-
central. The extension of this system to Kalo did not bring with it the strict exclusiveness, and migrant herds were allowed to use the water and pasture of the oasis.

The introduction of cotton accentuated these divisions. There were no commercial farms along the Amsa canal in the central delta, which exclusively remained for the use of the Amsa peasants. Although, they did not lose land, they nevertheless were affected by shortage of water arising out of the development of commercial farms upstream. [134] Some major irrigation development took place in the North-central delta, (see map no.5) but this avoided confrontation with the agro-pastoralists. For example, the Sultan’s own Sahile Estate, and those of his family nearby, were developed on the Sultanate’s own pastures. However the period of 1972 and 1973 saw the emergence of cotton farms in the South-central area which affected the semi-nomadic pastoralists of the South (see map no.5).

The Kalo region witnessed the biggest and by far the largest development of commercial farming. Tendaho made some 10,000 ha in Dubti and Ditbahari inaccessible to the semi-nomads. Some large Afar farms were also developed there. The effectiveness of the Malak management system did not equal that in the delta; it was only nominal, a symbolic presence of the political centre. In fact, some of the senior livestock Malokti managed large agricultural farms in Kalo, [135] so there was very little check on the process of commercialisation. A number of the resident herders began to farm their own land or lease it to others.

Some clans set up their own cooperatives in Wahligobi, Bayahale, Dubti and Ditbahari, but not all of them could do this. A farm ownership survey

[134] For example in 1972/73, there was very little water in the River, due to shortage of rain in the highlands. This resulted in “acute shortage of water”; see Gibb and Hunting, FSLAV, 1973, Part 1, Main Report, op. cit. pp.52-53; see also Gibb and Hunting, 1973, FSLAV, Supplementary Report on flooding in Lower Awash Valley during August,1973 (Hunting File, Report No. 340); For general information on water, see Meacham, I.R., 1972, op. cit; Gibb and Hunting 1973, FSLAV, Annex 3, p.24

[135] For example, Malak Habe, a Senior Malak (livestock and timber) was also in charge of large farms in the Bayacle area, close to Tendaho's H.Q. in Dubti.
conducted by Cossins in 1972/73 indicated that small farmers had 100% family ownership and control of their farms in the delta, compared with only 20% in Kalo. [136] A large number of the small farmers in Kalo were thus actually tenants, or land users.

In the periphery there are two main groups whose livelihood is tied to the Oasis of Awsa. Historically they formed part of the Sultanate. Both are semi-nomadic pastoralists and each group is composed of several clans. For reasons of simplicity, we will call the first group Adalik-Aroyta, and the second group the Non-Awsa Moodayto. The first forms a buffer between Awsa and the Issa-Somali; they normally graze in the South delta area and are known to be difficult to administer. The Sultans of Awsa always preferred not to interfere with them. In the 19th century, Galeela, an important branch of this group, controlled many of the trade routes to highland Ethiopia on behalf of the Sultans of Awsa, who chose not to involve themselves. [137] In the 20th century, and the new relationships with the highlands, there was no need for support from this group. Thus, when commercial farms were fast developing in the South delta area, not much thought was given to this group and they began to lose much of their traditional pasture.

The second group, which we call the non-Awsa Moodayto, inhabit the area North of Tendaho and include all of the Afar clans between the Red Sea coast and the Abyssinian plateau. For this group, the Awash is a natural reserve to which they turn to in times of crisis. Some of them who inhabited the area close to Tendaho used it almost every year as dry-season grazing but, as we have seen, large tracts of the river bank were barred to them since 1961. When the Great Drought hit the area in 1972/73, this group was badly affected: when thousands of them and their cattle moved into Tendaho, they found to their surprise that there was no water or pasture for them. They had to move back into the desert and the now well-known story of overcrowding and overgrazing followed.

[137] For information on trade routes, see Abir, M., 1968, Ethiopia: The Era of the Prince, London, p. 27

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Thus we can see that the introduction of cotton as a cash crop brought dramatic changes in the social and economic structure of the Afar Sultanate. It widened social divisions, but it also consolidated the position of those already in power. This led to sharp divisions between social groups, between economic activities, and between regions. On the social level, the agricultural Malokti and the officials of the newly founded Awa Farmers Cooperative, formed the nucleus of a new bureaucracy which wielded great power over the allocation and distribution of resources. This was in fact a process of state formation within the Empire-State of Ethiopia. Below this level came the large cotton farmers (Arabs, Afar and highlanders), followed by the heads of kinship groups who shared, albeit from a distance, in the allocation of resources and distribution of benefits. Below them were the small farmers, tenants, nomads and the rural proletariat.

The delta, where land-ownership was historically consolidated and where the politically dominant Afkeek-Maada ruled, witnessed a fairer distribution of wealth among all groups. Kalo, where the heads of kinship groups were subordinate to the Sultanate, and where the kinship group heads had recognised control, but not ownership of land, witnessed extensive land development by non-residents. Here there was sharp divisions between land users who became rich, and land owners who remained poor. The contrast between these two regions and the rest of the Afar pastoralists who roamed the desert was even more extreme.
CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENT AND REVOLUTION: AWSA–ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS SINCE 1960


In the last chapter we saw how the Awsean elites began to challenge the stated objectives of AVA by setting up their own organisation to manage new cotton farms on land which was regarded by the State as "public domain". This challenge included a campaign to bar the AVA from excercising any sort of influence in the Awash valley, waged not only in the Awash Valley, but also at the Ethiopian capital and at the various provincial levels. It took several forms, notably a challenge to the AVA's legal status in the provincial courts. The Central Government of Ethiopia did not take any substantial counteractive measures beyond its refusal to grant Awsa farmers agricultural credit through the Agro–industrial banks, and barring them from acquiring tax–free gasoline. These measures did contribute to the increase of production costs, but not enough to subjugate Awsa to AVA. We have noted earlier how AVA itself was unable to acquire the necessary political and financial support from the State. The acquisition of immense wealth from cotton, along with the assault by government–supported concessionaires on land regarded by Afar as their reserve, generated bitter feelings towards any outsider. This gave the Awseans, themselves heirs of the expansionist Moodayto rulers, an impetus to challenge the objectives of the State, with the rallying cry of "Afar land for the Afar". In the words of Cossins, "the Sultan in discussions continually emphasised the unity and uniformity of the Afar and his influence as a leader". [1]

In what sense was the challenge to the Authority of AVA a challenge to the State? Most scholars would agree that in the context of Haile

Selassie's Ethiopia there was little or no discontinuity between the person of the Emperor and the institutions of the State. [2] The civil and military bureaucracy which was established after 1941 was "a replica of the old inner circle of retainers". The various attempts which were made after 1941 to modernise the administration did not constitute anything like the process of nation building which was put in motion in post-independence Afro-Asian countries. For its rulers, Ethiopia had already been an independent state for two-thousand years. The Government was headed by the Emperor and an imperial court. The latter allowed "considerable scope for bringing different elements into the government, within the limits of subordination to the Emperor". [3] Different opinions and views were thus permitted within the limits of the acceptance of "Amhara rule and centralisation at the regional level, and the authority of the Emperor at the Centre". [4] The Imperial Court (Ghibi) thus served to integrate various regional and provincial interests.

After 1954, the old pattern of relationship between the political Centre under Haile Selassie, and the Awsean leaders was restored. On the Afar side, the Awsean rulers were given predominance, but lesser leaders were also given Ethiopian titles and ranks. Where new administrative institutions were allowed to function, they were staffed by local leaders. For example, the Wereda or district office in Aysaita was headed by Hamadi Yayo, the Sultan's own Wazir, from 1954. In other Afar regions of Ethiopia, no local appointment to administrative positions were made until 1963 [5] and most of these were on the level of either advisors or Assistant District Governors.

The Afar Sultanate of Awa was incorporated into Wollo Governate–

[3] Ibid, p. 2
[5] Personal Communication from Haji Ibrahim Ali, Djibouti, 4/5/81. This person was a Wereda administrator in Teru, Tigre Administrative Region between 1977-1978. He told me that the first two Afar were appointed district Deputy Governor in 1962, and in 1964.
General and came to be known as Bati Awraja, [6] later re-named Awsa Awraja. It was administered from the town of Bati in the highlands, by an Amhara Governor. [7] His authority was limited to the town, and the surrounding highlands but beyond this, the running of the administration rested with the Afar Makaaban. Wollo itself was under the honorific governorship of the Crown Prince Asafa Wossen, although the administration was handled by the Endrassie, [8] the Emperor's representative. The Crown Prince played a crucial role until the mid 1960s in resolving the conflict between the Awaysek leaders and the Central Government over the issue of direct rule. [9] This enabled the Awaysek leaders to acquire direct access to the Imperial Court, by-passing the existing governmental machinery. For example, when in Addis Ababa for official business, the Awaysek leaders stayed at the Crown Prince's palace as guests of the Prince, and conducted their business through his office. [10] Their association with the Court officials allowed them to learn the political game. The Sultan himself avoided befriending the officials, but maintained a close and cordial relation with the Emperor. The Awaysek leaders unlike the Ethiopian lords did not invest in real estate in Addis Ababa, and did not move their residences to the Ethiopian Capital, Aysalta, and their various summer residences along the Assab-Addis Highway, remained their homes. Sultan Alimirah, was always keen on getting himself informed on every subject but knew that he was an outsider to this exclusively Christain Amhara dominated club and made sure that he remained outside the political quarrels between the various interest groups. This helped him to maintain


[7] Appointments to the Governorship of this province consisted of military men. For example, Colonel Azeghen (formerly security chief of Eritrea), Brig-General Gessesse Retta (3 April 1970), Colonel Simie Wedajo (29 June 1971), and Major Wonderad (1974).


[10] In 1965, the Sultan rented a private house for himself in Addis Ababa, and subsequently bought one, and built another, while others, notably Hamadi Yayo, the Sultan's deputy, continued to use the Prince's premises until his death in 1972. Afar leaders from the Middle Valley often used the office of Ras Emru, the Emperor's cousin.
his contacts with those in opposition, such as the Eritreans and Oromos. The latter tried [11] to involve him in their bid for state power in 1966 under General Tadasse Biru, an Oromo General and in 1972, the Amease leadership helped Tigrman Nationalists who were on the run from State security to leave the country via Amsa. [12] Sultan Alimrah's direct access to the Emperor did not please the Prime Minister, Aklilu Habte. The Sultan's recollection of this relationship is interesting:

Aklilu made several attempts to discredit us with the Emperor but our close association with Haile Selassie made his attempts useless. We also made friends. Our struggle necessitated that we use all kinds of weapons under our disposal. [13] For example, in 1972, he submitted a proposal to the Cabinet to put a ceiling on land to be allocated to us at 5,000 ha. This was defeated at the Cabinet meeting. Our counter proposal was for the government to recognise communal ownership on the same basis as those prevailing in the Northern Highlands of Ethiopia. There was a general agreement for acceptance of this proposal by people in the Ministries of Agriculture and Interior. A meeting was held at the Ministry of Interior. Several Afar leaders from the Middle Awash Valley were present. We told the Government that we would recognise AVA's right to control water and charge fees, in exchange for recognition of communal ownership rights. Aklilu rejected this. We thought this was discriminitory.

The Prime Minister was good at presenting volumes of unsubstantiated reports to the Emperor implicating us with foreign powers. At times he would make false claims about existence of what he termed as "Sultan's Party". He made claims that the young educated Afar around us were not real farmers and office staff, but only fronts for political work. Aklilu's government had very little idea of what went on in our region. They simply misunderstood the situation. There was no party. Much money and time was wasted on such reports and

[11] Personal Communication from H.E. Sultan Alimrah, Jeddah. The Sultan maintained close contacts with Oromo nationalists notably Sheikh Hussein the leader of the Ethiopian National Liberation Front. He frequently met them during his Middle Eastern Tours. In 1975, Sheikh Hussein slipped into Ethiopia via Amsa. Again in 1975, there were rumours of an alliance with Gen. Tadesse Biru, who was released from detention by the new Government.

[12] This group consisted of relatives of H.E. Abebe Retta, the Minister of Agriculture. Personal communication from Hanfare Alimrah.

investigation. Since no party existed, they could not find anything. [14]

The Sultan's statements indicate that he had established not only provincial government links, but an "ability to be heard and to a certain extent even influence important central government sources. The Sultan is capable of mustering a considerable and by no means ineffective power block, sympathetic to his, and Aawsa Afar causes". [15] It is no wonder then that AVA decided not to submit its proposal to parliament to upgrade its charter from general notice to a proclamation. In such a political arena it would have certainly faced difficulties.

The question of illicit trade on the border area between the coast and the hinterland was always an area of contention between Aawsa and the centre. The Sultans of Aawsa understood the agreement signed with Emperor Menelik II as allowing them to charge fees on goods passing through their territory. [16] When the slave trade which was their main source of revenue was abolished, they continued to collect taxes from smugglers. With the construction of the Assab-Addis Ababa Highway, and the establishment of a station manned by the Finance Police at Tendaho, the illicit trade declined but the Sultan's tax collectors maintained their presence on the main villages along the Assab-Addis Ababa Highway. The Finance Police always complained about these collectors obstructing their work, [17] but increased wealth from cotton meant that the Awseans were less interested in this illicit trade.

The Sultan's annual trips to Mecca, and other Middle Eastern Countries, and his growing foreign connections, were a mixed blessing to the Ethiopian political centre. His detractors used this to foster Ethiopia's centuries-old fear of Muslim domination, while his friends, particularly at the Imperial Palace, thought that this would improve Ethiopia's image in the Muslim world in the face of accusations by Somalia and Ethiopian

[17] Personal Communication from Mohamed Sule, Tax Officer of the Sultanate.
Muslim exiles of widespread repression against Muslims in Ethiopia. [18] Alimirah himself had substantial support among Muslims, and was known to have applied strict Sharia Laws in his own domain in the delta. [19] Nevertheless, the Major beneficiary of these trips was Sultan Alimirah himself who used them to bolster his standing at home and abroad. During these trips, he met Arab and Muslim leaders from all over the world. He used the trips to acquire scholarships for Afar students in Egypt and elsewhere. The number of Afar students increased dramatically after his first trip to Cairo in 1968. The trips also helped him to maintain contact with the exiled opposition and paid handsome dividends when he was forced to leave Ethiopia in 1975.

For the Afar leaders this was an important beginning for it meant that having established the line of communication they could send more students to study in Islamic universities. Thus the Sultan approached the Emperor in 1966 for permission to send 17 students to Cairo. The Emperor, aware of opposition from some quarters, suggested to the Sultan that possibly Morocco could be a better place to send students. [20] The affair dragged on for almost a year. The Minister of State at the palace, told the students, and the Sultan's interpreter who was acting on behalf of the Sultan, that the whole matter was being referred to a four-man Ministerial Committee, and he further pointed out that the Church opposed sending students to Al Azhar University in Cairo. In May 1967, seven of the seventeen students were granted passports to go to Cairo, after the intervention of Dr. Mensa Haile, then in charge of the Emperor's Private Cabinet. [21]

[18] See the letter addressed to President Ismael Alazhari, of the Sudan in 1958, by a group of Ethiopian Muslims, on the eve of his visit to Ethiopia. See, Al Ethiopie, Abu Ahmed, 1964.
[19] Ibid p. 100
[20] Personal communication from Kadafo Mohamed Hanfare, the Sultan's interpreter, 1980. Kadafo also told us that the idea of Morocco was suggested to the Emperor by Ato Yilma Dresse, the Finance Minister who attended the meeting. The informant also suggested that the Sultan kept on going back to the issue of the students while the Emperor was mainly interested in discussing Djibouti's problems.
[21] The Author was one of the students.
The activities of the Awsean leaders were even more pronounced on the local and provincial level than on the national level. At the level of the district, the Government itself had no presence, and the Awsean leaders were allowed to run the show without interference. The Sultanate formed part of the provincial government in an auxiliary capacity and regularly paid livestock tax to the province amounting to Eth$20,000s [22] a year, while the AVA and its concessionaires paid their dues direct to the Central Treasury. The Sultanate assisted Afar students studying in Bati and Dessie, and this was regarded by provincial administration as an important contribution. At the headquarters in Bati, the Sultan was regarded as the Awraja's "Chief Balabbat" and was regularly consulted in the settlement of tribal disputes. [23] This role was also demanded by the Tigre Administration to the north, to which the Sultan regularly sent deputations to resolve intra-Afar disputes, and disputes between Afar and their neighbours. By 1971, Hamadi Yayo, the Sultan's Wazir, was appointed Deputy-Governor of Awsa Awraja based in Bati, which increased their role on the provincial level.

The actions and attitudes of the Afar leaders were dictated by the general situation in the Awash Valley in which the semi-nomadic Afar were increasingly alienated from land. The deepening crisis in the Ethiopian political centre helped to give this leadership a wider scope for manoeuvre.

The Ethiopian political structure almost a hundred years after the establishment of the Empire was still fractured. The system allowed considerable scope for differing opinions to prevail. Even if one assumes that authority belonged to the Emperor alone, power, as distinct from authority, remained at the prerogative of the regional centres:

Thus, the whole administration, which was in theory subordinate to the Central authorities, retained a wide margin of autonomy between each of its levels. It had not destroyed the web of feudal fabric. The State apparatus was like a series of pyramids, of unequal heights depending on the size of the administrative zones they were responsible for, and out of line with one another. It was far from being a single

[23] Ibid, p. 53

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pyramid, with the Emperor at the top and with all the others, from the largest to the smallest, fitting perfectly. The governor of a Wereda enjoyed some degree of freedom vis-a-vis his superior, the governor of the awraj, a situation reproduced between the awraj and the province, and the province and the capital. [24]

This then leads us to the nature of the Afar leadership and how it was able to present an image of uniformity in its drive against AVA, despite the capitalist intrusion which brought about social and regional inequality hitherto unknown in this basically pastoral society.

6.2 Alimirah: An Afar ideologue

When young Alimirah Hanfare replaced his uncle Sultan Mohamad Yayo in 1944 as the Sultan of Awwa, non-Awwa Afar did not contemplate that this change in Awwa's leadership would affect the course of events in their particular localities. They saw it as a purely Moodayto affair. But from 1960 onwards the Sultan of Awwa was obliged to assume an Afar-wide leadership extending far beyond the delta. Traditionally, the political influence of the Awwa Sultans outside the delta was limited to a role of arbitrator, deriving from their control of the permanent water course and the fertile pastures of the delta, and their standing Militia.

Awwa's new role, however, was to be dramatically different in scope and content. Was Alimirah a moderniser who wanted to advance the interests of his own Awwa subjects and the Afar at large, as his friends and supporters argue, or was he simply a shrewd businessman, using his position to advance his own personal political and financial interests? Had he been a head of an independent state, would he have been seen, like Haile Selassie as a moderniser? A study by a British firm describes him as:

Amoyta or "Lord" to the Afar, alms giver, holy man, large farmer innovator, businessman entrepreneur, educator planner, leader and judge; Contentious opponent of AVA police, antagonist of and yet partly cooperating with TPSC; damned by his detractors as a self-interested capitalist, praised by his freinds as a selfless worker for the Afar interests, Bitwoded


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Alimirah, thirteenth Sultan of Awa, is a man of many parts. [25]

His detractors in the Ethiopian bureaucracy saw his role in the Awash Valley in quite a different perspective. His land development project was seen as "grabbing away" Government land for his own benefit. [26]

Two aspects of his agricultural policy were at the centre of debate, both among his own people, and outsiders: His material and political support for Afar elders in Badhu (in the Middle Awash Valley), advocating sedentarisation; and his development of land in Awa itself. Discussing development politics, A. F. Robertson, pointed out that while "Alimirah leads one particular segment of the Afar, others of whom are not at all appreciative of his interests and methods". [27] Robertson doubts "whether the colonial zeal of Alimirah is necessarily more virtuous than that of the Ethiopian Government". [28]

In Badhu, the Debne and Wieima clans of the upper middle Valley saw Alimirah's intervention as perpetuating the historical conflict between themselves, and the Moodayto of Gewani, who received the main bulk of financial aid from Awa. However, to be fair, some of the Debne and Wieima leaders were themselves beneficiaries, and among Alimirah's major opponents in Badhu were his own Moodayto kin. [29] In general his intervention created divisions between those who accepted the new Awsean hegemony, and those who wanted to retain an autonomous position vis-a-vis the AVA. In Awa, the AFC, which supported the aid to Badhu in principle, nevertheless disapproved of the way it was handled and attempted to distance itself. An example of the mismanagement was the purchase of agricultural equipment worth E$1.5 M in 1972 for Badhu, without any prior organisation to manage the funds or the farms. This equipment was standing

[27] Robertson, A. F., 1975, Anthropology and the Nomads: Another view of the Afar, RAIN, No. 8, p. 9
[28] Ibid.
[29] People like Hassan Abdalla, a Moodayto from Gewani, stood against Alimirah, and others like Fit. Humad Caba, a non-Moodayto sided with Alimirah.

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rusted and unused at the end of 1973. [30] The Sultan's need to build up a network of political supporters, further aggravated the situation and created an environment of divisions, at a time when unity should have been the policy. This gave AVA the chance to create dissent among the elders, who kept changing their positions.

The second area of dispute was Alimirah's relentless expansion of agricultural land in Awsa itself. Related to this, and of greater significance in the internal debate within Awsa, was the role of non-Afar in the development process. Unlike Badhu, Awsa is the Sultanate's home, and while AVA's influence and role there was negligible, the threat of external intrusion was always present. It was symbolised by the presence of the 10,000 ha. Tendaho plantation, the largest single farming unit in the valley. The rate of land development, and the way this was managed in Awsa, could not be considered apart from the general framework of the capitalist development in the Valley. The Awsean experiment was moulded by it. It took on basically the same pattern as those farms and plantations run by capitalists elsewhere in the valley, but with one important difference: it was mostly managed by Afar. Furthermore it incorporated within the capitalist structure a traditional notion of communal albeit commercial ownership, whereby the individual entrepreneur who farmed the land on lease from the Kedho ownership group, gave it a substantial portion of his profits. This was in contrast to Tendaho which took over large portions of land without any compensation.

How did the Awsean pastoralists, and those outsiders who used this land for grazing, view this development? In Awsa, there was general agreement, at least among its traditional elite who were themselves agro-pastoralists, that the task was to keep the AVA and its concessionaires out of the Awash. Sedentarisation, was the strategy adopted. The pastoralists were coopted through leases of land to farmers, but no provision was made for the non-Awsean graziers, who used the Tendaho area but who exerted little influence within the Sultans' court. The leadership was able to convince them that their plight was caused by Tendaho plantation rather than land expansion by Afar farmers. Thus, the

The politicisation of the land issue overshadowed the growing antagonism between farmers and graziers. In emphasising this aspect, G. Flood observes:

"Afar unity owes much to the presence of outsiders for pastoralists are aware that without their own cotton people, they themselves could not exist as cattle people". [31]

This is a little over-stated but it shows how the Afar were closing ranks against outsiders. The Awsa leaders prided themselves in this impressive land development. In addition, the Awaans were not much affected by the continuous drought that other Afar areas were witnessing since the mid-1960s. Two factors were responsible for this; firstly Awa's livestock and timber management system which was based on conservation of pasture, and restriction of entry to their pastures by outside cattle; secondly the high degree of capitalist penetration into Awa's agriculture, which allowed a large number of its population to be absorbed into the new economy. These two factors saved the Awaans from the kind of horror that the other Afar went through. Yet the intensity of drought and the famine which accompanied it in 1972/73 horrified the Awaans who lived in an enclave amidst poverty. In their search for grazing and food, thousands of Afar and their cattle poured into Awa in 1973, bringing with them all kinds of famine-related infections like cholera. [32]

This presented the Awaan leadership with a moral dilemma, which was met by short term solutions, such as mobilisation of resources to provide water along the road, food in relief camps and fostering of the children of those whose parents died of famine. [33] Flood summed up the position of the Sultan, in this regard:

"Alimirah is in a morally difficult position, for if he continues to support the pastoralists in these times of need, he diminishes the Afar capability of expanding their farming interests and thus risks losing Afar land to outsiders." [34]

[31] Flood, G., 1975, RAIN, No. 5, p. 8
[33] Flood, G., 1975; see Mohamode Gaas, 'The Afar or the Danakil Plight,' Ethiopian Herald, April 17, 1974
[34] Flood, G., 1975, RAIN, No. 5, p. 8
In fact, this solidarity with drought affected pastoralists was short-lived. There was more expansion of irrigated land after 1973 than before. The debate within the agricultural community, in particular among the prosperous farmers, was about the role of non-Afar in the process of expansion. The Sultan's policy must be seen in this context, particularly the argument that since the non-Afar had more knowledge of farming, they could serve as an example to the Afar. [35]

Before elaborating further on this aspect of the Sultan's policy, we must note that unlike the elders of Thio who sponsored the idea of the Greater Afar in their conference in 1962, and who wanted to establish an Afar-wide administration under the hegemony of Imperial Ethiopia, [36] Alimirah's brand of Afarism did not envisage an administration in which Ethiopian officials were to play a dominant role, rather the extension of the Awsean style of government, with he himself supreme. Alimirah was against any extension of government services in Awsa. For example, he worked vigorously against the transfer of the Awraja (provincial) government from Bati to Aysaita, which would have facilitated easy access for Afar nomads to local government. [37] Most striking was Alimirah's emphasis on the role of Islam. In their idea of Greater Afar, the elders of Thio did envisage the use of Arabic, as an official language in the autonomous state, but said nothing about Islamisation. Alimirah's policy served to make Afarism subordinate to Islam but also allowed and encouraged the accommodation of other ethnic groups who professed Islam. The role of the Awsean state as a centre of Islam in Eastern Abyssinia at least until the Afar take-over in the Middle of the 17th Century, seems to have had a great influence on the orientation of its leaders. Alimirah seems to have believed that the revival of Islam could only restore Aawsa's glorious past, ensure an eminent place for Aawsa by accommodating Muslims of other ethnic groups such as the Wollos, Hararis, and Eritreans, and revive contacts with the Islamic Middle East. From the beginning of his reign Alimirah imposed strict Islamic laws concerning prayers and fasting

[36] The influence of this on the political movement in the region will be taken up elsewhere.
[37] Alimirah himself does not deny this. Personal communication from the Sultan.
in Awsa. When he was made Sultan of Awsa in 1944, Alimirah insisted that the traditional ritual of succession be supplemented by ceremonies used by the Caliphs in the early period of Islam:

In the Name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate.

Those who swear fealty to thee swear fealty in truth to Allah, Allah's hand over their hands.

Our Master, Your Highness Sultan Alimirah bin Hanfare who trusts in Allah.

We, the undesigned, the Ulama and the dignitaries of Awsa swear fealty to Your Highness as Sultan of the Awsa country, and as Prince on its people, provided that you rule us according to Allah's Book and the traditions of His Messenger, and that you safeguard the interests of the people and the homeland within the limits of the great Islamic Sharia. To you we swear the pledge of Allah and his convenant that we be faithfull to you in obedience and loyalty, and that we commit ourselves to the Jihad for Allah and the homeland under your leadership offering our money and our souls. Then whosoever breaks his oath breaks it but to his own heart, and Allah is the trustee and the witness to our say, He is the Best Trustee and the foremost witness, there is no strength but the strength of Allah the Almighty, the Gracious. [38]

He established a strong link with the Muslim Ulama of Dawe in Eastern Ethiopia, [39] Eritrea, and the Middle East. Many prominent Muslim scholars from Dawe took up residence in Awsa and some of them became influential in the Sultan's court. They were followed by Eritreans, a large number of whom flooded into Awsa after 1963. Unlike the Ulama from Dawe, these Eritreans, were composed of bureaucrats, teachers, technicians, farmers and semi-skilled workers. Some of them were Afar, others were Saho, a group linguistically related to the Afar, and yet others were Tigres from the Red Sea region of Massawa. These people brought with them skills that Awsa required. Another group of foreigners, who were playing a crucial role in Awsa's development, were Arab farmers from Yemen.

These foreigners, particularly Arabs, controlled large tracts of the best land. The AVA attempted to discredit the Sultan by emphasising his

[38] Subhi, M. S., 1954, op. cit.

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Arab connection to Ethiopian rulers who were generally anti-Arab. The Sultan avoided Christian highlanders because of fear that they could claim the land after years of continuous farming.

There was a general resentment among the population against the presence of foreigners, particularly the Arabs, highlanders, and to a lesser degree the Eritreans. The non-Awse Afar figured prominently among officials of AFC and the farming community as did the Saho. Resentment was strong among the educated Afar, both Awsean and non-Awsean Afar and less so among the general populace. These groups were growing in strength due to their position as farmers, farm managers and AFC officials. They were less committed to Islam. They felt very strongly their lack of political power, although they commanded very strong influence in economic matters, except the way land was distributed. They were, however, in no position to present a unified stand or a threat to the Awsean leadership, to whom they owed their positions. They knew that Afar unity was essential in the face of AVA's threat, therefore the antagonism between them and the traditional elements was subordinated to the need for a united front.

6.3 The Afar and the Ethiopian Revolution:

In 1974 Haile Selassie's regime fell under the strains of the great drought and famine of 1973 which left more than a quarter of a million people dead. It was replaced by the Derg, a 'shadow committee' made up of representatives of the armed forces. [40] In February and March 1975 the Derg launched sweeping social and economic reforms to put an end to the feudal system. The Afar welcomed the introduction of the possessory rights

but mistrusted the nationalisation of land. [41] Since the early 1960s Afar leaders have been demanding the unification of Afar Territory into a single autonomous province. Haile Selassie's Government was able to contain the problem by allowing a degree of autonomy for the traditional leaders, but the new government did not show a willingness to accommodate Afar grievances' and therefore a clash was inevitable. The Sultan's rejection of Land Reform, [42] his increasing cooperation with Somalia and the Eritrean Liberation Front, and his refusal to share power with the military leaders aroused the hostility of the Derg, which was reluctant to leave the strategic corridor to the Red Sea in the hands of the Afar. [43]

As soon as it took power in July 1974, the army chose Major Mohamed Yassin, [44] an Afar and a Military Academy graduate who had recently become governor of Assab province (Awraja) in Eritrea, to act as its agent and security advisor for the Afar region as a whole. Major Mohamed, who was sympathetic to the Sultan and a supporter of the idea of the creation of an autonomous Afar State within Ethiopia, tried from the beginning to minimise suspicion on the part of the Afar leadership about the army and its plans. In June 1974, the Government approved agricultural loans to the AFC amounting to more than Eth$10M, the repayment of which was guaranteed by the Sultan. This in itself reassured the farmers, the Sultan, and others of the intentions of the Government for the moment, and on the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Sultan pledged support. According to the London Financial Times, this was made on the understanding that the ruling Derg would continue its policy of non-interference with the Sultan. [45]

However, on 22nd of November 1974, the Derg executed its chairman, General Aman Andom and 56 officials of the imperial regime by firing

[41] See Ashami, H. G., 1982, op. cit. pp.25-39; see also A Proclamation to provide for the Nationalisation of Rural Lands issued by the PMAC: Published in the Ethiopian Herald, March 4, 1975, Addis Ababa (see Articles 24 and 27 dealing with Nomadic land).
[44] Major Mohamed is a son of the Afar Nationalist Shiekh Yassin Mahamooda. He was killed in suspicious circumstances in Edd during a campaign against ELF in 1978.
squad, without trial. [46] This shattered whatever confidence Sultan Alimirah might have had in the Military Government. Soon after, the Derg sent Major Mohamed Yassin and Major Wandered, the newly appointed Governor of Awas province to convince the Sultan to come to Addis Ababa for consultation with the new rulers. The Sultan kept giving excuses for delaying his visit to the Ethiopian capital. As early as July 1974, he had begun to mobilise public support for himself at home by sending delegations to various Afar regions and beginning to activate his foreign connections. In August 1974, the Sultan’s delegate was present in the first Afar congress which took place in West Berlin. This meeting was attended by Afar students from Europe and the Middle East. It was here that the formation of the Afar Liberation Front was first discussed and approved. Some of those who attended this meeting joined other delegates of the Sultan in the Middle East, where they began to prepare the ground for the launching of an armed struggle. Visits were made to Sudan to meet with the ELF, while contacts were made with the governments of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, and South Yemen. [47]

While these contacts developed, at home the relations between the Sultan and The Derg became less cordial. The Derg launched several important reforms including the proclamation to nationalize rural land in February and March 1975. [48] The Awas farms were not included when the Government announced the appointment of the new managers for nationalised farms in the Awash Valley and elsewhere, with the exception of a farm run by the Afar elders in Badhu in the Middle Awash Valley which was financially supported by the Sultan of Awas. This was not taken lightly by the elders in the Middle Valley or in the Sultan’s court, for this particular farm was the subject of a court ruling which the Afar had won against AWA. It was contested by the elders the following May during their meeting in Addis Ababa. As far as Awas farms were concerned the Government

[46] see Thompson, B., 1975, op. cit.
[47] Personal communication from Mohamed Abubeker, ELF representative in Paris, who participated in these meetings.
[48] I was told in early 1975 by the then Chairman of the Social Affairs Committee of the Derg, Major Hagos, that the Government had not decided what to do about Awas, because of the Complexity of the land Tenure System and because thousands of farmers were involved.
approved a further loan amounting to ETh$4.5M against delivery of goods (cotton) as late as the middle of May 1975. The rise in the wages of labourers and the need to get its money back had forced the Government to advance the loan.

On the political front, Majors Mohamed and Wandered were now joined by a third official, Abbabiya Abba Jifar, the new Governor General of Kaffa and the son of the Sultan of Jima, who is a very close friend of the Sultan's family. The Government was now insisting that the Sultan make the trip to Addis Ababa, and inclusion of Abbabiya was to assure the Sultan of his safety.

After the attack on Asmara in February 1975 by the Eritrean revolutionaries there was fear of similar attacks on Assab, the site of Ethiopia's only oil refinery. This fear and the growing cooperation between ELF and the Sultan are seen by some as being responsible for the deteriorating relationship between the Sultan and the Government:

"The mutual relations began turning sour late this year when ELF guerrillas extended their activities to Afar-controlled territories. The inference drawn from this was clearly summed up by one diplomat who said: "Nothing goes in the Afar Territory for very long without the Sultan's knowledge or expressed consent". [49]

However, the Ethiopian authorities had always been aware of the advantages of the cooperation between the Sultan and the ELF. It was the Sultan's Militia, who were not paid by the Government, which guarded the bridges on the Assab-Tendaho highway, not the Ethiopian army. There was a good working relationship between the Militia and ELF fighters since 1972 when the latter used the office of the Sultan to re-enter the Afar region of Eritrea, from which they were driven out in 1970 by Afar nationalists within ELF itself. [50] As long as the sultan could check their activities, the Government tolerated their presence. But in 1974 the Afar leadership did not have the kind of access which they previously had to the highest

authority in Addis Ababa and the cooperation with ELF had taken a dramatic turn against Ethiopia, for the two parties were now publicly working together in Arab capitals, and in Mogadishu, the Somali capital. Moreover the Government of South Yemen is said to have played an important role, along with ELF, in securing the Somali support for the Afar. [51] The Military Government viewed this development with serious concern, hence its constant call for the Sultan to visit Addis Ababa to discuss national security.

During this time the Sultan, who had taken up residence in Manda [52] on the Assab-Tendaho highway some 60 km south of Assab, began to organise an (Afar Liberation Front) ALF among the Afar students. He succeeded by the end of November 1974 in sending some 60 students, via ELF, to Somalia for Military training. Most of these came from the Aysahta Islamic Institute, which he himself had established, but others came from Assab, Dessie and Djibouti. This group of students was later to play an important role in the running of the movement. This new alignment with Somalia was viewed with suspicion among the Sultan's supporters in Ethiopia, who were making every effort to mend the souring relationship with the government.

The most devastating blow to this group and to the relations between the Sultan of Aawsa and the Military Government was a visit to Somalia in late April 1975 by Hanfare Alimirah, the son of the Sultan. Upon his return to Addis Ababa, Hanfare Alimirah was confronted with this by Mingestu Haile Mariam, the Chairman of the Military Government. Hanfare denied having been to Mogadishu [53] but the damage was done, and he slipped out of the Ethiopian capital soon after. The Government might have prevented him, but were probably waiting for a bigger fish. It was after this visit by Hanfare to Addis Ababa that the Government began to exert pressure on the Sultan to visit Addis Ababa. The Sultan decided to send a 67 member delegation of Afar chiefs, [54] carefully selected to reflect all Afar regions from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Their mission was to tell the

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[51] Personal communication from Hanfare Alimirah.
[52] Manda is one of the Sultan's summer residences. It was close to ELF held area on the coast, and to the then French occupied Djibouti.
[53] Personal communication from Hanfare Alimirah.
Derg that the security situation did not allow the Sultan to travel to Addis Ababa, and that they were authorised Afar spokesmen. These elders were kept at the Chion Hotel, the capital's most luxurious Hotel and were addressed by high officials who explained to them the aims of the revolution. During their last day, they were taken to the palace to meet with members of the Derg, and ministers involved in Development. The chairman, and the two vice-chairmen addressed the meeting, and three representatives from the Afar side representing elders, farmers and students, also spoke. The elders requested that the Government restore the farm belonging to the Elders in the Middle Valley to its owners. They also requested the Government to stop its support for the exiled son of Sultan Mohamed Yayo who was deposed by Emperor Haile Selassie in 1944. [55] The representatives of the farmers and youth stressed the need for a united Afar within Ethiopia.

At the end of the meeting, the Afar representatives submitted a proposal which contained all of their pronounced views. The Derg told them that they could not be a substitute for Alimirah, with whom they wanted to talk about matters of national security. Two weeks later, the Government despatched to Awsa a "Development Delegation" which was headed by a certain Sergeant Petros and which included the general manager of AVA, and an "Administration Delegation" which was headed by a vice-minister in the Ministry of Interior and was mostly made up of experts.

While in Aysaita Sergeant Petros refused to go and meet the Sultan on the pretext that he was representing the head of state, and requested the Sultan to come and see him. The Sultan refused, and Petros could only address highland labourers in Dubti and Aysaita. Majors Mohamed Yassin, W Anderson, and Abbabiya tried in vain to convince Petros to meet with the Sultan, or minimise his verbal attacks on the Afar leadership. This impasse was exacerbated by a sudden announcement broadcast in the Afar language programme from Addis Ababa, that land in the Awsa area was to be divided

[55] Throughout 1974, and early 1975, a group of Afar headed by Major Mohamed Yassin, and H.G. Ashami, attempted a reconciliation between Sultan Alimirah and his cousins, the sons of Sultan Mohamed Yayo, but they failed, due mainly to the Sultan's refusal to share the earnings from cotton, which they requested as a part of the reconciliation.
into two types, one to be taken over by the Ministry of National Resources Development which meant the establishment of state farms, and another to be taken over and distributed by the Awash Valley Authority. This was the first nationalisation programme announced in a language other than the official one and it may be the Government wanted to assess Afar reactions. It certainly was against the assurance given by the Ethiopian Government to the Elders in Addis Ababa. The Derg had pledged that AVA was not going to be involved, and that land issues were to be handled by the Ministries of Agriculture and Land Reform and Administration.

This new development obliged the Government to send another delegation, to conduct the Sultan safely to the Ethiopian Capital in the company of Afar leaders from Djibouti. The new delegation was composed of Lt. col. Asrat Feleke, a Derg Member, and Colonel Tesfaye Wolde Selassie, the Derg's chief security official. [56] The latter arranged a meeting between the Sultan and Sargeant Petros' delegation. [57] The Sultan promised to leave for the Ethiopian capital the following day.

On Tuesday 3rd of June 1975, all the morning papers in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa carried the following headlines on their front pages: "Afarland for Afar people". Underneath the headlines there was a picture of Sultan Alimirah with members of the delegation taken two days earlier on Sunday in Aysaita. The irony about these reports is that they must have been written a day earlier when the journalists accompanying the Military delegation returned to Addis Ababa on Sunday evening. The reports asserted that peace had been made between the Afar leaders and the Government. But at 1.00 am, some six hours before these papers appeared on Addis Ababa streets, the Afar Militia had already attacked and taken control of the Military and police posts in Aysaita, Dubti, Hayu, Logya and Tendaho. [58] The Ethiopian Government probably did receive information regarding attacks on military posts in the early hours of Tuesday morning.

[56] He is now Minister of Public Security; his companion Lt. Col. Asrate was killed along with the second chairman of the Derg in early 1977.
[57] Jabha, Nida ela al alam al islami (ALF, Appeal to the Islamic world). Jeddah, p.1
but they certainly did not know for example about the blowing up of the Doobi bridge or that the Sultan had left Awsa on Sunday evening some few hours after he bade farewell to the Government delegation. Confusion, rumours and lack of information are understandable in this part of the world, but the amazing part of the story is that the Ethiopian Government did not make attempts to withdraw the reports or inform the public about its prolonged negotiations with the Afar leaders which had been in process since the middle of 1974.

Armed confrontation in fact began on Sunday 1st of June, some few hours after the last of the Government delegation had left Aysaita for Addis Ababa. Violence broke out between the Sultan's Militia and the highland labourers, who the Afar claimed were disguised members of the Armed forces. [59] The police contingent joined the army units, a sign that negotiations between the Sultan and the Military rulers had failed. This last confrontation with the government probably convinced the Afar leadership that it was time to act and that same evening the Sultan decided to leave the country in secrecy after having given the green light to his army to go into action. One of the understandings between the sultan and the Government was that a delegation comprising Afar leaders from Djibouti, which included Abdalla Mohamed Kamil who later became Djibouti's prime minister, was to fly on a special aircraft from Addis Ababa to Aysaita on the Monday. They were to escort the Sultan to Addis Ababa to meet with the country's Military rulers to discuss "issues of national security". The Sultan's deputy, Haji Hanfare, advised the Government on Monday to defer the arrival of the plane to Tuesday to allow for the tense situation to subside. [60]

The Afar mediators from Djibouti arrived in the Ethiopian capital on Saturday but there was no role for them to play. In addition there was a strong rumour in the Ethiopian capital that the Government was despatching several tanks in the direction of Awsa. By Monday evening the tanks had in fact taken positions near Aysaita and along the desert road between

[60] Personal information from Haji Hanfare, the Sultan's deputy.
Aysaita and Sardo, possibly to prevent the Sultan from fleeing that way. They were to be engaged that same night, and for many months after, by an estimated 5,000 well-armed and well disciplined Afar Warriors [61] supported by more sophisticated guerrillas of the Eritrean Liberation Front "Revolutionary council", which had dispatched small contingents of its forces numbering less than 40, but including men trained in anti-tank warfare and explosives. [62] The Ethiopian tank force was later reinforced with jet aircraft which went into action causing many Afar to cross to Djibouti. [63]

The Sultan’s men blew up the main Doobi bridge along the Assab-Addis Ababa highway, some 160 kms west of Assab on the morning of June 3rd, thereby cutting off oil supplies to the Ethiopian capital. [64] Describing the panic this created among the dwellers of Addis Ababa a correspondent of the London based Financial Times wrote:

The significance of Assab as the nation's supplier of fuel has not been lost to the average Ethiopean. As news spread that the Afar had cut off the Addis-Assab road by blowing up a bridge at the town of Sardo, about 160 kms West of the Red Sea port, filling stations in the capital and elsewhere were besieged by panic-stricken motorists with Tervicans, stocking up for the shortage they knew would follow. Their fears were proved correct. [65]

The Government soon declared rationing of petrol, and this is still in force. Motorists still travel in military convoys.

The Sultan fled, explaining his reasons and his actions in an appeal to the International Community:

[62] Personal communication from Assa Ismail, ALF military commander.
[63] see Financial Times, 20th June 1975 p. 7
[64] This was accompanied by rounding up of all the vehicles carrying fuel all along the Highway. The author counted more than 78 trucks that evening between Sardo and Doobi, some 30 kms.
[65] Financial Times, 20th June, 1975 p. 7. There is no Bridge near Sardo as reported by FT; the bridge which was blown up is 30 miles north of Sardo at Doobi.
"Since its takeover of authority (state power) the Military Government of Ethiopia sent several delegations to the Sultanate requesting assistance in the administration of the country and demanding that people should not engage in any activities against the Military Council. We replied to the Derg: that we are a peaceful nation, on condition that the Addis Ababa Government does not interfere in our internal affairs. The delegation replied that they would never interfere in our internal affairs. At the same time, however, the Ethiopian Authorities, were engaged in secret conspiracy to destroy the Sultanate because it is the last bastion (fortress) of Muslims in all of Ethiopia. It sent (brought) large amounts of weapons disguised in the form of food for those affected by drought. It also sent (brought) trained soldiers disguised as labourers. Once it had the weapons and men stationed, it began to execute its conspiracies against the Sultanate, and it also actively supported public demonstration throughout the country.

On 28/5/1975, the Military Junta sent another delegation requesting a meeting between ourselves, and a Government delegation. I received them in my residence on 1/6/75. The delegation was composed of fifteen members, including three members of the Ruling Council. They requested that I assemble the Country's chiefs and notables, and having done these we all met in a large space in front of my residence. Suddenly, we were surrounded by two hundred soldiers who were pointing their guns at myself, and the notables from all sides. Major Wandered, of the Ethiopian delegation spoke in an offending manner which gave the impression of extremism. The idea of gathering us in one place was meant to kill us all, but they were surprised that they too were soon surrounded from all sides by the Afar defence force which were in turn pointing their weapons at the soldiers. They then realised their failure, and demanded from me to disperse the Afar defence force. I told them that their actions contradict the understanding between us. That this was a proof of a premeditated conspiracy, we knew about it. You should now leave in peace until we meet again. The Ethiopians left the meeting with their heads down.

They soon became engaged in an immoral act (operation) as is their custom, by attacking unarmed civilians without any warning. This resulted in 125 martyrs, most of whom were Arab merchants from Yemen, Somalis and Eritreans. The Afar defence force intervened to defend, and were able to stop the fighting at 6:00 p.m., five hours after it began. During this time the Ethiopian army cabled its command for reinforcements and supplies. We were informed of this. Now, a decision had to be taken. The Council of Elders met and the following decisions were made: A) Establishment of a political command B) Establishment of a military command C) Establishment of a foreign mission, which I was personally to head in order to
explain our cause to the international public in general, and the Muslim nations in particular.

The Council passed resolution to all commands to execute its duties in defending its religion, country and honour. The Foreign Mission left the country on Monday morning, the second of June 1975, at 1.00 a.m. after giving a signal to start operations against the soldiers of the aggressor. The military operation began at 2.00 a.m. on 3 June 1975". [66]

6.5 Afar Today

The launching of armed struggle by Afar under the leadership of the Sultan of Awsa in June 1975 brought the movement unprecedented support from all regions and sections of Afar. For a time, it looked as if the experience of the last two hundred years of internal schism was being swept away with the cry for unity against an external enemy. Afar youth from Djibouti and Eritrea joined their Awsean brothers in hundreds. Djibouti, which had suddenly become a home for thousands of Afar refugees, found itself in the unhappy position of hosting political activists engaged in armed conflict against Ethiopia, on which its entire economy depended. [67] But the tremendous support that the ALF gained from the Afar began to evaporate by early 1976 under the strains of internal splits.

The ALF was an uneasy alliance of three groups:

(a) The state functionaries of the Sultanate of Awsa headed by the Sultan, and including Makaaban and traditional warriors. They constituted the majority of the fighting force which was mostly drawn from the Sultan's own militia, and from the Moodatio branch of Afar. They were all from Awsa and loyal to the Sultan. Most of the fighting force were not trained in modern weapons or in guerrilla warfare. These men were used to taking orders from their political superiors and the Sultan set up a

structure of command drawn from the Makaaban. The Sultan maintained his control through a network of intermediaries, some of whom were stationed in Djibouti, while others either lived in Dikhil, a border town, or in the hinterland. They were mostly Moodayto Makaaban, some of them quite influential residents in the Djibouti Republic and who exercise some influence in Djibouti itself. These men made frequent visits to Jeddah to discuss latest developments at the Sultan's court, which is now permanently housed in the Al-Attass Hotel. Saudi Arabia helps the sultan maintain his link with his people. He can acquire visas through the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Djibouti for those who want to come to Jeddah, to visit Mecca and Medina, or to find employment. He is given special grants to confer residence and employment permits on would-be job seekers. For thousands of Afar who are unemployed in Djibouti, the Awash Valley, and in the Red Sea coastal villages, such access is vital, as Alimirah knows well. Islam is strictly observed among his fighters. They call themselves Mujahidin. For Alimirah, the words ALF are not to his liking, and in his official publications he uses "Afar Defence Force". Every Communique and publication emphasises the Islamic character of the revolution and the fact that the population are 100% Muslim. The ALF sees itself as part of the world wide Islamic movement, fighting a "Jihad" to raise the word of Allah and liberate every inch of the Afar Nation from the occupation of a "colonialism of Ethiopia", while at the same time fighting a Communist threat in the Horn of Africa. [68]

(b) Former ELF fighters who left the movement in 1970 to launch their revolutionary struggle in their home province of Dankalia. They came to call themselves as "Gumleyin-Nationalists" and by 1975 they were joined by other active Afar elements from ELF, with the approval of the Eritrean movement, from which they received strong support. [69] They had the military training and experience that the Awsean Sultanate required and


[69] The 1970 split within ELF in Dankalia led to the appearance of three groups, who were collectively known as "Gumleyin". One group went over to Ethiopia, another remained with ELF, and a third, comprised the bulk of those who founded ALF, left the field and were not active until 1975. Personal communication from Assa Ismail, Djibouti, 1981.
thus they formed the nucleus of the ALF. Their leader Assa Isma'il, a Syrian trained experienced fighter, became ALF's military commander. This group did not develop a programme of their own, but like the students they were all followers of Yassin Mahamooda and his idea of the Greater Afar.

(=) The Students, mainly secondary and elementary school graduates. Some of their leaders had been to Universities in Cairo and Europe. They numbered less than 70, but they had the support of other students in the Middle East. While the Sultan's group was mainly from Awsa, this group was drawn from all over the Afar Territory in the Horn of Africa, as a result of the Sultan's mobilisation process in 1974. But its leadership was mainly drawn from the Eritrean Afar. [70]

Unlike the other two groups the students had a programme in the form of a position paper which was published after the 1974 Congress of Afar students in Germany. [71] This programme was refined in Somalia, while they were in training. While there they also developed a script for the Afar language which became known as Demise-Reedo script. [72]

The Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM), the student wing of the ALF, had a clear vision of the future:

"ANLM is an organisation of nomads, workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and the nationalist section of petit bourgeoisie. The total liberation of the Afar masses which this movement takes upon itself is against the interests of the Afar Nomad aristocracy, landed tribal chiefs and national bourgeoisie". [73]

[70] The executive Committee of Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM) were exclusively drawn from Eritrea, with the exception of its president, Hanfere Alimrah, who was not himself a memier.
[71] This programme is to be found in "The Guidelines of Afar National Liberation Movement". 6 p.
[72] It is named after Demise (an Afar from Djibouti, who was for a time a leader of Djibouti's movement populaire de la liberation, an exclusive Afar, and marxist orientated organisation) and Jamaledin Reedo (an Afar from Eritrea), one of ANLM's leaders, who led the split from ALF in 1976, and later went over to Addis Ababa, and became a militia leader. For the script, see Reedo, Jamaludin and Demis. 1976 (a). Darit Essinah Affa, (Learn Afar Language). Paris; for the same authors see their 1975 (b). Yatti Raklibe, (Afar Grammar). Paris.
[73] ANLM, Guidelines, p. 5

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On the nature of the Ethiopian State, it declares:

"The military who started the movement, and later took over the power, was and is a force of repression in the hands of the oppressing classes. Their integrationist, and content less "philosophy of Ethiopia first", their gross negligence regarding basic national issues, their repressive measures against the masses, their chauvinistic politics towards the oppressed nations especially Eritrean people is a clear manifestation for the continuation of the old politics with new methods and slogans. Hence the military regime is one of those coup d'etats in Africa carried out by a petit bourgeoisie class of Habasha". [74]

On their ultimate aim, and the means to achieve it, their programme states:

(a) That only through protracted armed struggle can the Afar reinstate their national rights and gain their democratic rights. (b) That the repressive violence can only be challenged by correspondingly revolutionary violence of the masses. (c) That only their own organised efforts can liberate them from the class-Nation-religion oppression in Ethiopia. (4) That only when their right to self-determination including succession is recognised can they contribute their part to national democratic revolution and later socialist transformation of Ethiopia. (5) That only autonomous Afar state within the borders of a free union of Ethiopian nations can guarantee the economic and social development of the Afar masses. [75]

When the Sultan launched military operations in 1975, he took his decision in consultation with his Council of Elders. [76] He did not consult the students, the bulk of whom did not join the armed struggle until late 1975 [77] because they were still in their training camps in Somalia, although their leaders were in Awa. The Ex-ELF fighters were, however, involved, at least in matters related to the military operation. This was resented by the leaders of the students. When those in training in Somalia finally arrived, they complained to the Makaaban, who took their

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[74] Ibid, p. 5. The word "Habasha" refers to Abyssinians, and throughout the text, Ethiopians are referred to as Habasha's.
[75] Ibid, pp. 4 – 5
[76] Jabha, Mida ela al alam al islamî. (ALF, Appeal to the islamic world), Jeddah, Saudia Arabia.
orders from the Sultan in Jeddah but the latter refused to discuss the matter. The students were soon joined by the Ex-ELF fighters who found it difficult to run a liberation front in this manner. According to the Sultan and his Makaaban, every Afar of fighting age was to be given a gun, and allowed to enroll in the Front. The Ex-ELF wanted to screen, train and politicise the fighters, and were unhappy to see the Afar nomads come and go, and to find the weapons distributed to them end up in Aysaia's Tuesday market where the Ethiopian army could confiscate them. [78]

In short, neither the students, nor the Ex-ELF fighters could tolerate this situation of confusion and disorganisation. The students were the first to go, only a few months after they had arrived from Somalia. They were accused among other things of being soft on the Derg, of being "marxist infidels", and of creating factionalism and regionalism. They were presented as wanting to create an Afar region without its coastal parts (Eritrean Dankalia and Djibouti), and to the Eritreans they were presented as anti-Eritreans. The students, who had no experience in dealing with Makaaban, lost ground. When they moved to Djibouti, their chances of survival as political activists were even worse because of the influence of the Moodayto elders, whose loyalties have always been with the Sultan of Awa. Attempts at reconciliation failed. [79]

It was in this atmosphere of hopelessness that the students accepted the Ethiopian Government's National Democratic Revolutionary programme (NDRP) launched in April 1976. [80] They stated:

"ANLM's decision without ambiguity, for foes and friends to know, is to terminate the line of hostility it pursued against the Ethiopian Military regime (the Derg), and to participate in the current revolution of the Ethiopian peoples to make the role of the Afar masses more effective on entering the second phase of the struggle to institute a society free from exploitation of man by man". [81]

[78] Personal communication, Assa Ismail, and Abdu Ali.
[79] Personal communication from Mohamed Abubeker, who participated in these meetings, Paris 1/1/1981
[80] Some 54 students left for Ethiopia. They were met by Mengistu Haile Mariam, then Vice Chairman of the Derg.
[81] ANLM - Communique of the ANLM, distributed by the Ethiopian student Union in Europe, Stockholm, 8/9/1976 (English text), p 1

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This set off a new configuration of alliance between the marxist ALNM and the centralist radicals in Addis Ababa. This was based on common ideological and political commitment rather than political accommodation as was the case in the days of imperial Ethiopia. The students departure to Addis Ababa, was followed a year later by the departure from the ALF ranks of the Ex-ELF fighters, including its leader Assa Ismail. [82]

The ALF was thus robbed of all elements capable of mobilising the people and waging successful Guerrilla warefare, which could in the long run force the Central Government to accept Afar demands for self-administration. Unlike the students who sided with the Derg the EX-ELF fighters disappeared either into the slums of Djibouti, or joined the thousands of Afar migrant labourers in Jizan, Southern Saudi Arabia. Their departure soured the relationship with ELF, which was being blamed by the Sultan for creating secret organisations within his ALF. [83]

The hopes and aspirations of ANLM's members who joined the Derg soon faded away too. In April of 1977, The Derg launched an Afar Congress at Gewani, in Badhu (Middle Awash Valley), as part of its National Democratic Revolutionary Programme. The congress was "considered a success, with Afar from all various tribes attending". [84] But since then,

"NDRP has not been carried out and everything suggests that it may even be dropped altogether. No regional autonomy has been introduced anywhere. The proposal for an Afar region, debated at the Gewane Congress in April 1977, and put forward with the obvious intention of removing the part of Assab from an Eritrea that might become independent, was pigeon-holed". [85]

A consolation for the ANLM members was the dismantling of the AVA in

[82] Another split occurred in early 1981, and followed by another in 1982, when Mohamed Abdu Ahmadin, the ALF's Revolution Security Chief left the field and later went to Ethiopia.
[83] Personal communication from Abdalla Suliaman, Head of ELF's foreign mission, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
September 1977, as a development Agency for the Awash Valley. [86] It was replaced by the Awash Valley Development Agency (AVDA) which became responsible for water management. The Settlement Schemes were transferred to the Settlement Authority. The nationalised farms were put under the State Farms Authority. The latter was probably not seen in favourable terms by ANLM which stated that "The movement will see to it that the natural resources of Afar region be exploited in the best interest of the Afar masses" [87] and that "ANLM will distribute the land taken by foreign concessions and feudal lords among the Afar peasants." [88] All of the ANLM members and sympathisers were given jobs in the various administrative regions and in other organisations, including the settlement Authority, but none at the level of decision making process in so far as development organisations were concerned. [89] The Valley was still run by non-Afar, but the Government had some use for Afar in its Militias. In fact during 1977, the Military Junta asked the ANLM members to dismantle their organisation and state their views on the ongoing power struggle in the Ethiopian capital between the Derg and other Marxist organisations. According to one of those who participated in a meeting held by ANLM members in Addis Ababa, it was decided to dismantle ANLM and merge with a party established by the Army. [90] In addition, they were asked to give up the Demise-Reedo script for Afar. ANLM did not inform its supporters outside Ethiopia of these important decisions. [91] Thus, the Derg gradually began to turn them into State agents - the new Balabbats. There was some resistance to this. As late as 1981, the Ex-ANLM members


[87] ANLM, Guidelines, p. 5

[88] Ibid, p. 5

[89] Personal communication from Musa, Cordinator at Amibara. Interviewed in Dikhil, 1/5/1981

[90] Musa, Coordinator, and Issa, administrator of the Amibara Settlement Scheme told me that the meeting was convened by Yussof Yassin, and J. Reedo and attended by: Mohamed Ahmed Shaheem, Mohameda Gass, Ahmad Russian, Khalil Ismail, Mustafa Ahmed, Abdulkadir Sule, Idris Abdulkadir Farade, and three members of the Farmers Cooperative. Again, we see the strong presence of those drawn from Eritrea.

[91] Musa and Idris, Dikhil, 1/5/81

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were conducting evening literacy classes in Demise-Reedo script secretly in some of the coastal villages in the Red Sea [92] but united action was not possible once the organisation was dismantled. One of the methods used by the State to disperse them was to send them off on foreign study tours. Upon return they were posted to areas other than the Afar region.

Prior to these developments, most of the activities of mobilisation, establishment of Militia, and other mass organisation took place either in the Eritrean province of Dankalia or in adjacent Tigre Administrative Region and in the Middle Awash Valley. In the latter, ANLM became active in the Amibara settlement organisation. A settlement coordinator at Amibara between 1978 to January 1981, who defected to Djibouti in April 1981, sheds some light on the state of affairs in the Middle Awash Valley:

"The settlers have not been paid their shares of the produce for 5 years. They receive only Eth50 per month. Highland labourers are not given land. There are 2500 of them in Amibara. A committee of Elders and settlers went to Addis Ababa, and Harar several times to demand their share of the produce. The Awash Valley Development Agency (Ex-AVA) still does marketing of the produce (cotton), although the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is officially responsible for the Settlement Authority. Some 12,300 ha of state farm had been developed. Everyday people are pushed out by huge D7 (caterpillars) which remove trees and homes. A committee of Elders went to Harar to complain. Elders again raised the matter after farm lay out was made. The Governor of Harar came to visit. He told the Elders that the Government would give them 300 ha out of 12 300 ha as pastures. Although the farm is now developed, and produced its first cotton crop the promise did not materialise. Eight people died of chemicals used by new farm. Reports about these were despatched, including my own" [93]

As for the Sultanate of Awa's, the Ethiopian Government did not attempt to introduce any major political or social changes. Alimirah was replaced by his cousin, Habib Mohamad Yayo, the son of Sultan Mohamad. There was no major redistribution of land or livestock, except the 2000 ha Sahile Farm. The Mitchell Cotts projects were transferred to State farms. According to

[92] Abdalla Ibrahim, 3/8/81, Jeddah
[93] Musa, Dikhil, 1/5/1981
an FAO group, which visited the Lower Plains in 1977, there was only confusion, and they were not able to determine how the agricultural developments were managed. [94] It seems, the Government wanted the local people to manage things in their own way.

The emergence of ALF, the schisms, the decline of Afar hegemony in Djibouti after independence, the wars in Eritrea and Tigre, and the upheavals within Ethiopia's Military Government, all had political and economic repercussions in the Afar region.

In the Awash Valley as a whole, the State's need for cash and commodities led to the creation of more State Farms. There has been a noticeable increase in the proletarianisation of the Afar nomads. This was prompted by the labour shortage which occurred as a result of the land reform in the highlands after 1975 and the highland labourers' fear after the 1975 June revolt in which large numbers of them were killed in the fighting in the Lower Plains. There are indications that Afar women are fast turning into wage labourers on cotton, banana, and pepper plantations, and are even acquiring a reputation for high quality work. [95] But there are some indications that ethnic balance is changing in favour of highlanders in the Upper Valley, where migrant labourers outnumber the indigenous pastoralists, although the Afar are still in the majority in the Lower Plains.

The crisis in pastoralism resulting from continued drought and irrigation developments has thrown large numbers of people into permanent relief settlement schemes, which were set up after the 1972/73 drought along the main roads. [96] The permanent nature of these projects which were originally organised to provide temporarily food in exchange for some work, meant that their participants were neither settlers nor were they receiving sufficient income for themselves and their relatives who still practised pastoralism. Thus, they became another source of wage labourers.

[94] Personal communication from P.P. Bonnemaison, FAO, Director Ethiopia; see also Bonnemaison, P. P. et al., 1977, (April), Report on a field visit to the Lower Awash Valley (mimeo 35 pp). Jointly prepared by FAO Project Staff. Rome: FAO.
[96] For these projects, see Helland, Johan, 1983, op. cit., pp 79 - 136
for the cotton and banana plantations. [97]

Another related development is that the Issa Somali, who do not frequent the Awash Plains but who nevertheless exert influence on its people are putting strong pressure on the Afar to move towards the Awash flood plains and away from the area of Issa Somali expansion in the basin East of the Awash. [98] Competition for grazing and livestock raiding has resulted in a number of deaths.

The ethnic balance of the Valley is also affected by outmigration to Djibouti and Saudi Arabia, after the Ethiopian attacks in 1975. In Dikhil, a border-town in the Djibouti Republic, there are 4200 officially registered refugees from Amsa. Prior to independence Afar politicians and ALF officials were divided over the question of registration of Afar as refugees. By 1978 these views had changed, and Afar were encouraged to register. The Afar refugees in Dikhil, however, still have their separate dwellings and support services and live apart from the other Somali and Oromo refugee camps. They share with other refugees a dependence on international aid handouts. The two refugee camps keep close contact with their own communities at home: each camp has its caravan stand and there is a flourishing caravan trade with the hinterland. Dikhil, like the other border-towns, is steadily growing with the illicit trade between Arabia and the Abyssinian highlands. The refugees' link with this trade is difficult to assess, but certainly some are involved.

For those Afar who stayed in Djibouti and the smaller towns in this tiny republic, the economic situation is probably far worse than for those who stayed in the Awash Valley. Many of them are without jobs, some do not have proper papers and therefore cannot travel in search of employment. They live in overcrowded and unhygienic conditions with relatives in Arhiba and Angela Housing Estates in Djibouti. Arhiba, meaning "welcome", and Angela, meaning "Unite", were built in the mid-sixties during the Afar heyday under French rule to accommodate Afar workers who were brought there by the Afar Premier Ali Arif Bourhan in 1967 to replace Somali

[97] Kloos, H., 1977, op. cit. p. 32; see the same source for ethnic origins of farm labourers, p. 76
[98] Ibid, p. 33.
dockers. The housing units were meant for small families, not whole lineages.

The social and political crisis which engulfed the region in the wake of the Ethiopian Revolution led to changes in the configuration of local and regional alliances as new social and political groups began to appear in the Afar region and in Ethiopia. Furthermore additional centres such as Somalia and Saudi Arabia began to take an active role in the political economy of the Afar area. This has increased political opportunities and activity. The ANLM leaders did not succeed in convincing Addis Ababa to set up an Afar state within Ethiopia or to allow them to take over all charge of development in the Awash, nevertheless their activities say a great deal about their political skill. Their response to new opportunities seems to replicate Amsa's relationship with Imperial Ethiopia. They have exerted important leverage on Addis Ababa with their exclusively Afar Militia, Ugoguma (Revolution) which assisted the Derg in its actions against the ELF in the Assab Administration in 1980-1981. [99] There is strong evidence that ANLM supporters in the Assab Administration have succeeded in the aftermath of this action to obtain a concession from the Central Government to bar the Ethiopian Navy from interfering with the activities of the Afar fishermen and traders, who are totally dependent on Saudi Arabia. The coastal Militia were also given the task of guarding the coast and ensuring the registration of merchant boats in Thio rather than at Assab or Massawa.

[99] The Assab Astadadar as it is officially referred to is at present under direct rule of the central Authority. ANLM supporters are heavily involved in its administration. The separate status has to do with the Governments' fear of an Eritrea that could become independent rather than as a serious plan to make a nucleus for an Afar state within Ethiopia.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: DYNAMISM IN THE PERIPHERY

To the outside observer, the Awash Valley appears as one of the most remote and inhospitable places on Earth. With its sparse and mobile population, one might not expect to discover a complex and lively political economy, nor would one reckon that the forces of international capital would find very much to interest them in its arid and baking landscape. Of all the peripheries of expanding capitalism, this would seem to be one of the most remote and least responsive. And yet, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the Awash Valley has been the site of protracted, complicated and vigorous struggles as the established 'traditional' population confronts the intrusive forces of the 'modern' world.

The complexity of this confrontation challenges familiar theoretical views about development in areas remote from the metropolitan centres. It obliges us to consider with great care the forms in which capitalism presents itself in distant localities. But the 'periphery' itself consists of a multiplicity of interests, acting on each other as well as on intrusive forces, producing patterns of development which theory does not always allow us to anticipate.

In our effort to explain development in the Awash Valley, we have been obliged to take a very broad view in time and space, tracing political-economic processes through a series of levels, from the various centres of international capital to the frontiers of the Ethiopian state, and beyond to its multifarious component populations and polities. Capitalism, as it has presented itself in Ethiopia, is not a homogeneous force; it has emanated from a variety of international centres and has been refracted by the distinctive structures and processes of the Ethiopian state. The political discontinuities between centre and periphery have greatly increased the scope for manoeuvre among emergent classes and power blocs.
The Awash Valley has by no means been devoid of such active interests. The long-standing regional, economic, social and political divisions within the population have a 'traditional' dynamic which has, over the centuries, been complicated by the fact that the Awash has been peripheral not to just one centre but to several: its somewhat tenuous incorporation within Ethiopia should not disguise its protracted association with the politics of the Saudi Arabian peninsula and the Red Sea, with the enclave of Djibouti, with Somalia, with Eritrea, and with the Imperial interests of Italy, France and Britain. The history of the Afar is not one of inertia and passivity, for these people are very practised in dealing with outsiders from all quarters. The simplified view which each 'centre' (Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, Rome) may have of this periphery, is seen to be false from the perspective of that periphery. Indeed, comprehension of the range of interests, issues and activities which converge in the Valley places extraordinary demands on the investigator.

The efforts of the modernising Ethiopian state testify to the problems of comprehending and controlling these troublesome marcheslands. After the Second World War, policies to strengthen the centre and develop the regions unleashed forces which ultimately ensured the demise of the Imperial regime. The Awash River became a focus for the expansion of commercial agriculture, but the government agency (the AVA) set up to mediate among concessionaires, officials, and local interests at once became involved in a political arena in which the Afar leaders exerted profound and - to the outsiders - largely inscrutable influence. The AVA's efforts to control access to land and the exploitation of natural resources were frustrated as much by these 'traditional' interests as by its own political weakness and the activities of the motley collection of Ethiopian and international companies.

The sultanate of Awa, centrepiece of our story, reveals in microcosm the complexity of these encounters. A major contestant for power in the Valley, Awa drew much of its strength from its existing, pre-capitalist social and political structure, but as it responded to new opportunities and particularly to the stimulus of Mitchell Cotts company, so that structure was itself transformed. The Makaaban, the traditional managers of resources and people, and the Malokti, managers of livestock and
irrigation, were revitalised by commercial farming and became nuclei for the formation of new social classes. Consequent internal antagonisms, notably between those who were benefiting from farming and the pastoral majority, made it increasingly difficult for the sultanate to consolidate its leadership of the Afar, to act decisively against the agents of the Ethiopian state, and to manipulate rival capitalist interests in the Valley.

Crisis was eventually precipitated at the Ethiopian centre by the 1974 Revolution. New forces were released which put paid to the AVA, the foreign concessionaires, and the political and commercial ambitions of sultan Alimirah. He could no longer play off a distant and inept Imperial government against an array of regional interests in the Valley. He was confronted by cadres from the highlands, revolutionary youth, and regional secessionist movements. Outmanoeuvred, he was forced to take advantage of his carefully cultivated links with the Islamic world, and seek refuge in the Saudi metropolis.

It would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the Ethiopian state has finally established suzerainty over the Awash, and is now firmly in a position to direct progress there. Indeed, the continuing turmoil in the region may have increased rather than diminished local political opportunities and activity. Certainly, there is nothing to suggest that the creative encounter between the peoples of the valley and the wider world has ended.
Appendix A-1

The Genealogy of the AydaHisio Ruling Lineage of Aswa

Hadal — Mahis
Mooday ib Ibrahim
Hamil
Ali
Afke
(Aske — Sara)
Omer
(Afke — Sara)
Hamid
(Hamid — Sara)
Kada — Ali
Unda — Ali
Daabo
(Daabo — Sara)
(Ubri — Sara)
Hamid
(Hayso — Maale)
Maski
Unda Hamid
Ali ablises
(Anda — Hamad — Sara)
Aydahisi
(Founder of)
Ali Yaro
Ali — Mohamed
Afkada
Hanfar
(Affafada)
(Aytelela)
(Akhsa)
Kada — AydaHisio
(AydaHisio — AydaHisio)
(Ubri — AydaHisio)
Bariita
(Ruyam — Gudnto)
(Fiemat Abba)**
Kadafo (First Sultan/s)
Mohamed(s)
Afro
Hanfar’
(Unda — AydaHisio)
(Lariku)
Kada AydaHisio (S)
Unda AydaHisio
(Maaddinatitti)
(Miraha)**
Mohamed (S)
Aydahisi
(Known as)
(Ale)
Hando
(Illalata)
Hanfar
(Emfa)
Hono
(Samu)
Unda — Alo
Aso — Alo
Mohamed (S)
(Moun Son)
Mohamed (Acting S)
AydaHisio
(Yayo — S)
Alimrah I (S)
Hanfar (S)
Kadafo (S)
Hanfar
Mohamed (S)
Alimrah II (S) (1944 — 1975)
Notes: S = Sultans; **Denotes heads of Fiem (age set/militia) and also leaders of war; ( ) Denotes names of clans.

*Other sons of Sultan Mohamed were: Hanfar; Hanfar; Alo; Alo; AydaHisio; Kadafo; Almirah; Asa Alo; Hanfar; AydaHisio; Suaro Alo.
Appendix A-2

Genealogy for Maad Sara

Hadal - Mahis
Moday le Ibrahim

Maad
Ali

Afkeo
(Afke Sarra)

Aydahiso ruling
lineage of Awas

Dangayta
Andae
Abakari

Abakari
(Abakari Sara)
(Maad)

Hannakil
(Hannakis Sara)

Hummad
(Adamato)

Maad
(Shoodo)

'Aduwe
Jaale
Hummad
Adhuna

Ashab
Seido
Ali Baddayo
Kayreli Usa Maad

Omar
Maad
Mohamed
Kada Maau

Hummad
Seid
Digra
Mohamed
Ali
Queshed
Mohamed

Notes: *Same mother, thus no marriage relations between their siblings.

Others however can, e.g. Ashabto and Ali baadayo.

(S) refers to the lineage from which Hangadaalle, the Senior

Mekasabantu is drawn, i.e., Ashabta.
Appendix A-3
Genealogy of Hassan Affa (Dammohoyta)/Filla Unda

Hadal - Mahis
  Sambolukuli
  Egra Mayfeli
  Hammad
  Sirele Hammudy
  Ubjan

Alleems (1)
  Tussuf
  Alito
  Gardia
  Hulalto
  Hulalto

Alleems (2)
  Burelik
  Herto
  Dammohoyta
  Bori
  Dammohoyta Edd

Hassan Affa
  (5 branches)
  Guable Ali
  Adadan
  Ad Hammad
  Boorod
  Garad
  (Boorodu)
  (Garada)

Dan
Asaamo
Filla Unda Ali
Unda Kurle
Orsen

Igima
(Amerto)*
  Ubar
  Bariita
  Madhad
  Ighle
  Yaidi
  (Basa-Yaidi)
  (Ubarto)*
  (Bariito)*
  (Madhad)*
  (Ighle Sambo)

Notes: *Same mother.
APPENDIX B

THE AFAR CUSTOMARY LAW [1]

Preface

Realising the inevitability of memory failures in the retention of unwritten norms and the subsequent loss of valuable information in the process of passing it from generation to generation by word of mouth, and recognising the importance of putting down in writing the Afar Customary Law (MADA) for the benefit of future generations, the late Fitwarari Yacin Mohammed devoted the last decade and a half of his life in collecting material from the memories of the Afar elders. The fruit of his life collecting material from the memories of the Afar elders, the result of his long research is presented here.

In the Afar triangle there are two main MADAs governing the day to day activities of an Afar individual of which the one researched by the late Yacin is the most widely accepted and adhered to this day. The two MADAs or the Customary Laws are:- 1. BUR EALI MADA 2. BUDDUTO BADIR MADA

[1] This document was translated from Arabic by Jamaluddin Reedo on 12.9.1973
Historical background

The historical beginning of the Afar Customary Laws (MADA) dates to no particular epoch but it is of certainty that every valley environment had its own legal procedures governing the day to day activities of the population in that area. Bur Eali Mada in itself is the modified collection of these valley to valley laws of Bidu, Araata and Eiddi regions. According to the researcher an initiative for general conference of the three regions was launched by the Sultanate of Grifo (Bidu region). Invitation for participation was given to the elders of Araata region and the conference was agreed to take place at the village of Eiddi. The conference of consolidating the then existing valley to valley laws of the three regions into one unified code was conducted under an atmosphere of mutual understanding and beneficial cooperation. It was crowned with a successful debate. The unified code was termed BUR EALI MADA deriving its name from the tribe of Bur Eali that took the initiative in organising the conference. To facilitate amendment and review submissions it was agreed at the conference that a yearly session should be convened for two consecutive years. The first review conference took six months and the second took three months. Both took place at Eiddi. With the passage of time, the unified code came to enjoy such a widespread acceptance among the Afar people that Bur Eáln Mada has become synonymous with universality and certainty.

The Basic Concept

The Mada takes the view that any criminal act a person commits is executed by three and only three organs of the body. They are:
1. CABA (hands)  2. ARRABA (tongue)  3. SAMMO (genitals)

The basic principles of the Afar Customary Law (MADA)

We find the Mada being divided into EIGHT basic principles. They are:

1. The essence  5. The punishment
2. The types of crime  6. The varieties of bodily injuries
3. The responsibility  7. The compensation
4. The category of crime  8. The execution

1. The Essence (Nature of crime)

Crime is defined as the perpetration of an act forbidden by the law i.e. the Customary Law of the Afar people.

2. The Types of Crime

All criminal acts are classified into five types. Namely:

A) Crime on life  - EIDO (Killing)
B) Crime on body  - AYMISIYa (Injury)
C) Crime on property  - RADO (Breakage, looting, etc.)
D) Crime of adultery  - SAMMO (Adultery)
E) Crime of insults  - DAFU (Affront)

3. The Responsibility

The responsibility for any criminal act is not restricted to the party committing the crime, but includes the clan of the criminal in particular and his tribe in general. The closer one lies in a clan bond to the criminal, the greater the portion of responsibility that falls on him.
4. The Categories of Crime

The criterion for measuring criminal act is first tested in the category of acknowledgement (positivity) - ABEITO or negation (Refusal) - GEELWAY. The positivity in itself is divided into two:-

A) GORHI - Intentional (premeditated act)
B) GARHI - Un-intentional (accidental act)

5. The Punishment

Punishment for any criminal act committed would take any of the four terms mentioned below. They are listed in descending order of severity.

A) HANE - Vengeance
B) DIAT - Compensation for murder
C) DEIKHA - Compensation for cases other than murder
D) MARUSSO -

Unless a criminal act is settled by A) hane, the process of settling it by B) Diat or C) Deikha is called the basic solution and D) Marusso is added to it as complementary solution. Naturally, Bur Eali Mada does not recommend nor advocate the taking of vengeance but equally it does not object or prohibit recourse to it.

6. The varieties of bodily injuries

The Afar Customary Law (MADA) divides bodily injuries sustained through any criminal act into two main divisions with several subdivisions under each. Namely:-

A) WAR A - (Injuries that require medication)
B) WAllALLA - (Injuries that do not require medication)

A) WAR A
1. Sirrible - When the beat of the stick is clearly seen on the body of the victim without any bleeding.

2. Anda - When injury leaves a definite scar on the body after the healing of the wound.

3. Ayma - When injury on an organ like nose, ear etc. leaves a sign or defect on the organ sustaining injury.

4. Eirghinna - When injury paralyses/renders an organ of the body of the victim permanently inoperative.

B) WALALLA

1. Haro - When wrestling/fighting leaves part of skin superficially bleeding.

2. Mussao - When wrestling/fighting leaves part of joints superficially bleeding.

3. Endibo - When one is superficially injured by tip of knife, sword etc.

4. Komam - When the beaten part of the head swells.

7. The Compensation

The standard of compensation for any criminal act in Bur Eali Mada is BAKLO. Baklo literally means a kid of a goat. It is the standard measure for meting out punishment to fit the crime and is convertible to camels, cows or money. Any given number of BAKLOs are then divided into two:

A) UFUY LE Baklo - living ones (non convertible to money)

B) UFUYMALE Baklo - unliving ones (convertible to money) and this is applicable only to cases of bodily injuries
8. The Execution

There is no police force or executive authority to enforce the rulings of the MADA, however, a general fear of tribes from each other stands in the position of an enforcing authority. As was stated in section 3, the criminal is not solely responsible for the crime he commits but the clan and the tribe in general are held responsible for the criminal acts of their members. If the clan of the killer does not compensate the family of the deceased in accordance with the rulings of the MADA, the latter considers it a challenge and is honour bound to avenge for his death. Thus fear of bloodshed enhances recourse to the MADA and the complete acceptance of its ruling by all parties concerned.

THE PROCEDURE

Before going into the detail of how any given case is processed in the Afar tribunal, it is essential to define the ingredient terms.

1. Kusra  
   - A type of tree with a considerable shade which acts as a tribunal. Therefore a tribunal.

2. Maro  
   - A session held in a circle-like manner. It consists of plaintiffs, defendants, jury observers.

3. Makaban  
   - Judge

4. Hayssit  
   - Plaintiff

5. Edde-Hayssit  
   - Defendant

6. Habi  
   - Person guaranteeing the good behaviour of the plaintiff or defendant through-out the process of litigation. Also guarantor.
7. Lekeysso - Amount collectable from plaintiff and defendant and payable to the jury for conducting the litigation.

8. Guma - The act of reciting the last letters of words of speech by a person to whom speech is directed/addressed.

9. Cumi-mabadha - The person reciting last letters of words


11. Fithi - Judgement processed on a very restrictive legal ground.

12. Rittio - Judgement processed on a loose mutual basis.

13. Dento - Peaceful co-existence/good neighborliness

14. Waa - Failure to reach an agreement at Mable

15. Agarad - Investigate

16. Mable - Litigation

17. Habti - The process of ostracizing a person from his tribe.

18. Ama - Reconciliation

19. Fataha - The completion of litigation
Unless it is for BILU (case involving murder), the process for the rest of Mables is the same although punishment/compensation differ from case to case. The case of bilu does not require MABLE but there are certain ways in which AMA (reconciliation) is conducted. Hence, the procedure for an ordinary case and procedure for murder case.

A) To begin with, the plaintiff brings his grievance to the attention of the elders. The elders in their turn construct MARO for the investigation of claim (Agarad). Once Maro is set, the Makaban give the first right of speech to the plaintiff but before doing this they ask both parties to name guarantors or Habi whose asked to bring LEKEAYSSO. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have the right to speak in person or through an advocate according to their wishes. The plaintiff then addresses his speech to one of the persons in Maro and spells out details of his case. Then the defendant answers the charges levelled at him by the plaintiff. If is seem necessary, both parties are once again given the right of rebuttal. Then the Makaban asks someone among the Maro to give a short resume of what was said by the plaintiffs and the defendants. After all this it remains to Makaban to investigate the arguments put forward by both sides and decide. Then recourse is made to the MADA to find out a fitting punishment, e.g. if Egahle claims that Goumed has killed his camel and proves this when it is processed by Mablo, then there remains an investigation of the manner in which Goumed killed Egahle's camel, i.e. if the camel was killed for the purpose of enmity (ADABLE) etc. Then, the question of "What does MADA say of the camel killed for purpose of enmity (ADABLE) supposing the camel of Egahle was killed for sheer enmity". Ans. 170 Baklos. To this the complementary solution of SAGA KE FIDIMA (11) baklos is added for BATIL. However, 10% is deducted for the Maro or Kusra from the basic punishment and the defendant or his clan pay 153 Baklos to the plaintiff.

As was stated earlier, a clan cannot escape responsibility for the criminal acts of its members unless it had priorily announced HABTI. A clan can disavow any of its members for repeated criminal acts, however, it cannot under any circumstance disown: A) a minor, B) a woman, C) an insane person. Before announcing HABTI, a clan tries its best to dissuade the concerned member from his repeated criminal acts, but if it fails in this then it calls for a general meeting of the clans living in the area and
give out SEFA, a baklo to every clan and announce at this meeting that it has henceforth disowned its member X. Then this means that no clan can lay claims against the disavowing clan and this clan in turn cannot bring suit against anybody for any criminal act committed against the disowned member. The HABITI can be partial, i.e. disavow his property only or full i.e. disavowing his property and his person.

B) When a member of a clan kills somebody from another clan, two courses are open to the former. They can either leave the area immediately and appeal to other clans to act as a go-between and help them make peace with the concerned clan, or they can stand their ground and let the bereaved clan take vengeance upon the killer, but prepare to defend themselves if the clan exceeds the rule of vengeance. If vengeance is not taken immediately, the other clans in the area try to reconcile (AMA) the two clans by the payment of DIAT. If this is accepted by the bereaved clan, a general meeting of the clans in the area is called. The clan of the killer is called upon to provide SEFA a sort of LEKEAYSSO for the MAKABAN. The two clans are then stationed at separate places for the purpose of facilitating mediation. The BILU is judged according to the MADA. After this members of the murderer's clan disarmed including sticks and wearing garments in a loose manner are taken over to where the bereaved clans is stationed. They follow the Makaban in single file repeating after him YALIAL HABAI NEL RASA (Forgive and Forget) to members of the bereaved clan who remain seated during the whole process. After this the MAKABAN pronounces the Fataha and that seals the case.
## TABLE OF COMPENSATION

Title 1 Punishments for crimes resulting in death

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Diat (Full compensation of the murdered male)</td>
<td>3000 Baklo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Diat (Full compensation of the murdered female)</td>
<td>1500 Baklo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3    | Diat of pregnant woman murdered                                              | 1500 Baklo for the woman payable to the tribe of the woman.  
|      |                                                                              | 2500 Baklo for the child whose sex is unknown payable to the tribe of the husband of the deceased. |
| 4    | Diat to the woman whose pregnancy is aborted by beating sustained. If pregnancy was visible. | 500 Baklo     |
|      | If pregnancy was confirmed by some other means.                              | 120 Baklo      |
| 5    | Sarri Waydal (later grave)                                                   | 10 Baklo for the family of the late deceased.  
|      |                                                                              | 120 Baklo for Makaban collectable from both parties. |
Art.6 Name (Vengeance) - Limited to the 7th descendant of the common ancestor of the killer

Title 2 Punishments for crime resulting in bodily injuries

Section 1 On single organs if cut or paralysed

Art.7 Arraba (Tongue) - 1/2 of the diat
Art.8 Sanne (Nose) - 500 Baklo
Art.9 Sammo (Penis) - 1/2 of the diat
Art.10 Moudie (Testes) - 1/2 of the diat

Section 2 On paired organs if cut or paralysed

Art.11 Elba (Foot) - 1/2 of the diat
Art.12 Gaba (Hands) - 1/2 of the diat
Art.13 Einti (Eye) - 1/2 of the diat
Art.14 Ayti (Ear) - 1/4 of the diat
Art.15 Daga Sokto (Upper Lip) - 200 Baklo
Art.16 Gubi Sokto (Lower Lip) - 300 Baklo
Art.17 Angu (Breast)
- If of female - 500 Baklo
- If of male - 300 Baklo
Art.18 Loss of 2nd pair of an organ, the first of the pair of which was already lost. - Same as for a single organ if the earlier loss of one of the pair is not the fault of the defendant.

Section 3 On fingers if cut

Art.19 Chili (Thumb of the hand) - 500 Baklo

Art.20 Fera (Finger)
- If broken or cut at
  1st Joint - 200 Baklo
  2nd Joint - 150 Baklo
  3rd Joint - 100 Baklo

Art.21 Eibi Chili
(Thumb of the foot) - 450 Baklo

Art.22 Eibi Ferar
(Toes of the foot) - 250 Baklo

Section 4 Head Injuries

Art.23 Andid (breakage) for the tip of knife
- 30 Baklo
If opened further for the purpose of medication
- 10 Baklo to be added to 30
If a piece of bone comes out
- 10 Baklo to be added to 30

Art.24 Koman (Swelling) - 10 Baklo

Art.25 Ayna (Scar) - 10 Baklo
Art.26  Forcefully pulling out hair
        of the head of a woman          -  20 Baklo

Section 5 Injuries of Teeth

Art.27  Tassouli (Loss of incisor)
        -If upper ones                  - 120 Baklo
        -If lower ones                  -  80 Baklo

Art.28  (Loss of smaller incisors) -  80 Baklo

Art.29  Naisy (Canines)            -  60 Baklo

Art.30  Ada (Korals)                -  40 Baklo

Art.31  Sunku (Shoulder)
        If cut by a sharp
        implement (knife)              -  10 Baklo
        For tip of knife                -  10 Baklo
        Anda (Scar)                     -  30 Baklo

Art.32  Filla (Neck)
        - If cut by stick or
        stone                           -  40 Baklo

Art.33  Uduς (Choking)
        - If inflicted on standing
        person                         -  10 Baklo
        - If inflicted on a person
        lying prone                    -  20 Baklo
        - If inflicted on a woman       -  30 Baklo
Art.34 Lifia (nail)
- on the neck if it results in bleeding  - 5 Baklo
- If thumb nail's mark remains visible  - 6 Baklo
- Nail's mark on rest of body  - 1 Baklo

Art.35 Arow (Biting)
- If it results in bleeding  - 10 Baklo
- Without bleeding  - 6 Baklo

Art.36 Aro (Calf)
- Mark on it  - 10 Baklo
- Tip of knife  - 10 Baklo to be added to 10
- Anda (Scar)  - 30 Baklo to be added to 10

Art.37 Deiar (Thigh)
- Mark on it  - 10 Baklo
- For tip of knife  - 10 Baklo to be added to 10
- Anda (Scar)  - 30 Baklo to be added to 10

Art.38 Dadab ( )  - Same to that of neck

Art.39 Sarba (Calf)  - Same to that of neck

Art.40 Dunkhunto ( )  - Same to that of neck

Art.41 Dega (Posterior or Buttocks)  - Same to that of neck plus 10 Baklo for Helewaite
Art. 42 Injury on female genitals
by an unordinary means also
on that of male, Ablewaynu
(out of ordinary) - 10 Baklo
Abewayny (out of ordinary) - 10 Baklo
Hewelaito (Unbecoming) - 10 Baklo
Edim (Cutting) - 40 Baklo

Section 7 Breakage of Body bones

Art. 43 Gaba (hand)
If no permanent injury
is sustained - 40 Baklo (Gmarala)

Art. 44 Eiba (leg)
If no permanent injury
is sustained - 40 Baklo (Gmarala)
For full compensation - Final state of hand/leg is taken into account

Art. 45 Doiror Lafa (Backbone) - 1/2 of the diat

Art. 46 Filla (neck) - 1/2 of the diat

Art. 47 Massengale Lafa (Rib) - 10 Baklo for each rib

Art. 48 Fera (Finger)
If no permanent injury
is sustained - 10 Baklo

Art. 49 Kora (Dislocation) - 50 Baklo

Section 8 Throwing a person on the ground (Neikso)

Art. 50 If between equals - Not punishable

Art. 51 If between unequals - 10 Baklo
Section 9 Beatings (Ugra)

Art.52 Ass Gaba
(Open handed blow) - 10 Baklo
- across the face - 60 Baklo
- if wearing a ring - 10 Baklo to be added

Art.53 Ass Gaba
(Open handed blow) -
- on rest of the body - 10 Baklo

Art.54 Kumoussa (Fist)
- If on a sensitive part - 10 Baklo
- on rest of body - 5 Baklo

Art.55 Geisie (Striking with head) - 10 Baklo

Art.56 Addaas (To trample down)
- inflicted with a kick by bare feet - 120 Baklo
- a kick with shoes - 160 Baklo
- to trample down with bare feet - 60 Baklo

Art.57 Kabella (Shoes)
- striking a person with a shoe held in the hand - 10 Baklo

Art.58 Haro/Musso (Slight injury) usually to the elbows or knees - 1 Baklo

Art.59 Bullet passing through the mouth of a person without causing permanent damage - 200 Baklo
Art.60 Mahadou (Spear) - 140 Baklo

Art.61 Chile (Knife)
  - a slash or a cut - 70 Baklo
  - a stab - 40 Baklo

Section 10 Beatings by different varieties of sticks

Art.62 Eile - 10 Baklo

Art.63 Loussa - 12 Baklo

Art.64 Diga - 8 Baklo

Art.65 Bado-Bouretya - 10 Baklo

Art.66 Dangheita - 6 Baklo

Section 11 Beatings by the following

Art.67 Da (Stone) -

Art.68 Nalanghi (Whip)
  If used by a person usually uses
  as a stick or carries it regularly - 15 Baklo
  By others - 30 Baklo

Art.69 Akatta (Rope)
  If one is tied with it - 120 Baklo
  If one is beaten with it - 6 Baklo

Art.70 Awoul (Fainting/swoon)
  If could not stand on own feet and
  was carried away - 40 Baklo to be added
Section 12 Criminal Attempts

Art.71  Bullet fired at a person but missed him  - 120 Baklo

Art.72  Bullet put in the breach of a gun for the purpose of firing  - 30 Baklo

Art.73  Mahadou (Spear) thrown at a person but missed him  - 30 Baklo

Art.74  Chile (Knife)
If taken out of its scabbard  - 10 Baklo
If raised from the ground  - 10 Baklo

Art.75  Sef (Sword)
If taken out of its scabbard  - 20 Baklo
If one leaves loaded gun, spear or any other implement in a public place and these weapons cause harm to a person or beast, the owner is punished for negligence - Half the punishment of an intentional act

Section 13 Different varieties of crimes

Art.77  Afti-umane
Supplying a person with information that helps him in carrying out a criminal act that results in loss of life  - 100 Baklo

Art.78  Mira  - 10 Baklo any damage caused to life or property is punished under the proper heading
Art.79 Hawa
(Assistance in a brawl or fight) - 10 Baklo

Art.80 Kabella
(Accompanying an attacking enemy without actually taking part in the attack) - 270 Baklo

Art.81 Ettaheloway
(Unequilibrium of antagonists i.e. male and female or young and old) - 10 Baklo

Art.82 Yaliyablakala
Fighting between a sane and insane person or between a health and a sick person) - 10 Baklo

Art.83 Aysohowa
To lead a criminal(s) to the would-be victim of the crime)
If the act led to loss of life - 270 Baklo
If the act led to looting - 270 Baklo
If the act led to the taking of a cow or camel - 10 Baklo

Art.84 Gelelway (To refuse rescue)
If this resulted in loss of something of small value - 10 Baklo
If this resulted in loss of something of medium value - 30 Baklo
If this resulted in loss of something like loss of life - 100 Baklo
Title 3 Punishment for crimes committed on camels

Section 1

Art.85 Gara
(camel slayed by theft) - 96 Baklo

Art.86 Adable
(camel slayed for sheer enmity) - 170 Baklo

Art.87 Cula
(camel slayed by necessity of hunger) - 50 Baklo but usually it is not taken

Art.88 Limo
(camel sold by theft) - 106 Baklo

Art.99 Rado
(camel taken by assault) - exchange of camel by camel
(camel brought back after being away) - 12 Baklo

Art.91 Guyah/Neare
(killing a baby camel for the purpose of making her mother's milk for self use only) - 10 Baklo for act alone

Art.92 Fanti Dalsa
(Forcefully aborting the pregnancy of a camel for the purpose of milking it for a longer period) - 30 Baklo
Art.93 Buro
(Forcing a camel to be milked by unordinary means)
If sign remains visible - 10 Baklo
If not - 10 Baklo

Art.94 Mudum
(Forcing camel to accept a baby which is not her own) - 30 Baklo

Art.95 Deber/Gulub
(Tying up a camel) - 10 Baklo

Art.96 Drer
(Using a camel as a beast of burden) - 1 Baklo plus Fidima

Art.97 Aini
(Taming a camel to use it as a beast of burden) - ???

Art.98 Badu
(Branding a camel)
If branding was done with knife - 30 Baklo
If branding was done by fire - 40 Baklo

Art.99 Diglo
(Milking a camel without the permission of its owner) - 1 Baklo plus Fidima

Art.100 Ugra
(Beating of a camel in an unordinary way) - 10 Baklo

Art.101 Kira
(Camel died while under rent) - 10 Baklo plus Fidima for act alone
Title 4  Punishment for crimes committed on cows

Art.102 Gara
  (Cow killed by theft)  - 30 Baklo

Art.103 Adable
  (Cow killed for sheer enmity)  - 60 Baklo

Art.104 Daru
  (Forcing cow to be milked by an unordinary means)  - 6 Baklo

Art.105 Bedu
  (Branding cow)
  If mark was done by knife  - 6 Baklo
  If mark was done by fire  - 10 Baklo

Art.106 Ugra
  (Beating a cow in an unordinary way)  - 6 Baklo for every stroke of stick

Title 5  Punishment of crimes committed on goats

Art.107 Gara
  (Goat killed by theft)  - 3 Baklo

Art.108 Adable
  (Goat killed for sheer enmity)  - 10 Baklo

Art.109 Unhusle
  (Goat killed by theft after its owner trusted some owner/shepherd to graze his goat among his)  - 10 Baklo
Art. 110 Seibo
(Taking away one's goat without his knowing) - to be returned under Fidima

Art. 111 Eies
(Killing the kid of a goat) - 10 Baklo

Title 6 Punishment for crimes committed on donkeys

Art. 112 Bedu
(Branding a donkey) - 5 Baklo

Art. 113 Eido
(Killing a donkey) - to be replaced by a similar donkey and one goat for seifa and one goat for Fidima

Art. 114 Erer
(Putting a load on a donkey without permission of its owner) - 6 Baklo

Title 7 Punishment for crimes committed on Mules

Art. 115 Eido
(Killing a mule) - In all respects punishments for mules is the same as that of a camel plus 10 Baklo if it was saddled

Art. 116 Erer
(Using a mule as a beast of burden) - 30 Baklo
Art.117  ???
(Withholding water for a mule at a well)
If it was saddled - 10 Baklo
If it was not saddled - 6 Baklo

Title 8 Intercourses

Art.118 If a person makes intercourse with an animal whose milk is undrinkable and whose meat is inedible - Helalto i.e. garment to be used on back of an animal when leading

Art.119 If a person makes intercourse -
with an animal whose milk is drinkable and whose meat is edible - 30 Baklo

Art.120 If a person commits a crime against a domestic dog or vice versa - 1 Baklo

Title 9 Crimes commitable by animals

Art.121 If an animal does a serious injury or harm to a person - The animal which has committed the crime is taken by the one on whom the crime was committed.

Art.122 If an animal injures or harms another animal - Not punishable
Title 10 Crimes committed on different kinds of property

Art. 123 If money, clothes, foodstuff or ornaments are stolen/located
   - Similar ones are to be returned under MARUSSO usually SACA KE FIDIMA

Art. 124 Beirta
   (Rifle)
   If taken by theft
   - Returnable under Marusso

Art. 125 Kaffirinna
   (Setting fire to a house)
   - 120 Baklo

Art. 126 Cutting/Burning a tree of a person
   - 10 Baklo plus Fidima

Art. 127 Desso
   (Grassland preserved for a group)
   - 10 Baklo plus Fidima

Art. 128 Dora
   (Trough holding water)
   if broken
   - 10 Baklo plus Fidima

Art. 129 Targa
   (Receptacle for drawing water out of a well)
   If cut at time when cows/camels arrive for drink and if the targa was made out of cow hide
   - 30 Baklo

Art. 130 Uguh
   (Fence for kids of goats)
   If broken
   - 10 Baklo
Art.131 Malab da  
(Bees hive)  
If honey was taken by theft  —  10 Baklo

Title 11 Crimes committed on properties of personal nature

Art.132 Kabella  
(shoes)  
If taken by theft and returned  —  10 Baklo  
If not  —  60 Baklo

Art.133 Alfeita  
(water condenser)  
If stolen/broke out during summer  —  10 Baklo  
If stolen/out during other seasons  —  1 Baklo

Art.134 Eintimali Markassa  
(Blind man's stick)  
If taken  —  10 Baklo

Art.135 Ibamali Mandada  
(Stick of a lame person)  
If taken  —  10 Baklo

Title 12 Adulteries

Art.136 If a person commits adultery with a married woman  
for the first time  —  6 Baklo  
for the second time  —  10 Baklo  
for the third time  —  30 Baklo
Art. 137 If a person commits adultery with a widow
Kelewayto (Unbecoming) - 10 Baklo
Ablewaynu (Out of ordinary) - 10 Baklo
Abewayau (Out of ordinary) - 10 Baklo

Art. 138 If a person commits adultery with a spinster
Helewayto (Unbecoming) - 10 Baklo
Ablewaynu (Out of ordinary) - 10 Baklo
Abewaynu (Out of ordinary) - 10 Baklo
Bikri (Losing of chastity) - 40 Baklo

Title 13 On Insults

Art. 140 There is no difference among types of insults. Any word of insult - 10 Baklo
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