

MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL
ANTHROPOLOGY

RESEARCH GROUP HOW 'TERRORISTS' LEARN

**Localizing Scientific Advice:
The Role of Terrorism Research in
German State Policymaking**

Author:

Leo H. M. BAUER

Supervisor:

Dr. Carolin GÖRZIG

August 9, 2020

Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Theoretical Considerations	2
2.1 Going Local: Utilizing Critical Conflict Studies	2
2.2 Conflicting Concepts and Priorities: The Interplay of Social Sciences and Policymaking	3
2.3 Terrorism Studies Revisited: Cleavages, Discourses and the German Context	5
3. Methodology	8
4. Findings and Discussion	10
4.1 The Role of Terrorism Studies in Policymaking: Practitioners' Accounts .	10
4.2 From Constraints to Approach: Processes of Leveraging Research	12
4.3 Criticism and Expectations: Concepts, Communication and Comparability	14
4.4 The Specter of the Far-Right: Perceptions of Threat and Response on the State Level	15
5. Conclusion	17
<i>Appendix A: Questionnaire</i>	19
<i>Appendix B: Word Cloud Python Code</i>	22
<i>References</i>	23

1. Introduction

In the nine months between June 2019 and February 2020, a series of three high-profile terror attacks rocked Germany, sending shockwaves through civil society and the polity. Unprecedented in frequency, the three perpetrators targeted a politician as well as Jewish and immigrant communities in different federal states. The resulting trauma and sustained fear especially within the affected communities but also among the wider public underline that terrorism is all but subsiding. This lends importance to a comprehensive effort on behalf of the state, scholars and civil society to understand terrorism in order to prevent further attacks. For this study, the relationship between the state and scholars is of particular interest.

Designed as an explorative empirical study, this project came to fruition during my stay as an intern at the Max Planck Research Group How ‘Terrorists’ Learn. It goes beyond the primary subject matter of terrorism studies in that it provides a snapshot of views and narratives of policymakers, in this case members of a German federal state parliament (state MPs), with regards to the employment of terrorism research in legislative policymaking. Its main aim is to provide researchers with feedback on how their work is used and suggestions on how to further study the relationship between terrorism research and crafting policy. Thus, the following research question is posed:

What do state MPs expect from and criticize about their relationship with terrorism researchers and what implications for scholarly practitioners arise thereof?

Regarding the scope of this study, it seemed reasonable to focus on the state of Saxony-Anhalt, wherein the Max Planck Institute resides, as this would yield more tangible results. Further, counterterrorism (CT) policymaking in a more local setting remains understudied and overall, localizing scientific advice and responses to terror help uncover narratives and feedback that might have gone unnoticed in a macro-study.

Thus, for the theory section I draw on literature from the Local Turn in peace and conflict studies to contextualize my research focus and discuss several cleavages around which the study will evolve. As Germany has unique academic and political cultures, the exercise of localizing will firstly help with clarifying which conceptualizations of the relationship between science and policymaking are applicable in the context of this study and which are not. I will then turn to terrorism studies and conduct a similar endeavor. Although terrorism research is extensively conducted in Germany, it does not constitute a discipline of its own and the debates among scholarly peers and their relationship with state power deviate from dominant U.S. discourses and practice. I provide context for the study of terrorism and counterterrorism policy in Germany, in particular regarding its academic culture and federal security architecture. The aim of these exercises is to better refine theoretical considerations in order to structure the interviews and pave the way

for the empirical analysis. Further, I aim to highlight the importance of exerting caution when importing concepts and debates. In turn, the methodology section is devoted to detailing participant selection and anonymization, semi-structured interview process and the interpretive approach used for the analysis.

The analysis shows that policymakers relied on an instrumental notion of terrorism studies' contribution to policy, while narrating the relationship between science and policymaking as one of fundamentally different objectives and opportunities for action. Further, it became clear that their approaches towards working with research findings are shaped by time and resource constraints exacerbated by the local context they operate in. Moreover, their criticism of and expectations towards the field only partly mirror debates among German and American terrorism researchers, while carrying implications for science communication and research comparability. Lastly, the MPs had a joint threat perception and a relatively liberal notion of CT policy, while expressing overall satisfaction with terrorism research's output. Overall, the participants' input offers new suggestions for studying terrorism and the various forms of response, particularly at the local level.

2. Theoretical Considerations

2.1 Going Local: Utilizing Critical Conflict Studies

The Local Turn in peace and conflict studies can be thought of as a critical intervention in the field, yet focuses mainly on challenging liberal peace theory and its practical implementation in, e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 774; Paris 2011, 64–5). In contrast, a recent endeavor in the wider field of international relations (IR), termed Global IR, focuses on challenging long-held Eurocentric IR concepts and instead advocates lending attention and credence to local agencies as well as shared modes of interaction and sensemaking (Acharya 2014, 4). As the broader movement of Global IR, the Local Turn implies a focus on local particularities while emphasizing relationality and contradictions between the local, national and global (Bräuchler and Naucke 2015, 424). Thus, it eschews the oft-cited binary opposition of universalism versus relativism (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 764). Further, it advocates the employment of anthropological methods, like ethnography, in order to come to terms with its research agenda (Bräuchler and Naucke 2015, 426–7). It has to be noted that particularly Global IR, and to a certain extent the Local Turn as well, place postcolonialism at the core of their endeavors (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 763; Acharya 2014, 6). Nevertheless, I argue that it is still fruitful to explore local responses to terror in the West against the backdrop of the Local Turn. After all, dominant narratives and theories on terrorism and the relationship between science and politics are present in the West as well and by no means universally

embraced.

Thus, I start from the premise that firstly, local perspectives matter. Secondly, these local perspectives can provide crucial information for fleshing out and reflecting on cleavages between the local and global, which are particularly worth discussing in a global field of study like terrorism research. Yet, the meaning of local itself is contested so that perhaps it is more advisable to start with what scholars argue it is not. Firstly, it does not stand strictly opposed to the national or international, nor is it isolated from them (Bräuchler and Naucke 2015, 424). Secondly, it is always below the national level of analysis (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 770) and can take on various forms, whether collective or individual (Cohen 1982, 13). Thirdly, it exercises autonomy, whether that may constitute itself in thought, shared everyday practices or political representation and decision-making (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 770). Consequently, I argue that choosing a federal state as my unit of analysis indeed counts as local. It is a collective locality with a certain degree of autonomy, both politically and culturally, and interacts with the national and global.

Furthermore, despite a variety of “localized” research projects in terrorism studies (e.g., Idler and Paladini Adell 2015; McCoy and Knight 2015), local responses to terror in relation to national or global discourses and power remain understudied, although the local is affected by terror primarily and can exercise autonomy and sometimes even sovereignty, as in federal states. Further, although research has been conducted on responses to terrorism on the local level, these studies focus predominantly on law enforcement practices (Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie 2007; Stuntz 2002). Most importantly, what sets the first and second pairs of examples apart is the former’s explicit effort to reconnect research on the local with national or global developments, narratives and influences, highlighting cleavages and points of convergence. Further, this is arguably the difference between Local Turn research and domestic or comparative politics approaches, which regularly focus on local political practices, yet do rarely discuss research results in the context of hierarchies. It is in the realm of the first kind of works that a research gap exists in terrorism studies and in which this study is situated.

2.2 Conflicting Concepts and Priorities: The Interplay of Social Sciences and Policymaking

Within conflict studies and IR as part of the sphere of social sciences, a body of literature has formed which casts the relationship between these parts of academia and policymaking as a mismatch. Scholars like Desch (2019, 3–4) and Waltz (2001, 76) see this mismatch as a result of positivist social sciences’ preference for methodological rigor at the expense of policy relevance. Yet, other scholars like George (1994, 145), Paris (2011, 59) and Buchholz (2007, 69) argue that this incongruity stems from the different interests and

constraints that have developed in both worlds and that the relationship is thus more complex than a mere focus on methodological paradigms would suggest. What sets both conceptualizations further apart is that scholars like Desch tacitly acknowledge that in principle the social sciences are not only able to assist the state in crafting policy and reaching decisions, but that the question of scientific relevance mainly revolves around whether it has any relevance to policy, not to society at large. This stance goes hand in hand with an instrumental notion of knowledge production and its linear conveyance from scientists to policymakers, which, as British political theorist Hedley Bull (1966, 376) argues, can be seen as decidedly American.

This view of the role of social sciences in politics has certainly left its mark on continental European and German social sciences as well. However, a conception of the relationship between the social sciences and policymakers which centers more on both sides' interdependence is needed for this study, given a more compromise-oriented approach to policymaking and scientific advice (Buchholz 2007, 65) and much-cherished academic freedom in Germany (Müller 2007, 215). Yet there are points valid for political and academic culture in both the U.S. and Germany, which are discussed as well over the following paragraphs.

The academe's relative freedom from political interference remains its most important trademark (Buchholz 2007, 63–4), lending it crucial credibility in public debates and decision-making alike. This freedom, however, collides with a core expectation on the policymaking side. It can be assumed that in order to craft *rational* policy, scientific knowledge sought-after by policymakers is expected by them to be neutral (Buchholz 2007, 63). Scientific freedom is thus assumed to produce neutral output, although neutrality is highly subjective, a problem also prevalent in the U.S. (Desch 2019, 9). Research findings' relevance in the German context, in turn, is less determined by policymakers alone and more subject to discussions between them and researchers as well as the media, while the professional consulting industry including think tanks is still underdeveloped (Hustedt, Veit, and Fleischer 2010, 18). Yet, there is still the expectation that scientific advice should be actionable, whether in the form of background information, actual policy recommendations or innovative ideas (Müller 2007, 219).

Nevertheless, when discussing relevance in the context of terrorism studies, a dilemma for the scientist and a limitation for the policymaker come into view. Topical relevance (e.g., research on a particular terror organization) is directly tied to the policymaker's threat perception which can be biased, particularly ideologically (Stampnitzky 2014, 172). Thus, the scientist might feel inclined to conform to a flawed or exaggerated threat assessment in order to be able to further advise and make his or her research known to policymakers (Müller 2007, 240–1). Particularly critical terrorism scholars like Jackson (2015, 23) highlight the pernicious consequences of a close alignment of terrorism research with policymaking, thus explicitly calling for the field's distancing from state power.

While the relationship between both sides and the tendency to tailor research exclusively to serve political agendas is certainly problematic, other scholars favor a more pragmatic approach. Toros (2016, 129) argues that it is indeed possible to engage with policymakers *and* maintain a critical distance to loci of power, in order to formulate precise critiques and eventually act as a corrective vis-à-vis state power.

Yet, the potential need of social scientists to conform to political, not rational, threat perceptions is problematically tied to the core interest of long-term funding, which in turn is closely interlocked with a third interest: communicating research findings to the general public as well as policymakers (Schneckener 2007, 252–3). While scientific communication has arguably gained in importance with the advent of means of digital communication, the process of securing funding from the state is now more competitive as well (Hustedt, Veit, and Fleischer 2010, 18): The sites of knowledge production have diversified to include think tanks, non-profit organizations, companies and “in-house” research by state bureaucracies (Buchholz 2007, 57). This development causes scholars to question these sites’ adherence to scientific quality standards (Müller 2007, 216; Hustedt, Veit, and Fleischer 2010, 16) and the question of whether this sentiment is shared on the policymaking side as well arises. In sum, interests and expectations regarding academic freedom, neutrality, relevance, funding and communication become entangled and influence each other.

Policymakers, in turn, face unique constraints on the state level. Like their federal counterparts, state MPs have to be both generalists and specialists and face time constraints (Wanner and von Hoyer 2012, 137–8), yet are confronted with less resources, as they have a smaller staff budget. These limitations are exacerbated when a caucus, i.e., the group of MPs belonging to one party, only has a small amount of members: Taken together, the two smallest caucuses in Saxony-Anhalt’s parliament are comprised of 16 MPs. Yet, both still have to cover all policy fields just like center-right CDU, which has the biggest caucus with 30 MPs (Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt 2020). It can be expected that these circumstances result in a particular demand for research that is digestible and does not exhibit a high level of methodological sophistication. Indeed, IR scholars frequently emphasize theory as their most important asset when advising policymakers. Paris (2011, 62) states that “conceptual ordering,” i.e., providing policymakers with conceptual frameworks to make sense of new phenomena, constitutes the most profound influence IR researchers can exert upon practitioners.

2.3 Terrorism Studies Revisited: Cleavages, Discourses and the German Context

Throughout the last two decades, terrorism research has experienced unparalleled growth, mainly because the September 11 attacks and subsequent foreign interventions have fueled

American politicians' and bureaucracies' demand of academic research and policy recommendations (Dolnik 2011, 3). Yet, the development of terrorism studies as a distinct social science subfield with different schools of thought and research paradigms in the U.S. does hardly match terrorism research's evolution in continental Europe and Germany. Overall, terrorism studies does not constitute a field of its own in Germany. Moreover, German terrorism research is not overly relying on positivist approaches (Spencer, Kocks, and Harbrich 2011, 153-4), thus largely eschewing the simplistic cleavage of positivism and post-positivism which characterizes American terrorism studies.

Regarding the American context, Lisa Stampnitzky (2014) critically recounts the origins of terrorism studies and the field's evolution, casting it as a largely undisciplined social sciences subfield with various areas of contestation. Firstly, according to her and other scholars terrorism studies is confronted with an ever-present debate on how to define terrorism, both in scientific and legal terms (Stampnitzky 2014, 198–9; Chenoweth et al. 2019, 34–5; Schneckener 2007, 256). This debate, however, is largely eschewed in Germany. On the one hand, research and policy regarding domestic terrorism enjoy a certain tradition due to experience with prolonged episodes of domestic state and non-state terror (Spencer, Kocks, and Harbrich 2011, 316). Thus, clear-cut concepts of terrorism exist both in law and in social science research and are hardly contested (Spencer, Kocks, and Harbrich 2011, 316-7). On the other hand, to a certain extent the definition's fuzziness arises from discussions on transnational terrorism in the context of international legal norms (Schmid 2013, 43-4). However, the portion of German terrorism research that concerns itself with purely transnational or foreign terrorist groups is arguably smaller than in the U.S. Thus, the question important for this study is whether this conceptual fuzziness is observed on the German state policymaking level as well or whether it plays any role at all.

Secondly, terrorism discourse has the tendency of characterizing terrorists as pathological, i.e., inherently irrational (Stampnitzky 2014, 4; Spencer, Kocks, and Harbrich 2011, 30; Jackson 2016, 434), in order to apply both repressive and preventive responses. At the same time, terrorism scholars predominantly see terrorism as a rational form of political violence and terrorists as actors with strategic aims (Schmid 2013, 17). This opposition carries implications for policymakers and researchers alike, which will be of interest for this study's interviews. On the one hand, it is worth inquiring about what policy approach (repressive or preventive) is favored by state policymakers in Germany. On the other hand, the public image of the irrational terrorist and a scholarly community working with the assumption of a rational terrorist result in a research agenda for terrorism studies fraught with tension. Some scholars (Dolnik 2011, 4; Stampnitzky 2014, 188) even argue that primary research involving speaking with terrorists or studies on social determinants of terrorism are shunned by scholars for fear of being cast as apologetic. Yet, as this assessment is mainly derived from the American terrorism studies discourse,

it is worth asking if policymakers in Germany see tendencies or gaps in domestic terrorism research's agenda and output. In line with this question, it is also of concern whether the interviewees are receptive to scholars' criticism of CT policy output or whether they see them as mere providers of tailored knowledge, which Bull Bull 1966, 376 argues with regards to the U.S.

Thirdly, both German and American scholars describe terrorism research frequently as ad-hoc (Schneckener 2007, 249), overly event-driven (Chenoweth et al. 2019, 6) and thus mainly descriptive (Dolnik 2011, 5). According to Schneckener (2007, 250), research follows media-induced cycles of attention in the aftermath of high-profile attacks. Recently, terrorism researchers have thus produced many works on Islamist terrorism, in particular on Al-Qaeda and ISIS, while neglecting other important developments of non-state political violence (Chenoweth et al. 2019, 6). Consequently, the questions of which terrorist threat the state policymakers prioritize now and whether their perception varied throughout the last year are of interest for this study. In addition, because this kind of research is hardly generalizable and useful to predict further attacks, a mismatch between existing research and needed answers on the policymaking side seems to exist (Schneckener 2007, 259). A further question for this study is therefore whether this mismatch is perceived as well in German state policymaking or if terrorism scholars' focus on actors driven by attention-cycles is congruent with policymakers' threat assessments. As a last point, it will be valuable to ascertain their opinions on what terrorism studies could do better to help prevent failures like the NSU scandal in Germany involving neo-Nazi terrorists in the future.

Because the issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs reflect a particular focus on discourses in the U.S., next I will consider important implications of studying terrorism and devising CT policy in the context of Germany.

Firstly, when revisiting the dynamics between social scientists and policymakers, German social sciences are somehow detached from the rigor versus relevance debate. In contrast to the U.S., theoretical works and non-empirical studies are arguably not treated as inferior to empirical research in terms of scientific value, which is also salient when considering anecdotal evidence from scientists-cum-advisors. Buchholz (2007, 65–6) argues that among German policy advisers from the social sciences it is clear that basic research alone is not sufficient to give policy recommendations. He notes that although this is expected from the policymaking side, a more important exercise is to derive risk assessments from findings and outline trade-offs for several courses of action (Buchholz 2007, 65–6). Similarly, Müller (2007, 216) highlights the primacy of theory when advising mid-level diplomats and MPs on questions of arms control. Thus, for this study's interviews it will be of concern if policymakers indeed expect basic research to serve as a means to decide upon courses of action and whether or not theory is in higher demand than empirical works.

Secondly, Germany’s decentralized security architecture and previous responses to terror are distinct from other European countries and the U.S. (Mucha 2017, 243) and thus carry important implications for CT policymaking and terrorism scholars alike. Germany’s security architecture is highly decentralized due to the state’s federal makeup. Further, the states have similar sovereign powers and the necessary police and intelligence agencies as the federal government to counter domestic terrorist threats (Hellmuth 2016, 126). Although this creates deadlocks, coordination problems and bureaucratic parochialism (Hellmuth 2016, 98-9), it makes Germany ideally suited to study the impact of terrorism studies on policymaking on the federal state level.

Thirdly, there is considerable experience with terror on German soil. In the 1970s, groups such as the RAF and Black September executed high-profile attacks (Rapoport 2002) while recently Islamist terrorists have struck, yet on a more limited scale. As a consequence, the domestic component of the response to the September 11 attacks largely mirrored the German federal and state governments’ CT approach in the preceding decades, treating terrorists exclusively as criminals subject to law enforcement (Hellmuth 2016, 88–9). This contrasts with the U.S. where CT policies are more repressive (Chenoweth et al. 2019, 626), while CT responsibilities have been largely consolidated at the federal level in the aftermath of 9/11. Further, it can be argued that in Germany the reliance on preventive and repressive CT approaches is augmented by a decidedly liberal notion of criminal justice centering on crime prevention and rehabilitation (Mucha 2017, 235), which will be discussed with the study’s participants.

3. Methodology

In order to address the questions and issues posed in the preceding section, structured elite interviews were conducted with state MPs, lasting for 45 minutes on average.

Firstly, due to time and pandemic constraints, the number of interviews was limited to three and all participants came from the parliament of Saxony-Anhalt, the state in which the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology is located. Because this study addresses the utilization of terrorism research in crafting security policy, participants were selected from the state parliament’s interior affairs committee. The committee is the primary venue for formulating and amending domestic security bills, which are then voted upon in parliament during plenary sessions (Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt 2020b). As this study is not representative or comparative but rather seeks to explore state policymaking on terrorism, the selection process was non-systematic. However, participants were selected from different parties, comprised different age groups and had varying professional backgrounds, thus providing heterogeneity to enrich the analysis. Crucially, selection also depended on availability, as MPs face tight and highly structured schedules.

Secondly, as terrorism policy is a sensitive issue and MPs might not feel inclined to

talk freely when attributing information to their name and party affiliation, participants were ensured anonymity before conducting interviews. Anonymization is also a standard practice when conducting elite interviews (Harvey 2011, 435). In turn, participants' professional backgrounds, which were ensured to match the biography of at least one other committee member, are mentioned in order to conduct a meaningful analysis. In sum, the anonymization measures make it impossible to unambiguously identify participants without relying on other detailed data. Further, guaranteeing anonymization was useful in establishing trust as the interviewees are politicians and because interviews were conducted over the phone, which is sometimes seen as inhibiting the quality of interviews due to its impersonal nature (Harvey 2011, 435). As restrictions on freedom of movement related to the COVID-19 pandemic were in place in Germany between March and April 2020, the time during which this project came to fruition, the phone represented the only means to speak to participants then. Interviews were recorded with consent, to not lose information and be able focus on the conversation, and audio files were permanently deleted after transcribing them.

Thirdly, the questionnaire was structured according to the theoretical considerations discussed in the preceding section. A semi-structured approach was taken in line with other scholars' experience in conducting elite interviews (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). A total of 33 questions were included in the final questionnaire. Questions were divided into eight blocks, covering personal background, perceptions of the relationship between science and policymaking in general, terrorism studies in particular, expectations towards terrorism studies, critique, counterfactuals, concluding remarks and feedback to improve questions. Although not ethnographic in principle (Lie 2013, 213), interview questions were designed borrowing from anthropological methodology (Bräuchler and Naucke 2015, 428). I predominantly formulated open questions, yet asked a few closed ones at crucial junctures in order to sharpen responses. Examples can be found in the appendix, where the full questionnaire is provided. Overall, it was my aim to inquire about policymakers' perceptions of their counterpart and their relationship with them, in this case terrorism scholars. In addition, it was my aim to let participants narrate their strategies of both engaging with researchers and using terrorism research for crafting policy.

Lastly, in analyzing the interviews I rely on an interpretive approach (Lie 2013, 216). In line with Schwartz-Shea and Yanow's (2012, 80) proposal for interpretive social research, I seek to compare and contrast participants' narratives with concepts and expectations formulated in the preceding section. I aim at developing clusters when answers seem to follow patterns of contestation or agreement with theoretical considerations, while comparing individual differences. In doing so, I highlight local perspectives as an enriching source for reflecting back upon both the field of terrorism studies and its practitioners' conception of the relationship between science and politics.

4. Findings and Discussion

4.1 The Role of Terrorism Studies in Policymaking: Practitioners' Accounts

Firstly, participants offered differing views on terrorism studies' role both in politics overall and for crafting specific policies. Furthermore, their narrations of the process of incorporating research findings and expert talks into policymaking highlight the unique challenges they face in legislative politics at the state level. However, they all agreed in that public research institutions, universities and institutes, remain the most trusted sites of knowledge production. To illustrate the interviews' overall talking points, the participants' responses were used to create a word cloud (Figure 1), in which font size corresponds to word usage frequency. Evidently, science (“Wissenschaft”), research (“Forschung”) and politics (“Politik”) feature prominently.

With regards to the role of terrorism studies in politics and policymaking, two points of view were articulated by participants in particular. While one participant consistently highlighted the need to convince political partners or opponents with research findings in order to get a majority of votes for a particular course of action, the two other participants largely agreed that research findings are mainly of use for crafting rational policy.

The notion of research as a “persuader” is consistent with the decision-making mechanisms in a system with proportional representation and a compromise culture like Germany (Hellmuth 2016, 78–9). Moreover, the participant consistently stressed this point as the most important contribution of research to policymaking, expounding an understanding of legislative politics as mainly interest-driven and concerned with bargaining. Interestingly, the participant also argued that instead of the parliament, “profound research” would rather be useful for the executive, due to its responsibility of translating strategies and bills into praxis. For legislative work, it was argued, technical studies were more useful to lend policy proposals credibility. This differs significantly from how scholars look at terrorism studies, i.e., as a social science discipline. To underline this point, the example of a technical study on the efficacy of a digital surveillance tool that found its way into a policy proposal to strengthen state police CT capabilities was cited by the participant. Consequently, this participant was keen to note that not the type of scientific advice, policy recommendation, background information, or creative ideas, but the research findings' alignment with one's own argument should be seen as its decisive advantage.

In contrast, the two other participants agreed on the notion that science was mainly useful to gauge complex issues and get clear recommendations for legislative action. Regarding background information or clear policy recommendations, both did not prefer one over the other. Rather, they noted that although clear recommendations for action

were easily consumable, receiving background information from expert talks was highly important to understand a policy recommendation’s deficiencies. Thus, the two participants’ point of view coincides with Müller (2007, 219), who recounts similar experiences when advising diplomats and lawmakers. In addition, these two participants frequently related their perception of terrorism studies to their professional backgrounds. On the one hand, the participant with a social science background stressed the inherent complexity of terrorism studies as an innate social science problem while still describing it as highly useful. On the other hand, the participant with a background in natural sciences wished for terrorism studies to operate more like the natural sciences: To advance faster and be more flexible by mainly operationalizing existing research and “proven” concepts. Thus, the participant argued for a normal science approach in the Kuhnian sense, which contrasts with concerns from within the critical terrorism studies community (Jackson 2015). In sum, the participants articulated an *instrumental*, rather than a *normative*, notion of terrorism research’s role in policymaking, to which I will return again in the conclusion section.

Figure 1: Frequently Used Terms in Participants’ Responses



Interestingly, all participants saw terrorism research as being mostly neutral. Moreover, two participants noted that they sometimes had problems with grasping where the budget for a particular research project came from. However, this perceived neutrality may also confirm Jackson’s (2016, 23) point that terrorism studies largely conforms to the state’s threat perception and enjoys an uncritical, cozy relationship with state power.

As this assessment stems from an analysis of American terrorism studies, more research is needed to draw a sound comparison with Germany. Furthermore, the participants agreed that public research institutions were the most trustworthy sites of knowledge production and cited Max-Planck Society, Leopoldina, Fraunhofer Society and Berlin School of Economics and Law as examples. These were followed by NGOs as well as federal and state police colleges and criminological institutes, while research by party foundations was described as lacking in trustworthiness. The diverse set of actors involved in producing research that were cited by participants showcase the diversity of scientific knowledge production today (Buchholz 2007, 57). Yet, the participants did not share Müller's (2007, 216) and Hustedt, Veit and Fleischer's (2010, 16) sentiment, in that this diversification of knowledge production automatically leads to a depreciation of scientific quality.

Overall, it became clear that neither participant saw the relationship between terrorism studies and policymaking and its built-in contradictions as tied to the rigor versus relevance debate. Rather, narratives emerged which centered on the irreconcilability of the distinct environments both politicians and scientists operate within. Thus, they sided more with George (1994, 145), Paris (2011, 59) and Buchholz (2007, 69) in their assessment of the relationship. In addition, criticism of CT policies from the ranks of academia received a mixed response: Two participants argued that they were willing to listen to researchers' concerns, but did not go as far as to acknowledge that the sciences' normative conclusions acted as a corrective for their work. Yet the third participant was not as responsive as his colleagues and largely rejected scientific criticism of legislative work. This participant recurred to the narrative of the two incompatible environments of science and politics to make the case that navigating the political sphere was actually not as easy as scholars would expect. Thus, in this case separating oneself from a critical cooperator like the terrorism researcher can also be seen as a mechanism for defending one's own legitimacy and necessity. Yet, all participants noted that time and resource constraints placed upon them as state MPs also contributed to the complex relationship with the social sciences, which will be detailed in the following paragraphs.

4.2 From Constraints to Approach: Processes of Leveraging Research

Secondly, the participants' narrations of the procedure of incorporating research findings and expert talks into policymaking highlight time and resource constraints of legislative politics at the state level.

Overall, participants split in their descriptions of processing research findings according to the size of their caucus. In Saxony-Anhalt, five parties and four independent MPs are in the state parliament, while caucus sizes range from five to 30 MPs (*Abgeordnetensuche Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt* 2020). Committees in turn are staffed proportionally to their

party's caucus size (*Lexikon Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt* 2020b), meaning that between one and five MPs are on a committee per party. As noted earlier, this makes state MPs more generalist. Concurrently, all participants agreed that time constraints were the greatest obstacle to engaging profoundly with terrorism research.

The two participants from smaller caucuses agreed in that they relied particularly on scientific newsletters on police, security, extremism and intelligence to read through abstracts quickly and then decide on whether to explore articles further. In addition, the help of staff was noted as crucial in preparing summaries of research findings. Yet, one participant also noted the need to personally sift through a 10cm pile of new material by research institutions, interest groups and professional associations each day, making a systematic approach to understanding and using current research impossible. This points to the lack of a budget to fully transfer tasks like this to a bigger staff. These two participants also emphasized the advantages of discussing security- and terrorism-related research with fellow interior committee members from other caucuses, as well as the helpfulness of expert talks and public expert hearings in grasping terrorism-related issues in more detail. Specifically, the ability to assess the veracity of a researcher's argument by asking follow-up questions in talks and hearings was noted as important. Furthermore, it was stated that networking with other MPs, belonging to one's own party in other state parliaments, who share the same specializations was useful in the absence of a bigger caucus. Thus, these participants sketched out strategies to compensate for the lack of interlocutors from one's own caucus, centering on networking with peers across state borders and interacting more with MPs from other parties.

In contrast, the participant from a bigger caucus saw discussing research and hearing experts in the committee as a less important step in the policymaking process. To this participant, the own caucus's working group on interior affairs, staffed by a handful of MPs, was the primary site to keep oneself up to date, share and discuss scientific material, and craft strategy as well as draft bills. Only then did research findings find their way into the committee, in order to lend a proposed bill further credibility or as the basis for suggesting to invite a certain expert. Thus, this participant's outline of the process differed significantly from the other two respondents. This could point to procedural disparities between the state parliament's caucuses but needs further inquiry to be ascertained. Further, it becomes clear that a shortage in time, which all participants mentioned, is exacerbated by resource constraints, in line with Wanner and von Hoyer (2012, 137–8). These constraints hamper working with social research that was described as inherently complex. Coupled with specific criticism and expectations, these constraints on and of the local carry direct implications for terrorism scholars, which will be addressed throughout the following paragraphs.

4.3 Criticism and Expectations: Concepts, Communication and Comparability

Thirdly, the participants highlighted the concept of extremism's fuzziness, the wish for intensified scientific communication and a lack of research that was comparable to local particularities.

As noted in the theory section a canonical definition of terrorism does not exist, yet the definition debate is not too prevalent in German terrorism research. However, the participant with a background in the social sciences voiced concerns about conceptual fuzziness, although regarding the concept of extremism. Criticizing the concept's lack of epistemological quality, the participant linked these concerns to left-wing extremism: It was argued that the concept was particularly ill-suited for subsuming a diverse set of phenomena under the term left-wing extremism. Further, the participant argued that as this set of political actors was "too ideologically disparate," it would be more worthwhile to shed light on the different forms of political violence within the left-wing spectrum to gain insights about actors' exact motives. This point echoes voices from within the terrorism studies community who call for a conceptual disaggregation to increase analytical precision, yet regarding the various strands of Islamist political violence (Spencer, Kocks, and Harbrich 2011, 215). And although extremism is best understood as a general approach to politics that is decidedly illiberal and uncompromising and thus clearly delimited from terrorism, both terms nevertheless share a continuous conceptual ambiguity (Bötticher 2017, 76). Yet, no participant shared concerns regarding terrorism's definition directly.

In turn, all participants emphasized the need for intensified scientific communication. Here, time and resource constraints as well as participants' perception of the political sphere as fundamentally separated from the sciences come into view again. To the participants, these constraints could be alleviated by more and particularly more *targeted* scientific communication. The participant who exhibited an understanding of research findings as a "persuader" in legislative politics consequently stressed the need to specifically target state ministries and police colleges with new findings and ideas, as these were seen as implementers. This resulted also from the fact that this participant saw an information asymmetry, in which state MPs received the majority of news from the field of terrorism studies. Another participant argued that "terrorism studies need to explain themselves, it is not enough to just be there and say 'we do research here.'" In addition, this participant called upon the social sciences in general to pay more attention to bridging barriers to other societal domains, implying the political sphere, and thus reflecting the notion of the fundamental separation of science and politics.

Further, it is salient that participants' descriptions of how communication and trust relate to consulting research findings and experts seem to be iterative: It was stressed

that speaking to scientists in person raised trust in them, which in turn increased the chances that participants would work with research findings from that person or the associated institute in the future. In this regard, one participant stressed that continuing “support” for an expert or institute depended on trust reached by means of personal conversations, yet without clarifying what this support implied. Thus, for the participants strong scientific communication seems to increase trust in researchers, institutions and their output. In addition, the participants emphasized that communicating research is closely linked to trust and attention on the MPs’ side, while this trust in turn leads to support for, e.g., funding requests. Yet, the question of what trust entails exactly remains. If it is also informed by perceived neutrality, these linkages lead back to the researcher’s ethical problem of whether to conform to a potentially flawed threat assessment, and be neutral in that sense, to ensure continued access to policymakers and funding (Müller 2007, 240–1).

Interestingly, the three participants also agreed upon the notion that comparability of research findings was a shortcoming of terrorism studies. To them, this touched upon two points in particular. Firstly, a lack of terrorism research on the state level was lamented. This highlights the difficulty, especially for empirical research, of gathering a sufficient amount of data on the local level to conduct sound analyses. To give an example, one participant noted that to conduct a quantitative study on the effects of equipping Saxony-Anhalt’s police officers with tasers, there were just not enough recorded incidents in which the devices were used to begin with. Secondly, it was noted by two participants that they were often clueless *if* a research finding from another federal state could be applied to their state. This concern could be easily addressed by providing additional information regarding to which population a specific finding could be extrapolated meaningfully and to which not. After all, the concept of a representative study and to what population specifically it applies are issues which policymakers cannot be expected to be uniformly familiar with. What follows from a scarcity in empirical works that focus on the state level is that theory and background information may even be more important in local contexts than they are already on the federal level (Müller 2007, 216).

4.4 The Specter of the Far-Right: Perceptions of Threat and Response on the State Level

Lastly, the participants’ accounts of terrorist threats throughout the last decade in Saxony-Anhalt deviate from the wider public discourse. Furthermore, the participants exhibited a relatively liberal notion of CT policy and only observed a lack of research findings on deradicalization and CVE programs, thus differing from Stampnitzky’s (2014) assessment of the state of terrorism research in the U.S.

When asked about their current threat perception regarding terrorism, it is salient that

all participants explicitly or implicitly identified right-wing terror as the biggest threat to the state of Saxony-Anhalt. Two participants were candid and unmistakable in their expressions, stressing the high frequency of right-wing and neo-Nazi violence, the effective support networks for such groups and the propensity for radicalization among parts of the populace. In addition, they pointed towards a recent strengthening of the violent far-right. While the third participant refused to prioritize the threat of right-wing terrorism, said participant only referred to right-wing terrorism and extremism when asked about actual examples and pointed out the exceptionally high number of instances of right-wing violence in the state. Thus, this participant sided at least implicitly with the other two MPs. Taken together, the participants' accounts outline a threat perception that is asynchronous to the frequently invoked specter of Islamist terrorism in German national discourses throughout the last two decades (Spencer, Kocks, and Harbrich 2011, 204).

As one of the gravest right-wing terrorist attacks in 2019 happened in the city of Halle, Saxony-Anhalt, the memory of that incident might have shaped participants' responses. However, all participants also agreed in that right-wing terrorism had been the biggest threat to their state throughout the last decade. This perceived continuity and the lack of references to a wave-like evolution regarding both Islamist and right-wing terrorism contrast further with national and global debates. Moreover, the only instance in which cyclical developments were noted was in the context of media terrorism discourse. One participant explicitly stressed the cycles of attention that followed widely covered attacks, relating back to terrorism studies' problem of event-driven and unsystematic research, as outlined by Schneckener (2007, 250).

Regarding responses to terrorism, participants only noted a lack of research on CVE programs that could be compared to their state. Otherwise, they did not feel that German terrorism studies' research agenda was skewed, which again contrasts with Stampnitzky (2014, 188). Yet, the participants' views in this regard have to be taken with a grain of salt, as Jackson (2015, 23–4) argues that the gaps in American terrorism studies result from the field's alignment with policymaking. Regarding terrorism research's ability to learn and improve only one MP made a point, suggesting that terrorism researchers should listen more to victims of political violence to detect patterns of political violence more quickly. In turn, the participants concurrently stressed the efficacy and continuing importance of civic education on democratic pluralism in schools and other educational institutions to counter the wider problem of political extremism, thus expressing a more liberal notion of prevention in line with Mucha (2017, 235). Only one participant noted that repression would also constitute a form of prevention, yet added that preventive measures were still an important component of CT policy and should also be borne by civil society. Thus, further research should explore the question if CVE programs and non-repressive CT policies in general are more popular on the state level, because state policymakers are closer to the local, i.e., the people these policies have an impact upon.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this study shows that the interviewed MPs rely on an instrumental notion of terrorism research's contribution to policy. Moreover, the perception that science and policymaking are separated by substantial differences between their respective objectives and opportunities for action surfaced time and again during the interviews. In turn, time and resource constraints appeared as important determinants of the process with which the interviewed MPs use research findings. Further, one participant's criticism of the concept of extremism mirrors a similar debate within the terrorism studies community: both touch upon definitional fuzziness and the concepts' politicization. In addition, participants expected more and better targeted scientific communication while noting problems with the comparability of research results. Moreover, the participants agreed that the far-right represented the biggest terrorist threat to Saxony-Anhalt while largely advocating for more liberal CT policies. Lastly, they saw no gaps in terrorism research's output.

Before moving on to this study's implications for further research, the fact that all participants shared an instrumental notion of terrorism studies' and social sciences' role in politics, rather than a normative one, merits a discussion. The participants' view reflects a narrow perception of terrorism scholars as merely delivering ideas, information and solutions to politics with no sway over those items' exact, and in terrorism studies often problematic, usage. To again take up the discussion from the second part of the theory section, the participants' response seem to confirm Richard Jackson's suspicions. Certainly, the participants' attitude would indeed require scholars to both take a position and choose a research agenda closely aligned to their interests, if there was a big power imbalance. This, however, is hardly the case in a local environment like Saxony-Anhalt and its state parliament. As became clear in the second and third parts of the findings section, the participants heavily depend on third-party expertise for various legislative tasks. Scholars may actually have more opportunities to shape policy than federal MPs, not least because in contrast to their federal counterpart state parliaments do not retain their own scientific advisory body. Moreover, Toros (2016, 127) has a point when she argues that because it is necessary to negotiate with terrorist, non-state, organizations in order to offer alternatives to violence, the same argument should count for states and their organs.

Lastly, the study's insights carry implications for future research on local forms of and responses to terrorism and the cleavages which become apparent when contrasting them with dominant concepts and narratives in scholarly and public terrorism discourse. As this study has been designed as an explorative endeavor, further research should address the mismatches between macro-level theories, particularly from American terrorism studies, and local contexts. This study shows that when localizing the focus of research,

alternative narratives may emerge which deserve attention and, crucially, comparison. Systematically comparing the views of state MPs from Saxony-Anhalt to policymakers' views from other German states can yield important information on terrorism and CT policies in different localities, potential overlaps and reciprocal influences between the local, national and global. For example, it would be interesting to further investigate potential procedural disparities between state parliaments' caucuses regarding crafting CT policies. Moreover, further research could be devoted to the question if local policymakers favor less repressive CT policies than their national counterparts. Lastly, it is worth taking Jackson's (2016, 23) claim that terrorism research enjoys an uncritical and cozy relationship with loci of state power and applying it to the German context. Has German terrorism research taken a similar path as, allegedly, U.S. terrorism studies? And if not, what has caused this disparity and how does German terrorism research moderate CT policy? The point which I want to stress on a related note is that researchers need to reflect more upon their conceptual toolkit when focusing on the local. In addition, a more disaggregated, localized research approach to terrorism, where suited, may yield important insights regarding the actual manifestations of terror on the ground and ways to counter its destructive aims and consequences.

Appendix A: Questionnaire

1. Introduction

- 1.1. How long have you been involved in politics?
- 1.2. What are the three biggest challenges for the State of Saxony-Anhalt right now?

2. The sciences in general

- 2.1. Are you keeping yourself up to date about research findings that are relevant for your interior committee work?
- 2.2. If yes, how do you receive this information?
- 2.3. Which criteria do you use to select scientific works and experts for your interior committee work?
- 2.4. On which specific institutions can you rely on the most in this regard? Please prioritize: public (universities, public research institutes), police and administration (state administration college, state police college) private and non-profit (non-governmental organizations, consulting firms).
- 2.5. What is more important to you: Perusing scientific writings or talking to experts?

3. Terrorism and extremism research

- 3.1. Name your three most important areas of expertise with regards to your interior committee work.
- 3.2. In your opinion, what is the biggest terrorist threat to Saxony-Anhalt right now?
- 3.3. When was the last time you read a scholarly publication or talked to an expert on terrorism or extremism (alternatively homeland security or public safety), what was the topic and for what reason did you read/talk?
- 3.4. How did this publication/talk contribute to your interior committee work?
- 3.5. What is more important to counter terrorism, repressive or preventive policies?
- 3.6. Which topics do you regard as particularly helpful for your work: studies on behavior, structural and social determinants of terrorism, ideology, history of terrorism, law enforcement, prevention, radicalization, recruitment or deradicalization?

4. Expectations

- 4.1. What is of importance to you when you talk to an expert or read a scholarly publication? Please prioritize: Policy recommendations for a policy problem or a draft bill, background information on a specific topic, innovative and creative ideas on a current political issue.
- 4.2. What is your ideal conception of scientific policy consulting in written and

oral form?

- 4.3. Should terrorism and extremism researchers be able to come up with answers to new phenomena and incidents in a timely manner?
- 4.4. Do you think that the sciences are able to react to new threats and supply you with currently important information?
- 4.5. Do you think that scientific criticism towards your work/the state legislature's work with regards to terrorism and extremism is valuable?
- 4.6. If yes, do you incorporate said criticism or suggestions for improvement into your interior committee work?

5. Critique

- 5.1. Do you trust research results and scientific expertise in general and regarding terrorism and extremism in particular?
- 5.2. Do you feel that terrorism and extremism research is neutral?
- 5.3. If not, why?
- 5.4. Which gaps do you see in terrorism and extremism research? Please select among the following areas: research object (left, right, Islamist), type of research (basic research, applied research), research focus (studies on behavior, structural and social determinants of terrorism, ideology, history of terrorism, law enforcement, prevention, radicalization, recruitment, deradicalization).
- 5.5. If a gap exists, why is that the case in your opinion?
- 5.6. Do you feel that the sciences pursue their own interests and that this has a negative effect upon research output?
- 5.7. If yes, what do you think are the reasons for that development?
- 5.8. How can the sciences improve in order to meet your critique?

6. Counterfactuals

- 6.1. If we had talked ten years ago, do you think your answer with regards to which scientific institutions you can rely on the most would have been the same?
- 6.2. If we had talked ten years ago, would you also have said that X constitutes the biggest terrorist threat to Saxony-Anhalt?
- 6.3. Regarding right-wing terror as a terrorist threat to Saxony-Anhalt, the exposure of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) has its ninths anniversary this year. If we had sat together ten years ago, what could the sciences have contributed to prevent the far-right terror attacks that happened in the last years?

7. Conclusion

- 7.1. Do you want to add something?

8. Feedback

- 8.1. Were the questions comprehensible, challenging, redundant, uninformed or something else?
- 8.2. Do you want to share comments on the research project as a whole?

Appendix B: Word Cloud Python Code

```
# import necessary packages
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
from os import path
from PIL import Image
from wordcloud import WordCloud, STOPWORDS, ImageColorGenerator
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

# load interview responses' text data
with open("data/interviews.txt", "r") as f:
    text = f.read()

# stopwords
with open('stop-words-german.txt', 'r') as f:
    stopwords= f.read().splitlines() # splitlines(): create a list using
        space
stopwords= set(stopwords)

# set up wordcloud environment
x, y = np.ogrid[:1000, :1000]

mask = (x - 500) ** 2 + (y - 500) ** 2 > 400 ** 2
mask = 255 * mask.astype(int)

wordcloud = WordCloud(width=1200, height=800,stopwords=stopwords,
    background_color="white"
        ,collocations=False, mask=mask)

# generate wordcloud using the text
wordcloud.generate(text)

# plot
plt.imshow(wordcloud, interpolation='bilinear')
plt.axis("off")
plt.show()
```


References

- Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. 2002. "Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews." *Political Science & Politics* 35(4): 673–676.
- Abgeordnetensuche*. Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt 2020. Accessed April 10, 2020. <https://www.landtag.sachsen-anhalt.de/landtag/abgeordnete/abgeordnetensuche/>.
- Acharya, Amitav. 2014. "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(4): 647–659.
- Bötticher, Astrid. 2017. "Towards Academic Consensus Definitions of Radicalism and Extremism." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11(4): 73–77.
- Bräuchler, Birgit, and Philipp Naucke. 2015. "Peacebuilding and Conceptualisations of the Local." *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale* 25(4): 422–436.
- Brown, Andrew. 2011. "Anders Breivik is not Christian but anti-Islam." *The Guardian*, July 24, 2011: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/andrewbrown/2011/jul/24/norway-anders-behring-breivik-beliefs>.
- Buchholz, Kai. 2007. "Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung in der Wissensgesellschaft." In *Forschung und Beratung in der Wissensgesellschaft: Das Feld der internationalen Beziehungen und der Außenpolitik*, ed. Gunther Hellmann. Baden-Baden: Nomos pp. 45–79.
- Bull, Hedley. 1966. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." *World Politics* 18(3): 361–377.
- Chenoweth, Erica, Richard English, Andreas Gofas, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, eds. 2019. *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, Anthony P. 1982. *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Desch, Michael C. 2019. *Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dolnik, Adam. 2011. "Conducting Field Research on Terrorism: A Brief Primer." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5(2): 3–35.

- Falkheimer, Jesper, and Eva-Karin Olsson. 2015. "Depoliticizing Terror: The News Framing of the Terrorist Attacks in Norway, 22 July 2011." *Media, War & Conflict* 8(1): 70–85.
- George, Alexander L. 1994. "The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap." *Political Psychology* 15(1): 143–172.
- Harvey, William S. 2011. "Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews." *Qualitative Research* 11(4): 431–441.
- Hellmuth, Dorle. 2016. *Counterterrorism and the State: Western Responses to 9/11*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hustedt, Thurid, Sylvia Veit, and Julia Fleischer. 2010. "Wissen ist Macht? Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung der Bundesregierung." *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 60(19): 15–21.
- Idler, Annette, and Borja Paladini Adell. 2015. "When Peace Implies Engaging the 'Terrorist': Peacebuilding in Colombia Through Transforming Political Violence and Terrorism." In *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*, ed. Ioannis Tellidis, and Harmonie Toros. Abingdon: Routledge pp. 124–145.
- Jackson, Richard. 2015. "Towards Critical Peace Research: Lessons from Critical Terrorism Studies." In *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*, ed. Ioannis Tellidis, and Harmonie Toros. Abingdon: Routledge pp. 19–37.
- Jackson, Richard, ed. 2016. *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Koehler, Daniel. 2014. "German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the 'Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)' – 'DTGrwx' Project." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8(5): 48–58.
- Lexikon*. Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt 2020b. Accessed April 16, 2020. <https://www.landtag.sachsen-anhalt.de/service/lexikon/>.
- Lie, Jon Harald Sande. 2013. "Challenging Anthropology: Anthropological Reflections on the Ethnographic Turn in International Relations." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 41(2): 201–220.
- Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver P. Richmond. 2013. "The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace." *Third World Quarterly* 34(5): 763–783.

- McCoy, John, and W. Andy Knight. 2015. "Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38(4): 253–274.
- Mucha, Witold. 2017. "Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization: Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany." *Journal for Deradicalization* 10(1): 230–254.
- Müller, Harald. 2007. "Politikberatung in unterschiedlichen Kontexten: Notizen aus der Praxis." In *Forschung und Beratung in der Wissensgesellschaft: Das Feld der internationalen Beziehungen und der Außenpolitik*, ed. Gunther Hellmann. Baden-Baden: Nomos pp. 213–247.
- Ortiz, Christopher W., Nicole J. Hendricks, and Naomi F. Sugie. 2007. "Policing Terrorism: The Response of Local Police Agencies to Homeland Security Concerns." *Criminal Justice Studies* 20(2): 91–109.
- Paris, Roland. 2011. "Ordering the World: Academic Research and Policymaking on Fragile States." *International Studies Review* 13(1): 58–71.
- Parker, Tom, and Nick Sitter. 2016. "The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28(2): 197–216.
- Rapoport, David C. 2002. "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11." *Anthropoetics* 8(1).
- Rapoport, David C. 2016. "It Is Waves, Not Strains." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28(2): 217–224.
- Schmid, Alex P., ed. 2013. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. New York: Routledge.
- Schneckener, Ulrich. 2007. "Die soziale Konstruktion des "Terrorexperten". Terrorismusforschung im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft, Medien und Politikberatung." In *Forschung und Beratung in der Wissensgesellschaft: Das Feld der internationalen Beziehungen und der Außenpolitik*, ed. Gunther Hellmann. Baden-Baden: Nomos pp. 249–263.
- Scholz, Kay-Alexander. 2020. "Wie das Internet rechtsextreme Terroristen fördert." *Deutsche Welle* February 21, 2020: <https://www.dw.com/de/wie-das-internet-rechtsextreme-terroristen-fördert/a-52464697>.
- Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. 2012. *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*. Abingdon: Routledge.

- Spencer, Alexander, Alexander Kocks, and Kai Harbrich, eds. 2011. *Terrorismusforschung in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Stampnitzky, Lisa. 2014. *Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented 'Terrorism'*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stuntz, William J. 2002. "Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct." *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 25(2): 665–679.
- Toros, Harmonie. 2016. "Dialogue, Praxis and the State: A Response to Richard Jackson." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 9(1): 126–130.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 2001. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wanner, Tassilo, and Daniel von Hoyer. 2012. "Angebot trifft Nachfrage? Politikberatung im Umfeld deutscher Parlamente." In *Angewandte Politikforschung*, ed. Manuela Glaab, and Karl-Rudolf Korte. Wiesbaden: Springer VS pp. 137–149.
- Zimmermann, Doron, and Andreas Wenger, eds. 2007. *How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West*. Boulder: Rienner.