The Behavioral Ecology of Food Sharing among North Siberian Foragers
Research Objectives
Human food sharing and its relation to hominid evolution is a topic of considerable interest within anthropology. Food sharing is important for contemporary foraging societies (e.g., Freeman et al. 1998) and is a principal aspect in the theory of human evolution (Darwin 1871, Mauss 1967, Lee and Devore 1968, Alexander 1979, Tooby and Devore 1987, Lovejoy 1988, Wrangham et al. 1999). Recognizing the importance of food sharing in human sociality, a number of competing and complementary hypotheses have been proposed to describe the mechanisms that favor sharing behavior among human foragers (reviewed in Winterhalder 1997, n.d.). Recent empirical research has generated quantitative data with the goal of distinguishing among these multiple competing hypotheses for the causes of food sharing among contemporary foragers (e.g., Kaplan and Hill 1985a,1985b; Betzig and Turke 1986; Hawkes 1993; Bliege Bird and Bird 1997, Hawkes et al. 1997). Despite these advancements, the nuances and number of variables within human social interaction make it difficult to eliminate any of the hypotheses.
This project will document the behavioral ecology of hunter-gatherer sharing among Siberian foragers, test hypotheses of food sharing, and describe the relative importance of the different food-distribution mechanisms for various classes of social relationships and ecological conditions. The focus will be on three behavioral models described below: altruistic resource transfer, risk buffering, and value transfer. My earlier investigations among indigenous communities in northern Siberia described the renewed reliance upon these nonmarket distribution mechanisms with the Russian economic reforms of the 1990s (Ziker 1998a, Ziker 1998b). This unprecedented return to communal sharing and subsistence foraging by indigenous Siberians provides a unique opportunity to study nonmarket exchange of hunted and gathered foods. This research will expand the available empirical research on the topic of nonmarket intragroup exchange among human foragers, utilizing the experiences of individual hunters and their families in the community of Ust Avam, Taimyr Autonomous Region (Map 1, Appendix).
The specific objectives of this research are as follows: 1) Isolate instances of nonmarket exchange of local flesh foods in a hunting-and-gathering community. 2) Document ecological, economic, and social characteristics of the exchange. 3) Obtain self-reports about the motivations for exchange. 4) Test the patterns of exchange with the predictions from human-behavioral-ecology models. 5) Describe the relative magnitude of resource exchange through the three strategies within the foraging community.
Significance
A notable debate among anthropologists deals with the origin of human sharing economies (Blurton Jones 1984, 1987; Kaplan and Hill 1985b; Betzig and Turke 1986; Smith 1988; Halstead and O'Shea 1989; Hawkes 1993; Peterson 1993; Bliege Bird and Bird 1997; Hawkes et al. 1997). As others have suggested (Jochim 1976, Kaplan and Hill 1985b), it is likely that variation in human sharing patterns is related to socioecological contexts favoring a combination of strategies. With the likelihood of combinations of strategies, this project will, first, generate data that will test hypotheses about the function of human food sharing. As three models will be considered, the extent to which these strategies complement one another will also be investigated.
The Behavioral Ecology of Food Sharing among North Siberian Foragers
Altruistic Resource Transfer
Within hunting-and-gathering bands and other small-scale societies, resources are often supplied through kinship or friendship networks in sustained one-way flows (Sahlins 1972). Marshall Sahlins (1972:193-194, 199) defined generalized reciprocity, or "putatively altruistic" transactions of assistance given and, if possible and necessary, returned, occurring generally among close kin. The important feature of generalized reciprocity is Ego's transfer of resources to other individuals without expectations of some kind of equivalent payment in return.
Descriptions of one-way resource flows beg the question of what kind of benefit is received for such a behavior. This is the problem of the evolution of altruism (Batson 1991, Pope 1994, Sober and Wilson 1998). Explaining this problem on the genetic level has been a major focus for biologists and human behavioral ecologists (e.g., Hamilton 1964, 1975; Alexander 1979). Kinship cooperation implies sacrifice (Steadman, p.c.). For example, humans suffer high material costs as part of parental investment and, generally, are glad to pay these costs. Other things being equal, the kinship model implies that actual one-way transfers of resources should be more frequent or intensive as genealogical relatedness increases. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, as costs increase close kin should be favored in food transfer (Betzig and Turke 1986). Evolutionarily, benefits would accrue indirectly through the greater reproductive success of offspring or co-descendants. In large-scale societies, however, motivations for kinship cooperation do not necessarily imply inclusive fitness benefits, as environments of development vary with those in evolutionary history.
My survey research in Ust Avam showed that the Dolgan and Nganasan give meat and fish first and foremost to relatives (Table 1, Appendix). In this community, where the density of genealogical links is relatively high-there are only 8 unrelated individuals in this community of 673 people (Ziker 1998a)-distribution of meat and fish to relatives could include most community households. The amounts given and the character of these gifts needs further study. Many anthropologists view kinship as the driving force for diverse social organizational forms, institutions, and other traditions, from marriage and residence rules, food sharing, and garden labor exchange (Chagnon 1979, Hill and Kaplan 1993, Hames 1987) to modern banking (Robertson 1991) and institutional childcare (ibid.). Conversely, others (e.g., Schneider 1984) have attempted to repudiate the importance of kinship concept altogether, proclaiming it a suspect categorical holdover from "Western" culture. If kinship is really a metaphor used to manipulate food distribution in Ust Avam, one would expect distribution to "kin" of flesh foods to look more like scrounging or tolerated theft than provisioning.
Analysis of 41 cooperative hunting excursions I observed in the Avam tundra between 1993 and 1997 shows that real genealogical relatedness is present both in the organization of hunting parties and in the distribution of foods obtained. Twenty-nine out of 41 hunts had participants that were consanguineal relatives or were members of households that had consanguineal relatives (Table 2, Appendix). The average genealogical relatedness of each pair of hunters in the 41 cooperative hunts was 0.22 (Wright's inbreeding coefficient calculated with KINDEMCOM (Chagnon and Bryant 1984)). Genealogical relatedness between each pair of individuals in each hunter's household was also high (r = 0.17, average for the 41 cooperative hunts). During the previous research, I recorded the distribution of food obtained on these cooperative hunts in terms of "home" or "market." With use for the "home," hunters returning to the settlement from a hunting trip generally bestowed the meat and fish to their elderly mother and father or wife. The parent's, or wife's, responsibility was to redistribute it to children and relatives in other households and other people. For the proposed research, I intend to record individual ID numbers and amounts distributed in primary and secondary transfers in order to generate data relevant to the altruistic-transfer model.
In one of 41 cooperative hunts, meat was being prepared for transfer to the government hunting enterprise. Subsistence hunting and fishing comprises a significant proportion of bush-oriented activity in the Avam tundra. The proposed research will continue to keep track of food being obtained for sale, considering the social relationships of the hunters and the economic and ecological factors related to the hunt.
The Behavioral Ecology of Food Sharing among North Siberian Foragers
Buffering and By-Product Cooperation
The 12 cooperative hunts in Ust Avam in which there was no genealogical relatedness between hunt participants and participants' households are significant for the behavioral ecology of hunter-gatherer food transfer. Most of these hunts involve friends going out hunting or fishing together, and dividing meat and fish afterward. A different model should be used to account for this behavior.
One possibility for explaining food sharing during cooperative hunts by non-relatives is the by-product-mutualism model. This model entails cooperative hunting under conditions of environmental adversity and high opportunity costs for not participating in the pursuit (Dugatkin et al. 1992, Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin 1992). There are immediate net positive benefits to the individuals cooperating in the hunt. Defection on cooperative pursuit is not punished, but is to the defector's disadvantage, as foraging efficiency is reduced (Winterhalder 1997). Food sharing under by-product cooperation should occur in cases in which both parties participated in the hunt and not in cases of solitary hunts.
In Ust Avam, and among other human foragers, these cooperative hunts are likely parts of a chain of events. Any given cooperative hunt is a synchronic snapshot of a social relationship. These social relationships more than likely entail transfer of food at other times and situations. Thus, cooperative hunting at certain times may be related to risk reduction at other times.
Risk-buffering models emphasize sharing as a mechanism that reduces variance in daily food intake among cooperating members of a band through delayed returns (Cashdan 1985, Halstead and O'Shea 1989, Smith 1991). By contributing to the subsistence needs of a set of regularly cooperating individuals, buffering strategies are adaptive for individuals in terms of gaining predictable food supplies. Buffering strategies are expected when variance in daily hunting returns is high. The size of the sharing pool should be relatively small and composed of regular cooperators (Wilkinson 1988, Winterhalder 1997). With buffering, returns are delayed. The value of the item being exchanged is what is important, with benefits accruing directly to individuals for cooperation (Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984). Variance-reduction models make no prediction about the genealogical relatedness of the cooperators.
The Dolgan and Nganasan of Ust Avam spoke to me about two types of faunal and aquatic resources in their environment: local and migratory populations. Local and migratory populations of caribou (Rangifer tarandus sibericus), various species of whitefish and trout, as well as arctic fox were identified. Local populations of prey are widely dispersed, procurement is asynchronous, and the animals are often treated with increased symbolic respect or explicit conservation. Migratory populations are concentrated geographically and temporally. During chronologically compact periods of migration, foraging is characterized by synchronous and cooperative production. As a result, there is a range of predictability (Table 3, Appendix) and efficiency (Table 4, Appendix) for the same prey species. Asynchrony and package-size have been hypothesized as factors in the presence of risk buffering strategies (e.g., Winterhalder 1997, Kaplan and Hill 1985b). In Ust Avam, food sharing during periods of asynchronous production of large packages should take on the characteristics of buffering reciprocity, a concept explicitly used at times (vzaimno-obratnaia pomoshch, or mutual return aid). This project will span several seasons of foraging for local resources and foraging for migratory resources. By covering multiple seasons of local and migratory resource acquisition, as well as seasons when storage is possible and seasons when it is not, this project will significantly advance the available data on the role of synchrony and seasonality in cooperative resource production and transfer. One possibility to be investigated is that by-product cooperation occurs during migration periods and buffering occurs during periods of asynchronous acquisition.
Value Transfer
In Ust Avam, Dolgan and Nganasan told me that they distribute meat and fish according to the maxim "Give it, if you have it." Translated into behavioral-ecological terms, the transfer of a portion of a food resource increases the collective value of the resource. Marginal value means that people are sharing because they are giving away portions that have little value to them but great value to others. Higher quantities on hand should correlate with larger amounts or more frequent giving. Lower quantities on hand should correlate with less frequent or smaller gifts. Specific costs, such as household location, should affect amounts transferred and frequency of transfers under the marginal-value considerations. Knowledge of amounts on hand and relative household need are more easily assessed between households living in close proximity.
Marginal valuation does not necessarily exclude the possibility of altruistic resource transfer and buffering hypotheses. However, under altruistic resource transfer, marginal-value considerations should be weaker than in buffering transfer, especially in cases of resource transfer to kin. The exception should be in cases in which altruistic transfers are made to non-relatives. Among many hunting-and-gathering peoples, the ethic of meat sharing is argued to be part of hunters' reciprocal relationship with the prey species (Hallowell 1960, Fienup-Riordan 1990, Bird-David 1992, Nuttal 1992). In this literature, animals are considered non-human persons that must be treated in the correct way, which includes distribution to non-related people in the community. It is said that this distribution contributes to good future hunting, since the animal is perceived to be giving itself up to the hunter and will only do so if it is cared for by means of ritual and sharing. In other terms, this may be thought of as providing public goods. It is likely that such public goods provisioning operates under marginal valuation (Winterhalder 1997). In Ust Avam, previous survey research (Table 1, Appendix) revealed that people shared food with pensioners, single mothers, and other people who ask. These people are neither friends nor relatives, and amounts on hand should be the major consideration if marginal valuation is an influential consideration.
Because very large meat packages are rarely procured in Ust Avam and there are no public distributions, it is unlikely that distribution to nonrelatives is a kind of public show of hunting prowess to increase status. It is likely, however, that some meat and fish provisioning to nonrelatives is conducted in anticipation of sexual access. This type of transfer might be considered part of mating effort and cost-benefit measurements may be difficult to make because the return is in a different currency. Another similar type of value transfer is trade for another commodity of value. In the case of trade, transfer of meat or fish should provide a return in goods or services of higher value to the giver. In testing the value-transfer model, the objective is to determine the extent to which quantities of food on hand can explain the variance in observed resource transfer for altruistic resource transfer, buffering, and any other social contexts, such as public provisioning, mating effort, or trade.
The Behavioral Ecology of Food Sharing among North Siberian Foragers
History/ Previous Research
Ust Avam, population 670, was the focal community for 12 months of my doctoral research. Ust Avam is home to two indigenous populations: the Nganasan and the Dolgan. The Nganasan traditionally lived across the central Taimyr tundra and forest-tundra transition, where they practiced caribou hunting, fishing, and small-game and fowl hunting. Small herds of domestic reindeer were kept for transportation purposes. Currently, the majority of the 1,200 Nganasan live in three permanent settlements, alongside the Dolgan. One of these settlements is Ust Avam. The Nganasan language is related to Nenets and Enets, the three together making up the Samoyedic branch of the Uralic language family. The largest native group in the Taimyr is the Dolgan, who traditionally lived from Dudinka to Khatanga and in the northwest Anabar District of Yakutia. The Dolgan formed from several groups and traditionally practiced reindeer herding, caribou hunting, fishing, and fur-bearer trapping. The Dolgan language is a creole of Yakut, a Turkic language, and Evenk, a Tungusic language, and is mutually unintelligible with Nganasan. For this reason, the lingua franca in Ust Avam is Russian.The native population of the Avam tundra gradually moved to the permanent settlement Ust Avam beginning in the early 1970s, as the newly formed government hunting enterprise Taimyrskii constructed apartments and offered jobs. As Soviet workers, the Dolgan and Nganasan in Ust Avam still practiced traditional activities (e.g., arctic fox trapping, fishing, and caribou hunting), albeit with the benefits of modern implements and under production quotas, or plans, assigned by the state. Partially as a result of settlement and the mechanical intensification of hunting, reindeer herding was completely phased out by 1978. Living standards for native hunters and workers in Ust Avam, as in other northern native villages, were relatively high throughout the 1980s. Native hunters were assigned territories for hunting, and the enterprise paid good salaries and supplied tools and snowmobiles, nonlocal food, and fuel. Many women were included in the state enterprise, producing crafts and tundra clothing for brigades. They also worked in administrative and other budgetary posts. Educational opportunities and access to consumer goods improved throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Travel by commuter planes and helicopters to Norilsk, the region's industrial city, and Dudinka, the regional capital, were frequent and affordable (see Map, Appendix). The economic and cultural development of the 1970s and 1980s stands in stark contrast to the post-soviet period, which has become characterized by unemployment, isolation from urban centers, and a refocus on subsistence production.
Methods
The research design for this project will generate data relevant to test the hypotheses discussed above. Following Kaplan and Hill (1985b), Betzig and Turke (1986), and Bliege Bird and Bird 1997), the research instruments will document the following for each instance of transfer and sharing: 1) names and relationships of producers and consumers; 2) the resource type (reindeer, fish, etc.); 3) the original acquirer, butcher, and intermediary transmitters of the resource being consumed; 4) whose equipment was used, what hunting method was used, where the resource was acquired, and how long it took; 5) the purpose of the hunt; and 6) where possible, the amount consumed or transferred and the amount on hand. In addition, self-report explanations for food transfer will be documented. A daily household inventory study will weigh stores of meat and fish on seven consecutive days, at least once every four weeks (Dufour and Teufel 1995) using a spring scale or standard units where applicable. Marginal value will be calculated by comparing the amount of that food item on hand with the amount given. Changes in quantity on hand should influence the value of the food to the giver under a marginal-valuation assumption. Following the methodology used by Kaplan and Hill (1985b) and Betzig and Turke (1986), focal individual studies and economic diaries will document nutritional needs and source of food. The diary will be in the form of a preprinted daily checklist to be completed on a minimum of seven consecutive days, once every four weeks, by one member of each participating household. The focused economic diary will document quantities of inflows and outflows of resources, partners, motives, and timing. During focal individual studies, the investigator will accompany hunting party trips of seven to fourteen day lengths (Johnson and Sackett 1998). All resources procured will be counted or weighed. Consumption will be sampled by: 1) recording an entire day's activities of a single individual, randomly selected; 2) recording all the consumers of a particular food; and 3) recording all the activities of all persons within observation distance every ten minutes throughout the day. Participants will be compensated with outdoor gear or other goods and services upon completion of the project, following my previous methodology. This form of compensation usually requires taking orders and shipping by airmail. A service I provide to all families in the community is family photography. This service is also costly, requiring development, printing, and mailing.
During dissertation research I conducted a complete community census of Ust Avam. Households were located, and genealogies were collected and verified by third parties (Ziker 1998c). This information will be updated for this project to test the altruistic-resource-transfer hypothesis. Genealogical relatedness will be calculated on software that uses Wright's inbreeding coefficient and sums multiple relatedness loops between individuals (Chagnon and Bryants 1984). Household relatedness will be calculated as the average of each pair of individuals in each household.
The analysis of the data collected in the household inventory studies, focal studies, and economic diaries will be conducted according to the characteristics and predictions of the three models under consideration. The following table summarizes these models. A plus sign indicates the presence of the characteristic and a minus sign indicates its absence. Plus/minus signs indicate that the model is indifferent according to this characteristic.
The Behavioral Ecology of Food Sharing among North Siberian Foragers
| Characteristics | Altruistic Resource Transfer | Buffering/ Reciprocal Cooperation | Value Transfer |
| Genealogical kin | + | +/- | - |
| Package size | small, medium or large | medium or large | large |
| Synchrony in Production | + | - | +/- |
| Return equivalency | - | + | - |
| Marginal Value | - | + | + |
| Cooperative hunting | +/- | + | +/- |
| Predictions | - Distribution is positively correlated with genealogical relatedness, other things equal. - As specific costs increase (such as household distance), closer relatives favored. - As specific benefits increase (such as low age of recipients) more distant relatives favored. |
- Individuals that do not hunt should not be included. - Mean quantities of resources are similar, but variance is high. 1. Giving is less costly to the giver than it is gainful to the recipient. |
- Giving is less costly to the giver than it is gainful to the recipient. - Mean quantities and types of resources are dissimilar. - Larger households should keep more for themselves. |
Broader Implications
Nonmarket intragroup exchange is an integral tradition in contemporary foraging societies, helping to maintain community viability and cultural continuity. This research will add to the literature on hunter-gatherer food sharing and its role in the post-Soviet economy of indigenous Taimyr peoples. Empirical data on food sharing among contemporary foragers in Siberia will provide a fundamental geographical and ethnographic point of comparison for the existing behavioral ecological research on foragers' exchange, which has largely been conducted in tropical regions (e.g., Kaplan and Hill 1985a, 1985b; Betzig and Turke 1986; Hawkes 1993; Bailey and Peacock 1993; Hart and Hart 1993; Bliege Bird and Bird 1997; cf. Smith 1985, 1991).
Preliminary Results
A number of factors when taken together appear to favor common-pool land tenure in the study community, including ancestral proscriptions against overhunting; cross-cutting genealogical- and affinal-kinship relationships; cooperative hunting; non-market distribution of meat and fish; and economic leveling; as well as the migratory nature of the prey species, the distance from urban centers, and the high cost of transportation due to the lack of roads. Boundaries of hunting territories and favorite spots in the common pool zone are not defended as private property. Rather, social boundaries, maintained through cooperation of close bilateral kin and other local hunters, are implemented to manage the use of common hunting grounds. Non-local people are the most likely not to be included in user groups.